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ABSTRACT: 
The thesis principally examines the three categories of petroleum arrangements in 
Nigeria and gives examples of other developing countries. This study presents a 
systematic and in-depth analysis of both the structure and substance of some 
modern petroleum arrangements that have emerged in recent years and examines, 
the financial benefits of such associations. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with participation agreements, joint 
venture and production sharing contracts, whilst Part 2 examines mutual benefit and 
marginalisation of the host communities. These agreements are usually long-term, 
without any mechanism for renegotiations and are shrouded in secrecy and 
confidential clauses. A good example is the NNPC and Ashland oil contract. Due to 
this lacuna, it is usually the practice for renegotiation to be done through the passing 
of a legal notice or new law, resulting in the presence of quite a few laws in the 
petroleum industry and the attendant mystification. This practice would have been 
simple if renegotiation clauses were enshrined in the agreement, enabling changing 
circumstances; and confidential clauses removed, aiding transparency in the 
transaction. 
The study finds that some of the laws and the regulations are very old and clearly 
out of style with the times, not to mention in an industry that is forever changing and 
dynamic and further affected and determined by international factors. Further, the 
study also found that the activities of the oil and gas companies, to a great extent 
have not employed international best practices or remained compliant with the 
existing laws of the nation; resulting in oil spillages, various forms of pollution, 
serious health hazards, gross environmental degradations, rural agricultural 
destruction, distortion of social harmony and peace that exist in, and between host 
communities and have fuelled underdevelopment in these communities. As long as 
these social inequalities and injustice continue, human rights violations, gross 
mismanagement of natural resources, corruption in all forms and sizes exist and the 
activities of the participants in that sector are not addressed satisfactorily, so shall 
poverty, insecurity and serious threat to national existence and survival continue. 
2  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: 
I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my supervisor, 
Professor Andrew Haynes. You have been a tremendous mentor to me. I would like 
to thank you for encouraging my research and taking a chance on me and teaching 
me the art of writing. Your advice on both the research and my career has been 
priceless. 
 
Special thanks to Professor Itse Sagay, who was the Dean of the Law Faculty during 
my undergraduate days and offered me a place in the Law Faculty to study law at 
the University of Benin and I thank God that I commenced my academic career 
under such a distinguished scholar. 
 
I acknowledge with great respect Dr Michael Oyelere for being more than a colleague 
but for also taking on a brotherly role in advising ways of securing materials for this 
study. I would also like to thank Dr Oyakahilome Wallace for playing a notable role in 
the finality of this research. 
 
A special thanks to my family. Words cannot express how grateful I am to my 
children, namely Adaeze, Sophie, Stephanie, Sabrina, Sharon, Christian and Marcus 
for all the sacrifices that you have made on my behalf and for financing this course. 
Your prayer for me was what sustained me thus far. At the end, I would like to 
express my appreciation to my beloved husband who was always there in the 
moments when there was no-one to answer my queries. 
 
Finally, I thank God for letting me go through all the tribulations. I have truly 
experienced your guidance day by day. You saved my life when I was seriously 
afflicted. I will keep trusting you for my future. Thank you, Lord. 
3  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ 1 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: .................................................................................................... 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... 3 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 7 
1.1 THE SUBJECT: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY .................................................... 7 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY ................................................................................... 15 
1.2.1 Key issues to be addressed ................................................................... 16 
1.2.2 This research will aim to clarify ............................................................. 17 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ........................................................................ 17 
1.3.1 Fundamental conflict in objectives ........................................................ 19 
1.3.2 Stability ............................................................................................... 20 
1.3.3 Fairness .............................................................................................. 21 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................. 23 
1.4.1 Realist rather than Positivist or Natural Philosophy ................................. 23 
1.4.3 Models to appraise socio-economic impact of oil exploitation .................. 39 
1.4.3.1 Gravity allocation models ...................................................... 39 
1.4.3.2 Investigation of inputs and purchasers of products ................. 39 
1.4.3.3 Other survey techniques, case studies and analyses ............... 40 
1.4.3.4 Sampling procedure ............................................................ 40 
1.8 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS AND PLAN OF STUDY .................................................. 44 
CHAPTER 2 ..................................................................................................................... 49 
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT ......................................................................................... 49 
2 .1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 49 
2.2. DEFINITION OF JOINT VENTURE ..................................................................... 51 
2.3 JOINT VENTURE AND PARTNERSHIP COMPARED .............................................. 56 
2.4 PREVALENCE OF PARTNERSHIP ....................................................................... 57 
2.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF A JOINT VENTURE ........................................................ 60 
2.5.1 Business purpose ................................................................................. 62 
2.5.2 Joint interest ....................................................................................... 63 
2.5.3 Joint control ........................................................................................ 64 
2.5.4 Profit and Losses ................................................................................. 65 
2.5.5 Capital Contribution ............................................................................. 66 
2.6 REASONS FOR A JOINT VENTURE .................................................................... 67 
2.7 ADVANTAGES OF THE JOINT VENTURE ............................................................ 73 
2.8 DISADVANTAGES OF THE JOINT VENTURE....................................................... 74 
2.9 EFFECT OF FAILURE OF A JOINT VENTURE ...................................................... 75 
2.10 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT ................................... 76 
2.11 TYPES OF JOINT VENTURE .............................................................................. 79 
2.11.1 Equity Joint Venture ........................................................................ 79 
2.11.2 Contractual Joint Venture ................................................................ 83 
2.12 JOINT VENTURE AND CONTROL OVER NATURAL RESOURCES BY HOST COUNTRIES 88 
2.12.1 Three phases in quest for control over natural resources ................... 88 
2.12.1.1 Political sovereignty .............................................................. 89 
2.12.1.2 Vesting Mineral Resources in the State .................................. 89 
2.12.1.3 Control Within the Transnational Investment Process ............. 89 
2.13 THE TRAINING FUNCTION OF JOINT VENTURES .............................................. 91 
2.14 JOINT VENTURE AND PARTNERSHIP DISTINGUISHED ...................................... 92 
2.14.1 Liability to Third Parties ................................................................... 96 
2.14.2 Assignment .................................................................................... 98 
2.15 FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF JOINT VENTURES .................................................... 101 
2.16 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 103 
CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................... 105 
THE NIGERIAN VERSION OF THE JOINT VENTURE .......................................................... 105 
3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE JOINT VENTURE TYPE AGREEMENT ......................... 105 
3.2 PARTICIPATION ............................................................................................. 109 
3.2.1 Definition of Participation .................................................................. 109 
3 
 
3.2.2 Reasons for Government Participation ................................................ 112 
3.3 CONSTITUENT PARTS OF A JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT ............................... 114 
3.4 PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT IN NIGERIA ....................................................... 115 
3.4.1. Equity Share Participation Agreements ................................................. 115 
3.4.2. Matters Dealt with in Participation Agreements ..................................... 116 
3.5. JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS ............................................................................ 119 
3.5.1. Main Clauses in a Joint Operating Agreement ....................................... 122 
3.5.1.1 Parties’ obligations in the joint operating agreement ..................... 122 
3.5.1.2 Identity and Function of the Operator .......................................... 123 
3.5.1.3 Fiduciary Duties of the Operator .................................................. 125 
3.5.1.4 Operator’s Liabilities ........................................................... 131 
3.5.1.5 The Operating Committee ................................................... 132 
3.5.2. Insurance Aspects of a JOA ................................................................. 135 
3.5.2.1. Operator’s Undertakings with regard to Insurance ....................... 136 
3.5.2.2. Sole Risk Operations .................................................................. 136 
3.5.2.3 Separate Books, Records and Accounts: .............................. 139 
3.5.2.4 Election of Non-Participating Party to Participate in Further Work: 140 
3.5.2.5 Use of Joint Property and Personnel of Operator: ................. 140 
3.5.2.6 Entitlement to the Sole Risk Operations, Production and Facilities: 140 
3.5.3 Other Provisions of the JOA ............................................................... 141 
3.5.3.1 Force Majeure .................................................................... 141 
3.5.3.2 Funding of Joint Operations ................................................ 141 
3.5.3.3. Cash Calls: ......................................................................... 142 
3.5.3.4 Cash Call Default ........................................................................... 143 
3.5.3.5 Cessation of Operatorship .............................................................. 145 
3.5.3.6. Assignability of Interest Right ......................................................... 147 
3.5.3.7 The Governing Law ........................................................................ 149 
3.6. GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT .......................... 151 
3.8 THE WIDER VIEW .......................................................................................... 166 
3.9 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 168 
CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................... 171 
EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS ...................................................... 171 
4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................ 171 
4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT ............................ 174 
4.2.1 Management clause ........................................................................... 176 
4.2.2 Relinquishment provision .................................................................... 178 
4.2.3 Commerciality .................................................................................... 180 
4.2.4 Drawing Up a Development Plan ......................................................... 183 
4.2.5 Marketing of the crude oil ................................................................... 185 
4.2.6 Pricing ............................................................................................... 186 
4.2.7 Taxation matters: .............................................................................. 189 
4.2.8 Employment and Preference for Local Suppliers: .................................. 192 
4.2.9 Cost oil and cost recovery................................................................... 193 
4.2.10 FTP and investment credit .................................................................. 194 
4.2.11 Compensation and Production Bonuses: .............................................. 196 
4.2.12 Production Split/Profit Oil: .................................................................. 197 
4.2.13 Dispute Settlement ............................................................................ 198 
4.2.14 Termination....................................................................................... 199 
4.3 THE ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................... 200 
4.4 EVALUATION OF PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS .................................... 202 
4.5 SUMMING UP ................................................................................................. 207 
CHAPTER 5 .................................................................................................................... 209 
NIGERIAN PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS: PAST AND PRESENT .............................. 209 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 209 
5.2 PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS .............................................................. 210 
5.3 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES.................................................. 212 
5.3.1 Operating Costs: ................................................................................ 212 
5.3.2 Ashland operating costs and the sharing of profit ................................. 212 
5.3.3 Taxes: ............................................................................................... 214 
5.3.4 Management of the Operations: .......................................................... 215 
5.3.5 Work programmes and expenditure .................................................... 218 
3 
 
5.3.6 Marketing of oil:................................................................................. 219 
5.3.7 Pricing ............................................................................................... 221 
5.3.8 Fiscal legislation ................................................................................. 222 
5.3.9 Technology Transfer: ......................................................................... 222 
5.3.10 Title to Equipment ............................................................................. 227 
5.3.11 Other Provisions: ............................................................................... 229 
5.4 GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONRACTS .................................................... 231 
5.5 MODERN ERA PSCs IN NIGERIA ...................................................................... 238 
5.5.1 Allocations ......................................................................................... 239 
5.5.2 Royalties: .......................................................................................... 240 
5.5.3 Management provisions ...................................................................... 240 
5.5.4 Incentivisation ................................................................................... 241 
5.5.5 Stabilisation and arbitration clauses: ................................................... 243 
5.5.6 Termination ....................................................................................... 243 
5.6 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 244 
BALANCING TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS – RENEGOTIATION, STABILISATION AND 
CHOICE OF APPLICABLE LAW. ........................................................................................ 247 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 247 
6.2 RENEGOTIATION CLAUSE ............................................................................... 249 
6.2.1 Reasons why Renegotiation Clauses are Obligatory .............................. 259 
6.3 STABILISATION CLAUSE ................................................................................. 266 
6.3.1 Types of stabilisation clauses .............................................................. 274 
6.3.2 Scope of Stabilisation Clauses ............................................................. 276 
6.4 CHOICE OF LAW ............................................................................................ 281 
6.4.1 International Law as Applicable Law .................................................... 283 
6.5 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS THE APPLICABLE LAW .................... 293 
6.5.1 The Application of Domestic Law......................................................... 296 
6.6 STATE RESPONSIBILITY ................................................................................. 302 
6.7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 317 
CHAPTER SEVEN ............................................................................................................ 319 
THE IDEAL OF MUTUAL BENEFIT .................................................................................... 319 
7.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 319 
7.2 BARGAINING POSITIONS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND MULTINATIONALS319 
7.3 GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES ............................................................................ 327 
7.4 GOVERNMENT AND OIL COMPANIES’ RELATIONSHIPS: OBLIGATIONS .............. 331 
7.5 DUTY CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS .............................................................. 335 
7.6 OBLIGATION NOT TO MEDDLE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS: ................................. 340 
7.7 MULTINATIONALS AND THE OIL COMMUNITIES, THE NIGER DELTA AS A CASE STUDY 
350 
7.8 RESOURCE CONTROL ..................................................................................... 359 
7.9 OWNERSHIP OF MINERAL RESOURCES ........................................................... 362 
7.10 THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY ....................................... 365 
7.11 HISTORICAL DIVIDE AND RULE TACTICS ........................................................ 366 
7.12 THE WAY FORWARD ...................................................................................... 366 
CHAPTER EIGHT ............................................................................................................ 368 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................ 368 
8.1 AGREEMENTS CHANGED ALONGSIDE LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGISLATIVE 
DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................................................ 369 
8.2 BALANCE, STABILITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT AS OBJECTIVES FOR AGREEMENTS370 
8.3 THE THRUST FOR REAL PARTICIPATION ......................................................... 371 
8.4 CLAIM THAT DOMESTIC LAW UNSUITABLE ARGUABLY A RED HERRING ........... 371 
8.5 CLAUSES PROMOTING STABILITY EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED AND PRESENTED 372 
8.6 THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL POLICIES ON AGREEMENTS ............................. 373 
8.7 ECONOMIC PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE WILL BECOME CRUCIAL .................... 374 
8.8 TO BEGIN AS ONE HOPES TO CONTINUE ........................................................ 376 
8.9 HONESTY AND FLEXIBILITY BOTH NEEDED TO OVERCOME NEGATIVE FACTORS377 
8.10 DAWNING OF THE THEORY THAT THE MNC SHALL CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT .............................................................................................................. 378 
8.11 MIX OF REGULATION AND OPENNESS ............................................................. 379 
8.12 PSC vs JV UNDER THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DECLINE ........................... 380 
8.13 QUESTIONS OF DE FACTO CONTROL AND SHARING ........................................ 381 
3 
 
8.14 THE CONTINUED ABSENCE OF PALPABLE BENEFIT FOR THE IMPOVERISHED ...383 
8.16 RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................... 384 
8.17 SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS TO ENCOURAGE DEMOCRACY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
385 
APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................... 387 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................. 391 
PRIMARY SOURCES ........................................................................................................ 391 
Treaties 391 
National Legislation ...................................................................................... 391 
Other Legislation and Agreements ................................................................. 393 
Cases, Arbitrations, Commissions .................................................................. 395 
Interviews 399 
Other Primary Documents............................................................................. 399 
SECONDARY SOURCES ................................................................................................... 399 
Articles and Reference Works without Designated Authors .............................. 399 







On discovering crude oil many less-developed countries instantly think of it in terms 
of the revenue to be made from its extraction, production and distribution. However, 
to achieve this, they require the services of multi-national corporations who largely 
possess the technical expertise, capacity to absorb risk and the capital to carry out 
oil-exploration activities. The oil-rich, less developed countries are therefore 
compelled to rely on these multi-national oil companies to produce the oil and share 
the profits with them1. This is done by entering into a form of contractual agreement 
to share the oil produced with the multi-national oil companies in the form of oil 
taxes or oil profits. These forms of operational oil-production sharing agreements are 
what is called joint venture agreements or production sharing contracts that this 
study seeks to examine. Joint venture and production sharing contracts therefore 
characteristically entail the legal agreement between the host countries and the 
multinational oil companies to extract oil at its expense and risk with a view to  
paying oil profit or other compensation at an agreed ratio under the terms of 
contract2. 
 
1.1 THE SUBJECT: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
This is a study of the legal aspects of the relationship between some of the less 
developed countries and the international oil companies, and the directions this 
relationship has assumed in recent years. Once freed from the manacles of 
colonialism, the newly independent states had anticipated not only the ending of the 
economic supremacy of the former imperial powers within their states, but also a 
world order which would allow them more resources for the ordering of their own 
economies and admittance to world markets. 
After the first flush of exhilaration over political independence, developing countries 
were quick to grasp the sobering fact that sovereignty is not synonymous with 
economic self-sufficiency or development and that the rich industrialised nations still 
retained control of the distribution of the world’s resources. The cold war between 
1 Bernard Taverne, Production Sharing Agreements in Principle and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell 1996). 
2 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, 
Economics and Government Policies (Sweet & Maxwell 2000) 268. 
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the then superpowers made the law an arena for ideological conflicts.3 The 
independent movement, which arose in response to this opposition, exerted pressure 
to ensure that each newly independent state had absolute control over its economy. 
One avenue for the application of such pressure by the independence movement was 
by formulating new doctrines, using the numerical strength of its members in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. A number of resolutions were passed 
declaring the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and calling 
for the establishment of a new international economic order. This consciousness was 
also translated into a determined and continued attack on the international economic 
order and supremacy of the developed nations.4 The attempts by OPEC countries to 
turn round obsolete patterns in the production and distribution of petroleum products 
through collective action are well documented. 
The aim of the less-developed countries was the establishment of a more equitable 
international economic order, and the effective control of their respective economic 
resources. Developing countries have thus invoked various general, philosophical, 
juristic and pragmatic rationales such as equality, human needs, historic entitlement, 
the rectification of past injustice and the need for self-reliance and economic 
development.5 
In the past, the metropolitan oil companies and companies which operated in other 
natural resources sectors used concession agreements to tie up production in large 
areas of land for substantial periods of time.6 This picture, which originated in the oil 
industry, was reproduced in other mineral industries. The virtually identical pattern 
being employed around the world was another characteristic of this process. To this 
day, international business transactions retain comparable features; these make 
possible the formulation of a presumably uniform law around the world.7 The 
 
3 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd edition, 
Cambridge University Press 2010) 1. 
4 Samuel B Asante, ‘Restructuring Transnational Mineral Agreements’ (1979) 73(3) American Journal 
of International Law 335-371. 
5 D N Smith and L T Wells, Negotiating Third World Mineral Agreements (Cambridge: Ballinger 
Publications 1975) 335-371. 
6 The evolution and politics of the oil industry are well described in Daniel Yergin, The prize: The epic 
quest for oil, money and power (New York: Simon & Schuster 1991). 
7 This observable fact becomes the background for the arguments relating to a lex mercatoria. The 
wide pervasiveness of the joint venture form in foreign investment is an example in modern times. 
See generally, Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Law of International Joint Ventures (Longman 1992). 
The existence of a common form facilitates the claim for the existence of a universal valid 
international business law, again created through a wholly private process. Its bases are to be found 
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concession agreements often effected transfers of sovereign power over vast tracts 
of land to the foreign corporation for long periods of time, in exchange for the 
payment of royalties calculated on the quantity of oil produced at a fixed rate. The 
system was kept in place by a convoluted web of power exercised by the home state 
and a concerted supremacy exerted within the international system itself by the 
major powers.8 Several of these concessions have been subjected to legal scrutiny as 
they are subjects of international arbitrations. For instance, in Aminoil v. Kuwait,9 the 
concession agreement which was involved was initially concluded between the 
Sheikh of Kuwait, at a time when Kuwait was a protectorate of Britain, and a US oil 
company. The royalty which was to be paid was two shillings and six pence for every 
barrel of oil. The agreement was to last for a period of sixty years. The terms of the 
contract were not to be altered without the consent of both parties. 
Concession agreements were not limited to the petroleum sectors but were utilised in 
other mineral resources sector as well. The Ashanti gold fields’ concession, 
completed in Ghana, provides an instance of an agreement to prospect for gold that 
was to last for one hundred years from the date of the agreement. The ruby mines in 
Burma were subjected to similar concessions. Analogous agreements existed 
throughout the developing world. They were executed in the context of unequal 
bargaining power, the rulers of the states agreed either because they did not have 
the power to oppose the terms that were imposed on them or did not have the 
proficiency or desire to bargain for better terms owing to lack of technical expertise. 
This led to a regrettable situation whereby the people of the state rarely benefited 
from these transactions made because of the lopsided nature of the agreements. 
From the standpoint of democratic notions of sovereignty these agreements were 
deeply unsatisfactory. Time and again, they were signed by rulers who did not 
 
in writings of scholars and in arbitral awards rather than in the normal sources of international law 
such as treaties harmonising the law. The lex mercatoria is, in the conception of some writers, the law 
that applies to foreign investment contracts. 
8 Thus, the Iranian revolution in 1952 which affected the oil interests of the major British and 
American companies was ended through the collective exercise of power by Britain and the United 
States. The rule of Mossadegh was ended and the rule of the monarchy was restored. In the context 
of what happened two decades later, when the Shah was overthrown and an Islamic form of 
government established, it is contestable whether such interventions accomplish a useful purpose. 
They merely fuel more extreme forms of nationalism. See Alan W Ford, The Anglo Iranian Oil Dispute 
(University of California Press 1954); Jerrold L Walden, ‘International Petroleum Cartel-Private Power 
and the Public Interest’ (1962) 64(11) Journal of Public Law. 
9 Aminoil v Kuwait (1982) 21 ILM 976. For a discussion of the dispute, see Alan Redfern, ‘The 
Arbitration between the Government of Kuwait and Aminoil’ (1984) 55 BYYIL 65. 
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understand the implications of the contracts they were concluding or who did not 
care because they, being absolute rulers, could use the royalties they received for 
their own benefit. In some cases, these agreements were sustained by the fact that 
transnational governments were in control of the states in which they were made. 
For example, in Namibia, the South African government, (during the period of the 
agreement that the concessions that were made), favoured the interests of their own 
multinational corporations. As a consequence in recent times, the validity of such 
contractual arrangements, made through coercion or with unrepresentative 
governments, are regarded cynically in modern international law. 
The structure of the mineral industries had to undergo change with the 
independence of the states in which they were made. In the petroleum sector, and  
to a lesser extent, in the other mineral resources sectors, rapid changes were 
brought about by collective action initiated by cartels of producer countries. There 
were dramatic shifts, where state oil corporations were created and vested with 
ownership of the oil resources of the state. The outmoded, outdated oil concessions 
were annulled. Consequently, the concession agreement ceased to be the norm 
within the oil industry and was replaced by the joint venture and production sharing 
agreement, under which ownership of oil remained, throughout the period of 
exploitation, with the state oil corporation. In this new form of agreement, 
transnational corporations carry out a participatory role, with the state-owned 
corporation having dominant control of the operations. Such agreements reflect the 
shift in the power equations that have taken place within the oil industry. The shift 
was aided by the formulation of international law doctrines such as the doctrine on 
the permanent sovereignty over natural resources. There is a growing controversy 
amongst commentators as to the nature of such doctrines and their views may 
differ.10 Some regard them as jus cogens principles and others as sheer lex ferenda. 
In many developing states, it is now a settled principle of law that such practices 
have been incorporated in constitutions and in foreign investment codes.11 
As petroleum assumes increasing importance in the world economy, foreign oil 
companies are now left with no choice but to compromise many of the traditional 
 
10 For a survey of a different views of the doctrine, see generally Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University Press 1997); M S Rajan, The 
Doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (OJL 1982) 12. 




prerogatives which they have enjoyed in the undeveloped world. The Production 
Sharing Contract (PSC) stands out as an important effort to equalise the historic 
imbalance between the host country and the multinational corporations. Although, 
such contracts seem to exaggerate the actual shift in power between the parties, 
they provide an appearance of equality as well as a means for ultimately achieving 
such equality. 
There is a growing recognition that the production sharing agreement in the oil 
industry provides the best example of contractual arrangement for the exploitation of 
petroleum. It is futile to argue that the doctrine has no legal substance and it is a 
mere expression of fanciful desirable norms when it has been acted upon time after 
time. In the mineral resources industry, which it was mostly designed to influence, 
the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources reflects a sea change 
that is now well established. In any event, it basically emphasises a truism in 
international law that the sovereignty of a state encompasses control over all 
persons, incidents and substances inside a state, save where such control has been 
removed by treaty.12 
Even though the control of the natural resources sector by transnational corporations 
has been broken, the command of technology and capital that these corporations 
have, makes them key players in this sector. Nationalisation may have ended direct 
control. Without a doubt, modern legislation reserves the rights to the natural 
resources sectors to state corporations or, otherwise, to nationally controlled 
corporations. Hitherto, alliances with the foreign corporations have been essential to 
operating the sector, as these transnational corporations possess the technology and 
risk capital necessary for the exploration and exploitation of the resources. The 
interest that multinational corporations create to carry out activities in this area need 
protection and become a focus of the international law of foreign investment. 
Presently, there has been a perceptible sway towards the protection of the interests 
of transnational investors which is associated with the drift towards liberalisation.13 
Over an extended period, the activities of the multinationals have come under 
increasing scrutiny and criticism. Some authors argue that an increasing integration 
and overlap in the activities and policies of multinationals encroach on an increasing 




number of economic issues within host states, particularly those of the developing 
countries.14 Conversely, other writers have taken the extreme view that the 
transnational oil companies’ policies are not justifiable and undermine the respective 
sovereignty of the host states.15 The threat that multinational oil companies pose to 
sovereign states was a preoccupation when Multinational Corporations first started to 
invest abroad.16 Backed by its own immense financial resources and power of its 
home state which stands behind it, the fear was that the multinational may influence 
the political course of the state in which it seeks to invest. It could scuttle the 
economies of weak states by simply relocating its operations elsewhere. 
Similarly, some authors have acknowledged that multinational corporations, 
notwithstanding its enormous power both for good and for harm, has hardly been 
recognised as an entity capable of bearing rights and duties in positivist international 
law17. Apparently, this position must change, given the reality that it is as dominant 
an actor on the international economic vista as the state. There is no doubt that 
many multinational corporations command financial resources that are greater than 
many states can amass. Outsized hegemonic powers therefore act to advance the 
interests of multinational corporations.18 
While it can be stated that in a joint venture, the motives of the multinational 
corporation and the state entity will often be in conflict, the multinational corporation 
is enthused by the need for immediate profit.19 The host state, on the other hand, 
has or ought to have long term economic objectives of development and seek to 
pursue these through the joint venture with the multinational corporation. The 
synergy necessary for the success of the joint venture will be wanting in such an 
association and the potential for conflict is immense. There are, however, rules of 
international law which accord to host state entities a favoured status and make 
them immune, to a certain degree, from the processes of domestic courts. The entire 
14 Ibid; Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy 
(Cambridge University Press 1996); and Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (eds) Private 
Authority and International Affairs (Suny Press 1999). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 David Ijalaye, Extension of Corporate Personality in International Law (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana 
Publications, Leiden A W Sijthoff 1978) and Ignaz Seidi-Hohenveldrn, The Corporation In and Under 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 1987). 
18 The case of Iraq is probably a good example; the sensation by the media that the Iraq war was 
fought at the instance of the huge oil and construction companies, if not a fallacy supports this 
possibility. 
19 Ijalaye (n 17). 
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question of the applicability of sovereign immunity to host state entities has been 
difficult but this issue, however, is being resolved by the wide acceptance of the rule 
that such immunity cannot be claimed by a state entity which engages in commercial 
activities. 
Also, in contrast to the criticisms of some authors and some non-intergovernmental 
organisations, this thesis is not a study of the political and social justifications for 
either the multi-national corporations’ or the host states’ policies on reaching joint 
venture agreements for either’s objective. It is, rather, a legal inquiry into whether 
their relationships are mutually beneficial to each other, with a view to making far- 
reaching recommendations that preserve State’s sovereignty over their natural 
resources and ensure the welfare of the citizens of less-developed countries from 
their exploited natural resources on one hand, whilst guaranteeing profits to the 
multi-national corporations for their risk and capital on the other hand. 
It is a well acknowledged fact that flexibility and adaptability are to be considered 
necessary as stabilising influences in petroleum contracts, and some have called for 
the formulation of terms which are elastic enough to satisfy the concerned parties, 
principally with regards to the fiscal terms which certainly form the core of any 
contract. Omorogbe is of the view that these aspirations are better attainable by the 
design of a universal model contract which will be mutually beneficial and which 
could, by means of an adequate number of variable parameters, be made flexible 
enough to take into account, cavernous differences in the chances of finding 
petroleum or in the cost of operations.20 
An interesting twist is the role of non-governmental organisations in fostering or 
weakening these agreements. Whilst one of the cardinal policies of a non- 
governmental organisation is their ability to mount an international campaign against 
the acceptance of the multilateral agreement on investment,21 their mobilising 
wherewithal was publicised in protests against the WTO at Seattle and Cancun, 




20  See World Petroleum Arrangements (1989) in Yinka Omorogbe, ‘The Legal Framework for the 
Production of Petroleum in Nigeria’ (1987) 5 JERL 273-290. 
21 Robert O’Brien, Contesting Global Governance: Multinational Economic Institutions and Global 
Governance (3rd edition, Cambridge University Press 2000). 
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being associated with neo-liberal notions met in the western capitals.22 Further, the 
foremost plank in their gripe against the making of the code is their highlighting on 
the protection of multinational corporations without at the same time taking into 
account the environmental degradation and the human rights abuses that they are 
capable of. 
Views put forward by human rights groups assert that a multinational code on 
investment should be unbiased, bestowing protection on foreign investment but 
pointing out responsibility when there are violations of the associated environmental 
and human rights standards.23 In addition, human rights groups have also helped to 
shift the law from the protection of multinational corporations’ investments to a 
consideration of their responsibility for misconduct and breach of their contractual 
obligations to their host nations. 
Even though in recent years, there has been some academic discussion of new forms 
of contracts utilised by developing countries, recent legal studies seem to suffer from 
a number of pervasive deficiencies.24 Firstly, many of these studies and comments 
have, to a large extent, been expressive of difficulties and dissatisfactions but there 
has been no in-depth and systematic legal analysis of the contractual systems. 
Secondly, existing literature tends to approach the subject in a progressive manner. 
Little has been written in terms of a comprehensive and comparative study of these 
arrangements in developing countries, particularly Nigeria. 
Furthermore, little legal ink seems to have flown towards critically addressing the 
question of the transnational oil companies’ impact on the oil-producing areas with 
respect to the consequences of the activities that the kind of production sharing 
agreements entered into by them have on their less-developed host states. This is 
 
22 This is important as the protests against neo-liberal capitalism did not take place in the developing 
states but in the capitals of the developed states. The popular view is that the cavernous gap between 
the rich and the poor had brought the third world into the developed states, in that the poor in the 
rich world were acting as surrogates for the poor in the developing states. Caroline Thomas, 
‘Developing Inequality: A Global Fault-Line’ in Stephanie Lawson (ed), The New Agenda in 
International Relationships (Blackwell Publishers 2002). 
23 The responsibility of multinational corporations for environmental and human rights violations is 
dealt with in Chapter 7 of this study. 
24 For further commentaries, see Abdulaziz Al-Attar and Osamah Alomair, ‘Evaluation of upstream 
petroleum agreements and exploration and production costs’ (2005) 29(4) OPEC Review 243-266; M 
B Umar, ‘Legal Issues in the Management of Nigeria’s Production Sharing Contracts: A case study of 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (National Petroleum Investment Management Services) 
Perspective’ (2005) 3(1) OGEL; Yinka Omorogbe, ‘Contractual Forms in the Oil Industry: The Nigerian 
Experience with Production Sharing Contracts’ (1986) 20(3) Journal of World Trade 342-349. 
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largely because it is not just for stakeholders to concern themselves exclusively with 
strategic economic interests without regard for the welfare of the dwellers of the 
local community and their well-being. Thus, another purpose of this study is to 
investigate the impact the oil-production agreements entered into by host states and 
the multi-national companies in the oil industry and their activities have on the native 
populations in oil-producing communities. 
Various earlier studies on the Nigerian oil industry have been mainly concerned with 
trends in production, markets, revenue, environmental pollution and economic 
growth. These studies have no doubt proven helpful to the oil companies and the 
government, but inadequate attention has been given to determining the 
transnational and production sharing agreements’ impact on the indigenous people. 
This study considers whether the creation of competing objectives of protecting 
human rights and the environment from the abuse of transnational corporations 
leads to the recognition of the regulatory right of the state to interfere in 
circumstances where the transnational corporate investor abuses human rights, such 
as labour rights, or causes environmental pollution. The study further considers 
whether the increasing recognition of such regulatory rights will undermine the aim 
of investment protection and require the recognition that a state has the right to 
intervene in an investment that poses a serious danger to the environment or 
involves an abuse of human rights. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
 
The aim of this research will be the critical analysis of the fundamentals of joint 
venture and production-sharing contracts with a view to proffering alternative and 
more practical solutions than such arrangements have been found to possess. In 
addition, this work is concerned with the elimination of possible areas of conflict that 
could arise within a long-term contractual relationship for the exploration and 
production of crude oil, primarily between a host country and an oil corporation. It 
further pertains to the design of an oil contract that satisfies the aims, objectives and 
aspirations of the parties and also remains mutually beneficial to the parties 
themselves in particular and their transaction environment in general. Other issues 
that will be raised in passing will be examples drawn from the impoverished, less- 
developed countries of the world that have, in one way or another, suffered greatly 
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from the activities of the oil companies who have come to exploit their natural 
resources and unfortunately contributing to their resource curse. Examples will be 
drawn from such less developed countries as Nigeria, the point being that wider 
issues will need to be considered in future when drawing up international contracts. 
1.2.1 Key issues to be addressed: 
 
(1) What are the significant differences between concessions and contracts? 
 
(2) What are production sharing contracts? 
 
(3) How did they originate and what has been their subsequent development? 
 
(4) How wide has the concept been extended geographically? 
 
(5) What sort of variations exists in different countries that can be imbibed by oil- 
rich, less developed countries? 
(6) What are the desirable improvements to these contracts and how can they be 
implemented in less developed countries? 
(7) How can agreements be geared towards protecting the needs for sustainable 
development and protection of the environment? 
(8) How has the petroleum production sharing agreements entered into by less 
developed countries adversely affected them especially the exercise of their 
sovereign rights over their natural resources and the returns to the people and 
how can this be addressed by the law? 
The fundamental aspects of the petroleum arrangements will be covered in the 
literature review and conceptual framework. In the course of this research work, the 
following incidences of Petroleum sharing agreements would also be elucidated 
upon: 
(a) Risk and financing; 
 
(b) The issue of economic return; and 
 
(c) Terms of management for the ongoing arrangement. 
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Normally, the international company is said to be the “operator” of the venture and is 
subject to “supervision” by the government inspectors, with government committee 
representatives that exercise de facto control over their activities. To what extent this 
is true on the ground, and how much control these government officials exercise in 
fact, will be an additional focus of the literature review; with a view to gaining a clear 
understanding of what has gone before, and how the principles of previous 
agreements have actually functioned, irrespective of how they have been perceived 
and formulated. Knowledge and technology transfer issues will be at the core of 
these considerations. 
In addition, this research will highlight the main features of the various 
arrangements, their legal nature and will analyse these primarily from the host 
country’s perspective. 
1.2.2 This research will aim to clarify: 
 
1. Conceptualisation of terms; 
 
2. The inherent vicissitudes in the present arrangements; 
 
3. Whether Joint Ventures and Production Sharing Contracts are mutually beneficial 
to the parties involved; 
4. The effect of such agreements as they affect the inhabitants of the communities in 
the less-developed countries; 
5. The infrastructure provided by these companies and the inadequacy of such 
amenities. Example will be drawn mainly from some developing countries. 
Critically too, since the development of a country’s natural resources seems to be the 
pivot around which poverty, indebtedness and corruption have become ensconced in 
most developing nations, this essential dilemma of the resource curse would be 
addressed. 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Ever since the emergence of the modern petroleum industry at the turn of the last 
century, petroleum exploration and exploitation in developing countries has been 
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controlled by international oil companies, rather than the developing host countries 
themselves because the latter lacked the capital and expertise essential for the 
extraction of the resources. Notwithstanding the development of local capability and 
know-how since the last century, this state of affairs has not changed significantly. It 
is probable that this pattern will continue, because developing countries still require 
foreign risk capital and technology and transnational companies will still need the 
authorisation of host countries to carry out exploration and production operations. 
As the industry has progressed and governments have become more acquainted with 
both the technology and the markets, the sophistication of the regulation of the 
industry has increased. This sets the stage for the contractual relationship between 
the two actors: the government as the ‘landlord’ and the company as the ‘tenant’. To 
continually run this business relationship, a form of petroleum extraction and profit 
sharing agreement is reached and often allegedly skewed in favour of either party 
depending on certain circumstances like, the holder of the bargaining chip, legal 
expertise, the desperation of the host country to make huge profits, governmental 
corruption, tax regime, the licensing regime, the attachment of importance to State’s 
sovereignty over their natural resources and whether the host state is a newly 
discovered seat bed of natural resources with neither experience nor knowledge. 
Petroleum exploration and exploitation by foreign companies in developing countries 
is therefore an exclusive business in a complex industry. It links governments, 
owners of natural resources, and companies, investors of private capital, technology, 
and equipment obligatory for resource development, in a single sector where the 
stakes and risks, as well as the possible profit margins, can be very high. 
Consequently, the questions of how to provide for contributions to the partnership, 
the allocation of the petroleum profits and oil tax returns, breach of the contractual 
terms, propensity of a party to cheat the other, the interference of such foreign 
partnership with state’s sovereignty rights over their natural resources, the effect of 
the oil exploration activities predicated on such concessional or contractual 
agreements and their socio-economic and environmental impact on the citizens of 
less-developed host states have always been lingering problems in the arrangement 
between the two contacting parties. 
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1.3.1 Fundamental conflict in objectives 
 
In recent years, the developing countries have progressively become aware of the 
importance of the oil from which they can derive the financial resources required to 
undertake their economic and industrial development. The large sums deployed by 
the oil industry in other sectors and the high level of profits accruing to it have led 
these countries to seek, by appropriate fiscal measures and stringent economic 
policies, a growing share of the revenue derived from oil production. With time, 
increasing participation of host countries in most spheres of activity culminated in 
progressive increases in oil taxation and a substantial indigenous control of their 
exploited natural resources. 
The main objective of the transnational oil company is to ensure a satisfactory and 
sufficient level of profitability for the operations they undertake at such huge risks 
and capital investment. This position is logical as they alone bear not only the burden 
of the obligatory investment but also the risk attendant upon it. They thus desire to 
maximise operational freedom and equity returns, minimise political risks imminent in 
the face of political instability, provide for stabilisation of their investment and 
minimise operational costs. This relationship is also intrinsically unstable due to a 
number of factors. 
Firstly, the underlying objectives of the two parties are not only different but are 
also, often times, conflicting: Host countries are interested in making use of foreign 
investment to develop their resources for the benefit of national economic progress, 
while foreign companies are generally profit-motivated, gain-oriented and interested 
in minimising their investments at the least risk. There is also the need for the host 
states to balance its conflicting interest between economic objectives and 
environmental preservation through regulation. 
Undoubtedly, then, the fundamental objective of oil and gas contracts should be to 
seek a balance of the interests, rights, obligations, and benefits, between the two 
parties, to produce greater mutuality of interests, commerciality, and stability. The 
concern is therefore whether this can be realised, facilitated or remedied through the 
contract itself, or whether the situation is intrinsically unfair and unstable due to the 
imbalance of powers between the contracting parties. Following the demise of the 
traditional concession, the battle for control over the oil between international 
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companies and developing countries encompasses one of the impressive acts of the 
great drama of decolonisation and national independence in the post-World War 
period. In the past few decades, a number of modern contractual arrangements have 
developed in the petroleum sector which form an integral part of this research work 
to be analysed in subsequent chapters. 
1.3.2 Stability 
 
It is essential that, in seeking to attain the objectives of state, the host oil-producing 
country provides a stable, transparent and efficient legal system and administrative 
structure. Anything else would constitute a significant risk to the potential investor 
and deter investment and development. This is the stability question. Further, a 
proper and well-defined legal and administrative framework represents a strategy for 
development which employs mechanisms designed to achieve state objectives. More 
so, oil companies prefer to invest in those countries which have favourable geology 
and proven resources of oil and gas to reduce their chances of losing their capital to 
unprofitable investments. 
Petroleum legislation is the basic instrument employed by governments to regulate 
the exploration and development of petroleum. These laws basically set forth the 
major principles and assign the petroleum to the standard authorised government 
agencies – often state petroleum companies – to negotiate petroleum development 
agreements. These agreements, and some subsidiary petroleum regulations, 
constitute the hard core of the legal regime applicable to petroleum activities. 
The main purposes of a legislative framework are: 
 
1.) To provide the basic context for and the rules governing petroleum operations in 
the host country; 
2.) To regulate them as they are carried out by both domestic and international 
corporations and 
3.) To define the principal administrative, economic and fiscal guidelines for 
investment activities in the oil sector. 
In the petroleum industry, the vast amounts involved militate against allowing 
disputes to remain irreconcilable and therefore, the great majority of differences that 
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arise under such arrangements are solved by negotiations between the parties, often 
without recourse to third parties. At times, however, the conflicts are more deeply 
rooted and cannot be easily negotiated away by the parties. They could sometimes 
deteriorate to an extent that a major dispute arises and one of the parties becomes 
so disenchanted as to be unwilling to continue the association. Most times such 
relationships have involved a sovereign state, usually from a developing country. 
Most of these developing countries have reacted to such occurrences by adopting 
drastic actions, such as nationalisation, indigenisation, expropriation, and 
renegotiation of such agreements, or taking such actions as termination of the 
contracts, whilst damning the consequences including trade sanctions and 
discouragement of foreign investments in their country. The investment relationship 
is destroyed and in such cases restitution in integrum is not a practical remedy.25 
Investments into the host country often suffer a severe setback because of 
reluctance by many investors to invest in an expropriation-prone country. 
1.3.3 Fairness 
 
The inappropriateness of the old regime that led to instability and contractual breach 
gave birth to such new forms of agreement as joint-ventures and production sharing 
contracts. The traditional concessions regime contained a number of terms and 
features which reflected the imbalance in the bargaining powers of the contracting 
parties. As a result, the regime was faced with growing criticism, focused mainly on 
the inconsistent provisions that were inherent in the traditional concessions and 
which were mainly in favour of the oil companies. 
From the look of things, the new generation agreements have not generated a 
significant shift in the beneficial allocation of benefits, even though bargaining 
powers continue to shift in favour of the host country. The new generation 
agreements no doubt have provided ways of sharing symbolic power and economic 
benefits in ways different from the traditional concessions, but the fact remains that 
they have not eliminated the complex technical problems relating to the allocation of 
financial benefits and financial risks, technology transfer and the transfer of 
knowhow. Therefore, to date, serious technical issues have remained – no matter  
the structure of the agreement. 
25 Yinka Omorogbe, The Oil and Gas Industry: Exploration and Production Contracts (Lagos and 
Oxford: Malthouse Press Ltd 1997) 2. 
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The exact question raised here is how petroleum arrangements can be improved for 
the benefit of all parties, including the interests of the world community at large and 
those of future generations. One of the most significant developments in 
international petroleum law over the last few years, and perhaps in the last century, 
has been the rapid reform in the petroleum sector, stimulated by strong competitive 
forces following the collapse of oil prices in 1985 and the breakdown of state 
socialism. Economic cooperation between governments and companies and 
investment competition among producing countries may replace ideology and politics 
as the focus of conflict in the government-company relationship that has prevailed in 
the last decades. Throughout the oil and gas business, the emphasis has been on 
petroleum reform and rationalisation in the form of privatisation, deregulation, de- 
monopolisation, investment promotion, and so forth. An effort is thus made in this 
study to include these recent developments in negotiating international petroleum 
agreements. 
In recent years, this situation has improved somewhat, but significant collections of 
petroleum contracts are generally not yet readily available. Nearly all parties to 
modern contracts be they governments or companies, still consider the documents to 
be private, and few contracts are available for publication or even limited 
dissemination. Consequently, there is, to date, no transparency in international 
petroleum contracts. 
Under the general principles of law,26 whether it be contract law, constitutional law, 
or even criminal law, the agreements, rights and obligations of corporate bodies and 
individuals are regulated by law, terms of contract, and the obedience to civil law. As 
parties are bound by their agreements, no party can be prosecuted on the grounds 
of immorality. Similarly, in international law, treaties, rights, and duties bind parties 
and obligations arising from such treaties have legal validity and create international 
legal obligations. Also, obligations arising from the creative ground-breaking policies 
of one of the parties, whether it be the state or non-state actor, affect the rights of 
the parties upon whom the obligation is imposed. 
 
26 Under Article 38(1) of the statute to the International Court of Justice, ‘general principles of law’ are 
unclear and controversial but may include such legal principles that are common to a large number of 
municipal law. Given the limits of treaties or customs as sources of international law, Article 38(1) may 
be looked upon as a directive to the courts to fill any gap in the law and prevent non liquet by 
reference to the general principles. See generally, M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘A Functional Approach to 
“General Principles of International Law”’ (1990) 11(3) Michigan Journal of International Law 768-818. 
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The correlation of various economic, political and historical issues shape and  
continue to shape the development of international law on transnational investment. 
If international law is created by the ultimate resolution of conflicting national, 
business and social interests, the international law on transnational investment 
provides a picture of these processes of incessant conflict and resolution at work. It 
is an area in which the interests of capital exporting countries have clashed with the 
interests of capital importing countries. The ensuing resolution of the conflicts, if only 
any resolution is unquestionably achieved, demonstrates how international law is 
made and how imprecise the formulations of its principles are in the face of deep 
conflicts of views as to the law between states. International Investment Arbitration 
as a branch of law addresses a part of this and these conflicts become underscored 
when other actors in the field split behind the states and embrace the contesting 
norms that each camp supports. 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1.4.1 Realist rather than Positivist or Natural Philosophy 
 
The methodology is founded on the doctrinal literature survey and on a legal 
qualitative analysis based on the realist philosophical school of thought and legal 
jurisprudence that the policies and decisions of the host countries and the 
multinational oil companies must conform with the terms of the contract to promote 
the economic development and progress of such host countries under the checks and 
balances of international development law. This presupposes that international 
development law, conventions, rules, or the declaration of UN general assembly 
resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, including the general 
principles of law, are a unique socio-political phenomenon guiding the behaviour of 
host states and transnational companies in international relations – this would form a 
significant portion of reliance in this study. 
The methodology does not underplay the positivist and natural philosophical 
approaches, but after evaluating the international law and before the universal 
acceptance of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as a legal norm and 
doctrine, the realist philosophical approach is adopted. Although most theories of 
international law are rooted in positivism and are aimed at explaining law as an 
existing, static phenomenon unaffected by political and other trends, such theories 
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are inadequate when an attempt is made to apply them to a situation where the 
existing principles of law, formulated at a time when they were kept in place by 
hegemonic control and dominance, are under attack. Other theories are unsuitable, 
seeking to achieve objectives based on morality and conscience. These theories are 
also inadequate to explain a situation in which alternate value systems of rather 
equivalent moral validity are in conflict. Where existing rules supported by the 
established group of nations are challenged by somewhat new members of the 
international community,27 they become feeble and, until they are replaced, a 
situation of bedlam or normlessness will exist. The task of decision-makers and 
scholars will be to examine the conflicts between the alternate sets of norms in these 
areas and ensure that adjustments are made to bring about some acceptable 
mutually agreed upon and universally acceptable norms so that the state of 
normlessness may be ended. 
1.4.2 Research Methodology 
This work addresses the subject matter by adopting a doctrinal approach. It will be 
presented in a descriptive, analytical and prescriptive manner. 
 
Doctrinal Approach 
The doctrinal or black letter law approach refers to ‘a detailed and highly technical 
commentary upon, and systematic exposition of, the context of legal doctrine’.28 This 
method is at the basis of conceptual analysis and it is a core research methodology 
for legal research. It provides a systematic relationship between rules, whilst 
explaining areas of difficulty and future development. 
 
There are a number of criticisms levied on the doctrinal approach. Primarily, it is 
often thought that this approach was too subjective and lacked scientific 
corroboration. In response to this criticism, Langdell in his Preface to Contracts 
sought to promote legal doctrine as a science, in which he explains: 
 
 
27 The European origins of international law have been extensively commented upon. One view is that 
new nations are born into the world of existing law and are bound by it. See Daniel P O’Connell, 
‘Independent and State Succession’ in William V O’Brien (ed), New Nations in International Law and 
Diplomacy, (London: Stevens & Sons for the Institute of World Polity 1965). The opposing view is that 
they may seek revision of existing rules of international law, as they are not bound by these rules. 
28 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the 
Conduct of Legal Research (Pearson 2007) 31. 
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Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or 
doctrines… Each of these doctrines has arrived at it present state by 
slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases 
through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a 
series of cases… Moreover, the number of fundamental legal doctrines 
is much less than is commonly supposed… If these doctrines could also 
be classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper 
place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from their 
number… It seemed to me, therefore, to be possible… to select, 
classify, and arrange all the cases which had contributed in any 
important degree to the growth development, or establishment of any 
of its essential doctrines.29 
 
This view was further corroborated by Kimberly who argued that the law ‘ought to be 
studied from its own concrete phenomena, from law cases, in the same way that the 
laws of the physical sciences are derived from physical phenomena and 
experiments’.30 
 
In any case, with using the doctrinal approach, one needs to: 
1. Organise and reorganised case laws into coherent elements, categorised and 
concepts. 
2. Acknowledge the distinction between settled and emerging laws. 
3. Identify differences between majority and preferred or better practice ideally 
with some of the explanation for the criteria to be used. 
 
From the above, doctrinal work may be associated with three broad steps; namely 
reading and gathering facts, analysing legal issues found, and finally, synthesising all 







29 C C Langdell, ‘A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts’ (1871) quoted from B Kimball, The 
Inception of Modern Professional Education: CC Langdell (2009) 349. 







Descriptive analysis refers exactly to what the name implies. It involves the ability to 
capture many vivid sensory details that appeal to a reader’s sense including sight, 
hearing, touch, smell and taste where appropriate. In this work, descriptive analysis 
is adopted to summarise raw data to make it easily interpretable to the reader. Good 
descriptive analysis may involve the use of figurative language such as analogies, 
similes and metaphors to assist the reader capturing the message the writer is trying 
to convey. It may also involve describing the past and making reference to any point 
of time when an event has occurred, even if it is one minute ago or one year ago. In 
terms of its functionality, descriptive analysis allows us to learn from past behaviours 
and understanding how they might influence future outcomes. It also provides an 
overview of the plot by examining both the content and structure of the story. In 
terms of content, it draws special attention to characters and their relationship, 
describing settings and providing a general overview of leading events. It must be 
understood however that, its main obligation is not of theory development, even 
though through from the facts described, it can provide useful hints both for theory 
building and theory reference.31 
 
Analytical analysis 
This type of writing is used to break a problem down into the elements necessary to 
solve it. This is particularly important in this study for developing an insight and 
understanding on a particular subject matter, as well as for comparisons with 
numerical and experimental results.32 
 
Prescriptive analysis 
This involves the application and computational sciences. It involves options to take 
advantage of the results on descriptive and predictive analysis. Predictive analysis 
adopts a variety of statistical techniques, sometimes involving data mining and 
predicting modelling as well as analyse current and historical facts to make 
predictions about future or otherwise unknown events. Prescriptive analysis is an 
 
 
31 M K Malhotra and V Grover, ‘An Assessment of survey research in POM; from constructs to theory’ 
(1998) 16(17) Journal of Operations Management 407-425; and J G Wacker, ‘A definition of theory: 
research guideline for different theory-building research methods in operations management’ (1998) 





analytic science that guides decision-making for businesses. It adds value by 
providing notable clarity to other types of analytical approaches.33 
 
In this study, two further methods will be used. Firstly, library-based research will  
be carried out to review the literature of other authors, subsequently a socio-legal 
research methodology will be used to conduct the survey, in which practitioners in 
the petroleum field will be interviewed. The design of the questionnaire will be saved 
until after the literature review, because designing an effective questionnaire 
requires an understanding of problems and basic standards for potential solutions. 
Further, a comprehensive literature review will be conducted first because without it, 
it will not be probable to conduct the study and interview enough people with 
enough experience to meet basic standards and certainty for empirical research. 
 
Secondly, why the socio-legal research method will be used since the study feels it is 
important, is because an evaluation of this kind reflects real problems, real 
experiences and realistic solutions, and is not just an academic exercise. To obtain a 
true picture of the financial benefits in the petroleum sector, empirical work will be 
achieved by soliciting the views of international oil companies, arbitrators, lawyers 
and solicitors. The analysis of this empirical work will offer valuable insights into the 
situation and will form the basis of the conclusion of this study. The research will 
follow the following approach: 
• Detailed review of primary and secondary materials: primary sources 
comprise of petroleum legislation; petroleum contacts and arbitral decision 
will be reviewed. And secondary materials – these data are collected from 
books, articles, journals, newspapers, reports, policy papers, conference 
papers and statistics. These data will be reviewed. 
• Conducting an appraisal of oil and gas and other energy contracts and 
contract provisions determine the extent to which contractual use and the 
effectiveness in recommending their objectives. It must be recognized that 
there is a limitation associated with this type of study, which is the 







• Sending questionnaires to persons and organisations known to be active in 
this field. 
• In depth interview with specialist lawyers, as well as energy companies, 
international petroleum negotiators and law academics. 
Questionnaires 
Questionnaires are very useful survey tools that allow large populations to be 
assessed with relative ease. A questionnaire is a set of written questions which is 
designed for respondents to record their responses.34 Questionnaires come in 
different forms, from factual to opinion-based, from tick boxes to free text 
responses. Whatever their forms, questionnaires are often viewed as quick and easy 
to do. Survey by questionnaire is the most extensively used data collection method 
in management research due to its structured data gathering instruments.35 
 
The paramount issue in employing a questionnaire survey is to completely 
understand the question that the research is going to answer.36 The basic fact is  
that the information gathered from the survey will be used for either exploratory, 
descriptive or confirmatory research. 
 
Forza has remarked that the exploratory survey is usually carried out in the early 
stage of research where the objective is to understand the preliminary idea of the 
subject. On the other hand, they are focused on recognising phenomena to describe 
variance.37 If it is concerned with specific characteristics of a specific population 
either at a certain time or over varying times for comparison purposes. This kind of 
survey concentrates on a representative sample of population and the accuracy of 








34 Uma Sekaran and Roger Bougie, Research Methods for Business: A Skill-Building Approach (6th 
edition, New York: Wiley 2013) 395. 
35 Put forward by Pareek and Rao (1980) and quoted from Betty Jane Punnett and Oded Shenkar, 
Handbook for International Management Research (University of Michigan Press 2004) 35. 
36 Pervez N Ghauri and Kjell Gronhaug, Research Methods in Business Studies: A Practical Guide 
(Pearson Education 2005) 117. 
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Accordingly, survey research, like the other kinds of field survey, can contribute to 
the advance of scientific knowledge in various ways.39 Thus, researchers frequently 
differentiate between exploratory, confirmatory (theory testing) and descriptive 
survey research.40 
1. In the preliminary stages, exploratory survey research can help to determine the 
concepts to be measured in relation to the phenomenon of interest, how best to 
measure them and how to discover new facets of phenomena under 
investigation. In due course, it can help to uncover or provide preceding  
evidence of associations amongst concepts. 
 
2. Confirmatory survey research takes place when knowledge of a phenomenon has 
been expressed in a theoretical form using well-defined concepts, models and 
prepositions.41 In this model, data collection is conducted with the specific aim of 
testing the adequacy of the concepts developed in relation to the phenomenon of 
hypothesised linkages amongst the concepts and of the validity boundary of the 
models. 
 
Prior to starting theory-testing survey research, the researcher has to establish the 
conceptual model.42 
 
Sometimes, the theoretical framework is portrayed through a schematic diagram. 
Although it is not a requirement, it may be functional for easier communication. 
Before embarking on theory-testing survey research, the researcher is often obliged 
to develop a theoretical framework. ‘Once the constructs, their relationship and their 
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relationship amongst the constructs have to be translated into hypotheses relating 
empirical indicators’.43 
 
According to Forza, the common practice is that priority to the researcher planning 
how to collect data, it is necessary to: 
 
1. define the unit of analysis corresponding to the level of reference of the theory 
 
2. provide and test the operational definitions for the various constructs and 
 
3. translate the propositions into hypotheses. 
 
The matter of the empirical parallel of the level of reference of the theory 
to the unit analysis 
 
The unit of analysis refers to the level of data aggregation during subsequent 
analysis. It is important to determine the unit of analysis when formulating the 
research questions, data collection methods, sample size and the operationalisation 
of constructs may usually be determined or guided by the level at which data will be 
aggregated at the time of analysis.44 
 
Furthermore, the first difficulty that the researcher faces is in transforming the 
theoretical concepts into observable and measurable elements in a situation, 
whereby the theoretical concept is multidimensional, then all of its dimensions have 
to find corresponding elements in the operational definition.45 The list of observable 
elements that constitutes the operational definition of learning are: answer  
questions correctly, use suitable instances, recall materials after some lapses of  
time, solve problems and combine materials when necessary.46 
 
Consequently, the translation from theoretical concepts to operational definitions can 
be different from theory to theory. At the same time some theories lend themselves 
to objective and exact measurements, others are more ill-defined and do not lend 
 
 
43 Forza (n 37) 158. 
44 Sekaran and Bougie (n 34). 
45 Forza (n 37) 158. 
46 Sekaran and Bougie (n 34). 
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themselves to such exact measurements, more so when people’s feelings, attitudes 
and opinions are complicated. 
 
The steps taken in establishing the elements to insert in the operational definition 
may comprise both contacting those making up the population of interest to gain 
practical knowledge of how the construct is viewed in actual organisation and 
identifying necessary precise detail of the industry being investigated. 
 
Hensley has observed that ‘the development of items using both academic and 
practical perspective should help researchers develop good preliminary scales and 
keep questionnaire revision to a minimum’.47 
 
In addition, when the operational definition has been developed, the researcher 
should test for content validity. The content validity of the construct measure can be 
defined as the degree to which the measure spans the construct’s theoretical 
definition.48 
 
Data can be obtained in a variety of ways, different settings and from various 
sources. In survey research, the main methods used to collect data are interviews 
and questionnaires. Interviews may be structured or unstructured. They can be 
carried out either face to face or over the telephone. Questionnaires can be 
administered personally, by telephone or mailed to the interviewee. 
 
Each of the various data collection procedures has advantages as well as many 
downsides. The decision on which procedure is best cannot be made in the abstract; 
preferably, it should be based on the needs of the precise survey as well as time, 
cost and resource limitations. 
 
In the situation of mail surveys, questionnaires are printed and sent by mail. The 
respondents are asked to complete the questionnaire on their own and to send it 
back. Mailed questionnaires have merits, some of which are: that they save costs, 




47 Rhonda L Hensley, ‘A review of operations management studies using scale development 
techniques’ (1999) 17(2) Journal of Operations Management 343-358. 
48 Manus J Rungtusanatham, ‘Lets not overlook content validity’ (1998) Decision Line 10-13. 
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limitations, they can limit interviewer bias and they can also make anonymity 
certain. 
 
In the case of face-to-face surveys, the interviewer canvasses for information 
directly from a respondent in personal interviews.49 
 
The merits include flexibility in concatenating the details and explanations of the 
questions and the chance to manage extremely complex questionnaires. There are 
downsides, however, including high cost, interviewer bias, the respondent’s 
hesitancy to cooperate, greater stress for both interviewee and interviewer. Also, 
telephone interview surveying comprises collecting information through the use of 
telephone interviews. Amongst the merits are rapid data collection, lower cost, 
anonymity, large scale accessibility; the downsides obviously include less control 
over the interview matters, less credibility and lack of visual materials.50 
 
A trend has now surfaced to approach companies and administer questionnaires. 
The researcher can send a questionnaire through e-mail or ask respondents to visit  
a website where the questionnaire can be filled in and returned electronically. The 
merit of minimal cost as compared to other means of distribution is an obvious 
one.51 Nonetheless, probable difficulties lie in the sampling and controlling of the 
environment.52 
 
The principal feature of the survey is that it depends on a structured instrument to 
source information. As soon as the researcher has decided on the content of an 
instrument, various next steps have to be borne in mind. First and foremost, the 
ways that questions are asked need to be defined, the scaling of the answers needs 
to be decided and the questions need to be put into questionnaires that facilitate 
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The basic issue is that the actual design of the survey questionnaire is determined 
by whether it is going to be administered by telephone interview, on site through 
interview, by email or electronically. 
 
The underlying rule is that when creating the questions, it behoves the researcher to 
ensure that the language of the questionnaire is consistent with the respondent’s 
level of understanding.53 In a situation where the questions are ambiguous or 
interpreted with difficulty by the respondents, the researcher is bound to be flooded 
with responses that are untrustworthy and biased. In addition, the researcher has to 
choose between open-ended or closed questions. Closed questions make it easier to 
obtain fast decisions and make coding easy. However, the researcher has to make 
sure that the alternatives are mutually exclusive and that, collectively, they consider 
all the elements. 
 
Also, it is imperative that in creating questions, the researcher should mix positively 
and negatively worded questions in order to reduce the propensity for respondents 
to mechanically circle the point towards the end of the scale. 
 
Further, the researcher should use double-barrelled questions with various different 
questions. Statements that are unclear should be removed completely, as much as 
practicable. Leading questions should be avoided. In the same vein, questions that 
are emotionally charged should be removed. Questions should not be worded to 
generate socially useful responses.54 
 
The fundamental rule is that once the questions have been created and their 
associations to respondents have been developed, the researcher can administer the 
questionnaire.55 There are some basic rules that the researcher has to bear in mind: 
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To enhance the likelihood of achieving the right goals of data collection, the 
researcher should meticulously plan the execution of survey research and provide 
rules on: 
 
1. how sample units are to be approached and 
 
2. how questions are going to be managed. 
 
In recent times, companies and respondents are being asked to complete 
questionnaires and are becoming elusive about it. Researchers should endeavour to 
find amicable ways of getting collaboration of companies. Dillman56 has observed 
that the response to questionnaires should be seen as a social change and says: 
 
1. Reward the respondent by showing positive regard, giving verbal 
appreciation, using a consulting approach, supporting his or her values, 
offering tangible rewards and making the questionnaire interesting; 
 
2. Reduce cost to the respondent by making the task appear brief, reducing the 
physical and mental efforts that are required, eliminating chances for 
embarrassment, eliminating any implication of subordination. 
 
In addition, when respondents understand the rules of a study, lack of anonymity 
may not be problematic. It makes it easier for the provision of feedback to the 
respondents, which may serve as an encouragement for participation.57 
 
Translating 
Translating can change the precise details, wording or meaning of certain questions, 
so it is imperative to back translate into the original language. Because it was the 
language commonly read in the most communities, the questionnaire was drawn up 
in the Ikweire dialect. In a situation where the most common language is not 
commonly read in the community, the questionnaire would have been verbally 
translated during enumerator training and translated in real time during 
56 Ibid. 
57 Barbara B Flynn, Roger G Schroeder and Sadao Sakakibara, ‘A framework for quality management 
research and an associated measurement instrument’ (1994) 11(4) Journal of Operations 
Management 339-366; and Barbara B Flynn, Roger G Schroeder and E James Flynn, ‘World-class 
manufacturing project: overview and selected results’ (1997) 17(7) International Journal of Operations 
and Production Management 671-685. 
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questionnaire administration. For this purpose, it is obligatory that a sheet of 
common or difficult words and their phonetic transliteration be designed to help 
enumerators in remembering the agreed upon translation of fundamental terms. 
 
Re-testing and Piloting 
A pilot study is one of the important stages in a research study. A pilot study is 
defined as a small study to test research protocols, data collection instruments, 
sample recruitment strategies and other research methods in a prelude to the launch 
of the actual research. 
 
Pilot testing ensures that the questionnaire can be clearly understood by the 
respondents and also it is imperative that it is able to answer the research questions. 
In addition, pilot testing ensures the reliability and validity of the questions. 
Furthermore, pilot testing is one of the important phases in a research study and it  
is carried out to pinpoint problem areas and shortcomings in the research operations 
and protocol prior to the full study. 
 
1. To ascertain the feasibility of the study arrangement or agreement in this study, 
a pilot investigation was carried out in Isiokpo Town in Rivers State, Nigeria from 
June to August 2016. The rules of the study protocol were strictly adhered to. 
The supervisors enrolled 40 adult males and females: 30 males and 10 females 
respectively. The health officers and research assistants were well advised as to 
the procedure and to establish their understanding of the research objectives. 
2. The health officers invited respondents to take part in the investigation with 
sufficient time given to send respondents to whatever they are keen to 
participate in. The respondents convened showed their consent by signing the 
consent form. The study was conducted by pre-testing the questionnaire to two 
types of people: academicians and industrial practitioners. The role of the 
academicians was to ensure that the questions were able to capture necessary 
responses to answer the research question. On the other hand, input from the 
industrial practitioners was also to highlight some areas that might be overlooked 
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In the second phase, the researcher carries out the small pre-test 
sample to test the contact administrative protocol, to gather data, to 
perform an exploratory assessment of the measurement quality and 
to obtain information to better define the same and the adequacy of 
the measures in relation to the sample. 
Also, the pilot testing should resemble as closely as possible the 
actual survey that will be conducted for theory testing.59 
 
At the end of the pilot testing, the study proceeded with theory testing or the survey 
questionnaires and the survey administration process since all relevant issues to be 
re-used had been covered. 
 
Interviews 
There are several ways of structuring available approaches to interviewing. This may 
involve informal and impromptu questions posed in the field.60 In such scenarios, 
respondents may be asked to share their own perspectives and experiences. 
Interviewing may also involve a narrative which refers to storytelling and plot lines; 
or, focus groups which are concerned with questions designed to provoke interactive 
answers and debates among multiple participants interviews.61 
 
However, it was important to acknowledge that respondents may produce only 
superficial and cautious responses, given their unique circumstances. Indeed, a 
deeper understanding of the respondent’s circumstances may be required to put  
their responses into context.62 
 
Another perspective on interviews is known as romanticism. According to Dingwell, 
the nearer we come to the respondent, the closer we are to apprehending the real 
self.63 The romantic interviewer may seek to cultivate interpersonal relations founded 





60 Thomas R Lindlof and Bryan Taylor, Qualitative Communication Research Methods (2nd edition, 
Sage Publications Ltd 2002). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, Discourse and Social Psychology (Sage Publications 1987). 
63 Robert Dingwall, Context and Method in Qualitative Research (Sage Publications 1997). 
37 
 
interviewer, to wherein that the latter feels free to express themselves openly.64 
 
There has been an increasing recognition that romantics may be persuaded by 
external influences, wherein the interviewer interprets what he hears in a manner 
that coincides with his pre-conceived beliefs. As a response, romantics have begun to 
recognise the importance of establishing close relations with respondents who 
become participants rather than subjects, to minimise this problem. In this regard, 
active interviewing may be an ideal form.65 Notwithstanding, romantic interviews can 
be difficult to assess precisely because they tend to be context-bound and especially 
dependent on the dynamics of a particular research relationship and interaction. 
 
The next growing branch of interview worth mentioning is Localism. According to 
Silverman, localists emphasise that an interview statement must be understood in 
context, specific to the situation in which it is produced.66 
 
Another perspective on interviews is known as Reflexivism. It involves the 
preparation of the process and not necessarily the content of interview. It has been 
argued that reflexivism challenges the humanist underpinnings of romanticism in 
favour of interrogating the politics of interviewing.67 Also, with this perspective, 
reflexivism relates to scholarly interviewing as a meta-practice by concomitantly 
treating it as a comparative cultural and political practice.68 However, one key 
problem with reflexivism is that it comprises a tendency to engage in ‘confessional 
analysis that tilts toward self-absorption, where researchers methodically cut up in 
order to study their own positionality and performance in ways that is unclear rather 
than inform the broader phenomena at hand’.69 
 
It would appear that interview practice has to a great extent, developed from Neo- 
positivist advice to an increased awareness of the entanglement of the interview set 
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of circumstances.70 The work sought to adopt elements of these perspectives to  
bring out the best productive talk from respondents and participants.71 According to 
Alvesson and others, ‘without a theoretical understanding supporting critical 
judgement, any use of interview materials risk naively and leaves interpretations 
poorly grounded simply put, technique is important but cannot stand alone; 
discussions of good practice are framed on term of the deeper epistemological 
orientation at hand’.72 
 
Another question that readily comes to mind is, who is to be interviewed? By way of 
an answer, two guiding principles should be adhered to. The first is to identify a 
representative, in order to account for some coverage of a social category. The 
second is to aim for quality in the interview responses. Alvesson and others observed 
that ‘well-selected interviewees can be quite helpful but sometimes researchers will 
become inclined to reply heavily on those to whom they have ready access or who 
are simply to themselves on terms of values and other identity feature’.73 As such, it 
is necessary for researchers to strike a balance between utilising quality responses 
and responses that are true to the particular context. 
 
Furthermore, it is achievable to integrate different design elements, degrees of 
structure in a single research project. Matts and others explain that ‘one option is to 
start with a set of open-ended interviews in order to refine the focus and conduct of 
the study. After, an exploratory phrase will follow; wherein the researcher might 
produce more specific set of questions. A reverse logic could also work beginning 
with standardise questions to get an overall ‘Lay of land’ and later, selecting some 
time themes for a fuller exploration in more open in-depth the interviews’.74 
 
To sum up, given the various perspectives and methods, it cannot be overstated that 
interviews are carried out time and again with little reluctancy. Its use will continue 
to play a vital role in legal research and practice. 
 
70 Ibid. Neo-positivism typically involves a high degree of structure, while romanticism favours 
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The use of qualitative research techniques will be adopted in this study. Qualitative 
research uses a naturalistic approach and seeks to understand phenomena in 
context-specific settings, such as real world setting where the researcher does not 
attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Patton states that ‘both 
qualitative and quantitative researchers need to test and demonstrate that their 
studies are credible. Thus, it seems when quantitative researchers speak of research 
validity and reliability, they are usually referring to a research that is credible while 
the credibility of a qualitative research depends on the ability and effort of the 
researcher’.75 
 
Further, after composing a working definition of the production sharing contract and 
the joint venture, the thesis will advance to a more detailed analysis of the legal 
nature and fundamentals of such petroleum agreements. 
1.4.3 Models to appraise socio-economic impact of oil exploitation 
 
1.4.3.1 Gravity allocation models 
 
First, and foremost, gravity allocation models are used widely for investigating 
settlement patterns of energy-related workers. These models take it as a central 
principle that larger communities nearer to project sites will gain more population 
from the project than lesser, further inaccessible ones.76 
1.4.3.2 Investigation of inputs and purchasers of products 
 
Another device frequently employed in assessing the secondary effects of a 
preliminary economic incentive on an area’s employment, income, and output is an 
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other hand. This offers the basis for outlining the multiplier effects of a dramatic 
development of petroleum activity in the economy.77 
1.4.3.3 Other survey techniques, case studies and analyses 
 
Finally, some studies have adopted survey techniques useful to understanding the 
social and economic impact of energy-associated development on a community.78 
The methodology used to carry out this study is basically a combination of national 
case studies and comparative and theoretical analyses. The examination and analysis 
will also be predicated on the principle that the constructive and objective 
interpretation of the constituent documents of the contracts will assert the individual 
host countries’ legal rights and affirm the legal validity of the terms of the contract. 
Rather than making the terms less equitable, the legal approach is therefore likely to 
guarantee the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process. 
1.4.3.4 Sampling procedure: 
 
In this study purposive sampling is used to focus on particular characteristics of a 
population that are of interest. According to Burns and Groves, ‘the target population 
is the entire aggregation of the respondents that meet the designated sets of 
criteria’.79 The target population of this study is consequently the oil workers 
operating in Nigeria that are involved in production sharing contract and  joint 
venture operations with the national oil company NNPC, there are basically 10 of 
such companies which together with NNPC constitute the target population. The 
main goal of purposive sampling is to focus on particular characteristics of a 
population that are of interest, which will best able to answer the research questions. 
One of the main benefits of purposive sampling is the wide range of sampling 
techniques that can be used across such qualitative research designs: 
Qualitative research designs can involve multiple phases, with each phase building on 
the previous one. In such cases, different types of sampling technique may be 
required at each phase. Purpose sampling has a downside, notwithstanding the  type 
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of purposive sampling used, it can be extremely prone to researcher bias.80 The idea 
that a purposive sample has been created based on the judgement of the researcher 
is not a good defence when it comes to alleviating possible researcher biases, 
particularly when compared with probability sampling techniques that are designed 
to reduce such biases.81 Nevertheless, this judgemental, subjective component of 
purpose sampling is only a major disadvantage when such judgements are ill- 
conceived or poorly; considered that is, where judgements have not been based on 
clear criteria, whether a theoretical framework, expert elicitation, or some other 
accepted criteria.82 
The subjectivity and non-probability-based nature of unit selection i.e., selecting 
people in this study as the oil industry; purposive sampling means that it can be hard 
to defend the representativeness of the sample. 
1.4.3.5 Data collection: 
 
For this study, both primary and secondary sources of data collection have been 
relied on. The primary data was obtained from the senior officers of the oil 
companies involved in the joint venture and production sharing contracts through the 
questionnaires. The questionnaires were intended to be as simple as possible for the 
easy understanding of all the respondents concerned. It contained personal data 
information and information relating to joint venture and production sharing 
contracts management processes, performance and technology application and 
investment risk. Personnel interviews with selected employees were also carried out 
to supplement the questionnaires. 
Secondary sources included International Legal instruments, decided cases, 
Conventions, Treaties, national legislation, model concessional and contractual legal 
instruments, Joint venture Agreements and Production Sharing Contracts. The main 
substance of this legal research is therefore based on books, judicial decisions, 
journals and opinions of courts of competent jurisdiction; the United Nations Charter 
and the UN General Assembly Resolutions; the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, general principles of law, soft laws, including various  countries’ 
constitutions and on the opinion of other researchers. The decided cases are the 
 





judicial decisions of national and international courts on Joint venture, production 
sharing contracts, foreign investments, international trade disputes and host 
countries vs multi-national companies’ contractual conflicts. Other secondary sources 
include monographs, news bulletins, oil production reports, newspapers and 
magazine publications as well as materials sourced from the internet. These 
materials shall be subjected to context and contextual analysis to achieve both the 
broad and specific objectives of the study. 
1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF STUDY 
 
The scope of this study is the analytical legal study of joint venture and petroleum 
sharing contracts in less developed oil-producing countries especially Nigeria and 
some selected jurisdictions, the attendant conflicts raised by such contractual 
arrangements, its impact on the host countries and their citizens, the workability, 
functionality and sustainability of the sharing arrangement contracts, legal 
consequences in case of breach and way forward to making more effective and 
workable production sharing agreements that protect the interest of both contractual 
parties, the growth of the oil industry and their operating environment. 
In achieving this study’s objective, I have paid visits to the Shell headquarters in 
Nigeria, the Mobil Production Facilities and their regional offices in United Kingdom, 
China and Ghana, including the headquarters of OPEC in Vienna, Austria for the 
purpose of using their library to research primary documents and engage in 
discussions with their staff. However, these visits took place a considerable time ago 
and it has not been possible to revisit for updating purposes in this regard, as access 
to these establishments and to United Nations resources has been restricted since 
the 11 September crisis, thus limiting the research in terms of recency of figures and 
substantial access to primary data, but in spite of these, this research will be 
conducted with the available data information, resources and secondary data 
comprising the work of distinguished published authors. 
In a similar vein, endeavours to carry out legal research in Nigeria stumble upon 
several formidable obstacles. Firstly, there is no institutionalised public distribution of 
Nigerian statutes or regulations, hence it is almost impossible to find complete sets  
of laws or to remain abreast of recent developments, more so that most of the 
enabling laws are obsolete due to lack of legislative review. Secondly, there are no 
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official translations of Nigerian local laws and customs or regulations into English; 
The recent increase in foreign investment has prompted a surge of interest in 
Nigerian legal matters which has unconscionably raised the cost of legal publications. 
Furthermore, for this particular study, an important impediment was the general 
isolation of production sharing and joint venture contracts. Possibly the most serious 
obstacle to legal research in Nigeria is the astounding degree of variance between 
laws and administrative conduct. The loose construction of many principal laws 
enables administrative officials to exercise considerable discretion without 
unswervingly contravening any legal prohibition. Likewise, many decisions made by 
government officials acquire the force of law through enduring practice but are never 
publicly recorded. I therefore could not disregard anecdotal information wholly 
because of an absence of documentation. However, discussions with the staff of  
such establishments were indeed quite useful in the course of this research work. 
1.6 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
This study will promote a better understanding of the legal basis of the various 
developments in the area of the dynamics of entering into oil-production sharing 
contracts in the selected less-developed countries. Also, it aims to shed light on the 
rising conflicts in such contracts, assist in reducing the conflicts, raise awareness on 
the modalities of operational agreements in the oil industry and how they can affect 
the host countries’ sovereign power over their natural resources, reduce their 
expected revenue and adversely affect the industry’s growth and operating 
environment, suggest the way forward for creating a mutually beneficial oil- 
production sharing agreement including the insertion of legal safeguards to protect 
the parties’ interests. 
 
Particularly, this research will also enlighten the oil industry, the legal community and 
the general public on the emerging issue of oil-production sharing agreement 
disputes and ways of addressing them in the identified jurisdictions of Nigeria and 
other selected less-developed oil-producing nations. This research therefore hopes to 
make meaningful contribution to the understanding of law, legal contracts and state- 
corporation agreements in relation to Petroleum production, extraction and 
distribution of profits in Nigeria and other similar countries’ oil industry. 
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1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
The practice of entering into concession contracts, joint venture and production 
sharing agreements by less developed countries is a burning, contemporary and very 
controversial issue. It has led to breakdown of contractual economic relationships, 
attraction of trade sanctions on host countries of foreign investor’s investments 
through unlawful expropriation and non-payment of compensation, diplomatic rows 
and estranged relationship of host countries and transnational corporation’s parent 
countries, fostered corruption practices and loss of substantial revenue for 
developing countries. Thus, this study will highlight the reasons some of these less 
developed countries of the world exercise caution in going into oil-production sharing 
contracts with multi-national oil companies and the increasing desire of these 
countries to empower their state oil companies to take-over their oil production, 
distribution and commercialisation from the multi-national companies. 
 
This study will further shed light on the ways these contracts can be entered into 
more peacefully and harmoniously. It would equally help in the better understanding 
of the basis for entering into or refusing to enter into oil-production sharing contracts 
by the identified less-developed countries and to form a basis of precedence in 
designing such contracts for similar transactions in other jurisdictions of the world. 
The study would therefore become a useful material in the field of oil and gas law 
and expands the discourse on the contractual and legal relationship between multi- 
national oil companies and their host countries with their attendant issues and the 
law on one hand and would help in the better formulation of law for heralding the 
formation of the contracts and making more robust contractual agreements that best 
suits the interests of both contractual parties and their operating environment on the 
other hand. 
 
1.8 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS AND PLAN OF STUDY: 
 
The present (first) chapter explores the introduction to the conceptual framework of 
the study, the background to the study and the statement of the problem to be 
addressed by this research work. It clearly sets out the research questions to be 
answered in this treatise, the objectives of study, elucidates the legal issues to be 
analysed in the thesis and the arguments supporting them, most of which are based 
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on the moderate legal analytical concepts and philosophical approach of the realist 
school of thought; sets out the research methodology, the scope and limitation of 
study, the plan of study, the significance of study and the justification of study. 
Chapter 2 firstly examines the joint-venture, discusses its origin, definition of the 
joint venture, nature, types, reasons and background and analysing the general 
scheme set out. Secondly, it examines the wide variety of factors which made this 
form of business operation into a more propitious and viable proposition than the old 
concessions, in terms not only of a company’s internal development but also in 
response to the changes in the oil sector and the economic climate. 
Chapter 3 discusses joint operating agreements, their nature, purpose and terms, as 
applicable to the Nigerian oil sector. The joint operating agreement defines the rights 
duties and other obligations of the joint venture partners in respect of a particular 
leased or licensed area. It spells out the legal relationship between the partners, lays 
down rules for the joint development, and procedures for the development of the 
area concerned and of the jointly owned enterprise by the partners. This chapter 
further examines the memorandum of understanding (MOU), which arose when, with 
the oil glut of the mid-eighties, the Nigerian official selling price (OSP) for crude oil 
became unrealisable in the world market. The price of oil plummeted to record lows, 
discouraging further investment. The government quickly responded to this 
development to obviate further dwindling of oil revenue which contributed a large 
chunk of the nation’s foreign exchange earnings by introducing an incentive package 
better known in Nigerian legal parlance as MOU. The package was designed to 
stimulate investment in exploration and production activities and to encourage the 
export of Nigerian oil. 
Chapter 4 discusses the production sharing contract, its origin and subsequent 
development. This form of financing arrangement is becoming increasingly popular. 
The basic idea behind production sharing contracts was the requirement for 
redeemable fixed interest loans to be made by transnational companies to the 
Indonesian government. Under the Indonesian-styled PSC, the foreign investor was 
considered a creditor rather than a partner or contractor. For the arrangement to be 
of significant benefit to the host country, the government must be able to readily sell 
its share of the output of the extractive operations in domestic or foreign markets. 
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The PSC financing arrangements will not generate significant shifts in the allocation 
of financial benefits. However, in industries where bargaining power continues to 
shift in favour of the host country, and where host country negotiation skills are 
adequately strong, the changes will be more than political. There will be real changes 
in who controls the operations and who receives the financial benefit from the 
project. 
Chapter 5 examines Nigerian production sharing contracts, past and present. The 
Nigerian PSC differs in certain respects from the standard PSC which was pioneered 
in Indonesia. 
In Chapter 6, the question of renegotiation clauses is examined. A number of issues 
relevant to the question of the renegotiation of international petroleum agreements 
are dealt with in this chapter. Such issues include: the question of how such clauses 
can contribute to the stability of the international petroleum agreements; problem 
areas of renegotiation clauses; renegotiation in the absence of a renegotiation 
clause, and other related issues. This is followed by an examination of the effect of 
such clauses as articulated by the petroleum arbitral practice. In addition, the validity 
and the effect of stabilisation clauses is examined. Further, this chapter examines, 
the choice of law clause. In this area of law, several theoretical problems which arise 
from the participation of state governments or their constituent entities in 
international oil contracts remain unresolved. Opinions have become polarised, with 
respect to several issues, principally the severability doctrine and issues of applicable 
law. Also, this chapter deals with the controversial question as to the nature of 
compensation for expropriation of foreign property. There is a general acceptance 
that compensation must be paid. The Hull Rule Standard of full compensation seems 
to have amassed support principally in bilateral treaties but the alternate standard of 
appropriate compensation is still vigorously propounded by its adherents. Available 
evidence suggests that there has been an effort to transfer the emphasis onto the 
valuation standard but these efforts do not detract from the fact that the matter of 
the standard of compensation has to be settled first. 
Chapter 7 examines the relative objectives of the host country and the 
multinationals. The necessity for petroleum leads to different strategies by various 
countries dependent on whether they are developed or developing countries, 
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exporters or importers. Developing countries are mainly importers and place a lot of 
emphasis on ensuring security of supplies and not being dependent on any one 
source. They are also concerned with increasing or at least maintaining their reserve 
levels. On the other hand, the exporting developing countries with substantial oil 
deposits are eager to ensure effective control over their petroleum resources and to 
maximise the revenue accruing. The revenues retained by the state are or should be 
used to realise the policy objectives of the state and to ensure that the activities of 
the oil industry complement these policy objectives. 
Chapter 8 draws conclusions and makes a set of recommendations that can assist 
every stakeholder to adopt a most mutually beneficial production sharing contract 
that will take into cognisance the interests of the contracting parties and that of the 
inhabitants of their operating environment. 
The traditional concession, the predecessor of the joint venture, endured for about 
half a century as the exclusive institutional framework defining the commercial and 
legal relationship between energy-producing countries and international oil 
companies. According to Gao, “the early concession regime was based on power 
politics and a “big oils” policy rather than partnership and cooperation. As such, the 
concession regime accorded the major oil companies virtually absolute freedom to 
conduct petroleum operations in the conceding states. Governments had little control 
over either their resources or the companies operating within their territories”.83 The 
principle of mutuality of interests was not conserved under the concessions by host- 
country governments for a more equitable sharing of the gains, and it was ultimately 
necessary to go through a range of phases of renegotiation, revision, nationalisation, 
and eventual termination, in order to reinstitute the principle. 
The traditional concession agreements in general failed to develop a balanced, 
assiduously stable and mutually beneficial relationship between the contracting 
parties. Concerns for natural resource conservation and sustainable development 
were not articulated at all during this development. The third quarter of the last 





83 Zhiguo Gao, International Petroleum Contracts: Current Trends and New Directions (1st edition, 
Kluwer Law International 1994) 20. 
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also saw a firm emergence of new contractual arrangements.84 This transition from 
traditional concession agreements to modern petroleum contracts has been viewed 
by some developing countries as a “revolutionary process” which would ultimately 
restructure the legal relationships between governments and companies in the years 
to come.85 
The fact remains that the old agreements were concluded in conditions of gross 
discrepancy between the bargaining positions of the host countries and the oil 
companies. The companies very nearly dictated their terms and secured for 
themselves agreements they could neither substantiate nor defend in later, more 
progressive days. The financial benefits they obtained were unparalleled – so much 
so that the oil business became by far the most lucrative ever known in the world. 
More importantly, the control they exercised over their host-countries’ primary (in 
some cases, only) source of livelihood, was inordinately excessive, which placed 
those countries’ economies at their mercy and gave them powers which amounted to 
serious encroachments on the states’ sovereignty. Oil policy making was their 
preserve; they decided levels of production, prices and of course exploration 
programmes, with scant regard for the states’ rights to have a say in such matters. 
In short the host countries, apart from the stipulated financial returns, did not enjoy 
any of the rights and privileges that should rightfully be theirs by virtue of their being 
the owners of the oil. 
In light above, this shows the one-sidedness of the old agreements and partly 
explains the later developments that took place to correct the situation. The state- 
within-a-state position which the companies secured for themselves was to lead to 
their undoing. The producer countries became increasingly alive to the realities of  
the situation and step by step started taking back what rightfully belonged to them. 
From the foregoing, in order to understand the need for entering into joint venture 
and production sharing contracts by multi-national oil companies with less-developed 
host countries, it is important to explain the definition and characteristics of joint 
venture, how joint venture compares with partnership, and the rationale for joint 
ventures. 
 
84 Robert Fabrikant, Oil Discovery and Technical Change in South-East Asia: Legal Aspects of PSCs in 





JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT 
2 .1 INTRODUCTION 
The joint venture as a form of business organisation is deeply rooted in the past, 
however, the legal principles of joint ventures are of relatively recent development.86 
Some legal forms still employed in the world today were surprisingly well developed 
long before the Christian era.87 
The concept of joint venture as a legal relationship or association sui generis is a 
creation of the American courts dating back from about 1890. In ancient Egypt, 
Syria, Phoenicia, and Babylonia, the joint venture was used to conduct sizeable 
trading and commercial enterprises.88 It is on record that at the height of the Roman 
Empire, when a great concentration of wealth was needed, an organisation in the 
nature of joint venture was employed. In Venice, for instance, a form of joint venture 
was employed for the purpose of joining all the shareholders in the ships of a fleet 
principally for the purpose of making joint purchases and sales on definite voyages.89 
With the passing of time and with the growth of commerce and trade in Western 
Europe, business associations, including the joint venture, were adopted and 
enhanced. Some metropolitan countries such as Italy, France, Germany and The 
Netherlands made the most of some forms of joint venture practices. This form of 
business organisation ultimately spread to England, which had in earlier times what 
was referred to as the joint adventure. With the expansion of commerce, the need 
for greater concentration of capital and the desire for distribution of risk were cogent 
factors creating the need in England for a type of organisation such as the joint 
venture. It would appear that in most of these countries, they developed some sort 
 
86 See Glaser v Medford-Marlboro Knit Gaiter Co (1944) 93 NH 95, 36 A 2d 280; Albert Pack Corp v 
Fickling Properties (1941) 146 Fla 362 200 So 907; Werrberger v Mejunklin (1935) 171 Okla 528 43 
P2d 729; Fairbanks Morse & Co v District Courts (1933) 215 Iowa 703, 247 NW 203 Lesser v Smith 
(1932) 115 Conn 86 160 Ad 302. 
87 Henry Nichols, ‘Joint Ventures’ (1950) 36 Virginia Law Review 426. 
88 Miriam Beard, A History of the Business Man (New York: MacMillan Company 1945). 
89 Shephard B Clough and Charles Woolsey Cole, Economic History of Europe (3rd edition, Boston: DC 
Heath 1952); Joseph Adalbert Dewe, History of Economics: Or Economics as a Factor in the Making of 
History (New York: Benzinger Brothers 1908); Herbert Heaton, Economic History of Europe (New 
York: Harper & Brothers 1936); Frederic C Lane, ‘Family Partnership and Joint Ventures in the 




of joint venture practice. Likewise, in America, the concepts of joint venture as a 
business organisation were brought to the United States with the commerce from 
England.90 
In recent years, however, joint ventures have come to involve both blue chip 
companies and their more modest counterparts; they traverse most industrial and 
commercial sectors; they bring into relationship companies within an individual 
country, as well as linking companies across the national frontiers.91 They assist in 
the building of bridges between business organisations which have reached a mature 
stage of technical competence, and those with lower level of technology; between 
those who have marketing resources, business expertise and financial muscle and 
the innovators; and those who have an urgent need to rationalise and bring about 
order in their market places.92 It can be argued that the basic concept of joint 
venture arises in some industries as a saviour, in others as the harbinger of a 
brighter business future, and in some as a defender of the national birth right.93 
Individuals, partners and even corporations have joined, or attempted to join, in 
what they had called the joint ventures for the purposes of pooling capital and 
carrying out large industrial and financial projects.94 By pooling their  resources, 
plants and personnel, they demonstrate their joint ability to perform and provide 
capital sufficient to warrant their undertaking the job. Joint venture alliances and 
collaboration agreements are now being entered into on an unprecedented scale, 
with US companies forming thousands every year.95 
Often however, joint ventures do appear to rest uneasily between the legal 
constructs of partnership and contract. In many ways, the joint venture can function 
as a partnership, even though it lacks many of the fundamental elements of it. Thus, 
there are considerable questions on this subject, especially whether the joint venture 
activity is a business carried on in common and whether the agreement to divide the 
fruits of the activity, gives it a view to profit. 
 
90 For further details regarding the origin of joint venture, see Nichols (n 87) 426-429; W H Jaeger, 
‘Joint Ventures part I: Origin, Nature and Development’ (1960) 9(1) America University Law Review 2- 
5. 
91 The Financial Times quoted from John Walmsley, Handbook of International Joint Ventures 
(London: Graham & Trotman 1982) 1. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 




This chapter will examine the joint venture arrangement: the underlying principles, 
origin, definition, types, advantages and disadvantages of a joint venture. The thesis 
will further examine the objectives of the joint venture in relation to exploration and 
production arrangements. Also, a comparative study of joint ventures and 
partnerships will be carried out. In addition, the thesis will proceed to demonstrate in 
more detail the variations that exist in different parts of the world; the basic 
elements of the mineral and petroleum joint venture will also be established. 
2.2. DEFINITION OF JOINT VENTURE 
 
A joint venture has been defined as “an association of persons with intent, by way of 
contract express or implied, to engage in and carry out a single business venture for 
joint profit, for which purpose they combine their efforts, property, money, skill and 
knowledge, without creating a partnership or a corporation, pursuant to an 
agreement that there shall be a community of interest amongst them as to the 
purpose of undertaking, and that each joint venturer shall stand in the relation of 
principal, as well as agent, as to each of the other co-venturers, with an equal right 
of control of the means employed to carry out the common purpose of the 
venture”.96 
Young and Bradford remarked that a joint venture is “an enterprise, corporation or 
partnership formed by two or more companies, individuals or organisations, at least 
one of which is an operating entity which wishes to broaden its activities for the 
purpose of conducting a new profit-motivated business of permanent duration. In 
general, the ownership is shared by the participants with more or less equal 
distribution and without absolute dominance by one party”.97 
Crommelin provided a practical description of joint venture in the mineral and 
petroleum industry. He succinctly states: 
The mineral and petroleum joint venture is an association of persons 
(natural or corporate) to engage in a common undertaking to generate 
a product to be shared amongst the participants. Management of the 
undertaking is divided: specified activities are to be performed by a 
designated person (the operator or manager) as agent for the 
 
96 Johanik v Des Moines Drug Co (1945) 235 Iowa 679 17 NW 2d 385. See also Nichols (n 87) 431. 
97 G Richard Young and Standish Bradford Jr, Joint Ventures: Planning and Action (New York: 
Financial Executive Research Foundation 1977) 3. 
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participants; the power to determine certain matters is vested in a 
committee (the operating or management committee) upon which 
participants are represented and entitled to vote in accordance with 
their interests in the venture; and other matters are decided at the 
outset by the participants as terms of the association. The relationship 
among participants is both contractual and proprietary: the terms of the 
association are fixed by agreement, and property employed in the 
undertaking is held by the participants as tenants in common98 
It would seem that the mineral and petroleum joint venture, unlike a corporation, 
does not enjoy a legal personality. Sometimes, confusion is bound to occur as a 
result of terms such as “incorporated joint venture”, referring to a company formed 
by participants in a common undertaking as a vehicle for that undertaking, the 
participants being the stakeholders of that company with their relationship defined by 
a shareholders agreement. 
As a legal concept, this type of association has been slow to develop and has had a 
difficult struggle to obtain a legal character of its own. Although the legal significance 
of the joint venture has come to be recognised, no decisive and uniform definition of 
the joint venture agreement has yet been established nor is it possible to enunciate a 
general rule by means of which the question as to what amounts to a joint venture 
can be answered. This is because such an answer depends largely on the terms of 
the particular agreement in question; upon the construction which the parties have 
given it; upon the nature of the undertaking, as well as upon other facts.99 
According to Berg, Duncan and Friedman, most joint ventures are borne out of sets 
of unique circumstances.100 They also draw attention to the fact that they represent 
an organisational form for achieving economic objectives which neither parent could 
normally attain acting alone. However, Dunning is of the view that in 1982, 
98 Michael Crommelin, ‘The Mineral and Petroleum Joint Venture in Australia’ (1986) 4(2) Journal of 
Energy and Natural Resources Law 65-66. 
99 Nichols (n 87) 430; The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
corroborated this opinion in their publication about joint venture by stating that “the specialist 
literature gives many definitions…although none provides a truly definitive answer,” C Nightingale and 
Adrian Montague, Joint Venture (Sweet & Maxwell 1990) 1-7; Crommelin (n 98) 79, also stated that 
“the joint venture has provided the vehicle for huge investments in exploration for and production of 
natural resources in Australia in spite of the inescapable uncertainty surrounding its legal attributes. It 
remains for the courts to place their stamp of approval upon this creature of commercial ingenuity”; 
See also Jaeger (n 90) 1-2. 
100 S V Berg, J Duncan and P Friedman, Joint Venture Strategies and Corporate Innovation (Cambridge 
MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain 1982) 37. 
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corporative agreements formed between the United States and foreign companies, 
outnumber the number of fully-owned subsidiaries by a factor of at least 4 to 1. In 
his words, “the world’s leading multinational enterprises are operating through an 
intricate global web of formal and informal coalitions, most of which are in the 
advanced industrial countries. This development induced the formation of 
oligopolistic galaxies with the major world producers at the hub of the galaxies”.101 
Furthermore, some cases have defined the joint venture as an association of persons 
to carry out a single business enterprise for profit, for which purpose they combine 
their property, money, effects, skill and knowledge; each participant therein an agent 
for each of the others, and each has control of the means employed to carry out the 
common purpose.102 
One court describing the joint venture in concise terms stated that “a joint 
adventure, we think, exists when two or more persons combine in a joint business 
enterprise for their mutual benefit, with an express or implied understanding or 
agreement that they are to share in the profits or losses of the enterprise, and each 
is to have a voice in its control and management”.103 
In Scots law, for instance, the term apparently refers to a variety of partnership, one 
confined to a definite transaction or series of related transactions. Accordingly, it is 
defined as “a species of association in trade analogous to, or perhaps more correctly 
a variety of, partnership in which the partners use no firm or social name although 
they are associated in joint adventure or trade which is confined to a particular 
adventure, speculation, course of trade or voyage.”104 
In the United States of America, the law is no different. However, Williston puts 
forward a radical view, in which he states: “A joint venture is an association of 
persons, natural or corporate, who agree by contract to engage in some common, 
usually ad hoc undertaking for joint profit by combining their respective resources, 
without, however, forming a partnership in the legal sense (of creating that status) 
or corporation; their agreement also provides for a community of interest among the 
 
101 John H Dunning, The Globalization of Business (Routledge Revivals): The Challenge of the 1990s 
(Routledge 2015) 191. 
102 Johanik v Des Moines Drug Co (n 96). 
103 Chison v Gilmer (1936) 81 F 2d 120, 124, 4 cir. 
104 Encyclopaedia of the Law of Scotland 11 (1931) s 67 at 32 and Bell’s Principles 392; cited in J A 
Samuels, ‘Brian Pty Ltd v United of Dominion Corporation Ltd’ (1985) 59 ALJR 676-681. 
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joint venturers, each of whom is both principal and agent as to the other within the 
scope of the venture over which each venture exercises some degree of control.”105 
This position has received judicial support in Australia. The definition of joint venture 
came up for consideration in the case of United Dominion Corporation Ltd v. Brian 
Pty.106 The main issues that were canvassed in this case were whether UDC had 
acted in breach of a fiduciary obligation owed to Brian in obtaining the 
collateralisation clauses in the mortgages with the result that these clauses were 
unenforceable against Brian. The dictum of the High Court on the meaning of “joint 
venture” is instructive in this regard; Mason, Brennan, and Deane gave dissenting 
judgments: 
The term ‘joint venture’ is not a technical one with a settled common 
law meaning. As a matter of ordinary language, it connotes an 
association of persons for the purpose of a trading, commercial, mining 
or other financial undertaking or endeavour with a view to mutual 
profit, with each participant usually (but not necessarily) contributing 
money, property or skill. Such a joint venture (or, under Scots’ law, 
‘adventure’) will often be a partnership. The term is, however, apposite 
to refer to a joint undertaking or activity carried out through a medium 
other than a partnership, such as a company, a trust, an agency or joint 
ownership. The borderline between what can properly be described as a 
joint venture and what should be more properly be seen as no more 
than a simple contractual relationship may, on occasion, be blurred. 
Thus, where one party contributes only money or other property, it may 
sometimes be difficult to determine whether it is a joint venture in 
which both parties are entitled to a share of profits or a simple contract 
of loan or a lease under which the interest or rent payable to the party 
providing the money or property is determined by reference to the 
profits made by the other.107 
It would appear that this description contains some contrary implications for the 
mineral and petroleum joint venture. A project on international business ventures 
was carried out by a Colombia Law School team headed by Professor Friedman, and 
105 United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 49; (1985) 157 CLR 1. 
106 Ibid 506. 
107 Ibid 679. 
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they came to the conclusion that “in the widest sense, the term joint venture 
comprises any form of association which implies collaboration for more than a very 
transitory period.”108 More narrowly, the joint venture has been defined as an 
association of two or more natural or juridical persons to carry on as co-owners an 
enterprise or venture, or operations for the duration of that particular transaction or 
series of transactions or for a limited time.109 
Lastly, the joint venture may be defined as a corroboration of an existing or new 
investment involving shared ownership between local and foreign partners. The 
parties to a joint venture may be individual corporate bodies, governments or 
government agencies and the agreement may be bipartite or multipartite. 110 
Ultimately, the term joint venture has been most frequently interchanged with the 
partnership concept.111 Originally, joint ventures were assimilated to partnerships  
and were treated as a “special”112 or “limited”113 or even an “informal”114 form of that 
type of association. It was in the latter half of the nineteenth century that the 
American courts began to recognise the distinction between the two concepts.115 To 
this day, however, some courts seem to regard them as synonymous.116 Other courts 
have viewed joint ventures as similar to partnerships but not identical.117 Other 
jurisdictions are of the view that the joint ventures are not quite a partnership but 
are to be governed by partnership law.118 
The distinguishing features of a standard joint venture arrangement are: firstly, that 
the participants hold their interests in the assets of the venture in common and their 
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participants and the operation; and thirdly that the participants receive the fruits of 
the venture separately and in kind. 
2.3 JOINT VENTURE AND PARTNERSHIP COMPARED 
 
Partnership has been defined in Anglo Australian parlance as the relationship which 
subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view to profit.119 
There is a growing controversy as to whether it is necessary for the statutory 
definition of a partnership that the profits are divisible amongst the persons who 
carry on the business,120 but the resolution of this question need not hinder us in 
seeking to inform ourselves of the legal character of a joint venture. If what is done 
in common produces profits, there is no doubt that they are divisible amongst the 
participants. The significant questions are whether the joint venture activity is a 
business carried on in common and whether the agreement to divide the fruits of the 
activity, be they prospects proved or product won or treated, gives it “a view to 
profit”. It would be hard to uphold a contention that a joint venture formed 
exclusively for prospecting or exploration and which required separate arrangements 
to be made for the exploitation of discoveries, was either a business or an activity 
with a view to profit. 
The basic fact is that where the common activity is the working of a mine or a well, 
however, a further element is present. The product is not fixed capital but stock for 
consumption or sale. If a participant were to conduct the whole operation alone from 
extraction, through treatment to sale, in common parlance he would not be said to 
be conducting three businesses. If he were to join with another for the purpose of 
selling the product, the separation of that activity from production would make them 
different businesses, at law, for accounting and for taxation. Combination for 
production which is not followed by a separate transaction of sale independently of 
the product by the parties so grouping themselves is fundamentally dissimilar. 
Despite the fact that the parties acquire the individual’s business of selling, that 
business is not separate from the activity of production. He does not obtain his stock 
 
119 The Partnership Act 1890 was adopted shortly after its enactment by most developing countries 
like    the    Australian    colonies.    See    for    example,    Uniform    Partnership    Act    (1997) 
<www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partnership/upa_final_97.pdf> accessed 20 June 2018. 
120 See Pooley v Driver [1876] 5ChD 458 [472]. This case was decided before the promulgation of the 
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by purchase and the selling phase of the total activity that is carried out in common 
is not a separate rewarding activity.121 An arrangement to provide a facility, such as  
a treatment plant or a railway, for gain may be a partnership, notwithstanding the 
parties’ desire that it should not be. The previous cases that recognised that the 
ownership of income-producing property together with agreement about 
management did not amount to a partnership122 are given statutory acknowledgment 
by the rule that joint tenancy, tenancy in common, joint property, common property 
or part ownership does not of itself produce a partnership as to anything so held or 
owned, whether or not the owners or tenants share any profits made by the employ 
thereof.123 There is no partnership because there is no business. However, if the co- 
owners’ actions extend beyond the sheer ownership of property and the obligatory 
passive management to the ways of a business, it is hard for them to oppose 
characterisation as a partnership.124 
2.4 PREVALENCE OF PARTNERSHIP 
 
It is essential to the formation of partnership that in dealing with outsiders every 
partner has authority to act on behalf of the partnership and to bind the other 
partners.125 The scope of a partner’s authority is confined by the extent of the 
partnership business and the relationship of a particular transaction to it and by 
agreed limitations upon the partner’s authority to act on behalf of the firm. Other 
partners are bound only by a partner’s acts for carrying on in the usual way business 
of the kind carried on by the firm.126 Express limitations on a partner’s authority 
relieve his partners from liability for his acts only if the person with whom he is 
dealing either knows that he has no authority or does not know or believe him to be 
a partner.127 
Also, it is basic for the conception of partnership that each partner is liable, jointly 
with the other partner(s) and jointly and severally for loss or injury caused to an 
outsider or for a penalty incurred by the wrongful act or omission of any partner 
acting in the ordinary course of the partnership business or with the authority of the 
 
121 Partnership Act (n 119) Section’s 9 and 10. 
122 See French v Styring [1857] 2 CBN S 357. 
123 Partnership Act (n 119) Rule 1. 
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other partners.128 The partners may agree amongst themselves to distribute the 
burden differently, but their agreement does not bind outsiders who deal with the 
partnership even with knowledge of its existence. Individual partners cannot obtain 
limited liability by notice.129 A judgment creditor may levy execution against the 
separate property of one of the partners. The partner has only a right to be 
indemnified by his partners in the agreed proportions. The pledge of assets to a 
partnership does have legal consequences for creditors if the partnership becomes 
bankrupt. The claims of partnership creditors must be satisfied out of the partnership 
assets before those of the partner’s separate creditor. Execution cannot be levied 
against the separate interest of a partner in partnership assets, but provision has 
been made by statute for obtaining an order charging a partner’s separate interest in 
the partnership property and profits. 
Before the Partnership Act 1890, a separate judgment creditor was entitled to levy 
execution against a debtor partner’s interest in the partnership and for that purpose 
was entitled to an account between the debtor and his partners. Under the 
procedure instituted by the 1890 Act a charging order has the upshot of an equitable 
charge given by the debtor partner; nevertheless, an additional order must be 
obtained to give effect to the charge by the appointment of a receiver and, in 
exceptional conditions, the taking of accounts and investigation between the chargee 
creditor and the other partners. The other partners are at liberty at any time to cash 
in an interest that has been charged or, if the court directs sale, to purchase it; they 
may also break up the partnership. 
The agreement also has significance in relation to dealings by outsiders with the firm 
because it determines whether assets that are used for the purposes of the 
partnership are partnership property, and hence assets primarily available for 
partnership debts, or the separate property of individual partners. In the absence of 
opposing agreement, the interests of partners in partnership property and their  
rights and duties in relation to the partnership are resolved by statutory rules: - 
a) all parties are entitled to share equally in the capital and profits and are liable 
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b) the partnership is liable to indemnify each partner for payments made and 
personal liabilities incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of the 
business or in anything necessarily done for the business or property of the 
partnership; 
c) a partner making, for the purpose of the partnership, any payment or advance 
beyond the amount of capital he has agreed to subscribe is entitled to interest 
from the date of payment of advance; 
d) a partner is not entitled, before the ascertainment of profits, to interest on the 
capital subscribed by him; 
e) each partner may take part in the management of the partnership business 
but 
f) none is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business; 
g) no person may be introduced as a partner without the consent of all the 
existing partners; 
h) any differences arising as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership 
business may be decided by a majority but unanimity is required to change 
the nature of the partnership business. Where a partnership is not for a fixed 
term, it is terminable by any partner at will; the partners are obliged to render 
accounts of the partnership business and full information to any partner; 
partners may not contend with the firm; the court may decree that the 
partnership be wound up in particular conditions.130 
 
 
Further, occurrences of the relationship are imposed by law. Two are vital:- 
 
i) a partner has no title to specific property owned by the partnership but has a 
chose in action against all the other partners which entitles him to require the 
partnership property to be applied for the purposes of the partnership 
business during its currency and in its termination to receive a proportion of 
the net surplus of the assets after legal responsibilities are satisfied;131 and 
ii) a partner owes a fiduciary duty to the other partners in relation to the 
partnership business. These matters are recognised in the Partnership Act but 
they derived from the application of commonplace legal and equitable 
 
130 Partnership Act 1890 (n 119) Sections 19, 24, 26, 28, 31, and 35. 
131 Halsbury, Laws of England (4th edition, volume 6); Federal Commissioner for Taxation v Everett 
(1980) 6(54) ALJR 196, 197-198. 
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principles to the relationship of partners. They are intrinsic in the 
relationship.132 
An appropriately drawn joint venture agreement will categorise the assets that are to 
be used in the venture and apportion share in them. It is frequently declared that 
those assets are owned by the participants as tenants in common in the proportion 
of their defined share. (In some joint ventures, predominantly exploration ventures, 
assets committed to the venture remain the property of some parties to the  
exclusion of others. Special provision has to be made for those assets in the 
agreement. What is more, it is not compulsory for all the assets that are dedicated to 
a joint venture to be owned by the participants in the same proportions). The 
agreement binds the participants to assign the assets to the venture and by and 
large provides for their management and control. 
2.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF A JOINT VENTURE 
 
Joint ventures are not created by the operation of law.133 A joint venture is usually 
born out of a contract, either express or implied. The sine qua non of a joint venture 
is a contract purposefully entered into by the parties.134 As a legal concept, the joint 
venture is not a status imposed by law, for instance an agency, but is a relationship 
voluntarily assumed and arising wholly ex contractus.135 As is true of other contracts, 
it would seem that the contract need not be express, integrated, or, if in writing, 
contain all the details. 136 It is a settled principle of law that where there has been 
active participation in the venture, and also where a reasonable degree of control 
over the property or other subject matter involved is present, the conduct of the 
parties and other facts and circumstances may well justify the court in inferring the 
existence of a joint venture.137 
Since it is like any form of contract, all the elements of a contract such as offer, 
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136 See Samuel Williston and Walter H E Jaeger, A treatise on the law of contracts (3rd edition, Baker 
Voorhis 1957). 
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be present.138 The joint venture is usually created only if the parties intend to enter 
into such arrangement. Once the contract has been established, the rights and duties 
of the parties will be determined by law and it is, of course, unnecessary for the 
parties to enter into a special formal agreement to engage upon a joint venture.139  
As in the case of other contracts, a failure of one joint venturer to carry out his 
contractual duties where non-performance is not excusable will constitute a breach  
of contract.140 
There are certain elements which one comes across regularly enough in legal 
publications and cases to be considered as fundamental factors in the joint venture. 
It cannot be said with certainty that the joint venture will fail if any one of them is 
lacking.141 A number of these elements recurrently appear in the joint venture, no 
one of which, standing alone, is deemed sufficient to create the relationship. The 
features most regularly encountered are: 
(a) An enterprise which brings the participants together, i.e. a community of 
interest shared equally or otherwise by all participants. 
(b) A motive, generally profit, which moves the participants to embark upon the 
enterprise. 
(c) An agreement between the participants containing all the essentials of a legal 
contract. This contract may be written or implied. 
(d) A clear arrangement for the management of the joint venture, with or without 
joint control on the part of the participants. 
(e) Intention of the parties as to motive and enterprise is important. Unless this is 
a clear part of the contract, the joint venture may fail. 








138 Ibid 144. 
139 Ibid. 
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venture for profit; common control; each party participating in profit and losses. 
142 Nichols (n 87) 433. 
62 
 
2.5.1 Business purpose 
 
It is a fundamental feature of any joint venture that it is entered into for the 
prosecution of some particular business enterprise, or the pursuit of a specific line of 
trade.143 Only those associations or enterprises created for commercial purposes are 
by and large deemed within the purview of joint ventures.144 The parties must intend 
to join their property and efforts in furtherance of some enterprise.145 
The lack of any business relationship or objection has been considered adequate to 
repel an inference that a joint venture exists.146 According to Nichols, ‘in this 
connection social accommodations, courtesies and functions occurring during the 
course of a situation place no constraint upon the courts in reaching the conclusion 
that a joint venture transaction exists. Therefore, where there has been no financial 
or business interest involved, most courts are reluctant to find a joint venture 
relationship’.147 Thus, the joint venture concept must be confined to those 
transactions partaking of the nature of an association to carry out a business 
enterprise.148 
The law requires little formality in the creation of a joint venture.149 In evaluating 
whether or not such a relationship exists, the courts are guided not only by the 
spoken or written words of the parties, but also by their acts.150 
There must be an agreement to enter into an undertaking in which the parties have 
a common purpose.151 Sheer accompaniment in a project or coordinated action taken 
by two individuals and performed concomitantly does not meet these requirements, 
no matter how intimately joined.152 There must be entrance into mutually binding 
obligations to envisage a joint venture and it must in due course rest on a contract. 
In view of the fact that the joint venture is contractual, it is advisable that the 
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relation is left to be established by oral agreement, such an oral agreement rests on 
the recollections of the parties who may, with all honesty, differ in their recollections 
of what was said as to the terms and conditions of the agreement.154 
No fastidious form of expression is obligatory to create the relationship of joint 
venture, and it has been held that where a corporation and an individual come 
together in a specific venture for joint profit, such arrangement may constitute a 
joint venture notwithstanding the description of one of the joint venturers as a 
partner.155 
Since in all contracts, the intent of the parties is essential, the joint venture arises 
only where the parties to an undertaking intend to enter into such an arrangement. 
The first question in establishing a case of joint venture is to find out the intention of 
the parties inter sese.156 In giving a ruling on the intention of the parties, the courts 
are governed by the literal rules relating to the interpretation and construction of 
contracts.157 
2.5.2 Joint interest 
 
The underlying principle of the joint venture is open, non-secret dealings between 
participants: in other words, a fiduciary relationship requiring paramount good 
faith.158 It is sacrosanct that there must be in existence a community of interest 
between the parties to the transaction.159 Consequently, a pooling of funds for 
purchase for accounts is not a joint venture. There is no joint account or stock. In 
Charles Hasday et al v Morris Barocas et al160 the court held that “therein intention is 
paramount. There must therefore subsist more than the mere unity of possession of 
tenants in common”.161 The mere action taken in concert is not essentially expressive 
of a community of interest.162 Contributions of money, sharing of expenses,  
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jointly, have been considered evidence of a community of interest existing between 
the participants in a joint venture.163 
Despite that several cases have affirmed “community of interest”, an essential 
element of any joint venture, few courts have explained the terms. However, in 
Carboneau v Peterson an extensive analysis of the term “community of interest” was 
stated: 
“Next there must be a community of interest in the performance of the 
purpose. While this element is usually connected, and often identified, 
with the purpose to be accomplished, it is nevertheless, a distinct 
factor. The parties may have a common objective or purpose, and still a 
community of interest may be lacking. For instance, two parties may be 
engaged in the performance of a purpose or object, which may be for 
the sole interest or advantage of one, and from which the other is to 
derive no benefit whatever, or the interest of the one may be different 
and distinct from that of the other; in either of such cases there would 
not be a joint adventure. The term “community of interest” as applied 
to the relation of joint adventure, means an interest common to both 
parties, that is, a mixture or identity of the interest in a venture in 
which each and all are reciprocally concerned and from which each and 
all derive material benefits and sustain a mutual responsibility”.164 
2.5.3 Joint control 
 
The most imperative criterion of a joint venture is joint control or management of the 
property employed in realising its aims. In deciding whether joint ventures subsist in 
a particular transaction, most jurisdictions claim that some element of joint 
participation in the management or conduct of the enterprise or right of mutual 
control be present.165 Joint venturers, in general, have equal voices and control in  
the operations of the enterprise.166 The parties thereto tend to possess an equal right 
in the management and conduct of the undertaking; such right is noticeable in the 
power of each member to determine particularly how, when and where the details of 
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the enterprise are to be performed.167 Even though a joint venture may consider an 
equal right on the part of all persons engaged in an undertaking to have a voice in 
the leadership and management of the venture, the courts are aware of the right of 
the participations to surrender their control to one or more of the parties without 
changing the statutes of the joint venture.168 
There is no agreement on this point. Other courts have declared that while a joint 
venture usually relates to a single transaction, it may comprehend a business to be 
continued for a period of years.169 In other cases, where certain undertakings were 
adjudicated joint ventures, numerous transactions extending over prolonged periods 
of time have been involved.170 There are various authorities to the fact that a joint 
venture may consist of one or more transactions.171 Clearly, a commercial 
undertaking, transaction or business may consist of one act, or may involve 
numerous dealings or affairs, related or unrelated to one another. 
Furthermore, it would seem that in a joint venture laissez choisir is subject to the 
limitation, that were the success of the venture be jeopardised by the withdrawal, 
the court will permit the venture to continue to completion. A joint venture for an 
undefined term terminates at will.172 
2.5.4 Profit and Losses 
 
In Commercial Lumber Co v Nelson, it was observed that “a profit jointly sought in a 
single transaction by parties thereto is the main characteristic of a joint venture”.173 
Similarly, in Horning Inc v McAleenan, it was held that ‘”he well settled definitions of 
a joint adventure unequivocally include the element of profit seeking”.174 There must 
be the sharing of adventure by the associates, i.e. the seeking of profit with its 
correlative obligation of sharing of losses.175 Whenever money or labour is jointly 
contributed to obtain or construct property for personal use but not for profit, the 
courts have held that no joint venture relationship ever existed.176 Nor will a joint 
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venture be created where each party to an enterprise profits in his own way without 
sharing any common or joint profit.177 The principle issue in this instance is that the 
profit accruing must be joint and not several, as otherwise every person, firm, or 
individual who has any connection with the enterprise might be termed a joint 
adventurer therein, whether they had any such intention or not.178 
It would seem that an enterprise undertaken for profit is one of the key factors 
involved in any joint venture, but in and of itself it may be inadequate to ascertain 
the existence of the relationship. The courts have held in Marston v Gould that “a 
share in the net profit is an interest in the profits and implies a participation in the 
profits and losses.”179 
There are a gamut of authorities to the effect that one of the obligatory factors in 
proving a joint venture is the responsibility of the parties to it for losses as well as 
their right to share in the profit.180 Accordingly, even though there is no express 
provision for the sharing of losses, one may be implied.181 Whether expressly stated 
or implied, an essential ingredient in the association in a joint venture is sharing of 
both profit and losses. 
2.5.5 Capital Contribution 
 
One fundamental test in deciding whether a joint venture is said to exist is whether 
there has been contribution by all the parties to the common undertaking.182 There 
must be some contribution by each co-venturer participating in the enterprise. This 
contribution may be in the form of property, money, efforts, skill or knowledge. The 
responsibility of each of the parties may differ in amount, depending upon the terms 
of the agreement. The contributions need not be of the same character. In one 
situation adjudicated a joint venture, one participant agreed to provide a farm and 
purchase and sell all livestock, feed and farm products, and the other party 
contributed his labour to the undertaking. Where a party is apparently associated 
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with other joint ventures, but fails to contribute to the undertaking, such failure 
results in his omission from consideration as a participant in the venture.183 
Furthermore, funds have to be found for the common activities and participants 
agree to contribute them.184 It is not uncommon for participants to be given cross 
charges over each other’s interest to secure the performance of the obligations to 
contribute funds. If the cross-charges have priority over mortgages or charges to 
third parties, a third party’s own security will be subject to the charges of the 
participants other than his own mortgagor and he will take the benefit of his 
mortgagor’s cross-charges without innovation.185 
2.6 REASONS FOR A JOINT VENTURE 
 
The main reasons why industrial companies may wish to consider a joint venture are 
not farfetched. Primarily, the main attraction of a joint venture as a business tool is 
the clarity of purpose that arises as a precondition to its existence.186 For instance,  
an individual company may have lost its sense of direction when a practical 
examination of any set of business plans will demonstrate how easily chief executives 
and their staff can lapse into the role of merely maintaining long-standing company 
traditions, practices, and structures. Participation in a joint venture, by contrast, 
forces attention onto a dominant business purpose.187 
Furthermore, another important reason for the attractiveness of a joint venture is the 
fact that it often possesses a number of comparative strengths over other possible 
routes to the various business improvements that are desired.188 
Observers such as Walmsley, are of the view that where an organisation’s strategic 
interests lie outside a purely internal readjustment, there are a number of 
hypothetically cooperative options available.189 These may include joint venture, 
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merger, or acquisition. In this case, an important distinction can be drawn that is not 
a matter of semantics.190 
Consequently, embarking on a joint venture operation might be interpreted as a 
deliberate decision to achieve new business strength without the use of a merger or 
acquisition strategy based on the advantages of such a decision in terms of risk.191 It 
would appear that the joint venture affords the maximum opportunity to control and 
develop a structure which is consistent with clearly stated purpose. If it chooses, it 
can adopt its own style and there is no need whatsoever to assimilate inherited 
business strategies, and it has no resistance to overcome within its own 
infrastructure192 . 
Further, a joint venture need not contain any winners or losers;193 however it should 
and can harmonise the varying skills that the partners are able to contribute in the 
interest of the joint business mission. With regards to business development, the 
joint venture operation is so clearly isolated from the existing structure of the 
participants that both sides can measure the activity created and react in a way that 
is often not possible in the context of a merger or an acquisition situation. 
It has been further remarked that the joint venture may also provide the best and 
sometimes only realistic route for gaining entry to new emerging markets in areas 
such as Europe and Asia, where access to local knowledge or sponsorship knowledge 
is a practical necessity.194 
Further, international joint ventures can provide the most effective route for a party 
to expand the scope of its customer base by utilising a co-venturer’s strength in 
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Similarly, another important reason for a joint venture is that it contains an inherent 
flexibility.196 The fact is that they can be moulded and shaped in different ways to 
suit the specific needs of the partners and the market. 
Furthermore, firms, whether small, medium, or large scale, may be too small in 
relation to a particular project to raise adequate capital to undertake that activity on 
an individual basis.197 By pooling resources with other firms, it becomes relatively 
easier to finance such huge projects or obtain such venture capital due to their 
increased ability to repay loans and provide the necessary collateral.198 The inability 
of participants to provide such collateral would have being inimical to getting loans, 
for instance, in sectors like resource exploration and development, and in certain 
advanced technology sectors.199 In addition, research and development, natural 
resources exploration and large construction and engineering projects are types of 
joint venture in which even large enterprises may cooperate to reduce risk.200 For 
instance, in the oil and gas industry, exploration activities are usually beset with low 
success rates and such projects involve the expense of huge sums of capital which 
individual enterprises cannot contemplate. It is trite law that in industries where 
economies of scale are substantial, joint ventures, and particularly the vertical joint 
venture, may produce substantial distributional and transnational savings.201 In most 
cases, such a limited integration of this kind may be preferred, with the parent firm 
establishing a subsidiary rather than an outright merger of all the firm’s operations 
because this is a more flexible arrangement capable of being ended if it does not 
meet expectations or if circumstances change.202 
Similarly, another reason that may be adduced as to why enterprises may opt for a 
joint venture is to overcome entry barriers to product markets, especially in areas of 
highly concentrated markets or those protected by trade and investment barriers 
against foreign competition.203 The fact is that often the foreign enterprises are able 
to associate themselves with domestic firms to circumvent such barriers. In addition, 
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a joint venture may also be motivated by the desire to increase market power or to 
avoid competition, whether such competition is either actual or potential.204  
However, such power may be exercised on both the buyer’s and the seller’s side of 
the market.205 
According to the OECD, considerations of a legal or political nature play a central role 
in the creation of a joint venture.206 Competition authorities are more tolerant 
towards joint ventures than they are to cartel-type arrangements between firms.207 
Joint ventures also constitute an important vehicle for international investment, 
especially in countries where, for political reasons, a degree of domestic participation 
is a prerequisite for the setting of operations, for instance, in Nigeria under the 
indigenisation decree of 1978. 
Another plausible reason why firms engage in joint ventures is that “firms tend to 
expand by mergers acquisitions or internal development into areas directly related to 
their current sphere of operations, either complementary or supplementary. 
However, they have a store of ideas, knowledge or know how that is a spin-off of 
their current activities without being a complement or supplement to them…In short, 
the joint venture is a feasible organisation because it allows fuller use of a firm store 
of knowledge for the exploration of new areas of endeavour that the firm could 
undertake on its own only at higher resource cost or with a rising marginal cost of 
internal coordination”.208 
Further, a joint venture may be a preliminary step for “an eventual disposal or 
acquisition of a business with a further tranche of the disposal or acquisition being 
contemplated, although perhaps not specified, for a later period”.209 
Furthermore, it could be a catalyst for change.210 For example, a situation could arise 
where the parties to the joint venture may wish to bring in another party or even 
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The joint venture is a convenient means for providing a greater concentration of 
finance and managerial resources, knowledge and skill essential to the 
accomplishment of large scale construction projects such as oil exploitation. Backman 
says that, “joint ventures are formed for a variety of reasons. The joint ventures are 
not seeking partners merely to share profits. Rather they are formed because each of 
the partners has a contribution to make, either in terms of technical know-how, 
marketing know-how or financial or other resources. The main advantages of the 
joint venture are widely recognised. They are used to: (1) unite diverse technical 
abilities of different industries; (2) expand new sources of raw materials; (3) 
surmount local discrimination against foreign corporations or make use of the 
resources of local enterprises overseas; (4) coalesce a range of raw materials with 
knowledge as to how to convert them into multifaceted finished products; (5) 
broaden the risk and thus smooth the progress of raising capital; (6) acquire 
economies of scale in production and marketing; (7) generate new products; (8) 
mingle the scale techniques of one company with the production know-how of 
another; (9) achieve technical resources beyond the capacity of single companies.”211 
In addition, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
observed that “the reasons American businesses choose to enter joint ventures 
include: (1) the desire to spread the risk in rather speculative projects or in projects 
in an unstable area; (2) the need to raise large sums of capital or credits; (3) the 
need for the skills or marketing experience possessed by other businesses; (4) the 
necessity or political advisability of having local interests associated with foreign 
investment and (5) a requirement of local governments that they or their interest in 
any business established by the foreign investor.”212 They went further to suggest 
that “the following more theoretical explanations have been given for the increased 
popularity of the joint venture: (1) the magnitude and integrated complexity of 
today’s major commercial projects; (2) the advent of governments as buyers and 
sellers in the economic field and (3) the growing habit of cooperation in a society 
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In the developing countries, from an economic point of view, one basic reason for 
setting up a joint venture is to make use of complementary technology and research 
activities.214 Most governments are seen to favour joint ventures on the grounds that 
they permit local capital to participate more fully in the benefits of economic 
development and that they transmit technical and business know-how more rapidly 
and effectively than either purely local or 100 per cent foreign owned ventures.215 In 
addition, joint ventures lessen the danger of foreign domination of the industry. Such 
a joint venture usually involves firms from different industries or different segments 
of the same industry cooperating in order to acquire knowledge they do not 
possess.216 It invariably means that the joint venture may serve as an important tool 
for transferring technology. 
Furthermore, in the post-war period, when balance of payment problems were 
severe in most developing countries, their governments were concerned, from time 
to time, that any immediate benefit to the balance of payment arising from the  
inflow of foreign capital would be more than counterbalanced in the long run by the 
outflow of dividends.217 Thus, in most cases, this has been a major reason for 
preferring joint ventures, since the burden of dividend transfers and the repatriation 
of foreign capital is thus abridged, by and large, whilst still acquiring the gains in the 
acquisition of techniques and the management skills.218 
Friedman and Kalmanoff have favoured the view that “less developed countries insist 
on joint ventures with government participation because of lingering misgivings 
about foreign investment and the fear that it may put forth an unacceptable political 
and social impact. An unreceptive minority partnership for the government may be 
adequate to assuage anxiety, since their representatives sitting on the board are in a 
better position to examine the activities of the business and to make known its 
intentions appropriately than would be an external group of officials to whom the 
business might otherwise have to report. Further, it would appear that the persistent 
use of joint ventures may reflect the yearning to preserve the opportunity for the 
local business interests to share in the lucrative industries designated by foreign 
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investors for exploitation. Where the market for the given product is too small to 
allow more than one large plant sufficient scope to earn the benefits of the device, 
there is a strong attraction to pre-empt, by government pronouncement, a place for 
the local business interests by insisting on the joint venture form of business whether 
or not this is the judicious path for speedy development”.219 
2.7 ADVANTAGES OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
 
A very important advantage for the joint venture is a limitation of the investment 
requirement.220 According to Kolde, this can be attractive per se but, more 
particularly, this may particularly be the case when the investment is made in a 
country with either existing or potential exchange control problems affecting possible 
repatriation.221 
Another advantage may well lie in overcoming national limitations in a country where 
joint ventures are proposed by foreign-owned businesses or restricted outright or are 
subjected to prior approvals which is difficult to obtain except where it is of obvious 
advantage to the country.222 
The most apparent advantage is the limitation of the risk of failure of the 
enterprise.223 The party tendering for a large contract may wish to mitigate his risk of 
failure by subcontracting.224 Herzfeld and Wilson argue that “where a joint venture is 
entered into to introduce a product into a country by local manufacture, the 
investment of the foreign party may largely comprise the transfer of industrial 
property rights and of technological know-how and, in addition, the supply of 
machinery and of components, with the total further contribution coming from within 
the country”.225 This invariably reduces the financial risks for the foreign contractor. 
Walmsley has remarked that joint venture provides a reasonable means of crossing 
ethnic, cultural and business frontiers at one and the same time, through the 
cautious selection of local partners; and secondly it encourages modernisation and 
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inventiveness harnessed to a common business goal.226 At a time, when many other 
forms of company development are essentially being hushed by free enterprise 
structures, joint ventures offer a way out of that problem which centres around the 
predisposition of businesses to grow and amalgamate, and in so doing develop a 
lifestyle of their own, which is not always favourable to risk-taking and capitalist 
action.227 
The lifeblood of the future, that is, the resourcefulness and modernisation inherited 
through the first industrial revolution, which should keep reputable manufacturers 
ahead of recently developed competitors, is at best at risk, and at worst often 
undeveloped.228 Joint ventures are subsequently, not only a means for the renewal  
of companies, but also “an important lifeline” 229 for the continuous existence of the 
Western manufacturing economies. 
Both sides could also secure the benefits of efficient production resources in very 
depressed markets. Only time will tell if the deal will come through with all the 
benefits envisioned, but in theory the joint venture solution provides a malleable tool 
for both sides in the framework of a defensive policy. 
2.8 DISADVANTAGES OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
 
Management style: In broad terms, joint control means joint decision-making and to 
many top executives the sharing of decisions does not necessarily come easily.230 It 
should be acknowledged that this intricacy goes beyond the barely defined subject of 
decision-making and concerns all issues affected by what is known as management 
style. There is also evidence that even the composition of the joint venture’s board 
may pose a huge challenge. Obviously, if it is to function efficiently, its members 
must be able and willing to attend the majority of its meetings. In a large 
corporation, this may not augur well, since this may mean excluding the top cadre 
from the board and this might be displeasing to some members and throw doubt on 













It will be obvious that in any joint venture, conflicts of interest may arise between 
the participants and between the interests of one or other participant and those of 
the joint venture. In fact, to Roulac, “some of these may not be obvious to all 
parties”.231 It has been suggested that one such situation could be where one 
participant might look for benefits that would come to him rather than to the joint 
venture. Indeed, participants may well be looking ahead to what they can achieve on 
premature termination of a joint venture, an attitude sometimes described as 
‘competitive collaboration’ or ‘takeover by stealth’.232 
2.9 EFFECT OF FAILURE OF A JOINT VENTURE 
 
The major problem upsetting joint ventures is consideration of the possible 
consequences of failure. It will be understandable that a participant who had earlier 
decided in favour of a joint venture in preference to available alternatives will not 
wish to find that after a limited time he is faced with just one or other of those 
alternatives, principally if that now entails total loss of control because he cannot, for 
whatever reason, obtain control himself.233 
According to Herzfeld and Wilson, “in some circumstances, the fact that a business is 
operated as a joint venture may, particularly in the early stages, tend to concentrate 
the limelight on it and probably to show larger start-up expenses than would have 
been the case under the umbrella of an existing organisation where some 
expenditures might never have been charged to the business. Whether this is to be 
considered a positive or negative aspect may depend as much on the outlook of the 
different participants as on any strictly objective measure, but participants should 
take cognizance of it in judging a joint venture’s results”.234 
In a large number of conditions, joint ventures are not the first choice of either  
party. The options that are available are subject to a wide range of issues. The main 
issue in the decision must be the nature of the business venture. 
In practice, it is obligatory to be aware that the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and other equivalent arrangements comes up progressively more against 
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various forms of anti-monopoly legislation and as a result is becoming less certain in 
its dependability. A joint venture in research and development may also come about 
as an appropriate way for the participants to resolve a conflicting exclusive rights 
situation.235 In particular, Houlder points out “teaming up with a stronger partner to 
improve skills or gain access to new technology or products is a risky strategy, as it 
usually results in the weaker partner being acquired by the stronger one”.236 
Furthermore, in circumstances where the participants are large corporations, it is 
necessary and desirable for the joint venture to have a long-term sponsor in each 
participating corporation.237 
2.10 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT 
 
The objectives of each joint venture are basically the same. However, the terms and 
conditions vary somewhat from one agreement to another. Under this kind of 
arrangement, exploration plans are to be prepared and implemented, either directly 
by the foreign partner or through the agency of an operating company. Exploration 
should be to the maximum possible extent and in conformity with good oil field 
practice, and periodic progress reports should be submitted to the National 
Company.238 Usually the foreign partner provides the capital at its own risk and is 
committed to spending agreed minimum amounts of money in a certain agreed 
number of years. If, unfortunately, after an agreed number of years, exploration 
does not result in a commercial discovery, the agreement automatically becomes null 
and void. The transnational will not be reimbursed in any way. If, on the other hand, 
exploration does result in commercial discovery the host country will have to 
reimburse the foreign partner for its share of the exploration expenses in accordance 
with a predetermined procedure.239 The agreements contain such obligations  
because of the potential conflict between the host country and the transnational oil 
company which arises from the motivation of exploring for oil.240 The purpose of 
these clauses is to make certain that the foreign oil company maximises input into 
exploration, not only to maximise the delay between the signing of the agreement 
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and the date of commercial discovery, but also to maximise the data produced for 
use by the host country.241 
Furthermore, the signature bonus paid by the transnational oil company when the 
agreement is first signed has been common everywhere, notably in the Iranian 
agreements. It has two main purposes: chiefly, to increase the revenues and to 
speed up exploration activities. Which of the two is more important depends on 
whether the bonus is recoverable or not. In a situation where the bonus is non- 
recoverable, it provides no incentive to speed up exploration and can be regarded as 
a way of increasing revenue for the host country, but in the case where the bonus is 
recoverable from future earnings subsequently, most probably ceteris paribus, it 
clearly constitutes an incentive to the company to find commercial oil as soon as 
possible so that it can begin to recover its expense on the bonus.242 In addition, the 
bonus also acts as an advance on revenue to the host country in the sense that the 
host country gets an interest free loan if a discovery is made, while if no commercial 
discovery is made the host country has at least gained some revenue in the form of 
the bonus. For instance, Iranian vintage agreements with Shell and the Tidewater 
Group, both of which failed to find commercial oil, paid to Iran $99 million, a sum 
equivalent to 55% of the consortium’s payments to Iran in the same year.243 Most 
times, the signature bonus is intended to be a sign of the prospects for the area; 
nevertheless, it has frequently proved an inaccurate measure.244 Minimum work 
obligations in terms of financial expenditure and or the number of rigs to  be 
operated or the metres to be drilled are prevalent in all the agreements. Such a 
bonus provides the most direct encouragement to the foreign company to maximise 
input and minimise lag. However, the only downside is a probable lack of flexibility if 
the obligations implicit are in technical rather than purely financial terms.245 A 
commentator has remarked that if the foreign company can withdraw before the end 
of the contract period, then a minimum work obligation becomes meaningless. Some 










245 Ibid 45. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Stevens (n 238) 46. 
78 
 
obligations before opting out and to pay compensation if these obligations are not 
met.246 
Normally, in a Joint Venture Agreement, the foreign company provides the financial 
resources and technical expertise. 
In addition to marketing its own share of the oil, the Transnational Company also 
undertakes to market part of the entire share of the national entity, if the latter so 
wishes. The joint venture usually runs for a period of twenty-five to thirty years, 
renewable for a further period of about half of the original duration.247 The effective 
date of the Joint Venture can either be the date of the beginning of commercial 
production, which tends to make the term of the agreement run separately for each 
field in which commercial oil has been found, or the date on which the agreement 
was signed, or the Law of authorisation published in the official gazette, which 
normally makes the duration the same for all fields, regardless of the date of 
commencement: Egypt is a classical case.248 The agreement might also make some 
provision for the amendment of the original contract to incorporate the improved 
terms that the National Oil Company might subsequently obtain under similar 
Agreements with other partners. 
A relinquishment program regulates the Joint Venture so that after a predetermined 
period of time the Joint Venture will be left only with areas where commercially 
exploitable deposits have been discovered. While this is expected to speed up 
exploration, a too rapid rate of relinquishment may well defeat its own end since the 
company may not have sufficient time to carry out the work properly. How far this is 
likely to happen depends on the size of the area to be covered and the uncertainty 
attached to the area. One would have thought the relinquished area may have an 
enhanced value for the host country since it is an area in which the level of 
uncertainty has been reduced and the area can be re-let, except for the fact that all 
the evidence is very discouraging.249 In addition, the sharing of profit is usually a 
fifty-fifty formula which was already in operation under the concession regime when 
these joint venture agreements were first introduced. Such agreements have also 
provided for payment of rent and royalty. A good example is the one stipulated 
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under the renegotiated Getty Agreement of 1968 in Algeria, where Getty undertook 
to reinvest 75 per cent of the profits of the sale of oil.250 
2.11 TYPES OF JOINT VENTURE 
 
There are fundamentally two types of joint venture: equity joint venture and 
contractual joint venture. 
2.11.1 Equity Joint Venture 
 
Equity joint venture (under the Italian approach) is usually characterised by closer 
partnership ties. The joint venture is a separate entity in the form of a joint stock 
company created under the local laws of the host country to conduct, as a corporate 
body, all phases of the operations, as well as the marketing of oil.251 These types of 
joint venture encompass arrangements where direct and significant participation in 
the investment is made by the two parties to the company.252 Know-how, technical 
assistance or personnel are made available under the contract between the operating 
company and the foreign partner. The operating company is run as an independent 
corporation, with profits distributed to the parties to the joint venture in the form of 
dividends.253 The parties exercise control of capital stock.254 Key decisions, including 
policy are developed by the operating company. Autonomously, in theory, of the 
holding companies, in “the equity type of joint venture, the ratio of participation 
varies between a foreign minority, a foreign majority and  a 50-50 arrangement”.255 
In no case is the mutual control by the parties affected. When the local partner has a 
minority of interest, it may still enjoy a right of veto. It is typical that when the 
foreign partner is in the minority, the host party’s lack of technical expertise and 
know-how may result in the foreign partner acquiring a greater degree of control. 
Further it can be remarked that the earliest joint ventures were those established by 
ENI, an Egyptian consortium, Agip Meraria (an ENI subsidiary) and NIOC of Iran, in 
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was in charge of the functions of exploration and sale of any crude oil or other 
hydrocarbon that was produced. It has been argued that “the symbolism of the joint 
venture lies not simply in its jointness and in the existence of an entity called a State 
Oil Company, but also in the fact that the territory is not licensed solely to a foreign 
oil company.”257 Agip could retain only those areas in which commercial quantities of 
oil were discovered.258 A commercial quantity embodied in the ENI-Agip agreement 
was as follows: 
“The yield capacity of a petroleum field in commercial quantities in 
which a commercial quantity will, under prevailing conditions, be 
estimated when the amount of oil extraction reasonably foreseeable is 
such that when the cost price of delivery seaboard, calculated on the 
basis of production costs plus transport and handling charges and an 
additional 12.5% of the posted price payable as a minimum for tax and 
duties to the Iranian government is deducted for the posted prices of a 
similar kind of petroleum, it would leave a reasonable margin of profit.” 
It is important to note that this agreement, however, did not incorporate a 
mechanism which would enable one party to proceed to development at sole risk, in 
the event that there was difference between the parties on the assessment of the 
commercial prospects of a discovery. Such a problem however arose under the Agip 
– NIOC agreement. To correct such anomalies, a formal mechanism was 
incorporated in the Agip – NIOC agreement to deal with the deadlock. This 
mechanism was not satisfactory, even though it provided a formal procedure for 
resolving a deadlock; it was more akin to an adjudicatory procedure than one for 
arriving at a consensus in the interests of the joint venture. 
Furthermore, with time, a more resourceful mechanism was developed and 
incorporated in later joint venture agreements to deal with situations where the 
parties did not agree on the commercial prospects of a discovery. A clause was 
inserted which enabled either party to undertake discovery at its sole risk. For this 
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1963, under which the operations were assigned to the joint operating company, the 
Fayoum-Petroleum Company (Fapco).259 
The sole risk clause was invoked in the Abu Qir gas discovery in Egypt by Phillip in 
1969, which the company did not regard as commercial but which the government 
decided to develop at its “sole risk” in order to meet domestic requirements.260 To 
some extent the sole risk clause may make the definition of a commercial discovery 
redundant.261 The sole risk clause allows either partner to develop a field at its own 
risk subject to certain conditions and provisions. This clause allows either side to opt 
out of the development of the find.262 Nevertheless, the sole risk clause usually only 
becomes operative once the venture has been created, i.e. a commercial discovery 
has been formally declared which still leaves open the problem of defining the first 
discovery as commercial or otherwise. What the sole risk provision actually does is to 
make the precision of the definition less important, given that once the venture 
exists, neither party is obliged to commit itself to the development of the field as the 
result of a declaration of commercial discovery. In addition, the “sole risk” clause has 
been praised as one of the commendable instances of elasticity made possible by the 
joint venture structure. The sole risk clause was introduced to provide a remedy for 
partnership problems where using arbitration clauses of the agreement was regarded 
by both sides as tantamount to a divorce.263 In a situation where the sole risk 
operation has been wholly financed by the opposing party in case of a failure then 
the loss is borne by the opposing party only. But, on the other hand, if the sole risk 
operation is a success then after a certain time the opposing party has the right to 
join in the operation but must pay a penal rate to do so264. Moreover, another case 
of flexibility is provided by the mechanism, embodied in the Pan American-UAR 
Agreement of 1963, to deal with a situation where a project is approved by both 
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In terms of the production phase, an obligation was imposed on the joint company to 
use all its possible efforts in order to raise to a maximum the sales level of 
production and for that purpose to develop the production of such fields so that 
production was achieved within the limits compatible with the most modern technical 
procedures in the oil industry.266 
One conspicuous problem presented by the joint venture is the relationship between 
production and “offtake” by the respective parties. So long as both parties lift oil in 
proportion to their equity interest, the arrangement presents no difficulty. However, 
Stevens explains that a “problem arises when there is a persistent under-lift. The 
obvious solution would be for the over-lifter to provide the necessary additional 
capital, but this would create the problem of altering the equity share of the two 
sides. Consequently, the over lifter must be able to buy crude from the persistent 
under lifter at a specific price. Intended for both parties to invest in the necessary 
capacity in such a way as to leave the equity interest unchanged, the under-lifter 
must receive a price for the crude oil which will provide a return on capital equal to 
or greater than a return from any alternative form of investment. The joint venture 
therefore had to provide a mechanism to deal with a situation where one party is 
likely to persistently demand less crude in proportion to its equity than the other”.267 
Secondly, the price demanded by the under-lifter as compensation should not be so 
high as to have an effect on the level of demand of the offtake. This situation is 
convoluted by the fact that, in a joint venture state of affairs, the foreign company 
and the host country require the crude for different purposes. The transnational oil 
company has entered the venture to secure the supply of owned crude.268 That is to 
say, the foreign company needs the crude as a refinery contribution. The host 
country’s national company, on the other hand, will demand the crude as a revenue 
earner in a direct sense. The fundamental distinction is that the foreign company as 
an integrated operation is not unswervingly interested in maximising revenue at the 
production level of the operation, particularly with regards to one source of crude 
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from perhaps many accessible to the company. The host country nonetheless, is 
interested in maximising revenue at this stage as a seller of crude.269 This problem is 
dealt with by different mechanisms embodied in the provisions relating to marketing 
under the Agip-NIOC agreement. 
2.11.2 Contractual Joint Venture 
 
A kind of joint venture broadly espoused is described as a contractual joint venture 
or a joint structure. The contractual joint venture is particularly common in joint 
ventures whose purpose is mineral exploitation. The device, even though 
infrequently dealt with as a distinct form of business organisation in the civil law or 
common law countries of the world, is nevertheless virtually always available under 
the general principles of contract law.270 The contractual joint venture, which 
depends almost wholly upon the mutual agreement of the parties, is highly flexible. 
The joint venture “does not assume a separate corporate identity, as the partnership 
is a not constituted into a joint stock company. Instead, an operating Company  
which is non-profit making in nature and registered under the Local Laws of the host 
country, is usually formulated to act as an agent for both the foreign and national oil 
companies. Its capital is contributed on an equal basis. The Company is mainly 
responsible for production and oil produced is handed over to each of the partners in 
equal shares”.271 The petroleum produced is not jointly owned; each party owns  
50% of the undivided shares and consequently owns its share of production. 
It is important to note here that although ownership of any petroleum discovered is 
joint and the operating company is jointly owned, the entire risk capital for 
exploration was to be furnished by the foreign partner.272 In the event that no 
commercial discovery was made, the loss was exclusively borne by the foreign 
partner. In the event of a commercial discovery being made, the jointly-owned 
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During the exploration period, a joint venture acts as an agent only of the foreign 
partners while in the development and production, it acts as an agent to both 
parties.274 
Furthermore, a possible handicap of a non-profit-making company is that it may not 
have at its disposal any reserves and could face operational limits approved by the 
partners. In practice, however, the budget can be planned so as to leave enough 
margin of financial freedom to the management. Also, as an agent, it has powers to 
take any action obligatory in case of an emergency. According to Friedman and 
Beguin, “the legal structure established by the 1965 agreement is not expected to 
hamper efficiency of management although it is not denied that in certain 
exceptional circumstances it could be an obstacle”.275 Hossain further argues that 
“the provisions regarding joint structure agreements have been gradually 
strengthened over the years.”276 
In addition, the joint structure agreement provides for a signature bonus. The 
financial provisions in the joint venture agreements, while proceeding on the basis of 
equal sharing of profits between partners as under an equity joint venture, in effect 
yielded a more favourable result to the government. The signature bonus paid by the 
foreign company when the agreement is first signed, even though not used in Egypt, 
has been widespread, particularly in Iranian agreements. The provisions and 
operation of the signature bonus has been discussed in Section 2.10 above.277 
Slight variations in contractual joint venture agreements are common. For instance, 
the agreement between NIOC/PAN-AM stipulates that if a partner is unable to 
provide the necessary funds, such a partner could resort to raising a loan or securing 
the necessary funds by any other method, provided that such method must have 
been agreed upon by the two partners.278 
The date for commencement and defining the nature of activities is usually not 
uniform. After the commercial discovery of oil, the operating Company normally 
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assumes the role of agent for both the National and Foreign companies. However, 
there are other Agreements, where the operating companies are to be established 
only upon commercial discovery of oil and within 30 days thereof.279 This method or 
form of business cooperation has been preferred by the American oil companies 
because under the United States Tax Laws, American Companies investing abroad 
may obtain considerable fiscal advantages if they can prove to the tax authorities 
that they have direct ownership of their part of the production when such proofs are 
established.280 Such American companies are entitled to deduct certain intangible 
expenses from the taxable account in the year of occurrence. In addition, the 
Company is also allowed depletion allowance,281 which supposedly is a form of fiscal 
compensation for the depletion of deposits each year. 
One can safely state that in a contractual joint venture arrangement, the national 
partner obtains exclusivity of title and ownership over installations and production 
and the foreign partner is limited to contractual rights for commercial 
compensation.282 Maniruzzaman is of the view that the joint venture system of 
association is totally different from the traditional concession system.283 When the 
fields discovered are being developed, “the host country takes a direct part in 
running the joint enterprise through its own managerial, administrative and technical 
staff, and this ensures that the country’s interests are represented in all decisions 
affecting the formation of their oil revenue while at the same time the staff are 
acquiring training and experience”.284 
Equity participation in the local subsidiaries of transnational corporations does not 
substantially mean participation in the downstream operations of marketing, 
processing, procurement etc.285 
It would appear that the law applicable to a contractual joint venture is generally for 
the parties to decide. In deciding their view, in particular, it is necessary to require 
the incorporation of a provision to settle disputes and to surrender to a modus 
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operandi for resolving them.286 The non-existence of any preceding agreement on 
the applicable law can lead to adverse consequences, for instance when A and B, 
domiciled in two different countries, coalesce to perform a contract in country C, the 
laws of which may not be particularly appropriate to governing the relations between 
the parties and may even be hard to establish.287 Most times the purchasing country 
maintains that its law is applicable to the supply contract. The fact is that the parties 
may have little choice but to agree to that arrangement, even though they may well 
wish their own internal relations to be managed as completely as possible by some 
other law with which they and their advisers are more familiar. The result would be 
that the joint venture arrangements would be governed, for instance, by Egyptian 
law but the supply law would be governed by the laws of the purchasing country. An 
additional choice is to acknowledge the local system of law, but to be in agreement 
to adjudicate in a third, unbiased country, e.g. Algeria. 
The agreement for which a corporate body is formed settles the law applicable to 
that corporate body. The laws of some countries, such as France, do not recognise 
as valid agreements between shareholders about the conduct of a company.288 In 
choosing where to locate a corporate entity, these questions of applicable law must 
play a significant role.289 Where a corporate joint venture is being formed to carry  
out activities in a particular territory, the requirement for local credibility will 
frequently dictate that the joint venture is corporate under the laws of the country 
concerned. 290 
Furthermore, it would appear that while most legal systems allow contracting parties 
latitude in arranging their affairs, joint venture contracts belong to the group covered 
by the phrase “complex long-term contracts”.291 This, in some legal systems, 
particularly on the Continent of Europe, may mean that they are subject to 
renegotiation and probable judicial or arbitral modification in the event of an 
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Also, in international joint ventures, it must be remarked that arbitration clauses can 
often be found in the joint venture contract.293 This, coupled with the choice of a 
governing legal system which would be neither party’s first choice but may perhaps 
be in the law of the country where the arbitration is meant to take place, and is 
occasionally considered an appropriate compromise. There is no doubt that a court 
or arbitrators might, in certain state of affairs, regard such a choice of law as invalid; 
and even more critically, it may, if upheld, lead to quite unexpected results unless 
the parties have totally satisfied themselves about the consequences of the legal 
system of their choice on any interpretation of their contract. In particular, in some 
jurisdictions, arbitrators have the right to adjust a contract to what they see as 
apposite in the situation.294 
It has been recommended295 that in international joint ventures relating to numerous 
parties there is a good case for multi-party arbitration. This would appear to have 
validity where all parties request a declaration of the same problem and has the 
additional advantage of reduction in time and costs. However, it must be borne in 
mind that notwithstanding any provision for multi-party international joint venture 
arbitration, scores of disagreements may possibly not be of such a nature as to be 
amenable to arbitration in that type of forum. 
There is a growing recognition that the progression from a traditional concession 
regime to a joint venture does not significantly affect the location of control of the 
decision-making process, so long as a corporation continues to manage the 
undertaking. In short, the mere acquisition of a majority equity interest does not 
disentangle the extractive industries of developing countries from the global network 
of Western corporations or the occurrence of the old international economic order.296 
Unless transfer of ownership is matched by a meaningful transfer of essential 
managerial powers and the acquisition and mobilisation of technical expertise for the 
purposes of effective management, the control of this sector by a developing country 
will prove largely illusory.297 
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2.12 JOINT VENTURE AND CONTROL OVER NATURAL RESOURCES BY 
HOST COUNTRIES 
For some time now, most developing countries have sought to establish control over 
the activities of transnational corporations by obtaining a majority interest in the 
equity or assets of their local subsidiaries.298 The general experience of most host 
governments is that the corporate structure of transnational corporations consistently 
denies the subsidiaries that measure of self-sufficiency that would permit them to be 
wholly incorporated into the economic strategies of the host country.299 For that 
reason, the attainment of control over subsidiaries is regarded as a compelling device 
for dismantling the restrictions imposed by the parent company. 
In following this device, some developing countries appear to have advanced on the 
premise that the acquisition of ownership necessarily implies effective control, but 
the experience of many developing countries, predominantly in Africa, belies this 
proposition. This was the reasoning of the court in the case of Anaconda Company v 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation300 and the tribunal came to the conclusion 
that “control, as applied to corporate operations, is an elusive term dealing, as it 
sometimes does, with the degree of influence in fact or potentially exerted by some 
persons within a complex structure over a multitude of actions taken  by many 
others. In differing legal contexts, different aspects of that influence can assume 
greater or lesser importance; sometimes actually exercised present control is more 
important than potential but dormant control and sometimes the reverse is true”.301 
2.12.1 Three phases in quest for control over natural resources 
 
According to Asante, it has been observed with time, that developing countries with 
fragile independence structure experience three distinct phases in their quest for 
control over their natural resources.302 Also, “each phase has a distinct political 
significance, though it may exert little or no impact on the existing structures for 
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2.12.1.1 Political sovereignty 
 
The achievement of political sovereignty is the first phase. Nationalists inveighing 
against a colonial regime have always looked upon political independence as 
tantamount to economic independence and unregulated control over their natural 
resources.304 However, after the initial excitement over this phase, developing 
countries soon came to realise that control over their natural resources was still a 
distant goal.305 
2.12.1.2 Vesting Mineral Resources in the State 
 
The next phase consists in the formalisation through legislation that all mineral 
resources are vested in the state.306 It soon becomes apparent that actual control 
does not fundamentally begin from such formalisations. It would appear that 
effective control of the undertaking in economic or practical terms may still elude the 
host government even after taking this step, however politically appealing it may at 
first appear. 
2.12.1.3 Control Within the Transnational Investment Process 
 
Asante further provides that “in the transnational investment process, control 
involves the exercise of decision making powers in such vital operational and 
managerial matters as budget, expansion and development programs, appointment 
of top management, pricing, marketing, declaration of dividends, borrowing, 
reorganisation, procurement of equipment, and the integration of the undertaking 
with the developmental objectives of the host countries”.307 Thus, an appropriate test 
of the suitability of any new arrangement the proper test of the suitability of any  
new arrangement asserting to vest control in the host government will include 
consideration of the following factors: 
(1) Does the acquisition of a majority equity position confer upon the host 
government the right to recommend a majority of the members of the 
governing board or committee? Some developing countries generally appoint 
only half of the members of the board or committee, notwithstanding their 
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majority equity position.308 This type of arrangement vitiates any substantial 
control that government has at board level. In consequence, a concession to 
the suggestion much explored by transnational corporations that “a genuine 
joint venture means a 50:50 equity partnership in which neither party has a 
controlling interest is an explicit acknowledgement of the principle that 
majority ownership and control are two separate concepts”.309 
(2) Does the host government really wish to have control? A good example is 
Ghana, which terminated its management agreement with all foreign-owned 
timber companies in which it acquired a majority equity interest. Lipton 
succinctly summarised the financial repercussions of the joint venture as 
follows: “A Joint Venture Company is consistent with the national aspirations 
of developing countries, but their Governments recognise that taking shares in 
the company is not going to change the ‘bottom line’ figure to an investor. 
Whether a mining company pays a Government in the form of dividends, 
royalties, profits taxes, bonuses or surface rentals, such payments must come 
out of the ‘bottom line’. The return to the investor is discounted cash flow.” 310 
(3) Is the arrangement the status quo in new clothing? The international 
corporations themselves have overcome their reservations about joint 
ventures with host governments in the extractive sector. They have also 
realised that such ventures may effectively resolve nationalist objections to 
foreign control of natural resources without significantly thinning the 
corporation’s actual control or its financial gains or returns.311 Furthermore, 
from the operational viewpoint, The Government’s equity interests coupled 
with the presence of important Government officials on the board of the Joint 
Venture assures easy access to local capital and other facilities such as import 
licenses and permits from the Government agencies and then, by so doing, 
improves communication between the host country and the foreign 
company.312 Newly instituted indigenisation schemes, now very much in vogue 
in Nigeria, Ghana and many other developing countries, have, as their sole 
object to enable nationals to assume command of the economy. But it needs 
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to be appreciated that the transfer of a majority equity interest in foreign 
owned enterprises to the citizens of the host country does not necessarily 
guarantee a change of control. Problems posed by ownership and control  
have attracted the attention of the intergovernmental working group of the 
United Nations Commission on Conduct for Transnational Corporations.313 
2.13 THE TRAINING FUNCTION OF JOINT VENTURES 
 
Despite the drawbacks of the joint venture agreement, it must be emphasised that 
firstly, joint can be employed as a valuable tool for management and technical 
training.314 
Secondly, they engender access to the operational strategies, policies, and 
techniques of multinational corporations, and as such, can provide developing 
countries with useful insights into effective management considerations and 
techniques.315 
The fact remains that there are drawbacks in such an arrangement, specifically the 
inability to achieve openness on the part of the transnational partners, and these 
may effectively undermine the development strategies of host governments; a 
government faced with such daunting tasks can rely on its sovereign rights to 
“impose an external regime of laws, regulations and administrative practices, which 
may subsequently achieve the control that has eluded its representatives in the 
boardroom”.316 Asante went further to explain that: 
“The search for control and increased financial returns on the part of 
host governments, principally in the petroleum producing countries, has 
given rise to a range of contractual arrangements with transnational 
corporations which, in form at least, represent a substantial departure 
from the traditional regime. The common characteristic of these new 
forms of agreement is that they underscore the status of the host State 
as the undisputed owner of the natural resource to be developed. They 
are formally structured to dismantle the enclave status enjoyed by the 
Transnational Corporation in the traditional concession and to reassert 
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in unqualified terms the sovereignty of the host State over its natural 
resources”317 
Unlike the traditional concessions, these new arrangements do vest title in the 
multinationals; rather, they give them the opportunity to perform certain specified 
tasks for a fee or consideration in kind.318 Governments of host countries have stated 
in clear terms their desire to assert state ownership of natural resources and have 
enacted legislation expressly abolishing the outdated and outmoded systems as 
being very incompatible with statehood and their sovereignty. 
2.14 JOINT VENTURE AND PARTNERSHIP DISTINGUISHED 
 
Time and again, there have been decisions that emphasise the difference between 
joint ventures and partnerships. Jaeger outlines key factors from the examination of 
certain case law: 
1. The single or ad hoc nature of the undertaking; 
 
2. The eligibility of corporations for membership; 
 
3. Absence or extreme limitation of agency relationship; 
 
4. Lack of entity; 
 
5. Loss-sharing not essential; 
 
6. Action on the contact; 
 
7. Status: Delectus personarum, unnecessary; 
 
8. Death of member does not terminate joint venture.319 
 
Various attempts have been made to distinguish between the joint venture and other 
types of association, in particular the partnership. In ascertaining the law relating to 
joint ventures, it is first necessary to determine whether the joint venture is a species 
of partnership. Some aspect of the law of partnership may extend to joint ventures 
but whether this is so, will largely depend on the extent to which it is appropriate to 
draw a comparison between the joint venture and a partnership. In England and a 
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range of ex British colonies, Australia, for instance, “partnership” is defined320 as the 
relation which subsists between persons carrying out a business in common with a 
view to profit.321 Furthermore, the Income Tax Assessments Act322 states that 
“partnership means an association of persons carrying out business as partners or in 
receipt of income jointly but does not include a company.”323 Professor Crommelin 
has remarked that: 
“The definition employs a composite expression: persons carrying on a 
business in common with a view of profit. While it is usual to analyse 
that expression in terms of its principal elements (business, in common, 
view of profit) that approach appears artificial and could mislead. For 
example, concentration upon the elements of the definition might 
suggest that it is sufficient for the profit motive to be present in each 
person as regards his individual activities, whereas treating the 
definition as a composite expression requires the conclusion that the 
profit motive attaches to the persons as a group in the conduct of their 
common business.”324 
It can be argued from the definition above that the mineral and petroleum joint 
venture is not a partnership, since each partner in the joint venture is undoubtedly 
engaged in the business of discovery and exploitation of natural resources with a 
view to profit. Although the participants are carrying out some common activities, 
they are not carrying on a business in common with a view to profits. Nonetheless, 
they are carrying on several businesses, each with a view to making profit, some 
aspects of which are performed in common.325 As enshrined in the Partnership 
Act,326it can be adduced that, tenancy in common does not itself create a partnership 
as to the property so held and more significantly, the sharing of gross returns does 
not itself create a partnership. 
In United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty. Ltd., Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ 
said: 
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"The term 'joint venture' is not a technical one with a settled common 
law meaning. As a matter of ordinary language, it connotes an 
association of persons for the purposes of a particular trading, 
commercial, mining or other financial undertaking or endeavour with a 
view to mutual profit, with each participant usually (but not necessarily) 
contributing money, property or skills. Such a joint venture (or under 
Scott's law, 'adventure') will often be a partnership. The term is, 
however, apposite to refer to a joint undertaking or activity carried out 
through a medium other than a partnership: such as a company, a 
trust, an agency or joint ownership. The borderline between what can 
properly be described as a 'joint venture' and what should more 
properly be seen as no more than a simple contractual relationship may 
on occasion be blurred. Thus, when one party contributes only money 
or other property, it may sometimes be difficult to determine whether a 
relationship is a joint venture in which both parties are entitled to a 
share of profits or a simple contract of loan or a lease under which the 
interest or rent payable to the party providing the money or property is 
determined by reference to the profits made by the other. One would 
need a more confined and precise notion of what constitutes a 'joint 
venture' than that which the term bears as a matter of ordinary 
language before it could be said by way of general proposition that the 
relationship between joint venturers is necessarily a fiduciary one: ... 
The most that can be said is that whether or not the relationship 
between joint venturers is fiduciary will depend upon the form which 
the particular joint venture takes and upon the content of the 
obligations which the parties to it have undertaken." 327 
 
 
Similarly, Dawson J came to the conclusion that “perhaps in this country the 
important distinction between a partnership and a joint venture is, for practical 
purposes, the distinction between an association of persons who engage in a 
common undertaking for profit and an association of those who do so in order to 
generate a product to be shared amongst the participants. Enterprises of the latter 
kind are common enough in the exploration for and exploitation of mineral resources 
327 United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty. Ltd. [1985] 59 ALJR 676. 
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and the feature that is most likely to distinguish them from partnership is the sharing 
of product rather than profit. It is, however, unnecessary to pursue that matter 
here.”328 
Consequently, the Joint Operating Agreement governs the core rights and duties of 
the participants inter se. Where a fiduciary obligation is to be imposed on a 
participant the obligation “must accommodate itself to the terms of the contract so 
that it is consistent with, and conforms to, them”.329 The courts will not superimpose 
upon a Joint Operating Agreement a fiduciary obligation upon a participant, which 
will alter the operation which the Joint Operating Agreement was intended to 
have.330 If there is to be a fiduciary obligation, it must accommodate itself to the 
relationship between the Participants created by the Joint Operating Agreement. 
This was the view that was canvassed in the earlier case of Mount Isa Mines Ltd v 
Seltrust331, where the trial judge was of the view that “this is not a case where one 
can ignore what the parties have said. Clause 2.5 expressly provides that a 
partnership does not exist. This, by itself, may not be sufficient to exclude such a 
possibility, but if it can be seen from the terms of the arrangement as a whole that it 
is not a partnership, then effect will be given to the statement of the parties that it is 
not”.332 
Compare Australian Mutual Provident Society v Allan.333 In this case, the issue for 
deliberation was whether the contract was one of service or one of agency. If it was 
the former, then the respondent falls within the definition of ‘worker’ in section 3(1) 
of the (South Australian) Long Service Leave Act 1967.334 As such, the main indicium 
of partnership was missing. 
The ultimate equitable interest in the whole of the assets referred to in Canny Gabriel 
Castle Jackson Advertising Pty Ltd v Volume Sales (Finance) Pty Ltd.335 Here, “at the 
end of the day, each of the parties takes in kind the object of the venture, i.e. nickel 
concentrate, and there is no express restriction on the way in which each deal with 
328 Ibid; Crommelin (n 98) 68. 
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that product”.336 He continues, “I make these comments only to indicate that the 
agreement not only states that it is not a partnership, but its provisions indicate, in 
fact, that it is not and were it necessary to do so, it can be distinguished both in this 
and other aspects from Brian’s case”.337 
It can be suggested that the normal joint operating agreement does not involve that 
each participant is entitled and bound to take in kind its share of the crude or gas 
which is produced either at the well head, or if conveyed ashore by pipeline, then at 
the terminal, and to sell its share for its own account. The fact is that this 
arrangement does not amount to a sharing of profits which the partnership act 
definition requires. It would appear that the participants share the expenses of 
production but, however, sell the products separately. Ladbury remarked that it is 
likely that the difference between the mining joint venture and partnership is that in 
the joint venture the profit or gain will be derived by the venturers individually and 
will not be derived for their common or joint benefit.338 The mining joint venture is  
an expense-sharing and production-sharing agreement. Although each venturer may 
have the object of individual gain, there is no joint profit motive and there is no joint 
profit; thus, the parties might be carrying out their business or undertaking in 
common, but they are not carrying it out for joint profit.339 
2.14.1 Liability to Third Parties 
 
A partnership is the type of association to which the joint venture has been most 
frequently assimilated. This is particularly true with regards to the right of third 
parties. The question of liability to third parties of the participants and the operator 
in the mineral and petroleum joint venture may arise in relation to the actions of the 
operator and those of an individual participant.340 With regards to the actions of the 
operator, the law of agency determines the liability of the participants and the 
operator.341 
In general terms, “the participants are liable to third parties both in contract and in 
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is actual, implied, apparent or ostensible”.342 Also, “the operator is not liable to third 
parties in contract for such actions but is jointly and severally liable with the 
participants to third parties in tort in respect of them”.343 
The standard rule that the contract of an agent concluded with authority binds the 
principal rather than the agent to third parties is not without exceptions. In the first 
instance, the agent rather than the principal is liable if the agreement displays an 
objective intention on the part of the agent to contract as principal.344 Secondly, 
“both the agent and the principal are liable where the circumstances of a contract 
demonstrate an intention on the part of the agent to assume personal liability in 
addition to that of its principal”.345 Thirdly, in situations where the agent is a party to 
a deed and executes the deed in its own name, “the agent rather than the principal 
is liable even though it is described in the deed as acting for or on behalf of a named 
principal”.346 Fourthly, “the agent rather than the principal is liable on a bill of 
exchange executed by the agent”.347 
There is a growing controversy among scholars with regards to the mineral and 
petroleum joint venture whether the liability of participants to third parties in respect 
of the actions of the operator is joint or several. The usual case is that such liability is 
joint. It has been remarked that, “the prima facie rule is that a contract made by two 
or more persons is joint. Thus, where two or more persons give authority to an 
agent, the presumption is that they are authorising him to act only in such matters 
as concern them jointly, e.g. their joint property, and not in matters concerning one 
or the other alone. But there may be indications to the contrary: and of course, 
contractual liability (if there is a contract) of the co-principal may be held to be joint 
and several, rather than joint in appropriate cases.”348 
 
Furthermore, “liability to a third party in contract or in tort for the actions of an 
individual participant in the mineral and petroleum joint venture does not extend to 
the other participant unless the relationship of principal and agent exists between the 
participants and themselves”.349 It is a settled principle of law that a classic joint 
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venture agreement does not contain any provision to this effect and, as a result, one 
should not be implied from the situation or conduct of the participants as participants 
in the mineral and petroleum joint venture. Nevertheless, there is constantly the 
likelihood that the words or conduct may give rise to agency by estoppel350 between 
the participants in the joint venture. 
The interest of a participant in the mineral and petroleum joint venture is twofold: 
proprietary and contractual.351 However, the proprietary interest is that of a tenant in 
common in the assets of the joint venture while the contractual interest comprises 
choses in action relating to the management of the undertaking.352 It can be argued 
that the interest is distinguishable from that of a partner in a partnership property. 
This issue came for consideration in Canny Gabriel Castle Jackson Pty Ltd v Volume 
Sales (Finance) Pty Ltd.353 The court came to the conclusion that “the partner’s share 
in the partnership is not a title to specific property but a right to his proportion of the 
surplus after the realisation of the assets and the payment of debts and liabilities. 
However, it has always been accepted that a partner has an interest in every aspect 
of the partnership and this interest has been universally described as a beneficial 
interest notwithstanding its peculiar character…The interest of the partner in an  
asset of the partnership is sui generis…it is, as we have said, recognised as a 
beneficial interest. As such it constitutes an equitable interest and is not a mere 




In a mineral and petroleum joint venture, are the rights of the participants 
assignable? It would appear that in a mineral and petroleum venture the capacity of 
the participant to assign its rights is dependent upon the nature of the interest. 
These interests could be proprietary or contractual and such aspects necessitate 
special consideration. In the case of proprietary rights, the capacity of the participant 
to assign those rights are clear, at least in the absence of a statutory restraint upon 
assignment.355 However, the positions differ from one jurisdiction to another. In 
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Australia, for instance, where the position differs significantly from other places, it is 
established that a contractual moderation upon alienation of property is void as 
contrary to public policy.356 There is no doubt that a contractual right of first refusal 
or right of pre-emption seems unlikely to be regarded as a moderation upon 
alienation, provided, at least, that the price payable upon exercise of the right does 
not depart too far from the value of the property rights to be assigned.357 It has  
been argued that the complexities involved in a contractual right of first refusal or 
right of pre-emption concerns the extent of its enforcement. The common practice is 
that such a provision is not enforceable against an assignee of property, even where 
the assignee at the time of the assignment had notice of the restriction and was also 
aware that the assignment was in breach thereof.358 
It is a settled principle of law that a court of equity will usually intervene prior to the 
completion of the assignment to enforce a contractual restriction against a party with 
notice thereof.359 The usual remedy in such an instance is an injunction; the 
underlying principle for judicial intervention possibly lies in an inherent refusal of a 
court of equity to permit specific performance of the agreement to assign in breach 
of the contractual restriction. This was the view that was canvassed in the case of De 
Mattos v Gibson.360 The dictum of Knight Bruce is remarkable when he noted as 
follows: 
“Reason and justice seem to prescribe that, at least as a general rule, 
where a man, by gift or purchase, acquires property from another with 
the knowledge of another, with knowledge of a previous contract, 
lawfully and for valuable consideration made by him with a third person 
to use and employ the property for a particular purpose in a specified 
manner, the acquirer shall not to the material damage of the third party 
in opposition to the contract and inconsistently with it, use and employ 
the property in a manner not allowable to the giver or the seller. This 
rule, applicable alike in general as I conceive to moveable and 
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the English law, may like other general rules, be liable to the exceptions 
from special circumstances…”361 
 
It is doubtful whether the qualifications suggested in the case of De Matos v 
Gibbons362 still hold water since they are contrary to the Doctrine of Privity of 
Contact. The underlying principle is that contractual restriction on assignment will 
not, by and large, be enforceable against an assignee of the property. 
Conversely, a proprietary restriction upon assignment of the interest of the 
participants in the assets of a joint venture is not without its drawbacks. It has been 
argued that the rule against perpetuities undermines any such restriction pertaining 
to assignment, contingent, to a certain extent, upon the rights vested on 
assignment.363 In addition, any such restriction may possibly be subject to statutory 
requirements of ministerial consent and registration with severe penalty attached to 
non-compliance.364 There are also instances of extreme cases where an option to 
purchase may be construed as a restraint upon alienation especially if the price to be 
paid upon exercise of the option does not in any way disclose the value of the 
property to be assigned.365 The question that readily comes to mind is to what extent 
can the contractual rights be assignable? It is not in doubt that the benefits of the 
contractual rights are assignable in equity. 
Nonetheless, there exist some exceptions. For instance, where the contract calls for 
personal performance, the benefits in this case are unassignable except where the 
parties to the contract have indicated a contrary intention.366 Further, the question 
then arises as to whether an assignment in breach of the restriction on assignment is 
enforceable. Once more, it appears obligatory to establish whether the joint venture 
calls for personal performance of the contract by the participants. Yet again, there is 
little doubt that an assignment of such contractual rights in breach of the restriction 
upon assignment is void. On the other hand, if the joint venture does not call for 
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than a warranty, the breach of which may escalate to an action for damages, but 
which nevertheless does not nullify the assignment constituting the breach.367 
2.15 FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF JOINT VENTURES 
 
We now go on to question whether joint venture is mutually beneficial to the parties 
concerned and, in areas where there are lacunae, look at ways of dealing with such 
drawbacks. There is a growing recognition amongst commentators that financial 
benefits and costs of joint ventures may be consistently coordinated. From the host 
government’s point of view, the financial and economic benefits depend to a large 
extent on the structure of the fiscal regime, the compensation formula for the equity 
interest acquired by the government, and the economic connection provided for in 
the arrangements.368 The financial returns to the host government may be 
significantly increased if it retains the right to impose a royalty in addition to such 
other forms of return as taxes on the income of the venture and on the shareholders’ 
dividends, surface rental, bonus payments, and mineral duty, not to mention the 
dividends which may accrue to its newly acquired equity.369 
Furthermore, the joint venture agreement differs in a number of significant respects 
from the rentier arrangements. Initially, the host country obtains a direct share in the 
real profit of the operation as opposed to a merely fiscal benefit.370 Whereas in the 
traditional concession the host country received 50% of the profit in tax, the profit 
was a notional accounting figure. In the early sixties, the income tax transformed 
into an almost pure per barrel tax, whereas in joint venture circumstances, the host 
country, through its national oil company, earns a proportion of the real profits of the 
operation.371 
The financial benefits are less apparent where the governments obtain an equity 
interest in lieu of all royalties, income tax, and other obligation, as in the Lamco 
Project in Liberia.372 Where such arrangements pertain, the amount of foreign capital 
and expertise brought in tends to be lower, and requirements for domestic capital 
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and expertise are consequently higher in the case of a joint venture than in a 
completely foreign-owned subsidiary.373 The joint venture approach consequently 
implies a lower aggregate level of investment for the company as a whole than  
would otherwise be possible. Furthermore, the fact that profits need to be “shared 
with the local equity holders creates a motivation for the parent company to reduce 
locally declared profits by making use of whatsoever flexibility exists in the pricing of 
inputs and outputs, by charging the full costs of technical, managerial, and other 
services supplied from headquarters or affiliates, and by other means”.374 
Lipton says that: “aside from the capital shortage, the primary pull towards joint 
venture appears to have come from the growing nationalism in the less developed 
countries. Enterprises in developing countries have tended to demonstrate a 
considerable reluctance to engage in joint venture. This reluctance has finally broken 
down as it has been revealed either that this is the only form of foreign investment 
available or that it at least contains advantages over wholly owned investments for 
relations within the less developed countries. A joint venture company is consistent 
with the national aspirations of developing countries, but their governments 
recognise that taking shares in a company is not going to change the “bottom line” 
figure to an investor. Whether a mining company pays a government in the form of 
dividends, royalties, profit taxes, bonuses, or surface rentals, such payments must 
come out of the “bottom line” – return to the investor, its inexpensive cash flow”.375 
Also, it is therefore not surprising that international corporations themselves have 
overcome their earlier reservations about joint ventures with host governments in  
the extractive sector. They have become conscious that such ventures may efficiently 
silence nationalists’ objections to foreign control of natural resources without 
considerably reducing the corporation’s de facto control or its financial returns. 
It should be noted that quite independently from probable financial and economic 
benefits, joint ventures, when appropriately handled or supervised, could serve as 
functional mechanisms for management and technical training. They could also 
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transnational corporation. To point out the possible drawbacks in such arrangements 
may effectively undermine the development strategies of host governments. 
On the part of capital exporting countries, the range of motives expressed by 
transnational companies is wide. Friedman and Kalmanoff paint a very clear picture, 
which is as follows: 
At one extreme, there is a strong opposition in principle to joint 
ventures; at the other there is an acceptance of joint venture as the 
most appropriate and rewarding way of doing business abroad. 
Between these two extremes, there are at least two intermediate 
positions: one prefers solo operations but accepts joint ventures as 
occasionally unavoidable; the other is neutral, accepting without any 
preferences either the joint venture or solo venture, depending on the 
dictates of opportunity, circumstance and direct advantage. The trend is 
toward increased acceptability of joint venture. It would appear that 
company policy, in earlier times unbendingly set in favour of solo 




In an effort to distribute risk, maximise the use of investment capital and divide the 
heavy costs of construction and operation, this study has identified that most 
developing countries seeking capital now resort to joint venture. The joint venture is 
beyond doubt one of the most flexible arrangements available. The idea may not be 
new, but in today’s business climate there is a blend of mandatory economic and 
political forces that bring this form of operation into ever increasing use. A 
considerable amount of sovereignty is restored to the government’s fiscal powers. 
The significance of such an extension of sovereignty is that once accepted by the 
company, it further reduces the areas where conflict can be expected. 
Successful joint ventures are considered as fostering the achievement of the major 
goals by each partner. These goals are a clear stipulation and understanding of the 
objectives, interest and contributions of the joint venture partners and it is 
recognised that joint ventures are most likely to succeed when each partner has 
376 Friedman and Kalmanoff (n 108) 132-133. 
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clear cut objectives and its cognisant of the objectives and the interest of the other 
partner. 
From the foregoing, the Nigerian version of joint venture, participation and joint 
operating agreement will form the crux of the next chapter. The essence of a joint 
venture is the successful acquisition of foreign technology leading to rapid 
technological assimilation and adaptation which is a sine qua non for industrial 
development, economic progress, and technological self-reliance. 
Although the terms of joint venture agreements were initially more favourable to 
host countries compared with the traditional concession regime, they have not 
remained static. Due to the changed circumstances and the improved bargaining 
power of some of the host countries, particularly OPEC producer countries, many 
countries have been able to negotiate new and better terms of agreement. A joint 
venture expresses the idea of partnership, and it is only based on partnership that 
the economic progress of the less developed countries can be achieved and that it 
will be possible to impart the experience and resources of the more developed 
countries to nations that want to bridge the gap without sacrificing national pride and 
human dignity. 
What measures did host nations take to regain control of their natural resources and 
judiciously share oil profits? What is the mischief and undoing of these contracts and 




THE NIGERIAN VERSION OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
 
3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE JOINT VENTURE TYPE AGREEMENT 
 
The terms of the concession form of agreement did evolve to meet the changing 
situation in the fifties and sixties. However, as host countries became more 
interested in the question for control, even the modified concession agreement 
became less apposite to the new situation. The replacement of the old-style 
concession by the joint venture agreement as the dominant agreement for new 
acreage began in the late fifties. In the early sixties, apart from some Gulf States, no 
new agreements followed the concessions form of agreement. Stevens is of the view 
that although the existing concessions continued to dominate oil production, they too 
came under increasing pressure which culminated in the participation agreements of 
1972.377 
The joint venture arrangements will form the subject of this chapter. Their nature, 
purpose and terms, as applicable to the Nigerian oil sector, will be examined. Where 
appropriate, comparison will be made with other jurisdictions, with a view to 
establishing what such an arrangement should provide for. 
The growth of this contractual form of arrangement was due to four major factors, 
mainly the obsolescence of the concession agreement for new acreage; the 
availability of new acreage; the liability of the host countries to pursue a course of 
sole development; and the rise of new oil companies. One significant factor that 
influenced the espousal of petroleum joint ventures in Africa was the success of the 
state-owned oil company, the Italian Ente Nationale Indro-carbon (ENI) and the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) led by its maverick, Enrico Mattei and operating 
through its subsidiaries.378 
African and Middle East countries saw in the joint venture plan an opportunity to 
achieve a favourable balance between foreign exploitation and national economic 
sovereignty over natural resources. Such arrangements are necessary because two 
or more parties, for their mutual benefit, wish to share or apportion the high risks 
377 Stevens (n 238) 7. 




and financial burdens associated with exploitation of petroleum products.379 Also, 
other agreements are obligatory between such parties and the third parties that 
provide them with services which they are unable to provide for themselves. 
Egypt was the first country in Africa to put a petroleum joint venture into practice. 
She championed the system of granting oil leases on much smaller acreages for 
shorter terms to many enterprises from many nations in contrast to the large 
acreages and long terms granted to a few oil companies in the Middle East under the 
traditional concession system.380 During 1957, the Egyptian General Petroleum 
Corporation (EGPC), a state-owned agency and the Egyptian Co-operation Petroleum 
Company, a national company, entered into a joint venture contract with the 
International Egyptian Oil Company IEOC), a subsidiary of ENI, for exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum resources. 
Other oil producing African countries followed suit namely Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, 
Ivory Coast and Gabon. ENI’s prospecting licence in Nigeria gave an option to the 
Government to purchase 30% of the share capital of the Nigerian subsidiary of ENI 
(called the Nigerian Agip Oil Company) if commercial discovery was established.381 
The new trend of petroleum joint venture amongst developing countries was given 
much impetus by the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries which was 
founded in 1960,382 with the tilting of the erstwhile contractual scale in favour of its 
member nations383 as its primary objective. According to Etikerentse, during this 
period the United States corridors reverberated with the sounds of the demands by 
the developing countries for the reordering of the concepts of the old international 
economic order.384 The basic truth is that in this period of time, the emergent 
developing countries began acting as prime movers, a change signalled by the United 
Nations resolution on permanent sovereignty over natural resources being passed by 
that body’s General Assembly. 
379 Ibid. 
380 M Olisa, Nigeria Petroleum Law and Practice (1997) 62. 
381 Annual report 1964-65, Petroleum Division of the Federal Ministry of Mines and Power Lagos, 
Nigeria. P 7 states that the option was for the acquisition of one third of the company’s venture; 
however, the agreement by which the option was granted specifically gives to the government the 
option to acquire 30% of the share capital of the Nigeria Agip company. For detailed account see Olisa 
ibid 63. 
382 However, the groundwork for its formation had been laid down since about 1949. Nigeria joined 
OPEC in 1971. 
383 Although the groundwork for its establishment has been in the pipeline since 1949. Nigeria, 
however, joined OPEC in 1971. 
384 Godfrey Etikerentse, Nigerian Petroleum Law (2nd edition, Lagos: Drewdew Publishers 2004) 18. 
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The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Resolution XVI Article 90 
of 1968 called for modification in the structure of the relationship between OPEC 
member states and IOCs.385 It provided that386 “where provision for government 
participation in the ownership of a concession holding company under any of the 
present petroleum contracts has not been made, the government may acquire a 
reasonable participation on the grounds of changing circumstances”.387 Plausibly, one 
of the reasons for the institution of the participation arrangement was a perceived 
need for Nigeria to become robustly involved in the exploitation of its petroleum. The 
potential for such arrangement to result in the acquisition by Nigerians of the skills 
and expertise required for petroleum exploitation must have been perceived. It must 
also have been seen that the participation arrangement is capable of leading to 
substantial increases in the revenue accruing to the Government of the Federation 
from the exploitation of its petroleum. 
Another possible incentive for the institution of the participation arrangement is the 
urging from the OPEC on its members to either exploit its hydrocarbon resources 
directly or become participants in the exploitation. This was reiterated in a 
declaratory statement on petroleum policy in 1968; in which OPEC urge inter alia 
that: 
Member countries shall endeavour, as far as feasible, to explore for and 
develop their hydrocarbon resources directly. The capital, specialists and 
the provision of marketing outlets required for such direct development 
may be complemented when necessary from alternate sources on a 
commercial basis. However, when a member Government is not capable 
of developing its hydrocarbon resources directly, it may enter into 
contracts of various types, to be defined in its legislation but subject to 
the present principles, with outside operators for a reasonable 
remuneration, taking into account the degree of risk involved. Under 
such arrangements, the government shall seek to retain the greatest 
 
385 Kola Adeniji, ‘State Participation in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry’ (1977) IIJWTL 156. See also H 
S Zakariya, ‘Sovereignty, State Participation and the Need to Restructure the Existing Petroleum 
Concessions’ (1971) 10 Alberta Law Review 201, 223. 
386 OPEC Official Resolutions Press Releases. Although Nigeria had not joined at this time, the Act 
embodied the principle contained in the resolution. The resolution reaffirmed “the inalienable right of 
all countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in the interest of their 
national development as a universally recognized principle of public law”. 
387 This resolution was affirmed in 1971. See Resolution 135 of July 1971 in OPEC Official Resolutions 
and Press Releases. 
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measure possible of participation and control over concessions. Where 
provision for participation in the ownership of the concession holding 
company under any of the petroleum contracts has not been made, 
government may acquire a reasonable participation on the ground of the 
principle of changing circumstances.388 
Another reason that can be readily adduced for the participation agreements’ 
attractiveness and use amongst host countries is that they are seen as a medium to 
attract outside assistance in the form of large risk capital, technological and 
management expertise, which are necessary for the development of petroleum 
resources.389 
It is further observed that the Resolution called on each member country to attain 
public sector participation in the oil industry operating within its territory and 
prescribed a guideline for the level of participation. The level of participation was a 
minimum of 25% participation by 1973 and of 51% by 1982.390 Each and every one 
of the member countries has surpassed the minimum percentage and a number of 
them have, in addition to this, a total nationalisation whilst at the same time working 
out an equally satisfactory arrangement for foreign oil companies to carry on 
petroleum arrangements.391 As a result, in most of the major oil producing countries 
these days, despite the fact that ownership of the hydrocarbon is vested in the state, 
the state is also an operator as well as the regulating and administrative authority 
governing its relationship with the transnational companies. In most of the cases, the 
state-owned oil companies in these countries operate as the instrument for achieving 
effective participation.392 
There is a general view that where the special terms and conditions impose 
participation by the Government of the Federation, it becomes very important to 
 
 
388 OPEC Bulletin No. 8, (1968), p. 4. Developments in the sixties were to alter the relative bargaining 
positions of the international oil companies and the producing countries. This could have led to the 
injection of participation by imposition as in paragraph 34(a) of the Schedule to the Petroleum Act as 
amended. 
389 Zakariya (n 385) 555. 
390 This new concept of host country rights has, of course, since been further re-emphasised in later 
Resolutions of the United Nations, such as those relating to the Declaration on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. In 
addition, see Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) 1974. See also Asante (n 4) 336-340. 
391 Olisa (n 380) 63. 
392 Maxwell Gidado, Petroleum Development Contracts with Multinational Oil Companies, The Nigerian 
Experience. (Maiduguri: Ed-Linform Services 1999) 136. 
109 
 
negotiate the terms of the participation agreement.393 The negotiations,  as 
prescribed by statute, take place between the Minister or his delegate(s) and the 
applicant for the license or lease.394 The terms arrived at in the course of the 
negotiations are reduced into an agreement known as the Participation Agreement. 
It can be suggested that a participation agreement is an assignment of a fractional 
interest in a petroleum leasehold estate together with the assets and funds employed 
in the development of the leasehold.395 It is an example of agreements that create 
the common law relationship of co-ownership, co-tenancy or concurrent ownership. 
In the participation agreement, the company assigns and transfers to the NNPC an 
undivided 60% (80% in the case of Shell) interest in the subject matter of the 
assignment for a specified consideration. More often than not, the consideration was 
payable in oil at the option of NNPC. The underlying principle is that “the basis of 
determining the amount of the consideration is the fiscal net book value of the assets 
of the company as declared in the tax returns of the company preceding the effective 
date of the participation agreement”.396 
3.2 PARTICIPATION 
 
3.2.1 Definition of Participation 
 
Participation is a process whereby the host country gains an amount of equity within 
the operating company in the existing oil concessions.397 The concept stems from a 
desire by oil-producing countries to acquire a greater share of the profits from 
producing and exporting operations within their borders and to exercise a greater 
control over such operations.398 
As prescribed in paragraph 34(a) of the Petroleum Act 1969, provision is made 
permitting the Nigerian Government to participate in all licenses or leases granted 




395 Olisa (n 380) 71. 
396 Ibid; Book value is defined in the participation agreement between the Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation and each of the oil producing companies in Nigeria as the sum of all qualified capital 
expenditure (including construction in progress) as defined in the Nigerian Petroleum Profit Tax Act 
and all exploration, costs, intangible drilling costs, and similar and related expenditure less the 
cumulative capital allowable deduction based on such costs, and which were utilized by the company 
to reduce the company’s Nigerian tax liability up to the effective date. 
397 D N Smith (1973) 67 AJIL Proc. 230. 
398 M A Ajomo, ‘An Appraisal of the OPEC’ (1977) 13 Texas International Law Journal 66. 
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The Act authorises the Federal government to attain participation in the oil industry 
by dialogue, to a certain extent, rather than through independent action. The Act 
prescribes that: 
If he (the Minister) considers it to be in the public interest, he may 
impose on a licence or lease to which this Schedule applies special terms 
and conditions not inconsistent with this Act, including terms and 
conditions as to: 
a) Participation by the Federal Military Government in the venture to 
which the license or lease relates, on terms to be negotiated 
between the Minister and the applicant for the licence or 
lease…399 
All licences or leases are granted subject to the Petroleum Act, as revised, and the 
regulations made under it. They are approved subject to the unique terms and 
conditions in the Annex attached to it, if any.400 The forms of an Oil Prospecting 
Licence and of an Oil Mining Lease as stipulated in the Schedule to the Drilling and 
Production Regulations specify these conditions. Where participation is obligatory, 
the annexure, it is suggested, can only be such as replicates the entailment of 
participation as special terms and conditions. To satisfy this, the annexure to the 
licence or lease has to consist of a statement imposing the special terms and 
conditions, the Participation Agreement and the Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) 




In compliance with OPEC time table which expects members to acquire a 
participating interest in the operation of oil companies in their individual countries. 
Subsequent to Nigeria joining OPEC in 1971, specifically in April 1973, the Nigerian 
government obtained a 35 per cent equity share of all the licenses and this was to 
oscillate in stages to 60 per cent by July 1979. It signed JOAs with a variety of oil 
companies, controlled all the way through by a government-owned company, the 









During August 1979, the government nationalised the British Petroleum (BP) 
shareholding in the Shell operation, consequently leaving the Shell/NNPC upstream 
joint venture, remarkably, with a 20:80 equity split. By mid-1989, the ratio became 
NNPC/Shell/Elf/Agip 60:30:5:5 and by 1991, it became 55:30:10:5. Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC), which today has more than 90 
producing oil fields in the Niger Delta, is the operator of this joint venture. Its recent 
production accounts for more than half of Nigeria’s total export. 
The other matter is that the ratio of participation at the early stages was rather 
flexible;402 it is usually as a result of the outcome of the negotiation with each oil 
company and whether or not the company involved was a holder of an existing Oil 
Prospecting License (OPL) or Oil Mining Lease (OML). As time went on, with effect 
from April 1973, Government participation at a level of 35 per cent was applied to 
other oil-producing companies in the country, that is: Gulf, Mobil, Agip-Phillips, 
Texaco and Pan Ocean.403 An additional 20 per cent interest was acquired with effect 
from April 1974, giving a total government participation of 55 per cent.404 This was 
followed by another acquisition of 5 per cent interest with effect from July 1979, and 
as such, from that date, the NNPC, as a transferee on behalf of the Government, 
owns a participating interest of 60 per cent in the operations and assets of all oil- 
producing companies in Nigeria, except those companies that are parties with NNPC 
to service contracts or production-sharing contracts.405 The procurement of this 
interest made possible concrete government participation in the operations of oil 
companies in Nigeria. As a result of obtaining such participating interest, Nigeria’s 
strategic position in a joint venture involves making payments in proportion to the 
costs of carrying out the oil operations of each company, and as a result collects its 










402 Gidado (n 392) 137. 
403 Uduiomo Itsueli, ‘Privatisation legislation and contracts in the petroleum sector’ (1993) 11(2) 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 94. 
404 Gidado (n 392) 137. 
405 All participation interest acquired by government became vested in the NNPC with effect from April 
17, 1977. 
406 Gidado (n 392) 137. 
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3.2.2   Reasons for Government Participation 
 
Government’s greater involvement and participation in the operation of transnational 
petroleum companies located within the developing countries, with time became 
increasingly unavoidable for the following reasons. 
The foremost reason given for government participation in the oil industry was that 
oil was going to play a strategic role in the nation’s economy.407 It would appear that 
in the case of Nigeria, government participation could be seen as a political as well  
as an economic necessity.408 Other than in the case of Elf, participation was achieved 
through negotiation with transnational oil companies. 409 
Secondly, such controls permit the delivery of consistent rules for oil resource 
development. The design of a petroleum guiding principle must be better prioritised 
by public officials, given its importance to the economic growth of the country. 
Thirdly, foreign exchange being a federal subject under the Constitution, the Federal 
Government is the only authority that can effectively pursue, in partnership with the 
oil companies, a policy that will not unfavourably affect the foreign exchange 
situation.410 
Fourthly, because of the strategic significance of oil as one of the most important 
industries of the twenty-first century and its weight on many facets of national life 
and all areas of economic development, it is only natural that it should be jealously 
guarded in the interest of the nation as a whole.411 
Fifthly, original deposits of petroleum are part of the national heritage and, with 
regards to those occurring beneath the continental shelf, the coastal State have the 
benefit of sovereign rights over them for purpose of exploration and exploitation, in 
 
407 Adeniji (n 385) 160. 
408 Ibid 161. 
409 Ibid. 
410 Keith W Blinn, International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation and Exploration Agreements: 
Legal, Economic and Policy Aspects (Euromoney Publications, 1986) 169. In the absence of 
contractual provisions pertaining to foreign exchange transactions, the multinationals may derive a 
certain measure of comfort from the fact that the general legislation governing current payments and 
currency-practices may not be depart from the principles stated in Article VIII of the International 
Monetary Fund. Articles of Agreement (Avoidance of Restriction on Current Payments and Avoidance 
of Discriminatory Currency Practices) 
411 Augustine A Ikein, The Impact of Oil on a developing country: The case of Nigeria (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers 1990) 14. Bargaining strength continues to be controlled by the demand and 
supply of oil and the degree essentially of oil in the world market. 
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accordance to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.412 For that 
reason, the State should have the sole discretion and power as to their disposition 
and the mode in which they are explored and exploited. 
Furthermore, considering such intrinsic features of the petroleum venture with the 
colossal capital expense required, the high level of technical competence that is 
obligatory, and the huge risks involved, only the Federal Government has the 
capacity to put up with those burdens.413 Besides, from experience all over the 
developing countries, only a strong government can impose enough sanctions to 
compel a foreign oil company to share the essential know how with an adequately 
large number of Nigerians to make a useful impact.414 Even then, the outlook is at 
times doubtful and recourse is made to the support of friendly governments which 
either share Nigerian political or economic aspirations or have suffered and overcome 
the same pattern of exploitation. 
In addition, private ownership and control of oil resources would deliver vast benefits 
to the few individuals that claim to own them. Rawls however highlights that these 
vast private benefits cannot guarantee a delivery of positive benefits to the rest of 
the nation. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that it will ease the “class struggle”, 
particularly in nations which are characterised by largely fratricidal tribal societies.415 
Lastly, federal control of oil resources is symbolic, in that it emphasises national 
heritage and the unity of a nation. It also serves to demonstrate that these resources 











412 It replaced section 61(a) of the Mineral Ordinance 1914. 
413 Ikein (n 411) 14. 
414 Ibid. 
415 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971). Rawls states: ‘Each person [or 
community] possess an invariability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole, 
cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a 
greater good shared by others. It does not allows that the sacrifices imposed on a few mineral 
producing areas are outweighed by the large sums of advantages enjoyed by many [nationally and 
internationally] Therefore, in a just society, the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled: the 
rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest… 
the [t]ruth and justice are uncompromising’. 
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In addition, to play a role in the policy decisions of the company and to exercise de 
facto control over the oil industry,416 participation by NNPC in the operations and 
assets of each oil-producing company has been in the following subject areas: 
(a) The OPLs and OMLs held by the oil company, 
(b) The fixed and movable assets of the company in Nigeria, together with 
development, production, transportation, distribution and export operations and 
related assets, such as offices, housing and welfare facilities, and 
(c) The working capital appropriate to the joint operations of the OPLs and OMLs.417 
It is significant to stress that the NNPC does not own shares or stock in any of the 
foreign oil companies with which it has joint venture operation agreements. In other 
words, NNPC only has a non-equity participation agreement with these companies. 
In terms of acquisition of participation interests, consultations between both parties 
were cumbersome. In several instances, the consultation period with the NNPC 
would last as long as two years.418 Also, reimbursement to the companies for the 
government’s acquired interests was at first established on premise of the 
rationalised value of their assets.419 In other words, this was based on a customary 
commercial calculation, wherein the value of the assets in future are calculated, 
regardless of the devaluation and qualifying capital allowances they had hitherto 
claimed on such assets.420 With time, this formula was abandoned for an assurance 
of oil and buy back system. 
3.3 CONSTITUENT PARTS OF A JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT 
 
In the case of a Nigerian petroleum joint venture, two or more oil companies enter 
into an agreement for joint development of oil prospecting licenses or oil mining 






416 P McPherson, ‘Recent Developments in Petroleum Laws and Contracts’ (1984) 33 International 
Energy Law 53 and M A Ajomo, ‘The 1969 Petroleum Decree: Consolidating Legislation in Nigeria’s Oil 
Industry’ 66. 
417 See Article 1 of the Participation Agreement between the NNPC and ELF Nigeria Ltd 1985, the 
NNPC and Gulf Oil Company Ltd 1984, the NNPC and Shell Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria Ltd 1984, and the NNPC and the rest of the oil companies operating in Nigeria. 






costs and shares the benefits or losses of the operations, based on its proportionate 
equity interest in the venture.422 
Similarly, under the joint venture arrangements, the relationship is defined not only 
by the License or the Lease but also by other agreements, e.g., a participation 
agreement; and a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA); The joint venture is also 
synchronised by a third agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). 
Every joint venture (JV) functions under a JOA with the NNPC and an MOU with the 
Federal Government. 
3.4 PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT IN NIGERIA 
 
It is a basic fact that participation agreements in Nigeria are heterogeneous in 
structure.423 There are two separate, but related agreements needed to achieve 
public participation in the oil sector: The equity share participation agreement and 
non-equity share participation agreement. In practice, the two agreements tend to 
become fused into one agreement, as is done in farm-out agreements between two 
private sector oil companies. By contrast, joint agreements in Kuwait, Qatar and 
Libya before total nationalisation, took the form of one single agreement covering 
participation, ownership, and the conduct and benefit of the joint venture 
operations.424 
3.4.1. Equity Share Participation Agreements 
 
Under this kind of arrangement, the government is a shareholder in the joint venture 
company and is allowed dividends to the amount of its equity share interest in that 
company. This arrangement requires the creation of a separate legal entity in the 
form of a joint stock company by a foreign oil company and the Nigerian Government 
or its agency. The company that is created is usually totally neutral vis-à-vis its 
parents and, as a result, can strive to unify its management approach and optimise 
human and material resources without recourse to the joint venture partners. In 
terms of representation on the Board of Management, this is solely dependent on the 
participation interest of the parties.425 Management is by and large autonomous, and 
 
422 Ibid. 
423 Adenji (n 385) 163. 
424 Selected documents –the international petroleum industry 19 OPEC Vienna (1973) p. 97, 125, 126 
and 146. 
425 Gidado (n 392) 140. 
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not subject to deviation or sway by the partners, who interfere only to protect their 
several interests if threatened at Board level.426 The joint company usually has its 
own wholly discrete picture and perspective. 
Prior to 1984, there existed only draft participation agreements, but over time,  
formal agreements came to be signed, in general between the NNPC and all the 
major oil companies in Nigeria in whose working interests and operations the NNPC 
had acquired varying levels or percentages of ownership.427 Two reasons can readily 
be adduced for the delay in completing the Agreements. The first of these was the 
obstinate position taken by the oil companies regarding the value of their existing 
assets which NNPC wanted to acquire and the ensuing claims and counter-claims 
which justifiably persisted for long periods due to the major financial consequences 
involved.428 The second cause of delay was the fact that there were regular and long 
interruptions because the Federal Government were unable to sustain the cadence of 
negotiations owing to the regular personnel turnover in its negotiation team.429 
It has been commented that the 1984 official Participation Agreements replicate 
entire tranches acquired by the Government through NNPC (including the additional 
5% taken from scores of the oil companies in July 1979); in the operation of the 
multinational oil companies in Nigeria. Similarly, were the Heads of Agreement (HOA) 
on off-take/scheduling and lifting signed alongside the Participation Agreements.430 
3.4.2. Matters Dealt with in Participation Agreements 
 
The chief matters dealt with in every Participation Agreement included the following: 
 
(i) The proportion of each party’s participation interests in the oil mining leases 
(initially owned 100% by the oil company listed in the Agreement’s Annex I) 
 
426 Asante (n 4) 349. The government, through its majority representation on the board of the 
subsidiaries of the multinational companies can however, influence investment and production polices 
but day-to-day decision making is left to the companies. 
427 Adedolapo Akinrele, ‘The Nigerian National Petroleum Company at a Cross-Roads: An Analysis of 
the Challenges of Funding, Commercialisation and Autonomy’ (2003) 2(1) OGEL 3. 
428 Ibid 4; These acquisitions which were punctuated by protracted delays due to bitter disagreements 
by the oil companies over the valuation of interests and other bureaucratic factors meant that former 
participation agreements were not executed until 1984. Such delays in securing participation 
agreements also accounted for the protracted non-existence of joint operating agreements long after 
NNPC acquisition had been completed. This gave rise to the anomalous situation where from the time 
of acquisition through to the signing of the JOA in 1991, operation of joint venture business was 
conducted on the basis of the gentle man agreement. 
429 Ibid 4. 
430 Adedolapo Akinrele, ‘The Nigerian Oil and Gas Law’ (2005) OGEL 140. 
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and in the assets i.e. pipelines, flow stations, oil terminals, movable and 
immovable property. These interests in the assets are described as 
“undivided”431 
(ii) The amount of consideration (fiscal) paid by the Government to the oil 
company in respect of the interest obtained.432 
(iii) The prerequisite for a Joint Operating Agreement (with an Accounting 
Procedure) meant to be signed by the parties as soon as feasible after the 
implementation of the Participation Agreement, to obviously establish the 
parties’ rights and obligations as to the method in which the joint venture is to 
function and be administered.433 
 
One legal argument of interest in the ownership structure of the joint venture 
property is worthy of note. The matter has to do with the legal significance of the 
parties’ interest being “undivided”, a term not defined in the participation Agreement. 
There is a growing controversy amongst commentators such as Akinrele, as to the 
term as ordinarily understood, means that one party’s interest or ownership in a 
particular joint property, though ascertainable, nevertheless is not discrete from the 
other party’s interest in the same property.434 One could indeed wonder what, 
subsequently, would be a court’s decision in a situation where the tenement rate in a 
joint property is opposed by a joint venture company based on section 16(1) of the 
NNPC Act which exempts such NNPC’s property from tenement rate payment. Thus, 
the non-NNPC joint venture partner needs to benefit by seeking to enlarge the 
protection enjoyed by an NNPC qualifying hereditament because the interests of the 
parties in such hereditament are undivided; e.g. pipelines or warehouse which 
cannot be actually taken separately for valuation purposes. This issue has been 
canvassed by the courts, amongst others, for instance the matter of Resolution in 
tenements rates payment, litigation filed by some local governments against some 
joint venture oil companies. The question pending for determination in these cases, 
is whether in light of the provisions of section 44(3) of the 1999 Constitution (same 
as section 40(3) of the 1979 Constitution and item 39 on the Exclusive Legislative 
List in the 1999 Constitution, a local government can impose tenement rates on 
hereditaments which are directly connected with “mines and minerals including oil 
431 See article 1 a) of the NNPC/Chevron Agreement. 
432  See Article d) of the NNPC/Chevron Agreement 
433 See Article 3.03 of the NNPC/Chevron Agreement. 
434 Akinrele (n 430). 
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fields, oil mining… and natural gas” e.g., pipelines, flow stations, storage tanks in a 
farm terminal, etc. These matters are still pending, begging for answers).435 
 
A related question arises in respect of participation in oil services companies  
because, by virtue of the Nigeria Enterprise Promotion Decree 1977 (the NEP 
Decree), the NNPC acquired substantial equity shares in certain of these 
companies.436 For example, the NNPC acquired an equity share ownership of 60% in 
the National Oil and Chemical Marketing Company (initially owned for 60% by B.P. 
Company Limited and for 40% by Shell) and the African Petroleum Company (initially 
owned for 60% by B.P. and for 40% by the NNPC). However, the nationalisation of 
B.P. was sparked off as a result of the fact that it shipped oil to South Africa, (which 
was against Nigerian government policy) and as a result of this ugly incident, Nigeria 
acquired the 60% interests that were owned by B.P. in both of these companies.437 
Following this event, it became apparent that the oil companies engaged in 
exploration and production operations were not in any way mentioned in the NEP 
decree in relation to the equity holdings. The Decree, in schedule 3, makes it 
expressly clear without any form of ambiguity that “all other enterprises not included 
in schedules 1 and 2, not being public sector enterprises, are exempted from the 
provisions of the act.” This means that the government, acting through its agent the 
NNPC, has no equity share, but merely an equity participation agreement with the oil 
exploration and production companies. 
Also, the NEP Decree, also known as the indigenisation Decree was enacted for the 
purpose of transferring proprietary interest in business organisation from foreign 
control to Nigerians. The Decree specifically categorises all business enterprises in 
the private sector into three groups, each carrying a different percentage of 
obligatory Nigerian participation, that is to say 100, 60, and 40 per cent in that order. 
435 Section 44(3) of the 1999 Constitution states: ‘Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this 
section, the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in under or 
upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone 
of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as 
may be prescribed by the National Assembly’; Capitalising further on the above provisions, Item 39(1) 
Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution has also vested in the National Assembly the exclusive 
powers to legislate on inter alia mines and minerals including oil fields, oil mining and geological 
surveys. The meaning of this is that irrespective of how aggrieved the oil producing communities of 
the Niger Delta may feel, over the natural resources ownership laws, no state or local government can 
give redress and solace. If true social and economic justice that will bring down the temple of 
militancy is to be achieved in the Niger Delta region, section 44(3) must be expunged from the 
constitution. 
436 Gidado (n 392) 140. 
437 Acquisition of Assets (British Petroleum Limited) Act (1979) 20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. 
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Similarly, the joint equity participation agreement between the NNPC and 
Shell/Agip/Elf, for purposes of gas liquefaction, led to the creation of a company 
known as Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Limited. Consequently, shares in this 
company were NNPC 60%, Shell 20%, and Agip 10% respectively. The NNPC 
similarly had substantial equity holdings in other companies such as Hyson and 
Bermuda Ltd. 
It would appear that a similar mode of operations exists in both equity participation 
agreements and non-equity participation agreements. In fact, apart from the fact 
that it has a say in the management through its Board representatives who see to it 
that Government’s policies are carried out, the NNPC acts as the non-operating 
partner. The fundamental disparity between the two types of agreements lies in the 
fact that on the one side, the government has equity share holdings and on the 
other, it has only a participatory right to a share in the ownership and conduct of 
petroleum operations in accordance with its participating interest. Another area of 
dissimilarity lies in the fact that under the equity participation agreement a new 
corporate body is created, while this is not generally the case under a non-equity 
participation arrangement.438 
3.5. JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS 
 
In Nigeria, a JOA was signed between the NNPC and each of its joint venture 
partners in July 1991 right after the very protracted negotiations. Under this form of 
arrangement, the government participates in the ownership and authorised 
operations as well as shares in kind in crude oil and other products.439 This particular 
type of JOA is described as a by-product of a legally and politically obligatory joint 
venture agreement or what some scholars has coined a mandatory or privileged joint 
venture.440 Thus, in this perspective the state, as a non-operator under a free or 
carried participation, gains access to the resources. The state is carried free, as it 
does not participate in the exploration efforts in the existing acreages at the time of 
its beginning participation. Consequently, the JOA in respect of existing acreages is 
focused principally on co-sharing as regards fields, development and operating 
expenditure, with the state as non-operating partner sharing in the production profits 
 
438 Gidado (n 392) 142. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Thomas Walde, The Current Status of International Petroleum Investment: Regulating Licensing 
and Taxing and Contracting (Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy 1995). 
120 
 
as well as the additional objective of know-how and technical information.441 Despite 
the dominance of the traditional joint venture JOA, no standard JOA is established in 
the Nigerian oil and gas sector, and consequently co-venturers will avail themselves 
the advantage of numerous model forms which have developed worldwide.442 
Akinrele’s, position is that the joint operating agreement (JOA) represents the 
fundamental conglomerate agreement between the co-venturers and manages the 
relationship between them in the conduct of operations under the license. It stands 
as the sole source of authority between the sets of co-venturers for a definite 
member known as the operator, for it to carry out operations and acquire 
commitments on behalf of other co-venturers.443 
Further, according to Taylor and Tyne, it is the constitution by which the joint 
venture is governed and performs essentially the same role as a partnership 
agreement or the memorandum and articles of association of a company.444 
In addition, the JOA can also give permission to the operating committee to take 
decisions on a wide range of issues which are not explicitly provided for in the JOA 
by preponderance and which will be binding on an insubordinate co-venturer.445 
However, there are certain matters that are not expressly within the scope of a JOA. 
Matters that are not within the ambit of the JOA are disposal of produced oil and  
gas, except perhaps to the extent of an agreement on lifting principles.446 Similarly, 
the acquisition of rights to explore, appraise, develop or produce hydrocarbon 
 
 
441 Akinrele (n 430) 140. 
442The origin of the JOA dates back to form 610 devised by the American Association of Petroleum 
Landmarks (AAPL), which for many years was standard for onshore operations in the United States of 
America. In the United Kingdom a wide variety of agreements emerged from the UK licensing rounds 
which started in 1964 and continued to the mid-1970s. Moves were now to standardize the form in 
the 5th UK Licensing rounds in 1977 when the oil companies were invited to consent to a 51% carried 
interest to the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC). This format was confirmed after the BNOC and 
its successor the Oil Pipelines Agency ceased to have a privileged position. Currently, a number of 
variants of the BNOC format have been negotiated, even though the bulk of JOAs remain standardized 
around the BNOC format. See, for instance, the Progressive Partnership Working Group (PPWG) JOA 
http://www.pilottaskforce.co.uk. Other existing formats are the Model Form International Operating 
Agreement (1995) prepared under the aegis of the Association of International Petroleum Negotiators 
(AIPN) and the American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA) (though not endorsed by either) and 
the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation’s Exploration, Development and Mine Operating 
Agreement (Model Form 5A) (1996). 
443 Ibid. 
444 Michael Taylor and Sally M Tyne, Joint Operating Agreements (Longman Law, Tax and Finance 
1992) 111. 




outside the contract area to which the JOA relates, other than as a consequence of 
the unitisation with an adjoining area, does not fall under the ambit of a JOA. 
Furthermore, under this kind of arrangement, the government does not own shares 
or stocks in the joint venture company and are not entitled to dividend from the 
company. There are a variety of these types of arrangement worldwide; these entail 
the formation of a working association between a transnational company and a host 
government or its agency without the creation of a new and separate company. The 
fact is that both parties agree to hold jointly all rights and interests under the joint 
venture agreement and meet expenses under the participating interests. A good 
example of a joint operating agreement is that signed in July 1991 between the 
Minister of Petroleum Resources with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation’s 
(NNPC) partners in the NNPC/Shell Joint Ventures. 
The joint venture partners are NNPC 60%, Nigerian Agip Oil Company 30%, and Elf 
Nigeria 5%. Shell is the operator of the joint venture.447 Before the official signing of 
the joint operating agreement in July 1991, no formal joint operating agreement 
existed between the partners. The agreement signed in July 1991 was therefore, the 
first joint operating agreement to make official the working relationships between the 
joint venture partners.448 The basic principle is that one of the parties, usually the 
transnational company, is designated as the operator of the undertaking. 
This kind of joint venture was first used by Algeria in 1968 when the state oil 
corporation Sonatrach entered into an association with Getty Petroleum Company for 
the exploration and production of hydrocarbons. The Agreement depicted the 
association as not being a “legal entity or a corporation or a partnership save for only 
the juxtaposition of participation and interest according to a percentage fixed at 51 
per cent for Sonatrach and 49 per cent for Getty”.449 It provided for a management 
 
447 The Acquisition of Assets (British Petroleum Company Limited) Act 1979 (No. 56 of 1979), referred 
to in Ajomo (n 398) 92. The nationalisation of BP’s assets in Nigeria was a political move against the 
British government’s widely publicised decision to supply crude oil to South Africa. See Ajomo (n  398) 
22. In 1989, the government voluntarily relinquished part of its 80% interest in Shell to establish the 
present partnership structure of NNPC 60%, Shell 30%, Elf 5% and Agip 5% in the NNPC/Shell joint 
venture. See (1991) September/October Report No. 138, World Petroleum Taxation and Legislation at 
51. 
448Ibid. 
449 The Agreement, governed by the Sahara Petroleum Code of 1958, except as otherwise varied by 
terms of the Association, provided for the transfer by Getty to Sonatrach of 51 per cent of Getty’s 
interest in selected concessions in Algeria in consideration of a price equal to 51 per cent of the net 
book value of the assets and exploration values payable over a period of four years in the form of 
crude oil deliveries from the share acquired by Sonatrach under the transfer. For a full text of the 
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structure consisting of an Executive Council of four representatives of Sonatrach and 
three of Getty and operation by Sonatrach, with Getty (as requested by it) to furnish 
technical assistance and qualified personnel, the cost to be borne by the 
Association.450 
3.5.1. Main Clauses in a Joint Operating Agreement 
 
3.5.1.1 Parties’ obligations in the joint operating agreement: 
 
An archetypal JOA specifies the percentage interest of each of the licensees by 
separating the joint tenancy created by the licence and therefore establishing 
tenancy in common between the co-licensees who are parties to the JOA. There are 
certain provisions overriding the obligations of the parties which touch on 
contemplated assignment of their participating interest as well as their undivided 
interest in the mining leases. It has been commented that these obligations are likely 
to limit the independent transfer of the participating interest of the parties. That 
notwithstanding, such limitation possibly will not extend to the circumstances where 
the proposed assignee is not an affiliate of the assignor. Nonetheless, even if that is 
the case, the would-be assignee requires satisfying the statutory provisions of 
paragraph 14 to 16 of the schedule to the Petroleum Act. However, a different 
scenario is created where the proposed assignee is not an affiliate, and the JOA 
makes this absolutely comprehensible as follows: 
(a) When the assigning party receives an offer from a third party which it 
desires to accept, it should give to the other JOA party or parties the prior 
rights and option in writing to purchase the participating interest and the 
other JOA party may within 30 days thereafter request in writing the 
assignment to it of the interest and such assignment must be so effected 
on the same terms as those offered by the non-JOA third party. 
(b) If such other JOA party fails to exercise the purchase option, then the 





Agreement, see, OPEC Selected Documents 1968 253-288. Quoted in G H Barrows, World Wide 
Concessions Contracts and Petroleum Legislation (Tulsa, Oklahoma: Penwell Publishing 1983) 263. 
450Adeniji (n 385) 166. 
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3.5.1.2 Identity and Function of the Operator 
 
Under the JOA, one of the parties will be appointed as the operator, i.e. will be 
responsible for the day to day running of the operations. The operator typically, but 
not at all times, has a significant percentage interest in the license. The operator is 
also expected to be financially sound and technically competent.451 
As a guide, Article 2.1 of the 1991 NNPC/Chevron JVA expressly provided for the 
appointment of the operator and it states as follows: 
“A company is hereby designated, and agrees to act, as the Operators of 
the Concessions and Contract Area under this Agreement and hereby 
assumes the duties and obligations of Operators and shall have the 
rights of the Operators hereunder. 
The Parties acknowledge that a company has been the Operator of the 
Concessions prior to the Effective Date…” 
 
Under this kind of agreement, the foreign owned Oil Company, or in case it is more 
than one, one of the foreign owned oil companies, is appointed as the Operator of 
the joint venture. The operator is responsible for (a) the conduct of all permitted 
joint operations subject to the requirements of the agreement and is under 
compulsion to conduct the petroleum operations of the venture as a careful operator, 
in a good and workmanlike manner, in accordance with permitted budgets work 
programmes; (b) good oilfield practice; plus (c) acquiescence with applicable laws 
and regulations. The Operator might conduct a number of operations by itself or 
otherwise through its agents or contractors. Consequently, the Operator remains in 
charge of the operations carried out other than by it. As formally expressed, the 
Operator has precise duties which include: 
[a] responsibility to carry out all joint Operations with utmost good faith and in a 
good workmanlike manner, in accordance with good industry practice and applicable 
Regulations, in respect of all the operations under the JOA452 “Regulations” in Article 




451 NNPC/Chevron Joint Venture Agreement (1991), Article 2.1. 
452 Ibid, Article 2.2.1 of the typical NNPC/Chevron Agreement partner JOA. 
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“all statutes, law, rules, orders and regulations affecting Oil Mining 
Leases in effect from time to time and made by Government authorities 
having jurisdiction over the Concessions and the Contract Area and over 
operations conducted thereon.” 
This duty put in a nutshell, as it were, the essential functions of the Operator as well 
as his obligations to the host government, its joint venture “partner”, the  
government agencies, the environment, the communities, etc. 
[b] responsibility to kindly consult with the non-operator (i.e. the NNPC) and reveal 
completely to it all matters of importance pertaining to the Joint Operations.453 
[c] responsibility to present to the Operating committee in each year when 
considering and approving the Work Programme and Budget, the organisational 
chart pertaining to the management and supervisory positions of the Joint 
Operations.454 It shall report on the actual implementation of the chart at such 
meetings. 
[d] responsibility to choose its employees for the use of the joint Operations and 
decide their number, qualifications, hours of labour and compensation. Such 
employees nevertheless shall be the employees of the Operator and not of the non- 
operator.455 
[e] responsibility to enter into any contract or place any purchase order subject to 
the limitations and restrictions imposed by the JOA, concerning services, the 
procurement of facilities, equipment, materials, supplies, etc.456 
[f] responsibility to keep precise records and books of account with reference to the 
Joint Operations and to make them accessible to the non-operator during normal 
business hours.457 
[g] responsibility to litigate and reconcile claims in correlation with the Concessions, 
Contract Area, or Joint Operations on behalf of the Parties in accordance to the 
directions of the Operating Committee; provided on the other hand that the Operator 
 
453 Ibid, Article 2.2.3 
454 Ibid, Article 2.2.5. 
455 Ibid, Article 2.2.8. 
456 Ibid, Article 2.2.8. 
457 Ibid, Article 2.2.11. 
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may perhaps reconcile claims not exceeding an agreed amount458 without the 
endorsement of the Operating Committee.459 
[h] responsibility to open and keep a Joint Bank Account into which the Parties shall 
deposit all funds required for the Joint Operations. The Operator shall confirm, obtain 
and forward to the non-operator on a monthly basis, copies of the Joint Bank 
Account statements for the previous month.460 
[i] responsibility to build up and submit to the Chairman of the Operating Committee 
the proposed work programme and budgets obligatory under the Act.461 
The operator as a matter of practice does not receive remuneration for carrying out 
his operatorship responsibilities. The operator shall only be entitled to reimbursement 
for costs incurred under budgets and programmes submitted pursuant to clause 
2.3.462 In addition, the budget shall contain only itemised and detained estimate of 
cost and also a charge in an amount to cover the administrative and overhead 
expenses charged to the operator to the head office of the operator’s parent 
company, popularly known as the head office overhead charge.463 It is important to 
note that such a charge is calculated by applying a fixed percentage to the total 
capital expenditure in the specific year464. 
3.5.1.3 Fiduciary Duties of the Operator 
 
Fiduciary duties are usually invoked as implied terms of operating agreements. The 
nature of the equitable principle of fiduciary relationships of the operator with non- 
operators and the disputes arising from such relationship has not been a matter of 
judicial pronouncements in Nigeria.465 Fiduciary has been defined by Professor Scott 
as “a person who undertakes to act in the interest of another person. It is immaterial 
 
458 Ibid, Article 2.2.15. 
459 Ibid. 
460 Ibid Articles 1.1.20 and 2.2.16. 
461 Ibid Article 2.2.3 of the JOA. 
462 Ibid Sections 1 & 2 of the Petroleum Act (Cap. 35) are in pari materia with the following provisions 
of the aforementioned pre-independence statutes, viz., section 3 of the Minerals Ordinance 1946, and 
section 6(1)(a) and 6(3) of the Minerals Ordinance 1914 respectively, save that the Crown was the 
governing authority in the context of the latter. 
463 Akinrele (n 430) 144. 
464 Article 6.1.1(i) of the Traditional Joint Venture JOA. 
465 It has, however, been judicially considered in other common law jurisdictions excluding the United 
Kingdom) and been the subject matter of academic works on the position in such common law 
jurisdictions including the UK. See Gerald M D Bean, Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures 
(Clarendon Press 1995); and Michael P G Taylor and Sally M Tyne, Taylor and Winsor on Joint 
Operating Agreements: Oil and Gas Law (2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell 1992) 9. 
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whether the undertaking is in the form of a contract. It is immaterial that the 
undertaking is gratuitous.”466 Fiduciary relationship is, however, intrinsic to the 
relationship created by the JOA and is based on the trust conferred on the operator 
for conducting joint operations on behalf of the co-venturers. The operator, in 
dealing with the joint venture property or in entering into a contract with third 
parties, owes a duty to the joint venture partners and cannot acquire for its own 
benefit any interest in the property on the basis of the information acquired for the 
performance of the fiduciary duties. He will be held to be constructive trustee for any 
interest so acquired.467 This is as a result of the fact that a relationship of trustee and 
beneficiary and that of agent and principal has started. 
MacWilliamhas suggested that the courts use of “joint venture” to provide a basis on 
which to find a fiduciary relationship. 468 Once having so found, a breach of the 
fiduciary relationship will lead to the imposition of a constructive trust on the 
fiduciary. This was the view that was canvassed by the Supreme Court in the 
American case of Anderson v Stansbury469 and the court held as follows: 
“The imposition of a constructive trust is an equitable remedy requiring 
the balancing of equities and where the venture is known to the plaintiff 
and he does not claim his right to participate in a hazardous venture 
until the enterprise is successful, such delay will prohibit imposition of 
constructive trust.” 
It would appear also that all the parties to the JOA owe fiduciary duties to one 
another because the relationship between the parties amounts to partnership.470 The 
operator is consequently an agent of the other parties to the JOA. This was the 
matter that was deliberated in the Canadian case of Standard Investment Limited v 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,471 and the court came to the conclusion that: 
 
 
466 Austin W Scott, ‘The Fiduciary Principle: Proceedings of the Twenty Second Annual Meeting of the 
State Bar of California’ (1949) in D A MacWilliams ‘Fiduciary Relationships in Oil and Gas Joint 
Ventures’ (1970) 11 Alberta Law Review, Petroleum Law Supplement 234. See also Olisa (n 380) 82. 
467 Ibid MacWilliams. 
468 Ibid 233. 
469 Anderson v Stansbury (1952) 242 p. 2d 305. 
470 G M Lewis, ‘Joint Operating Agreements: Partnership?’(1986) 4 JENRL 80. 
471 Standard Investment Limited v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1983) 45 OR (2nd) 16. See 
nevertheless, E Smith, ‘Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Non-Operators, Investors and 
Other Interested Owners’ (1986) Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, Proceedings of the 32nd 
Annual Institute 2. The writer argues that the relationship between an operator and non-operator is 
not one of agency. 
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“The common elements in a fiduciary relationship are the reposing of 
trust and confidence in one who undertakes to act for or on behalf of the 
person reposing the trust. Equity then imposes a duty on the fiduciary to 
act in good faith and with the regard to the interests of the one 
imposing the confidence.” 
Furthermore, it is a settled principle of law that where parties are participants in a 
joint venture, the courts will endeavour to find a fiduciary relationship. The mere 
existence of such a relationship does not, however, require one party to share the 
benefits of his own enterprise with another. It is abundantly clear that the interest 
required must fall within the scope of the fiduciary duty. In addition, if a person who 
undertakes to act in the interest of another person breaches his duty of undivided 
loyalty to that person by failing to disregard his own interest in exercising  its 
fiduciary duty, he must account to his beneficiary for any benefit gained by him from 
such a breach. This was the view that was deliberated upon in Regal (Hastings) v 
Gulliver472, and Lord Russell of Killowen inter alia gave a dissenting judgment when 
he stated that: 
“The rule of equity which insists on those, who by the use of a fiduciary 
position make a profit, being liable to account for that profit, in no way 
depends upon fraud or absence of bona fides; or upon such questions or 
considerations as whether the profit would or should otherwise have 
gone to the plaintiff, or whether the profiteer was under a duty to obtain 
the source of the profit for the plaintiff… or whether the plaintiff has, in 
fact, been damaged or benefited by his action. The liability arises from 
the mere fact of a profit having, in the stated circumstances, been 
made. The profiteer, however honest and well-intentioned, cannot 
escape the risk of being called upon to account.” 
The common law fiduciary duties are expressly incorporated in the JOA and these are 
as follows: 
1) Obligation to make full disclosure of personal interest.473 
2) Obligation not to use joint venture property for profit 
 
 
472 Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER. [379], [386]. 
473 See article 2.2.3 of the Standard JOA (n 452). 
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3) The operator must account for any interest made on money held in the joint 
account. 
4) The operator must not misuse the information derived in confidence. 
5) The operator is obliged to make an earlier disclosure of the facilities, assets, 
personnel if any, that might be common to the operator of such businesses or 
activities to non-operators and as such, the foundation for allocating the common 
costs, if there is any, relating thereto shall be subject to the endorsement of the 
operating committee. 
6) Further, where the operator engages in activities or businesses outside the joint 
operations not being a sole risk operation.474 
 
The basic underlying fact is that breach of any of these duties will give rise to liability 
for breach of the fiduciary duty. It invariably means that the operator occupies a 
position of trust in managing the affairs of the joint venture’s partners. The operator 
must act with utmost due care and diligence in the conduct of the affairs of the joint 
venture partners.475 
 
Moreover, there are contractual obligations that the operator can perform. For 
instance, the operator can enter into contracts with third parties for the purposes of 
carrying out joint operations. The operator in this regard has the professed authority 
of all the co-venturers to bind them in relation to a given activity. The standard JOA 
provides that the operator shall have the authority, subject to any limitations or 
restrictions imposed by the Operating Committee, to enter into any contract or place 
any purchase order.476 
 
 
The popular view is that where the general authority exists; a third party does not 
need to enquire as to the operator’s authority for the contract to be binding on the 
other co-venturers unless the third party is proven to have actual knowledge of the 
want of authority.477 As a result, where the operator enters into a contract without 
 
 
474 A sole risk operation is discussed in Akinrele (n 430). 
475 Lawrence Atsegbua, Oil and Gas in Nigeria: theory and practice, (2nd edition Lagos and Benin: New 
Era Publications 2004) 97. 
476 See Standard JOA (n 452) Article 2.2.6. 
477 The concept of the operator’s general authority is undiminished even where other co-venturers 




authority, the third party who has no knowledge of his lack of authority will not be 
disentitled from enforcing the contract. The operator will be solely liable under the 
contract and will thus be unable to recover any contribution from his co-venturers478. 
The operator’s role in the choosing of contractors is subject to the ‘Uniform Project 
Implementation Procedure.’479 The NNPC, as a non-operator but with a majority 
interest which is reflected by its prevalence in the membership of the operating 
committee,  exercises  significant  authority  over  the operator’s  decisions.480  Clause 
2.2.8 (v) of the standard JOA, for example, provides that “the operator shall give 
preference to a contractor that is a company organised under the laws of Nigeria to 
the maximum extent possible, provided there is no significant difference in price or 
quality between such contractor and other contractors”. The Uniform Project 
Implementation Procedure provides a mechanism by which the non-operator can 
intervene to prevent faux pas on the part of the operator, provided this role is 
exercised in time. Again, this is mostly necessary in view of the contending 
perspectives between the operator and the non-operator under the Traditional Joint 
Venture arrangement. The non-operator’s role in the contracting process permits it, 
as far as possible, to exercise its power to control costs and keep joint operations 
effectual and within prearranged budgets. 
Furthermore, an Operator that acquires for its sole benefit an interest or profit out of 
the joint venture may be liable for a breach of its fiduciary duty. The courts may 
regard the Operator as a constructive trustee and may compel it to account to other 
co-owners for the benefit or interest. Professor Scott has remarked that an exact 
definition of a constructive trust cannot be framed and the best that can be done is 
to give a rough description of it. That restatement of the liability for restitution states 
that: 
“Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty 
to convey it to another on the grounds that he would be unjustly 
enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.”481 
 
 
478 Akinrele (n 430) 147. 
479 These procedures, which appear in Schedule D to the Standard TJV JOA, apply to contracts over a 
certain monetary value as set out by the operating committee in the body of the JOA. It should also 
be noted that the Uniform Project Implementation Procedure is subject to amendment from time to 
time. 
480 Akinrele (n 430) 148. 
481 Ibid; American Law Institute, restatement of Restitution Para. 160. (1936). 
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He refers also to a statement of Cardozo J of the New York Court of Appeal in Betty v 
Guggenheim Exploration Company482 were it said that “a constructive trust is the 
formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression”. He further 
explains that the provision in the restatement does not purport to define a 
constructive trust but attempts to cover so far as possible the circumstances under 
which a trust arises. 
Also, the liability does not depend on fraud or absence of good faith or whether his 
co-venturer has been damaged or benefited by the action of the Operator. The rule 
in Keech v. Sandford [1726] EWCH J76 is a foundational case derived from English 
trust laws on the fiduciary duty of loyalty. The remedy of granting a constructive 
trust over property and the strict approach that all possibility of a conflict of interest 
was to be prevented obtained from the prevalent view at the time. 
The Lord Chancellor, Lord King, directed the appellant to disgorge his profit. He 
explained: 
“I must consider this as a trust for the infant, for I very well see, if a 
trustee, on the refusal to renew, might have a lease to himself, few 
trust-estates would be renewed to the cestui que use, though I do not 
say there is a fraud in this case, yet (the trustee) should rather have let 
it run out, than to have had the lease to himself. This may seem hard, 
that the trustee is the only person of all mankind who might not have 
the lease but it is very proper that rule should be strictly pursued, 
though I do not say there is a fraud in this case, yet (the trustee) should 
rather have let it run out, than to have had the lease to himself. This 
may seem hard, that the trustee is the only person of all mankind who 
might not have the lease but it is very proper that rule should be strictly 
pursued and not in the least relaxed, for it is very obvious what would 
be the consequence of letting the lease, on refusal to renew the cestui 
que use so decreed, that the lease should be assigned to the infant and 
that the trustee should be indemnified from the covenants comprised in 





482 [1919] 225 NY 380 at 386. 
483 Soar v Ashwell CA [1893] 2 QB 390. 
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This was the view that was canvassed in the case of Soar v Ashwell where the trial 
judge, Lord Justice Bowen, held with regard to a constructive trust that: 
“A constructive trust is one which arises when a stranger to a trust 
already constituted is held by the court to be bound in good faith and in 
conscience by the trust in consequence of his conduct and behaviour. 
Such conduct and behaviour the court considers as involving him in his 
duties and responsibilities of a trustee, although but for such conduct or 
behaviour he would be a stranger to the trustee. A constructive trust is 




It is trite law that it is imperative to recognise that a constructive trust is a flexible 
remedy resembling a trust that arises by operation of law as a response to certain 
events that are normally termed a wrong. For this reason, the most remarkable 
aspect of a fiduciary relationship is the strict rule that a fiduciary may not keep any 
unauthorised profit arising from a position where there is a probability of conflict of 
personal interest and duty to their beneficiaries. Rather, the trustee must disgorge 
such profit by way of constructive trust, whether or not it was made at the cost of 
the trust. See generally the case of Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2AC 46. 
This is particularly so as he is in a dominant position, at any rate in the Nigerian 
context. However, an operator which observes and performs its duties and 
obligations in accordance with the provisions of the operating agreement will not be 
accountable for breach of its contractual duty or its fiduciary duty since it is doing no 
more and no less than observing the provisions of the Agreement. 
3.5.1.4 Operator’s Liabilities 
 
The operator’s fundamental function under Art 2.2.1 is to conduct all Joint 
Operations with utmost good faith, in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with 
good industry practice. A corollary or converse of this is that the Operator would be 
485 Ibid, Article 1.1.34. 
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liable to the non-operator if it failed to conduct the Joint Operations in the manner 
and to the standard required under Art 2.2.11. 
In Art 2.2.2., it is provided that the Operator or its affiliate shall not be liable for any 
loss or damage which results from “Wilful Misconduct” on the part of its Directors or 
supervisory staff,484 provided that under no circumstances shall the Operator or its 
affiliate be liable to the non-operator for reservoir damage or pollution or for any 
consequential losses whatsoever or howsoever occurring. 
“Wilful Misconduct” in relation to the Operator means: 
 
“an intentional and conscious reckless, or wanton disregard of any 
material provision in the JOA or any substantial part of the agreed 
programme of operation, but does not include a situation where the 
operator acts in compliance with the instructions of any governmental 
authority or in pursuance, in good faith, of a decision of the operating 
committee, or relates to safeguarding of life, property, or joint 
operations, or any error of judgment or mistake made in the exercise, in 
good faith, of any function, authority or any discretion conferred upon 
the operator.”485 
In this context, it is submitted that, the operator being an agent of the non-operator, 
there is no reason why its acts and relationship with the non-operator would not be 
governed by the general principles of the law of agency. It is noteworthy that in 
most operating agreements, the liability of the operator is limited to wilful and 
wanton misconduct but to prove liability has time and again been shown to be 
complicated and, as a consequence, uncommon. 
3.5.1.5 The Operating Committee 
 
The Operating Committee is established by the parties to the operating agreement 
for the objective of providing organised broad supervision, control and direction of all 
subjects pertaining to the joint venture operations and shall be established within 30 
days of the first execution. The Operating Committee is not a characteristic of all 
operating agreements outside Nigeria. In a number of past operating agreements 
which did not have an Operating Committee, specifically in the United States and 
 
484 Ibid, Article 2.2.2. 
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Canada, the operator was given exclusive control and management of the joint 
venture operations or of those joint operations equally agreed to by the co- 
venturers. This provision tends to bestow upon the operator a degree of control 
which is really superior to the participating interest of the operator. In a number of 
operating agreements without operating committees, functions delegated to the 
operator include control and management of the explorations, development and 
operations of the joint lands for the joint account subject to free and frank 
consultation and disclosure to non-operators with respect to all decisions regarding 
the conduct of all joint operations. 
It should be noted that in such operating agreements, none of the parties is in any 
central position vis-à-vis the others in terms of technology, knowhow and the 
expertise required for the conduct of resourceful petroleum operations. Nevertheless, 
the trend in more topical operating agreements is that the operator holds his position 
as long as the majority in the interests of the parties want him to do so, and he may 
well be removed with or without cause or wrongdoing on his part by the majority.486 
As the case may be, the Operator typically acts or acts under approval of the 
Operating Committee in respect of: 
(i) approval, revision or rejection of all proposed work programmes and 
budgets;487 
(ii) determination of the selection, scope, timing and location of all wells and 
facilities for joint operations as well as changes in the use or status of any 
such wells; 488 
(iii) consideration and decisions on matters relating to the addition or reduction 
of the contract area;489 
(iv) settlement of claims exceeding $300,000 (or its equivalent in foreign 
currency), where such claims are not covered by policies of insurance 
maintained for the joint account;490 
(v) consideration of universal matters relating to general policies, special 
studies, research, procedure and methods of the joint operations;491 
 
486 J A Maclean, ‘The Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen Operating Procedure: An Overview 
of the Revisions’, (1992) XXX(1) Alberta Law Review, Petroleum Law Edition 133, 143. 
487 Ibid, Article 3.1 (i). Of the typical NNPC/ J.V partners JOA. 
488 Ibid, Article 3.1 (ii). 
489 Ibid, Article 3.1 (iii). 
490 Ibid, Article 3.1 (iv). 
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(vi) the abandonment and storage of joint property or any portion thereof;492 
(vii) Ensuring that the operator implements the provisions of the Uniform 
Accounting Procedure (Schedule ‘B’), the Uniform Project Implementation 
Procedure (Schedule ‘C’), the Uniform Nomination Scheduling and lifting 
Procedure (Schedule ‘D’) and all amendments and revisions thereto as 
agreed by the parties. 
The JOA, in summary, gives a high degree of control to the operator such that it 
carries out the joint operations by itself, its agents or its contractors under general 
supervision and control of the joint operating committee.493 
The operating committee generally consists of at least one representative of each of 
the co-venturers. Under the Nigerian JOA, the operating committee is made up of  
ten persons appointed by the co-venturers, six persons representing the NNPC and 
four persons representing the operator with a quorum of five persons (three from  
the NNPC and two from the operator). The non-operator appoints the chairman of 
the committee and the operator appoints the secretary (who need not be a member 
of the operating committee) to keep minutes and records of all actions and decisions 
of the operating committee. The operating committee meets once every four months 
or at regular intervals or by request of any of the co-venturers. 
Decisions of the operating committee are to be made by resolute vote of the parties 
and this ensures that the non-operator has a veto power over any proposed action of 
the operator to which it objects. Nevertheless, other JOAs provide for majority 
decisions and in some non JOAs, such powers of veto are intrinsically limited so that 
the operator may be permitted to override normal voting procedures for work 
programme approvals, mainly where the licence requirements for the fulfilment of 
drilling programmes need to be met. It is acknowledged that the reason why such a 





491 Ibid Article 3.1 (v). 
492 Ibid Article 3.1 (vi). 
493 This position is similar to the BNOC proforma JOA, which was imposed from the mid-1970s when 
the policy of State participation in the UK was being implemented. In the 1990s, CRINE provided for a 
relaxation in the degree of control of the operators’ functions based on the need to save costs. This 
should be contrasted with the position under the AAPL form 610 where there is no provision for an 
operating committee. In the latter context, non-operators look to the wide powers of ‘non-consent’ 
afforded them under this form of the JOA in order to object to the operator’s proposals as regards 
operations. Quoted from Akinrele (n 430). 
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an agency of the State, which acts in a quasi-regulatory capacity, is believed to be 
aware of its responsibilities under the licence.494 
Similarly, the JOA also makes provision for committee decisions to be made without 
the need to call a meeting, if such matter is submitted by the chairman on his own 
proposal or at the application of any party or, in the case of pressing issues, by the 
operator. Such notice will contain enough information regarding the issue to be 
determined so as to enable the parties to make a knowledgeable decision with 
respect to such issue.495 
Financial controls are exercised by the operating committee firstly in the course of 
the approval of programmes and budgets put forward by the operator and secondly 
through the process of authorisations for expenditures (AFE). The former, i.e. the 
budget, is always a rough estimate whereas the latter symbolise a more precise 
financial control which is prepared by the operator when it has determined more 
precisely the probable costs of certain services or operations. 
It is worth noting that the supervisory role of the operating committee is 
fundamental to the effective running of the JOA. It invariably means that if the 
committee fails to discharge its duty conscientiously, the operator will assume a 
dominant role in the JOA. This situation more often than not poses huge problems 
for the joint venture partners. Thus, the operating committee acts as a check to, and 
balances the role of the operator. 
3.5.2. Insurance Aspects of a JOA 
 
The insurance provisions in the Operating Agreement are very adequate; the scope 
of risks covered is wide and the limits of coverage in each category of policy are 
appropriate. Each party shall take out and maintain, at its sole cost and expense and 
in respect of its participating interest, insurance with respect to physical damage to 
property whether onshore, offshore or in transit for the full re-instatement value on 
an All Risks Basis and to include well control. Also, the Operator has to take out and 
maintain for itself and for the non-Operators and pay for and charge to the joint 




494 Ibid 151. 
495 Ibid Article 3.5. 
496 Olisa (n 380) 93. 
497 Akinrele (430) Article 5.2.3 for offshore operations. 
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The insurance maintained by each party shall not prejudice any insurance obtained 
by the Operator for the joint account of the joint venture and shall include a waiver 
of subrogation in favour of other parties to the agreement. The policy should also 
provide for each other party to be given not less than thirty days prior notice of 
cancellation so that such other party may take steps to protect its interest, such as 
payment of any outstanding premium on behalf of the party in default of premium 
payment. 
The responsibilities of the Operator are enormous as far as insurance is concerned. 
The insurance maintained by the Operator must name non-Operators as additions or 
co-insured and underwriters must waive all rights of subrogation in favour of non- 
Operators and their respective affiliates, directors, servants, agents and employees. 
3.5.2.1. Operator’s Undertakings with regard to Insurance 
 
The Operator undertakes to: - 
 
(i) use its best efforts to require its contractors and sub-contractors to 
maintain such types of insurance and within limits of accounts as the 
Operator deems fit with respect to joint operations;496 
(ii) ensure that the insurers furnish non-Operators with certificates of 
insurance (and renewal thereof) obtained and maintained by it 
pursuant to the agreement and with a summary of details of the policy 
evidenced by each certificate; and 
(iii) Take sole responsibility for any loss, claim, demand or damage arising 
from its failure to take out and maintain any of the insurance policies 
which the Operator is obliged to take out pursuant to the agreement 
except where the Operator has used all reasonable endeavours but has 
been unable to do so and has promptly notified the non-Operator(s).497 
3.5.2.2. Sole Risk Operations 
 
Sole risk simply means an action performed by only one of the party as enshrined in 
the provisions of article 8 of the JOA. The basic underlying purpose is to differentiate 
between those operations where the decision of the operating committee has been 
498 Akinrele (n 430) 155. 
499 Olisa (n 380) 95. 
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unanimous,498 and to help in determining the issue of which operations to undertake 
where a common decision cannot be reached. In the latter case, there is clearly a 
risk that the whole operation will come to an end; the JOA however, tries to mediate 
such an impasse through providing for the taking of sole risk, whereby the 
contentious operation may be undertaken by one of the co-venturers at its own cost 
and risk and for sole profit. 
In the first instance, the provisions for a sole risk operation lay down a mechanism 
for a party to a joint venture agreement to avail himself of a common law right of co- 
tenancy, which is the right of use and enjoyment of the common property provided 
he does not oust any of his co-tenants and provided further that he accounts to his 
co-tenants to the extent of their respective interests in the common property. 
However, the common law obligation of accounting to his co-tenants is still very 
much adapted by the sole risk provisions. 
Secondly, the party who is bearing the entire risk and costs of sole risk operation 
should be provided with a reward proportionate with the risk taken. It is only if the 
sole risk party or parties obtain production that the matter of reward arises.499 
Certain conditions apply to sole risk operations. As a universal rule, no sole risk 
operations may be planned or undertaken except when conditions prescribed in the 
operating agreement are fulfilled. One significant condition is that the proposed 
operations must not unfavourably affect and are not in conflict or capable of 
conflicting with any joint operations of all the parties. The additional condition is that 
the activities that may be performed as sole risk operations are limited to those listed 
in the agreement. That is the uniform Joint Operating Agreement in use in Nigeria. 
Such activities may include the following activities: 
(a) the deepening, side tracking or plugging back of an Exploratory Well; 
(b) the drilling of an Exploratory Well including testing and coring programmes; 
(c) the drilling of evaluation and development wells and the installation of production 
facilities to develop a discovery made by a Sole Risk Exploratory Well, provided 
the rationale (of the production facilities) is not to increase or step up production 
from any other geological structure than the one on which the sole risk 
exploratory well was drilled; also 
501 Olisa (n 380) 97. 
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It would appear that if the operating agreement establishes an operating committee, 
it follows that when a sole risk operation is being contemplated, a written proposal in 
complete form for that sole risk operation must be initially made to the committee. 
The basic underlying principle is that the written proposal must state apposite details 
of the operation such as the location of a proposed well, purpose of the operation, 
the scope of geological and geophysical programmes, proposed depth, enumerated 
estimate of the costs thereof, economic analysis and expected dates of 
commencement and completion. It can be argued that a proposal for sole risk 
operations is not permitted for deepening or side tracking an exploratory well at the 
same time as drilling is in progress unless the well has not run into a discovery and 
the parties are determined to discard the well. 
A further mechanism for undertaking sole risk operations is for a party to give to 
other parties a sole risk notice in writing within periods specified in the agreement. 
In some operating agreements, a party which elects to participate could do so either 
for its working interest or for its proportionate share of all available interests. If there 
is any surprising interest, the proposing party would have to assume it or else it 
could be allocated proportionately to the participating parties or by any other 
arrangement as the agreement may provide. A maximum limit may be set on the 
maximum percentage interest that a party may have in the sole risk operations. 
Furthermore, as among the participating parties, the provisions of the operating 
agreement relating to the duties as well as rights of the operators along with the 
rights and obligations of non-operators shall apply mutatis mutandis to the conduct 
of the sole risk operations, the accounting consequently and to the operation of any 




500 Clause 8.2 of the Uniform Joint Operating Agreement. In the Agreement, the definition of 
“Exploratory Well” is technical. For the present purpose, a simple definition will suffice and that is: “a 
well drilled in unproven or semi-proven territory for the purpose of ascertaining the presence 
underground of a commercial petroleum deposit.” See H R Williams and C J Meyers, Manual of Oil and 
Gas Terms, (2nd edition, New York: Matthew Bender & Company Incorporated 1964) 148. 
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Also, a number of the participating parties may not wish the operator to carry out the 
sole risk operations if they are of the opinion that the proposing party could carry out 
the operations proficiently for the cost set out in the notice or proposal for sole risk 
operations. To provide for such a situation, some operating agreements have 
provisions under which one of the participating parties will become the operator of 
sole risk operations. 
Before long, as the prescribed period of election to participate terminates or as soon 
as the parties have replied to the sole risk notice, the proposing party will without 
delay give notice to all participating parties stating how the costs, risks and benefits 
are to be borne or shared. The operator of sole risk operations must keep and 
maintain separate books, records and accounts with respect to these operations and 
the participating parties shall have the right to examine and audit the books, records 
and accounts. 
There is a growing recognition that a party not participating in sole risk operations 
may well subsequently elect to participate in the operations, but he has to pay a 
penalty for so doing. This penalty is typically of one of two kinds, namely a 
production penalty or a cash penalty. However, the uniform operating agreement 
presently in use in Nigeria provides for a cash penalty; a non-participating party may 
at any time, elect to participate in sole risk operations by paying to the sole risk party 
any amount equal to its participating interest share of the cumulative cost and 
expenditure of the sole risk operations incurred as of the date of the election plus 
200% thereof as re-entry penalty. The re-entry penalty must be paid in cash in the 
currency in which the sole risk costs were earned. The agreement also provides an 
alternative for payment “in kind” as the parties may jointly agree. It has been 
observed that with regard to the re-entry penalty, the agreement makes no 
distinction between an exploratory well and a developmental sole risk drilling. 
3.5.2.3 Separate Books, Records and Accounts: 
 
The Operator shall keep and preserve separate books, records and accounts 
(including bank accounts) regarding the Sole Risk Operation502 (Art 8.7.2.). In this 




502 Ibid; Uniform Joint Operating Agreement., Article 8.7.2. 
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expenditure for the Sole Risk Operation to the Operator within fifteen days after 
receipt of the Operator’s request.503 
 
3.5.2.4 Election of Non-Participating Party to Participate in Further 
Work: 
A non-participating Party may at any time, elect to participate in a Sole Risk 
Operation by paying to the other Party, an amount equal to its Participating Interest 
share of the cumulative cost and expenditure of the Sole Risk Operation, incurred as 
of the date of such election plus 200% thereof being a re-entry penalty.504 (Art  
8.10). 
3.5.2.5 Use of Joint Property and Personnel of Operator: 
 
The Sole Risk Party shall be permitted the use of Joint Property and the Operator’s 
personnel for the operation; provided however that at all time, the Joint Operations 
shall take precedence over the Sole Risk Operation.505 In all such operations the Sole 
Risk Party shall indemnify and hold free and harmless the non-Participating Party 
against all suits, claims, liens, liabilities and damages directly or indirectly caused to 
third parties or earned by the Non-Participating Party arising from anything done or 
omitted to be done in the course of the Sole Risk Operation.506 
3.5.2.6 Entitlement to the Sole Risk Operations, Production and 
Facilities: 
(i) Typically, all property obtained through a Sole Risk Operation, including data 
and information, is possessed entirely by the Sole Risk Party, subject to no 
participation election by a Non-Participating Party having taken place.507 
(ii) Where participation by a Non-Sole Risk Party occurs later, the petroleum and 
the facilities up to the time of such happening are owned by the Sole Risk 
Party.508 
(iii) Despite the election of a Non-Sole Risk Party to participate in an operation 
connecting production of petroleum discovered as a result of a Sole Risk 
 
503 Ibid, Article 8.9. 
504 Ibid, Article 8.10. 
505 Ibid, Article 4.11. 
506 Ibid, Article 8.12. 
507 Ibid, Article 8.13. 
508 Ibid, Article 8.13.2. 
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Exploratory Well, and the payment by the Non-Sole Risk Party of the amount 
referred to in Art 8.10, the Non-Sole Risk Party shall not be entitled to receive 
any payment in kind or cash or credit for any petroleum which was produced 
as a result of a discovery from such Exploratory Well prior to the date of such 
election to participate and such payment. Upon such election and payment, 
however, such Non-Sole Risk Party shall be entitled to its Participating Interest 
share of the petroleum produced as a result of a discovery from such 
Exploratory Well following such election and payment.509 (see Art. 8.13.3). 
3.5.3 Other Provisions of the JOA 
 
A number of other provisions are contained in Article 6.2. Of the Standard Nigerian 
JOA: 
3.5.3.1 Force Majeure. 
 
No Party shall be liable in respect of any delay in completion of work hereunder or of 
the non-performance of any term or condition of this JVA directly or indirectly 
resulting from delays by Acts of God; acts of the public enemy; strikes; lockouts; 
epidemics and riots; power failure; water shortage or adverse weather conditions; or 
other causes beyond the control of the Parties. In the event of any of the foregoing, 
the time for performance shall be equitably and immediately adjusted, and in no 
event shall any Party be liable for any consequential damages from its performance 
or non-performance of any term or condition of this JVA. The Parties shall resume 
the completion of work under this JVA as soon as possible following upon any delay 
due to force majeure. 
3.5.3.2 Funding of Joint Operations: 
 
The parties contribute funds in the proportion of their respective undivided 
percentage interest towards costs and expenses obligatory for standard operations 
under the operating agreement. The customary practice is that the operator is at 
liberty to levy an overhead charge under the JOA, of 2.5 per cent of total capital 
expenditure, representing the input made available by the experience of its head 
office staff.510 It must be stressed that in these circumstances, the practice of levying 
 
509 Ibid, Article 8.13.3. 
510This has been the subject of much resistance in some jurisdictions such as in the UK, where UK- 
based staff now have all the experience required to conduct UKCS operations and some, though not 
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the overhead charge does affect the ability of operators to include in their costs 
appropriate levels of ordinary overhead costs, such as benefits for personnel and the 
costs of running offices. The object of the accounting procedure is to ensure that the 
operator’s actual costs are covered and that he shall neither gain nor lose in acting in 
such a capacity under the JOA. Not later than 15 days prior to the day of the 
calendar month in which specific costs and expenditures are to be made, the 
operator shall submit to each non-operator its respective “cash call”511 for such 
month. 
3.5.3.3. Cash Calls: 
 
As enshrined in the JOA provisions, it is obligatory that the operator shall be well 
funded at every period by expressly providing that: 
“the operator shall, not later than ten (10) days prior to the first day of 
the cash call month, submit to each party: (a) an itemised estimate of 
such cost and expenditures, termed ‘estimated expenditures’ as well as 
an itemised return of the actual expenditures for the month, termed the 
‘actual expenditure month,’512 two months preceding the cash call 
month; (b) an itemisation of the cash available or cash deficit in the joint 
bank account as the case may be as of such date as well as any credit 
expected to be received in the cash call month and; (c) such party’s cash 
call for cash or deficits and credits in (b) above.”513 
Furthermore, as enshrined in articles 6.2.3 and 6.4, each party is required to pay its 
individual cash call into the joint bank account not later than the due date, which is 
the first day of the cash call month. In addition, all payments and receipts pertaining 
to joint operations are made into the joint account, which is governed by the rules 
set out in the extensive uniform accounting procedures comprised of three annexes, 
 
all, operators have agreed to withdraw the parent company overhead. This can be contrasted with 
Nigeria where the parent company overhead remains applicable, notwithstanding the fact that a 
proper fulfilment by the operator of its obligations under paragraph 37 of the First Schedule to the 
Petroleum Act, Para. 12-30/A28 and Regulation 26 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) 
Regulations, Para. 21-010/A16 et seq, post provides for the implementation of a detailed programme 
of recruitment and training of Nigerians in all phases of petroleum operations. 
511 “Cash call” means the amount in all currencies which the Operator estimates a Party must pay into 
the Joint Account in a given month to meet such Party’s Participating Interest Share of the costs and 
expenditures to be paid for the Joint Account in such month, after adjusting for balances and deficits 
in such Joint Bank Account as well as any credit receipts anticipated during the month. 
512 Ibid, Uniform Joint Operating Agreement, Article 6.2.1a. 
513 Ibid, Article 6.2.1b and c. 
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specifically the Uniform Accounting Policies, the Uniform Accounting Reporting 
Manual and the Uniform Budget Reporting Manual. 
It can be argued that a cash call may be disputed by the non-operator514 if the likely 
expenditures to be sensibly incurred by the operator have been exceeded, although 
such difference of opinion cannot extend to costs incurred for the protection of life 
and property, pollution prevention or action taken in matters of accidents or 
emergencies. In such situations, where there is a disagreement, the undisputed 
portion of the cash call shall be paid by the non-operator into the joint bank account 
not later than the due date. In this view, a stipulation is also made for payments of 
joint operating expenditure approved between the parties in accordance with NNPC’s 
typical evaluation procedures515 or any other basis decided by the parties516 through  
a technique for payment of the cash call in crude oil in lieu of cash, which can be 
generated by a notice or by the failure of a party classified as an ‘overdue party’517 to 
pay the cash call.518 
The modus operandi of cash calls may result in excesses in the joint operating 
account, possibly giving rise to the managerial burden on the operator of having to 
account for excesses and interest payments. Nevertheless, this is viewed as an 
essential trade-off for the need to secure, in advance, sufficient funding to meet 
operational overheads. 
3.5.3.4 Cash Call Default: 
 
In a situation where a party fails to pay its cash call by the due date or fails to inform 
the Operator of its plan to pay a cash call in crude oil, the Operator shall, on notice 
to the defaulting party and the Operating Committee, request a meeting of the 
Committee to resolve the default or take any other decision. Such decision will be 
binding on the parties. 






514 Ibid, Article 6.2.4. 
515 Ibid, Article 6.4. 
516 Ibid, Article 6.5. 
517 The basic fact is that the valuation of the lifting when the party is overdue is based on the Platts 
Oilgram, a Global service providing newsletters and reports on the Global Oil Industry. 
518 Akinrele (n 430) 153. 
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“If a party fails to provide a notice pursuant to Article 6.2.2 and fails to 
meet its cash call by the due date specified in Article 6.2.2; and the 
liftings available to the non-defaulting party pursuant to Article 6.4519 are 
inadequate to meet its cash calls, such party shall become a “Defaulting 
Party”.520 
If the default is overdue by two months, then the operator shall, on the approval of 
operating committee, borrow funds to meet the amount in default in accordance with 
the decision of the operating committee; pursuing any other remedy obtainable 
according to the law; suspending or limiting joint operations including those relating 
to the defaulting party’s participating interest share of production. Where the non- 
defaulting party is the non-operator, then the said party can defer payments of its 
cash calls, provided in each case that the party not in default first gives notice to the 
applicable governmental authorities. Analogous default provisions also apply in 
circumstances of major projects, such that crude oil can be applied for major project 
cash call defaults. 
In further types of JOA, stipulations will be made where there is default by one or 
more of the licensees for the non-defaulting party to step in to meet the defaulter’s 
share of present and future expenditures. This is expediently termed, ‘an additional 
cash call’ and it may probably (in addition to the obvious claim for reimbursement) in 
most cases, build up to rights to compensation by such non-defaulters for carrying 
the defaulting party as well as an array of sanctions.521 
What happens outside Nigeria when there is default by a party in payment of a cash 
call or cash advance under the operating agreement is that the non-defaulting 
operator is given a lien on the participating interest share of crude oil belonging to 
the defaulting party for the recovery of the cash call or advance and interest thereon. 
In the Oil and Gas industry in Canada, for example, clause 505(b) provides that 
519 Article 6.4.of the Standard JOA (n 452). 
520 Article 6.5.1.of the Standard JOA (n 452). 
521 This has been the case with U.S. JOAs as well as many early JOAs in the UKCS. In the U.K, a lien 
on the defaulting party’s share of joint facilities and production of petroleum, cannot be taken, owing 
to difficulties on registration of such liens as floating charges as they are categorized in the U.K. The 
current JOAs based on the BNOC proforma provide that during the continuance of the default, the 
defaulter losses his right to attend, receive information and vote at operating committee meetings. In 
cases where a default persists for more that six working days, the defaulter shall not be entitled to its 
share of petroleum until the default is remedied and the non-defaulting party is given a concomitant 
right to an assignment of the beneficial ownership (in proportion to the non-defaulting party’s share of 
the facilities and production) free of encumbrances as regards the interest of the defaulting party in 
the production license under the JOA (subject to the consent of the Secretary of State). 
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“The operator’s lien attaches to the all costs and expenses incurred for 
the joint account, not only costs and expenses pertaining to the joint 
operations, as well as the case in subsection 505(a) of the 
1981document.” 
The ultimate action that may be taken under the Nigerian Standard Operating 
Agreement is to suspend payments of their cash calls or otherwise curtail or suspend 
joint operations after the parties that are not in default shall have notified applicable 
Government authorities.522 
3.5.3.5 Cessation of Operatorship: 
 
There are certain situations that deteriorate to cessation of operatorship under the 
JOA. Conditions that can spark off such a termination are as follows: 
(a) where the operator assigns or purports to assign its interest to a non-affiliate 
company or where the operator assigns its general powers to an affiliate 
company, in addition to such assignment the said company ceases to be an 
affiliate; 
(b) where the Operator ceases or threatens to cease to carry on its business or 
becomes bankrupt or insolvent or commits or suffers any act of bankruptcy or 
insolvency or makes assignment for the benefit of creditors; 
(c) if the Operator defaults in its duties or obligations or any of them and fails to 
commence to rectify the default within the number of days specified in the 
agreement after written notice from other co-venturers specifying the default 
and requiring the Operator to remedy the default; 
(d) if the Operator ceases to own, hold or represent any participating interest in the 
joint venture; 
(e) if the affiliate to whom the Operator has assigned general powers and 
responsibilities of supervision and management as Operator ceases to be an 





522 Olisa (n 380) 90. 
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(f) if the party acting as the Operator (or any affiliate of the Operator which is a 
party) assigns or else disposes of, other than to an affiliate, all its participating 
interest in the joint venture. 
Termination of operatorship or the taking away of the Operator for any of the acts of 
breach or failure just specified will not take effect if the Operator commences, within 
twenty-eight days from the receipt of the notice to remedy the breach complained of 
in the notice and completes the same within a reasonable period, or within the same 
period, gives notice of arbitration as provided in the Agreement or until ninety days 
from an arbitration determination that the Operator has committed the breach or 
failure. Where the Operator has not referred the dispute to arbitration or has taken 
no steps to cure the breach of failure, the removal of the Operator will not take 
effect pending sixty days from the date of a joint notice given by non-Operators to 
the Operator. 
It has been commented that in some operating agreements which are employed 
outside Nigeria, there is a provision usually known as “Challenge of Operator.” Under 
such provision, so far as the Operator is not engaged in the drilling, completion or 
abandonment of a well for the joint venture account, and the Operator has acted in 
such capacity for a continuous period of two years, a non-Operator may, by notice in 
writing, inform the Operator of more favourable terms and conditions under which 
such non-Operator is prepared to act as Operator.523 
Having received a “challenge”, if the Operator is incapable or indisposed to match  
the terms, costs and state of affairs as set out in the challenge notice, then within a 
period of six months from the date of receipt of the notice, the Operator shall advise 
the non-Operator that gave the notice of its intention to quit the position of Operator 
and then must quit within a ninety days after it so advises the non-Operator that 
gave the notice.524 If the non-Operator becomes the Operator as a consequence of 
the challenge notice, it ought to immediately go on to carry out operations as the 
Operator in accordance with the undertakings made in the notice, as a result of 
which any costs in excess of those specified in the notice shall be for the new 
Operator’s sole account.525 The new Operator shall not resign from the position of 
Operator until it has acted as Operator for a period of at least two years provided 





that none of the conditions for automatic subrogation of an Operator takes place, 
such as, bankruptcy, cessation of business, failure to commence and continue the 
minor adjustment of default on the part of the Operator and the decreasing of its 
participating interest in the joint venture below an exact percentage. The underlying 
principle is that the “Challenge of Operator” provision is rarely ever invoked in 
practice. In those operation agreements in which it is incorporated, it is there to 
serve less as a control than as an additional disincentive to the Operator to open 
itself to the risks of a challenge.526 In the light of the fact that throughout the history 
of joint ventures in developing oil producing countries one consistent policy of 
transnational oil companies appears to be that they, instead of the host countries’ 
national oil company, are the operator, some commentators have argued that an 
attempt by the State-owned Oil Company to vest such control will be seen as 
usurping their position and be seen as wholly or partially diminishing the business of 
the transnational companies and ultimately reducing their position to that of mere 
investor.527 
3.5.3.6. Assignability of Interest Right: 
 
It is expressly provided528 that every party shall have the right at any time to transfer 
in whole or in part, its participating interest in the assets, joint property and working 
capital including its rights, title, interest and benefits, duties and obligations under 
the JOA. The exercise of this right is, nevertheless, based on the following 
circumstances:529 that no party may assign or transfer its interests without the prior 
written consent and approval of the other party or parties, which consent shall not  
be unreasonably inoperative;530 any assignee or transferee shall be of a technical and 
financial standing adequate to carry out the duties and obligations under the JOA  
and to meet liabilities to the point of the interest assigned or transferred to it;531 the 
 
 
526 Ibid 85. 
527 See provisions of JOA Agreement as provided for by the participation agreement. (Usually, signed 
between NNPC and each of its joint venture partner in July 1991.) Section 2.7. It is important to note 
that it is the right of the corporation to operator-specified portions of the joint venture not the whole 
of it, as is the case of the multinational operator; secondly, the petroleum joint venture between the 
operating company and the corporation has been going on since April 1973 with the transnational as 
the operator and thirdly, by section 2.7, the NNPC has forfeited its common law right as a co-tenant  
to operate any part of the joint land so long as it does not oust the co-tenant and that such forfeiture 
can last until the last producing well in the joint venture ceases production permanently. 
528 Ibid, Article 19.1. 
529 Ibid, Article 19.1. 
530 Ibid, Article 19.1.1. 
531 Ibid, Article 19.1.2. 
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transferring party shall have completely performed all of its duties and obligations 
under the agreement up to the effective date of the assignment etc.532 
There are also instances where the co-licensee is assigning all or part of its interest 
to an associated or affiliated company which it controls, or which is prescribed by a 
common parent company in order to aid re-structuring within its group of companies. 
In this regard, subject to the necessary governmental consents, such assignments 
rarely prove to be controversial. The assignment to a non-affiliated third party 
nevertheless requires that the transferor give notice to the co-licensee, giving him 
the earlier right and option in writing to purchase such participating interests. 
The following articles buttress this point: 
 
“19.4.1 The Transferring Party shall first give a notice to the other Party 
specifying within it the name and address of the aforementioned third 
Party and the terms and conditions (together with monetary; and other 
consideration) of the proposed assignment and transfer. 
19.4.2 Upon receipt of the notice referred to in Sub clause 19.4.1, the 
other Party may, within thirty (30) days thereafter, request in writing the 
assignment and transfer of such Participating Interests to it, in which 
event the assignment or transfer shall be made to it on the same or 
equivalent terms. 
19.4.3 Where the other Party does not call for the assignment or 
transfer of such Participating Interests to itself as in Sub clause 19.4.2 
above, the Transferring Party may, within a period of one year 
subsequently, assign or transfer such interests to the said third party 
provided that an instrument evidencing such transfer must be issued by 
the parties thereto and offered to the non-transferring Party.” 
As a result, no assignment to a third party can take place except the assignor 
originally offers the right of initial refusal to the other party or parties to the JOA to 
obtain the interest being assigned, which right ought to be exercised within 30 days. 
The basic truth is that Rights such as this, with the intention of enabling the parties 
to enjoy a first choice over third parties, may possibly have the practical shortcoming 
 
532 Akinrele (n 430) 175. 
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of causing difficulties with regards to negotiations for an assignment, as third parties 
may be unwilling to negotiate detailed terms once they are conscious that a co- 
venturer may possibly exercise a pre-emption right. Under the JOA, because the non- 
transferring party has only a period of 30 days in which to exercise its option to 
acquire, it is deemed a commercially satisfactory period for a third party to await the 
determination as to whether such an option will be exercised (after it has negotiated 
and made its offer to the transferring party). 
It has been commented that in the framework of non JOAs, provisions for longer 
periods in which a non-transferring party is to exercise its pre-emption rights may be 
a disincentive to third parties who cannot afford such extensive periods of 
improbability. This problem is quite noticeable in a number of oil and gas jurisdictions 
where pre-emption periods from 60 to 90 days or even longer exist. 
It has also been argued for the additional provision in Article 19.4.3 of the JOA for a 
one-year period, commencing after the decision of the non-transferring party not to 
exercise its right of pre-emption, taking into consideration the need of the third party 
assignee for enough time to act in conformity with the assignment provisions under 
paragraphs 14 to 16 of the first Schedule to the Petroleum Act, whereby the previous 
endorsement of the Minister of Petroleum to the assignment must first be sought 
upon the recommendation of the Director of Petroleum Resources. Such a provision 
recognises that failure to obtain this consent may lead to a cessation of the licence. 
Consequently, the JOA provides that pending the required government approvals, no 
assignment will be obligatory and further that there shall be a written instrument 
amongst the parties and the assignment duly implemented by the assignee 
accommodating all of the obligations under the agreement. 
3.5.3.7 The Governing Law: 
 
On the question of which law will govern the joint venture operations, all Nigerian 
Participation Agreements state unambiguously that the Agreements “shall be 
construed, interpreted and governed in accordance with and by the laws of Nigeria.” 
However, the position is different as regards views as to which Arbitration Law shall 
preside over disputes occurring between co-venturers. Each and every one of the 
Nigerian participation agreements, with the exclusion of the one between NNPC and 
Shell/Agip/Elf (NNLG Ltd) states that the Arbitration Laws of Nigeria shall be the de 
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jure law that is applicable. With regards to the NNPC and Shell/Agip/Elf Agreement, 
the clause relating to the applicable law for arbitration is as follows: 
“The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria having ratified the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of other states, the parties hereto shall submit all disputes 
arising out of this Agreement to Arbitration before the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States (ICSID), subject to the jurisdiction and the 
arbitration procedures of the said Convention and rules of ICSID.533” 
From the foregoing it can be deduced that one possible reason that can be offered 
for such marked difference in the terms of Arbitration Law between this Agreement 
and others which preceded it may be that Nigeria had just ratified the ICSID 
Convention. The legal framework for arbitration in Nigeria is provided for in the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act.534 The Act is based on the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law and applies 
throughout the Nigeria Federation. 
Generally, Nigerian courts are well-accustomed to arbitration and maintain a pro- 
enforcement bias with regards to the enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
arbitral awards. Notably, in Onward Enterprises Ltd v MMV Matrix,535 the Court of 
Appeal held that: “Once an arbitration clause is retained in a contract which is valid 
and the dispute is within the contemplation of the clause, the court will give regard 
to the contract by enforcing the arbitration clause. It is therefore the general policy 
of the court to hold parties to the bargain which they freely entered” 
The court took a radical view in the recent case of Continental Sale Limited v R 
Shipping Inc, where the Court of Appeal held as follows: 
1. The spurious argument that service of notice was not in writing cannot fly. 
 
2. Email is a form of communication that is set down in writing. It is not oral. 
The fact that it is electronic is immaterial. It is not in thin air. It can be 
downloaded and is as real as a hard copy of the letter or mail in your hand. 
 
533 Clause 40 (1) of the NNPC and Shell/Agip/Elf (NNLG Ltd) Participation Agreement 45. 
534 Cap A18, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
535 (2010) 2 NWLR (part 1179) 530. 
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3. Since the intention of the email messages and the correspondence from the 
Respondent, the Solicitor and the Arbitrator to the Appellant was to achieve 
the result of communicating the fact that the arbitration proceedings had been 
initiated at various stages of the process, there has been effective service of 
the whole arbitration process on the Appellant.536 
Since potential disputes are likely due to increased foreign investment activity, 
Nigeria could become an attractive destination for international arbitration. 
3.6. GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT 
 
In evaluating these arrangements, a number of points may be made. State 
participation of itself will not guarantee Nigeria control of its petroleum industry nor 
assure enjoyment of the utmost benefits from the industry. The objective of Nigerian 
participation is not merely to maximise financial returns whilst remaining a dominant 
partner in the industry. To a certain extent, the government seeks, through the 
NNPC, to be an active partner in the petroleum exploitation, retaining control of the 
nation’s petroleum resources and assuring future development for maximum 
eventual benefits. Principally, however participation agreements are perceived by 
host countries as a medium to exercise control over the exploitation of their 
hydrocarbons, the truth of the matter is that participation or equity ownership does 
not mean control for these countries. In practice, it only helps to augment the 
political image of the host government, for the real management remains with the 
major oil companies, because the host country is deficient in technical know-how and 
management skills to effectively protect the government’s interest. Notwithstanding 
the majority equity position of the host country in the joint venture, the effectual 
powers are in the hands of the major oil companies. 
By dint of the fact that they are the operators, they are in charge of exploration, 
maintenance, programmes, and supplies of equipment, the employment of expertise 
and all operational matters. Although the NNPC has a built-in majority on all the 
boards of the joint venture companies, since all proposals originate from the 
operator, it goes without saying that the latter’s representatives will have 
foreknowledge of such proposals and willingly approve of them.537 Additionally, it is 
conceivable that they may tailor their proposals to their own advantage. Since the 
536 (2013) 4 NWLR (part 1343) 67. 
537 Gidado (n 392) 152. 
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Nigerian representatives do not have the same foreknowledge of the operational 
management of the joint venture and sufficient knowledge in oil matters, there is a 
strong likelihood that they may go on to endorse it without having fully grasped its 
repercussions.538 
The fundamental truth is that leaving all technical and economic matters to the 
operators makes it impossible for the NNPC to develop the necessary skills for the 
operation of the venture. Consequently, with the agreements limiting Nigeria’s 
involvement in managerial tasks to those excluding operational matters, the 
accomplishment of independent operational capacity is frustrated.539 In respect of a 
similar subject, it has been commented: “that unless the host country has the skill 
and expertise, the control is rather political”.540 
Commentators have favoured the view that by concluding joint participation 
agreements, a host country will boost its revenue earning situation. This theory is 
founded on the premise that under participation agreements, the host government 
can receive, in addition to tax and royalties and the like, dividends proportionate to 
its interest in the venture.541 For instance, if the government has a 60 per cent equity 
interest in the operations, it takes an equivalent dividend, while at the same time 
receiving the normal tax plus any dues payable under its fiscal laws. Nonetheless, it 
has been argued that this may not always be the case because, for instance, a 50 
per cent dividend may not bring more revenue than 50 per cent tax.542 It has been 
further observed that that all costs and expenses, including interests on loans, debts 
and investment funds, are deducted before dividends are paid, but not before tax.543 
Consequently, a Government that has contributed its share of investment and other 
obligatory payments, can suffer a considerable loss in the instance where the joint 
venture company does not make any profit at the closing stages. On the other hand, 
if it is a viable undertaking, it will be more appropriate for the government to actively 
participate than to just be a spectator and wait for returns to be made to it 
periodically. The latter would invariably mean putting new wine into an old bottle; 
538 Ibid. 
539 Ibid. 
540 S Mankabody, ‘Oil Contracts in the Middle East, (1980) 1(1) International Contract Law and 
Finance Review 119. 
541 Gidado (n 392) 153. 
542 Ibid. 
543 G K N Ogunlami, ‘An Analysis of Nigerian Petroleum Profits Taxation’ (1989) Centre for Petroleum 
and Mineral Law Studies. 
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going back to the concession regime with all the attendant consequences of that 
policy. The upshot of this argument is that profit sharing or additional oil revenue is 
definitely less important than other objectives of state participation. These were well 
defined by the one-time advisers to the ruler of Abu Dhabi when he noted that: 
“The participation we propose is not intended to be a mere device to 
secure additional revenues to the states concerned. It goes further 
than that. The first result would be to give the governments, through 
their national oil companies, a voice in the policy decisions of the 
company and to exercise more control over their oil industry. 
Governments should no longer be satisfied with the role of a ‘sleeping 
partner’ or ‘absentee landlord.’ The second result is the long-term 
implication. Producing countries should develop technical and 
managerial skills in the oil industry in order to enable the governments 
to be in a strong position when the concession agreements begin to 
expire.544” 
Furthermore, according to Akinsanya,545 in terms of achieving de facto control of the 
oil industry, equity participation did not represent a radical departure from the 
framework of the pre-1969 grants of oil rights. Even though the government 
nowadays has a majority representation on the boards of the subsidiaries of the 
transnational oil company, the honest truth is that de facto control still resides with 
the transnational oil company because they still maintain effective control of 
management of the subsidiary oil companies. The popular view is that in the absence 
of de facto control of the oil industry by Nigerians, it is doubtful whether equity 
participation is compatible with the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources. 
The basic underlying principle is that de facto control entails the exercise of decision- 
making powers in such vital operational and managerial matters as budget, 
expansion and development programmes, and appointment of top management, 
pricing, marketing, declaration of dividends, borrowing, reorganisation, procurement 
of equipment, in addition to the incorporation of the enterprise with the 
 
544 ‘Disparity of Concession Terms in Middle East Oil Producing Countries’ (1968) Middle East Economic 
Survey 9 (emphasis added). 
545 Adeoye Akinsanya, ‘International Protection of Direct Foreign Investments in the Third World’ 
(1987) 36 International and Comparative Law Review 58. 
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developmental intent of the government.546 Therefore, the proper test of the 
feasibility of any new arrangement with the alleged objective of vesting control in the 
government is whether it will result in de facto control being vested in a board of 
directors in which the government has a majority representation and, as a result, the 
power to make the vital decisions on these specific matters and additionally to  
dictate provisions which will make the acquisition of all relevant know-how  as 
regards operational management by Nigerians mandatory. Notwithstanding the 
government’s acquisition of majority equity shares in the subsidiaries of the 
transnational and its majority representation on the boards of these companies, the 
governments have been willing to delegate the management of the subsidiaries to 
the transnational companies, apparently postulating that they can exercise de facto 
control solely through representation at board level. 
According to this argument, the official segregation of duties between the board and 
the management is such that the board is sometimes downgraded to nothing more 
than a rubber-stamping role as far as vital management issues are concerned. The 
end result of such an arrangement is that the benefit of managerial power which the 
transnational company had before the introduction of equity participation remains to 
all intents and purposes nearly intact.547 
The corporate structure of the transnational companies helps to promote their control 
of Nigeria’s oil industry. Consequently, even though all foreign oil companies 
operating in Nigeria must be registered in Nigeria as local companies, the 
management may still continue to refer all major decisions, whether technical, 
managerial or financial, to their parent companies in America or Europe548 as the case 
may be. The effect is that the headquarters of the parent companies hold on to de 
facto control under the new arrangement, in which they are technically junior 
partners.549 
An additional concern arises from the existing structures. The government’s pursuit of 
ownership and control of the oil industry may have led to a misunderstanding 
between symbols and substance. The fact is that careful examination of the key 
management positions of the transnational companies operating in Nigeria shows that 
 






Nigeria has not developed the potential to manage the oil industry550 and as a result, 
their decisions naturally reflect the views of the companies whose technical 
superiority is sufficient to overcome the consequences of Nigerian majority ownership 
and to keep in their own hands de facto control notwithstanding their minority 
position.551 The honest truth is that de facto control, consequently, hardly ever 
matches up to the degree of equity ownership.552 
It would thus appear erroneous to suppose that equity participation and the 
supervisory powers exercised on the boards of the subsidiaries of the transnational 
companies will be sufficient to ensure the exercise of de facto control of the oil 
industry.553 It is doubtful whether de facto control can be successfully maintained in 
cases where management powers are limited to corporate planning in the short and 
medium term, however fundamental these two areas are.554 The crux of the problem 
is that for management to be delegated with the day-to-day running of the oil 
industry, it needs to be able to deal with the highly complex standards of general 
direction and supervision, and that the government (even through the boards of 
directors of the subsidiary oil companies) being a new owner of the oil resources, 
have not been vouchsafed the opportunity to set up a record of corporate 
management in the oil industry.555 
Additionally, Adeniji is of the view that, as in other petroleum exporting countries, 
Nigeria needs to see State participation in the day-to-day corporate management of 
the oil industry as a political as well as an economic necessity. Such participation 
should ultimately limit the presence of oil companies to a solely business role, whilst 
preserving government control for purposes of economic development.556 It 







550 M S Olorunfemi, ‘Managing Nigeria’s Petroleum Resources’ 24 OPEC 25-26. 
551 Adeniji (n 385) 175. 
552 Asante (n 4). see also Atsegbua (n 475) 103. 
553 Samuel K B Asante and A Stockmayer, ‘The Evolution of Development Contracts: The Issue of 
Effective Control’ in Legal and Institutional Arrangements in Minerals Development: A study based on 
an International Workshop, West Berlin, 1980, jointly sponsored by UN Department of Technical Co- 
operation for Development, and the Development Policy Forum of the German Foundation for 
International Development (London: Mining Journal Books 1982). See also Smith (n 345) 122 at 18. 
554 Asante and Stockmayer (n 553) 59. 
555 Ibid see also The Petroleum Economics Monthly (1976) XIII(7) 263. 
556 Adeniji (n 385) 161. 
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development. In this way, the companies would be transmuted into essentially 
managerial operating cadres in the framework of board government.557 
It can safely be stated that de facto control has neither been advanced to any 
considerable degree through the sheer employment of equity participation 
substituting the traditional concession regime of the pre- 1969 grants of oil rights; 
nor has it, in fact, been exercised to the full extent predicted by the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources as canvassed globally. The basic fact 
is that de facto control of the oil industry can only be successfully exercised if 
“sufficient and appropriate capacity for control exists” i.e. control over 
management.558 
According to Asante, transnational companies contend that the global character of 
their operations is intrinsically irreconcilable with the surrender of control to any of 
their affiliates scattered around the world.559As a result control by the host country is 
illusory. Some commentators have argued that adequate control is possible through 
exercise of regulatory power.560 
Smith and Wells offer another view that: 
 
“equity sharing or participation may or may not bring the government an 
effective voice in the management decisions within the operating 
company and may or may not mean that the government plays an 
important role in other activities leading to the ultimate development of 
the resources.”561 
Participation can, of course, involve state participation. The determination of the  
level of local participation is naturally a matter for the host state. Nevertheless, 
questions will sometimes be posed as to whether strong local participation from the 
private sector is appropriate in a developing country where there might already be 
wide divergences of wealth. Such a policy might be of little advantage. The incomes 
thereby received might be invested or substantially spent outside the developing 
 
557 Ibid. 
558 Asante (n 4) 350. 
559 Ibid. 
560 Jenkins (M.P.) in the debate in the House of Commons on the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines 
Bill, 30 April 1975. Parliamentary Debate Official Report Fifth Section 1974-75 891 506-507. 
561 D N Smith, L T Wells, Negotiating Third World Mineral Agreements, (Cambridge: Ballinger 
Publications 1975) 573. 
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country, the local shareholders might identify themselves more with the foreign 
investors than with the interests of the host state, and most importantly, their equity 
interest might not be reflected in the control and management of the corporation.562 
Such a result could be achieved by the creation of different classes of shares 
whereby the local investors had little or no voting rights. 
Thus, in Ghana, the Swiss firm Société Générale de Surveillance was engaged to 
verify the prices of exports and imports against the prevailing world market levels.563 
Participation, then, must mean assuring effective participation in control and 
management; if this is not available locally, perhaps independent external expert 
consultants should be engaged until such expertise is available in the quantity 
demanded locally. 
Also, another view is that in addition to royalty, income tax and any other payments 
which are to be made by the transnational company, the government should also be 
allowed a share in the net profits. For that reason, it was further observed that 
participation is “an ingenious way of further increasing the tax per barrel without 
touching either posted prices or nominal tax rates”.564 It does not necessarily follow, 
however, that this is the foremost objective which a government seeks to secure 
through participation. It has been argued that “government take” can be increased 
without resort to participation. The arguments advanced by them are that, to a 
certain extent, transnational oil companies prefer to yield a larger government take 
through increased taxes than through the mechanism of participation and that 
participation requires the creation of investments by government.565 
3.7 THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
 
The received wisdom is that when a transnational company, wearing its investor’s 
cap, enters into a joint operating agreement with a country, it is well aware of the 
associated risk and will, as one would expect, seek to achieve a reasonable return on 
its investment. It is thus argued that it behoves the host country to provide 
appropriate incentives to compensate for that investment and associated risk. 
 
562 David Flint, ‘Foreign Investment and the New International Economic Order’ in Kamal Hossain and 
Subrata Roy Chowdhury (eds) Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources in International Law: 
Principle and Practice (1984) 168. 
563 Asante (n 4) 338. 
564 Petroleum and Submerged Pipe-line Act, 1975. 
565 M Adelman, ‘Is the oil shortage real?’ (1972) 9 Foreign Policy 84. 
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Consequently, Nigeria felt obligated to provide apposite incentives to oil companies 
and one such key incentive relates to improved fiscal terms aimed at ameliorating  
the effect of tax and royalty on the oil companies. The document which enshrines 
these improved fiscal terms is known as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). 
Prior to the materialisation of the MOU in 1986, the only fiscal incentives were those 
contained in the Petroleum Profit Tax Act (PPTA)566 1959 and its subsequent 
modification. The PPTA provided for tax at 85 per cent on chargeable profits of 
companies engaged in petroleum operations, calculated on net profits after 
deducting fixed tax-allowable expenses. Exceptions were sometimes made where it 
was necessary to attract new entrants, and here the applicable rate could go as low 
as 65.7 per cent. Further, there was royalty payable to the host government at rates 
ranging from 16⅔ to 20 per cent, depending on water depth and terrain.567 To 
counterbalance this, and on a comparable foundation, oil companies have the benefit 
of investment tax credit ranging from 5 to 20 per cent. 
However, there was a drastic change in this situation in about 1976, when there was 
a steep decline in exploration and drilling activities; the profit margins capable of 
being earned by the operating companies were being gravely eroded through the 
high cost of operations and government take. The government responded to the 
companies’  action  by  revising  the  notional  fiscal  margin  and  technical  cost  to 
$0.80/bbl and $1.00/bbl respectively in 1977. These incentives provisionally 
encouraged investment in exploration activities, and the industry observed improved 
exploration efforts.568 Seismic data acquisition increased from the low of 8,000 km 
coverage in 1976 to 20,000 km in 1978. Total footage of exploration/ appraisal wells 
 
566 Since its promulgation in 1959 (with a January 1, 1958 effective date) various legislative 
amendments have been introduced into the PPTA, the latest (which is of major significance) being the 
Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act 1999, No. 30. Immediately prior to 
this, an amendment contained in 1999 No. 9 had been effected wherein it is inter alia, provided that 
the petroleum profits tax rate applicable to signatory companies of Production Sharing Contracts 
(PSCs) shall be 50 per cent flat rate of their chargeable profits for the duration of such PSCs. In other 
words, the PPTA is meant to apply to the taxation of the assessed incomes of companies which 
engage in petroleum operations. This includes companies engaged in liquefied and associated natural 
gas operations. 
567Olayinka Alli, ‘Joint Venture Investments and MOU Incentives: An Appraisal’, in Victor Eromosele 
(ed) Nigeria Petroleum Business, A Handbook (Lagos: Advent Communications Limited 1997) 317. 
568Seismic data acquisition increased from the low of 8,000 km coverage in 1976 to 20,000 km in 
1978. Total footage of exploration/appraisal wells drilled during the same period also increased 
steadily until 1978, when it became obvious that the notional technical cost could no longer match the 
galloping prices of facilities and services within the oil sector. Again, the government increased the 
fiscal technical cost by 10% in 1978 to $1.10/bbl. Similar developments necessitated further 
adjustment of the notional margin and technical cost in 1982 and 1983. 
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drilled during the same period also enlarged progressively until 1978, when it 
became obvious that the notional technical cost could no longer equal the galloping 
prices of amenities and services within the petroleum sector. Once more, the 
government increased the fiscal technical cost by 10% in 1978 to $1.10/bbl. 
Comparable developments required further adjustments to the notional margin and 
technical cost in 1982 and 1983. 
Surprisingly, however, between 1977 and 1983, the incentive packages were 
evaluated four times, signifying that the incentives never actually got to the root of 
the industry’s economic problems. Even though in 1982 and 1983 there were 
dramatic increases in incentives, with notional profit margin doubled and notional 
technical cost up by 50 per cent, the effect of this, however, was short-lived. 569 
One of the foremost deficiencies in the way these four incentive packages were 
worked out was that they applied a non-market related price, the OSP (official selling 
price), in preference to a market-determined price. The OSP was generated by OPEC 
from time to time to reflect the oil price desired by the organisation at the time of 
issue.570 The price was, to a large extent, independent of the market, and obviously 
inconsistent with the market realisable price, resulting in the OSP always being  
ahead of the market realisable price, every so often by as much as $5.00/bbl. 
By the end of 1985, the price differential was so evident that the NNPC and the 
foreign oil companies found it almost impracticable to market their equity shares of 
the oil produced at OSP (official selling price), as required by OPEC. As a result, 
production began to dwindle and exploration operations nose-dived.571 
At the centre of the oil surplus of the mid-eighties, Nigeria’s official selling price 
(OSP) for crude oil became unrealisable in the market and as a result, the price of oil 
plunged to record lows, discouraging investment. As a result, the large fiscal burdens 
imposed on the operators led to reduced exploration, production and development 
activities in Nigeria. In most countries, this turmoil would have led to an amendment 




569 Alli (n 567) 320. 
570 Ibid. 
571 Ibid. 
572 Omorogbe (n 25) 87. 
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Furthermore, as world oil demands persisted, and non-OPEC production grew, the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) plunged from its commanding 
height of controlling 80 per cent of the market in 1977 to 54 per cent in 1985. The 
Nigerian oil industry reacted by cutting back exploration expenditures, resulting in a 
net depletion of the country’s reserve base. The oil companies’ notional profit margin 
of $2/bbl which was already in place since 1983 apparently became unrealisable. 
This resulted in a significant reduction in oil production, leading, of course, to lost 
revenue to both country and company. The situation was further complicated by the 
method of fiscal accounting which was based mainly on a fiscal (or posted) price 
derived from the OPEC generated and non-market related Official Selling Price (OSP). 
The government responded swiftly to this development to obviate further dwindling 
of oil revenues which contributed a large proportion of the nation’s foreign exchange 
earnings by introducing an incentive package, better known in the Nigerian oil 
industry by the expression “MOU.” The package was designed to stimulate 
investment in exploration and production activities and to encourage the export of 
Nigerian crude oil. This objective was achieved by abolishing the widening gap 
between the OSP and market-related price, thus guaranteeing a specific level of 
profit margin under a given technical cost. The MOU was first executed in 1986,573 
with a primary term of five years. It proved quite successful in reviving the pace of 
activities in the upstream sector, including crude oil lifting to a higher level. 
The incentive took the form of a guaranteed minimum margin of profit to the 
companies in respect of each barrel of crude produced. The consequence of the 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) terms, where the terms and obligations were 
complied with, was that the company ended up paying less petroleum profits tax 
than it would have paid under the stringent provisions of the PPTA as at December 
31, 1985. In consideration of the incentives, the company was obligated to carry out 
an agreed exploration work programme, the details of which constituted an Appendix 
to and part of the memorandum of understanding (MOU), as well as assisting in the 
lifting of certain volumes of the NNPC’s equity crude during a period of glut. Failure 
on the company’s part to meet its obligations would result in its profits being taxed 
under the PPTA provisions as at December 31, 1985. Certain details of the MOU were 
dealt with and particularised in Side Letters while matters that called for reviews 
 
573 Alli (n 567) 320. 
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were dealt with in the 1st and 2nd Amendments to the MOU about 22nd of October 
1987 and 1st December 1987 respectively. 
There was a second memorandum of understanding (MOU) implemented on January 
1, 1991 with comparable objectives to those of the 1986 one but with an extended 
scope that incorporated Reserve Addition Bonuses in favour of the companies and a 
recompense for cost efficient operations. The Reserve Addition Bonus (RAB), 
according to Clause 2.9 of the subject MOU, was to be set-off against the company’s 
PPT legal responsibility in the affected year, to the extent that in that year, the 
trappings to oil and condensate revitalisation surpassed the production for that year, 
as approved by DPR.574 However, in 2000, the RAB entitlement provision was 
obliterated from the MOU and as a result, the RAB policy came to an end.575 In 
consideration of the incentive embodied in the memorandum, the oil companies had 
embarked on increasing their work programme. The companies also agreed to lift 
certain volumes of NNPC’s crude oil which the NNPC was unable to dispose of and in 
return to share the profit margin equally with NNPC.576 
On August 4, 2000, a similar MOU was signed for a life of three years. The 
fundamental objectives were essentially to provide incentives for boosting cost 
efficient exploration and development activities and also for the transnational 
companies’ support in the realisation of the country’s long-term growth objectives in 
the petroleum sector, which were also part and parcel of this MOU. Particularly 
noteworthy in the taxation area is that the MOU contains a complicated formula for 
calculating what goes to the Government in a fiscal year or accounting period, etc. 
The underlying principle of the current MOU can nevertheless be stated in a nutshell. 
According to the information obtainable, what goes to the Government and is passed 
on in the MOU as “Government Take” consists of both royalty and petroleum profits 
 
574 The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR). The DPR is headed by a Director General who is 
responsible for the setting of standards for the effective control of the petroleum industry. The DPR’s 
general responsibilities and objectives are: 
1. Ensuring compliance with petroleum laws and regulations through monitoring of the 
operations of the exploration companies. 
2. Ensuring the full development of Nigerian petroleum resources 
3. Ensuring the protection of all oil and gas investments (foreign, local, public and private). 
The DPR processes all applications for licences from all entities seeking to carry out business in the oil 
and gas sectors. In so doing, it regulates and certifies by way of guidelines, the prerequisites for all 
registration requirements and/or bid submissions in the sector on behalf of the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources (MPR) 
575 Etikerentse (n 384) 266. 




tax relating to a joint venture company’s operation in respect of an accounting 
period.577 The MOU makes it fiscally desirable for the oil company to put its affairs in 
order so that its profits can come within the more favourable ambit of the MOU as 
against the PPTA’s rigid provisions. As a result, most joint venture companies prefer 
to have the taxation of their profits subject to the terms and conditions of the MOU. 
More so, in view of the fact that there exist very few precedents of commercial 
discoveries under the indigenous programme, instances of such concession are 
difficult to identify. In addition, because the process is discretionary, there is no 
assurance that the related tax concessions will be uniform or similar to the MOU 
terms for all indigenous operators, nor is there any form of assurance that any tax 
related concession will be granted.578The basic truth is that if such tax-related 
concessions are granted, they can possibly be enforceable by the courts. 
However, attention has been drawn to a difficulty which arises concerning the 
taxation laws which appertain to the country of origin of the transnational oil 
company when the oil company claims to have paid its tax based on the MOU terms 
(being a contractual arrangement) rather than under a fiscal statute such as the 
PPTA. It may be argued that, technically, the payments made under the terms of the 
MOU are contractual payments, and that as such, they cannot be classified as tax, 
with the result that the local branch of the transnational oil company has not, strictly 
speaking, paid tax. The resolution of this question is a significant matter, because 
under the laws of certain countries, for instance the United States, credit can only be 
accorded for taxes paid by a multinational corporate entity if such taxes had been 
levied and paid in accordance with the existing fiscal laws of the countries where the 
tax-paying subsidiary of the transnational company operates, and not as provided 
under an ad hoc arrangement. Until the validity or otherwise of the MOU mode of 
payment is clarified by a court of competent jurisdiction in Nigeria, the issue will 
remain doubtful for the time being. 
In exploring a possible answer to this difficulty, and in trying to approximate what 
the court’s attitude might be, recourse may be made to examining the Court’s 
opinion in a related matter. This was the view that was canvassed by the Supreme 
 
577 See the December 31, 1995 Royalty and PPTA provisions as amended, calculated by the 
substitution of Posted Price with Official Selling Price and the revised “Government Take” according to 
the December 31, 1985 Royalty and PPTA provisions (as amended) calculated by the substitution of 
Posted Price with Tax Reference Price. 
578 Akinrele (n 430) 314. 
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Court in the case of Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. vs. FBIR (1996)579 when the Court 
came to the conclusion that: 
“There is no doubt that the agreements…are not illegal contracts 
because their terms vary the obligations of the appellant and the 
respondent under the Petroleum Profits Tax Act…nor are they against 
public policy. Similarly, in Solanke v. Abed,580 since the agreements are 
not illegal it follows that the principles of contract can rightly apply to 
them.” 
It was suggested further that because the Nigerian Government and the oil 
companies have carried out their business in this way since the implementation of 
the first MOU on January 1, 1986, and the oil companies, paying their taxes to the 
Government in accordance with the MOU terms and the Government accepting and 
not demanding payment under the strict PPTA provisions over the years, the 
Government would be debarred from refuting that the oil companies had fulfilled 
their tax payment obligations. Also, it can be successfully argued that the legal 
doctrine of ‘accord and satisfaction’ may possibly put a stop to either party 
disagreeing with the success of the payments made under the MOU terms.581 
The memorandum of understanding (MOU) provides an overall structure for 
allocating oil income amongst the joint venture (JV) partners, including payment of 
taxes and royalties as well as the industry profit margin. The 1991 Revised 
Memorandum of Understanding was predicated on the objectives of achieving a 
national hydrocarbon reserve base of 25 billion barrels (from 20 Billion barrels) while 
keeping production at 2.5m barrels per day by 1997. In the year 2010, it is 
anticipated that the Nigeria oil production hopes to increase to four million barrels 
per day. 
The view is that even though a good number, if not all, copies of participation 
agreements examined are mute on what rates of taxation, fees, royalties and other 
levies are payable by the co-venturers to the government, such provisions as relate 
to these licences and leases under the Petroleum Act 1969 which pertain to fiscal 
measures will apply to these agreements, with the exception only of such provisions 
 
579 Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. vs. FBIR [1996] 8 NWLF part (466), p. 285. 
580 Solanke v. Abed [1962] SLNR 371 1ALL NLR 230 at 233-4. 
581 Etikerentse (n 384) 267. 
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as have been varied by a memorandum of understanding (MOU). The joint ventures, 
i.e., between NNPC and its partners, are therefore, liable to pay royalty, taxation and 
other chargeable fees as presented for the oil prospecting licences OPL and oil 
mining leases (OML) holders. 
The Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPTA), therefore, provides the formal basis for 
taxation of the Joint Venture companies. However, taxation is also strongly governed 
by the memorandum of understanding (MOU), which together with royalties creates 
the fiscal arrangement with the Joint Venture companies. The PPT/MOU system 
covers over 95% of Nigeria’s current oil production and will cover a substantial 
percentage of future production (when undeveloped reserves are brought into 
production). 
The other matter that needs to be resolved is that if the MOU is proposed to be 
renewed by Government, it is proposed that it be codified into law to provide for 
greater legal lucidity specifically in regard to tax administration and avoid conflicts 
that it has with the Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPTA). This is due to the MOU 
requiring two tax calculations to be made. The taxpayer is allowed to choose the 
lower of the two tax calculations in order to be guaranteed a certain after-tax margin 
based on crude oil price levels and operating cost and capital expenditure levels. This 
creates conflicts and confusion since it is not in consonance with the law. The first 
tax calculation is based on PPT and Royalty without any adjustment while the second 
calculation (referred to as Revised Government Take or RGT) is based on the MOU. 
The formulae used for this second calculation of RGT are rather complicated. 
Also, observers are of the view that Codification must also provide for the 
indefatigably changing conditions in the worldwide oil and gas industry, thus 
preserving the flexibility of response to economic and an oil market situation which is 
contained in the MOU and which provides for episodic amendment. 
It has been commented that the MOU negotiation process is an extremely technical 
undertaking, which requires a profound knowledge of the industry, internationally 
and also in Nigeria, as well as extensive financial expertise. In addition to 
adjustments for inflation, the focal points for negotiation are technical cost (TC), 
notional margin (M) and realisable prices (PR). Collaboration on these three vital 
points, as well as other MOU provisions, must be handled by professional oil and gas 
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industry specialists under the management of the Minister of Petroleum Resources. 
Regrettably, no substantive Minister of Petroleum has been appointed. This Study 
recognises the current deficiency in expertise within FIRS582 as of today and 
suggests, in the short-term, the utilisation of independent consultants, under whose 
management, FIRS specialists would be trained. 
Also provided for in the revised MOU is the Reserve Addition Bonus. An oil company 
becomes entitled to the bonus if in any one year its addition to the ultimate reserves 
of oil and condensate exceeds the production for that year. The bonus is enjoyed in 
the form of an offset against petroleum profit tax liability for the given year. The 
modalities for calculating the Reserve Addition Bonus are set out in the Memorandum 
of Understanding. 
In consideration of the incentives contained in the memorandum, the oil companies 
undertook to increase their work programme. The companies also undertook to lift 
certain volumes of NNPC’s crude oil which the NNPC was unable to dispose of, and in 
return share the profit equally with the NNPC. In addition, another instance is where 
the company was unable to lift all or part of the crude oil that it was obligated to lift; 
the company had to pay to NNPC a penalty of 2% of the “average realisable price” 
for each barrel of crude oil that it failed to lift. The penalty payment did not apply if: 
• The unlifted volume for each calendar quarter less than 5 per cent of 
the volume which the company was required to lift during the relevant 
calendar quarters. 
• The unlifted volume was lifted within 15 days from the beginning of the 
following calendar quarter or in the event of force majeure. 
The notional margin has been eroded by a number of compulsory payments in the 
form of indirect taxes such as Value Added Tax, education levy and levies by 
maritime authorities. As a result of the indirect taxes and increased technical costs, 
the oil companies demanded that the MOU should be renewed.583 





582 Federal Inland Revenue Service: they are merely consultants charged with the responsibility of 
collecting taxes. It also aims at correcting and clarifying any ambiguity that may have been created in 
the course of performing their duties as enshrined in the tax statues. 
583 Olisa (n 380) 195. 
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“The favourable response to these incentives…led to the addition of 1.5 
billion barrels of to reserves in 1992, as against a planned target of 1.1 
billion barrels, thus bringing the total crude oil reserves of the nation to 
20.5 billion by 1994.”584 
 
Then followed the very important statement that: 
 
“The policy of flexible and competitive fiscal regime…which has proved 
useful will continue to be pursued.”585 
It may be inferred from this that the MOU will continue to be in force, subject to 
periodic revision, of course. 
3.8 THE WIDER VIEW 
 
In order for Nigeria to compete successfully in the international energy market, it 
must adopt the right approach to tackle fundamental industry-specific matters. These 
matters include: reforming the national energy policy, instituting a modern fiscal and 
legal framework, harmonising OPEC’s quota, designing funding investment polices, 
developing commercial outlets for gas, and finally, establishing and monitoring 
environmental protection.586 
Currently, most multinational companies are not familiar with the provisions of the 
national energy policy, which exists in draft form. Therefore, it is important for the 
draft to be better publicised to target the multinationals, especially during this 
transitional period.587 
There is a general consensus that existing fiscal and legal frameworks need to be 
modernised. Significantly, the necessary incentives encompassed in the MOU should 
be encouraged, especially in an environment of increasing cost per barrel due to the 





584 K S Chafe, ‘The Problematic of African Democracy: Experiences from the Political 
Transition in Nigeria’ (1994) 2 Africa Zamari 5. Indications are that Nigeria’s crude oil reserves as at 
October 2002 were about 22 billion barrels. 
585 Ibid. 
586 Godwin Omene, ‘Oil and Gas: Realising Nigeria’s growth potential’ in Victor E Eromosele, Nigerian 





Furthermore, a long period has passed since Nigeria’s OPEC quota was reviewed. 
However, it has become increasingly evident that in order to improve Nigeria’s quota, 
the country will need to demonstrate that it has discovered more oil reserves and has 
a substantial production capacity. Therefore, this calls for significant investment in 
exploration and development.589 
A further concern is the apparent funding difficulty currently being experienced by 
the oil industry, associated with the existing “cash call” mechanism; and as a result, 
many companies through the Oil Producers Trade Section (OPTS) have made various 
proposals as to how the industry could improve on its funding. Such proposals 
include, but are not restricted to, the following: 
(i) Carry options 
(ii) Cash call crude 
(iii) Offset against petroleum profits tax (PPT) 
(iv) Finance and servicing agreements etc.590 
There is an urgent need to appraise these concerns and to take firm decisions. 
 
In this age of greenhouse gases, there are now in place advanced environmental 
standards around the world and growing public awareness on environmental 
matters.591 As a result, it has dawned on the oil industry in Nigeria that rethinking its 
age-old practices is vital. A classical case in point relates to gas flaring. It has 
become increasingly apparent that the flaring of associated gas not only represents 
an economic waste of Nigeria’s dormant resource potential but that it is also harmful 
to the environment.592 The World Bank estimates that “gas flaring in the Niger Delta 
releases some 35 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually to the air.” In view of the 
fact that carbon dioxide has been identified as a “greenhouse gas” and a contributor 
to global warming, major Nigerian oil companies are already committing resources to 









593 Ibid; For example, the SPDC initiative involves a commitment to install a US $1.6 billion complex of 
gas facilities around the Soku field in the East Niger Delta to process 450 million scf of gas of which 
some US $500 million will be allocated for environmental purposes. Also, for the Odidi field in the west 
which is an associated gas processing plant. 
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petroleum industry and a number of oil field and terminal facilities as well as flow 
lines need replacement or refurbishment.594 
On the other hand, in recent years, oil companies have considerably increased 
investment in host communities in the areas of education and unemployment, health, 
agriculture and community infrastructure. It is now generally recognised that there is 
lack of development in the Niger Delta area. With the majority of the people in the 
area dependent on land for their livelihood, many oil companies have ensured that 
agricultural programmes are central to their community development efforts. Oil 
companies are in dialogue with communities, finding new ways to demonstrate their 
increased commitment to community development. 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
 
From the preceding it can be adduced that the different forms of acquisitions of oil 
rights divulge the fact that the act upholds the basic framework of the pre-1969 
grants of oil rights. Petroleum joint ventures between the government or its National 
oil entity (the NNPC) and private investors from developed countries have 
increasingly taken over from the mere leasing or concession regime which 
appertained under the previous regime in which the control of petroleum operations 
was left in the hands of powerful international oil companies.595 
Under the old-style concession regime in Nigeria, transnational oil companies were 
granted rights over vast areas for long periods, without any precise commitments 
relating to work or expenditure, in return for modest rents to the host country. The 
transnational companies knew a host country would no longer be prepared to grant 
rights over its hydrocarbons except in return for specific work and expenditure 
obligations which can be enumerated, appraised and supervised at each stage in the 
life of the project.596 The rationale is that the host countries have become 
progressively more aware of the benefits to be obtained from the exploitation of their 
 
594 For instance, in 1996 alone, SPDC incurred a total environmental spending of US $314 million. This 
demonstrates that a large commitment is being made in that direction. 
595 International Oil Companies: Anglo-Persian (BP) in Iran, BP, Shell, Jersey Standard (and four 
American companies: Anglo-Persian (BP) in Iran, BP, Shell, Jersey Standard (and four American 
companies) in Iraq: Socal and Texaco in Saudi Arabia, BP and Gulf Kuwait, and Socal in Bahrain. 
These companies and Mobil, which later acquired an interest in Aramco, regarded as the seven major 
international companies and are referred to as ‘the majors’. In Venezuela, the same companies 
(except BP) competed concessions, and ultimately by 1937, 52 per cent of the total output was held 
by Jersey Standard, 40 per cent by Shell, and 7 per cent by Gulf. 
596 Gidado (n 392) 151. 
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hydrocarbon resources and want to maximise the financial return to themselves for 
enhancement of their economic growth and development.597 
There is a growing recognition amongst commentators that the most popular 
arrangement being sought and applied these days in developing countries is that of 
“participation”, whereby the host country gains an amount of the equity within the 
operating company.598 It might not give actual participation in transportation; it  
might not give participation in marketing. It may not even give the host country a 
real share in management and operations. In truth, it may simply give a host country 
a share of the income which the country might have had anyway under old profit- 
sharing arrangements. In particular, it is important to observe that even if the 
primary goal of participation is host government representation on the board of 
directors, in many situations that representation may be virtually meaningless. As 
outside directors, government representatives often are unable to ask the right sort 
of questions within the board to put forward a rational government policy. 
What is needed in addition to participation in this sort of situation is the acquisition 
by Nigeria of know-how, in the first instance through the assistance of a technical 
team of outside consultants briefed to inform, advise and teach the government’s 
own or appointed directors about all aspects of running the oil and gas industries so 
that when they need to be able to make evaluations and judgments in the course of 
their participation on the boards of directors, these decisions can be made in 
Nigeria’s best interests. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the depletion trend which commenced in 1985 would 
have been very complicated to turn around without the introduction of an incentive 
such as MOU.599 On the lifting of crude oil, this afforded the NNPC and the operators 
an immediate relief from the complexity of marketing their crude oil.600 In particular, 
the NNPC benefited not only from being able to easily market its own crude oil, but 
also from the provisions of the MOU on notice/emergency volumes as a “back-up” 
tool for marketing its distressed oil cargoes. 
 
597 Ibid. 
598 Thomas Walde, ‘Revision of Transnational Investment Agreements in the Natural Resource 
Industries’ (1978) 10 University Miami Inter-American Law Review 265. 
599 The MOU created a contractual package of incentives which guaranteed a minimum margin of 
profit per barrel of oil. The MOU terms when first offered were presented as an alternative to the BPT 





Even though the performance of the 1986 MOU has been remarkable, a few areas 
need modification to allow both parties (giver and receiver of incentives) to obtain 
optimal mutual benefits from the instrument.601 The 1995 Budget suggests an 
evaluation of the MOU to simplify the computations which a number of users found 
cumbersome.602 The oil companies are still in with the Nigerian government towards 
devising a revised MOU. There is copious evidence to suggest that in the course of 
execution, some operators have claimed the bonus in a manner not reflecting the 
original “spirit of the MOU.” Further, the Production Cost Bonus is considered 
superfluous, as this is already treated as a deduction under the PPT Act 1959.603 
It is fair to say that the Fiscalisation of the Realisable Price through the k-factor has 
been found to be excessively complex for many users.604 Propositions have been 
made for the mechanism is replaced by a Tax Reference Price (TRP) mechanism, 
which simply computes fiscal price from the Realisable Price in the same way as the 
Posted Price was computed from Official Selling Price.605 
The MOU has also encouraged investment in the development of new production 
facilities leading most importantly to new discoveries as well as to the refurbishing of 
old facilities. Nigeria has at least realised a sustainable production.606 The problems 
of the mid-eighties which were linked with crude oil marketing and lifting can 
currently be consigned to times of yore.607 
From the foregoing, the Nigerian version of Production Sharing Contracts (“PSCs”) 
will form the topic of discussion in the next chapter. The PSC has turned out to be a 
well-known petroleum development system through wide-ranging national practice, 




















EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS 
 
4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Production Sharing Contract is deeply rooted in the Napoleonic Era and French 
legal concept of ownership of minerals, wherein mineral wealth is not to be owned 
by individuals but by the State for the benefit of all citizens.608 This philosophy is 
embodied in the Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia, which states: 
All-natural wealth on the land and in water is under the jurisdiction of 
the state and should be used for the benefit and the welfare of the 
people.”609 
The PSC as a contractual form represents an accommodation of a spate 
of conflicting interests, a modus vivendi in the unending battle between 
a host country and foreign oil companies.610 
Out of dissatisfaction with the work contract, which was hardly an improvement over 
the concession agreement, there came into being another form of arrangement, 
namely the production sharing contract. 
In the middle of the twentieth century, as colonial empires were crumbling, the 
corporations had to seek new means to defend their investments. In the case of the 
oil industry, the collapse of empires was followed by the setting of tougher terms by 
host governments, the renegotiations of existing agreements, and in most cases, 
nationalisation of assets. Production sharing contracts were first introduced in the 
1960s, at a time when the European empires around the world were collapsing. They 
were seen by many as reflecting a new era of national control over resources, and a 
rejection of the colonial era concession agreements that had persisted for more than 
50 years previously. But compared to the nationalisations that took place in most 
major oil-producing countries, the rise of production sharing contracts just a few 
years later readily seemed rather more appealing. 
 
608 Daniel Johnston, The International Petroleum Fiscal System and Production Sharing Contracts. 






Under this system, foreign participation were to be allowed only through the 
provision of a foreign loan. This principle was first used in primary production 
sectors, such as the timber and agricultural production industries. Foreign investors 
were guaranteed some return on their investment since there were no pre- 
production risks of loss, such as the exploration risks in the petroleum industry. 
General Ibnu Sutowo, former founder and President-Director of Pertamina, 
incorporated this concept and instituted it in the petroleum industry in Indonesia.611 
In support of this system, he enunciated five basic principles that must be met for 
any future agreements with foreign companies. 
1. The host country national enterprise would have management control; 
 
2. The contract must be based on production sharing instead of profit sharing; 
 
3. The foreign company would provide all the financing for the operation and to 
sustain the production risks which are recoverable out of 40 per cent of crude 
oil produced per annum. If the contractor’s work expenses exceed 40%, the 
unrecovered excess may be recovered in the succeeding years. The contractor 
receives title to his share of the oil at the point of export; 
4. The remainder of the production would be split 65/35 in favour of the 
government; and finally, 
5. Title to equipment purchased by the contractor would pass to the State 
Enterprise upon entry into Indonesia.612 
There is no commonly accepted definition for the PSC. From various studies, it seems 
that each writer shifts the emphasis over time depending upon the theoretical 
purpose of his/her study, nonetheless, these contracts have, in one way or the other, 
touched the nerve of the arrangement.613 In Gao’s words: 
“The production sharing contract is an agreement under which a foreign 
company serving as a contractor to the host-country or its national oil 
 
 
611 Robert Fabrikant, ‘Production Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry’ (1975) 16 
Harvard International Law Journal 303, 340. 
612 Anderson G Bartlett Robert J Barton, Calvin Bartlett, George A Fowler and Charles F Hays, 
Pertamina. Indonesia National Oil (1st edition, Amerisian 1972) 154-158. 
613 For information on other definitions of the PSC, see H R William and C J Meyers(eds), Manual of Oil 
and Gas Terms (8th edition, New York: Matthew Bender 1991) 973-74. 
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company, recovers its costs each year from production and is further 
entitled to receive a certain share of the remaining production as 
payment in kind for the exploration risks assumed and the development 
service performed if there is a commercial discovery.614 
Independent Indonesia American Petroleum Company (IIAPCO) entered an 
agreement with Indonesia which was signed in 1966. It is generally argued that the 
IIAPCO contract of 1966 was the first genuine PSC in the petroleum industry.615 The 
IIAPCO contract is important because it can be considered as a watershed in the 
evolution of Indonesia’s as well as the world’s petroleum agreements.616 
It has been suggested that the concept of the production sharing contract originated 
in Bolivia or Venezuela as early as 1950.617 Even so, one can safely argue that it was 
Indonesia that substantially modified the concept to the extent that the exportability 
of the concept became worldwide. 
It is not new for investment agreements to give corporations extensive rights, 
prodigious profits and obligations to compensate for historical expenditure.618 Where 
recently-negotiated investment, agreements differ from those in the past is in the 
extent of their enforceability and their dominance over international and municipal 
law. 
Furthermore, the production sharing contract has a built-in tension between the 
desire by most countries to dominate and maintain control over their very important 
assets, and the need of the company to maximise the net present value of their 
investment. This expresses itself, on the part of the government, in a tendency to 
over-regulate, especially in areas of national sensitivity like the participation of 
nationals in the workforce in positions which range from labour through management 
and the enforced use of national products and services. 
In this chapter, I will attempt to elucidate the following issues: 
 
• What are production sharing contracts, in terms of their legal nature and their 
exportability? 
 







• How did they originate and what has been their subsequent development? 
• How wide has the concept been extended geographically? 
• What sort of variations exist in different countries? 
• What are the desirable improvements to these contracts and how can they be 
implemented? 
• How can government agreements be geared to protect the needs for 
sustainable development and protection of the environment? 
 
4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT 
 
The idea of production sharing originated from the Government’s attitude towards 
foreign investment during the early nationhood of Indonesia. During the post-colonial 
decade, the efforts of foreign petroleum companies continued to be hampered by 
nationalism and political turmoil. The Central Government had the herculean task of 
reconciling Indonesia’s desire to control its natural resources with the need to 
generate foreign exchange through the development of these resources. Up till now, 
the concessionaires had therefore permitted to operate under let alone, or Laissez 
faire, agreements.619 These agreements soon became the target of nationalistic 
censure in the Indonesian Legislature.620 The transformation of the existing 
concession agreements into “contracts of work” relegated the foreign operators to 
the legal position of contractors to State Enterprises.621 It was a reflection of the 
nationalistic policies favoured by the then government, which was not prepared to 
accept any foreign equity investment in Indonesia’s economy.622 As a corollary, 
foreign participation is to be allowed only through the provision of a foreign loan, 
which is to be repaid out of production. 
The principle of production sharing was first used in the primary production sectors, 
such as the timber and agricultural production industries. Since then, it has become 
extremely popular and extensively used in several countries all over the world. The 
term “production sharing contracts” could possibly be reserved for arrangements 
whereby the foreign firm and the government share the output of the operation 
 
619 Signed in 1948 with the Dutch colonial government; Alex Hunter, ‘The Indonesian Oil Industry’ in 
Bruce Glassburner (ed) The Economy of Indonesia: Selected Readings (Equinox Publishing 2007) 254, 
259. 
620 Ibid. 
621 Alex Hunter, ‘The Oil Industry: the 1963 Oil Agreements and After’ (1965) Bull. Indon. Econ. Stud 
16. 
622 Fabrikant (n 611) 309. 
629 Omorogbe (n 25) 60. 
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using a predetermined formula.623 In practice, the term has been applied to almost 
any kind of arrangement whereby there is at least an option that the foreign firm and 
the government receive their benefits in kind rather than in cash. Most negotiators 
have worked their way through more than one epoch of the Indonesian model. 624 It 
will continue to function as a model for all others. 
Under the standard PSC, the contractors bore the risk of exploration, so that if no 
commercial oil is discovered, the loss is borne by the contractor. In the event of a 
commercial discovery, the contractor is entitled to be reimbursed out of the 
percentage of the oil produced (referred to as cost oil) and further, by way of 
compensation for the work done by it, the contractor is entitled to the share in the 
remainder of the oil (referred to in the context as “profit oil”)625. 
Initially, the percentage served for reimbursement of costs was 40 per cent in each 
year, until all costs were reimbursed.626 Recent agreements, however, provide for a 
higher percentage in favour of the national company. The remainder is then shared 
between the contractors in predetermined proportions.627 
Asante suggests that production sharing contracts between “most governments of 
developing countries and transnational corporations are essentially variants of service 
contracts, except in one important respect: they provide for sharing the production  
of the enterprise between the host government and the transnational corporation 
based on a prescribed distribution formula”.628 
One remarkable aspect of this kind of arrangement is that ownership of the 
petroleum discovered remained vested in the State or National Company and the 
Foreign Company, as the contractor, did not acquire title to its share of the crude oil 
until it reached the point of export and, in some cases, until the oil has reached a 
mutually agreed point.629 Fabrikant contends that by postponing the title transfer, 
however, PSCs generate “an artificial distinction which acclaims form over substance, 
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might hamper legal action brought by contractors against the purchasers of 
nationalised oil”.630 
 
Furthermore, as in the case of service contracts, production sharing contracts varied 
considerably according to the particular natural resources and the circumstances 
surrounding their development. The purest examples of production agreements were 
the so-called Co-production Agreement that had been negotiated for manufacturing 
by western firms in the communist countries of Eastern Europe.631 Typically, the 
western firms provided licences, machinery and technical assistance. In payment, 
they agreed to accept a certain amount of the product from the firm. 
4.2.1 Management clause: 
 
The conferment of management responsibility on the national petroleum agency is a 
marked departure from the management arrangement under the concessions, joint 
ventures and service contracts.632 The big systemic issue, therefore, is whether the 
management framework under the production sharing contracts differs from the 
other arrangements and whether production sharing contracts proceed according to 
the wishes and aspirations of the parties concerned and the rules designed to 
preserve the primacy of the tenement of a production sharing contract. The 
production sharing contract is a fairly new legal format that is still evolving; the PSC 
was the outgrowth of the Indonesian national aspiration to regain control over its 
natural resources. With time, the demand for management was successfully 
incorporated into all PSCs and became a basic feature of the contract.633 All PSCs 
provide at the outset that “the national company shall have and be responsible for 
the management of the operations contemplated under the contract” and the 
contractor is responsible to the State company for the execution of such 
operations.634 
Not only was this clause seen as a masterpiece of ambiguity635 when it was first 
introduced, but its very suggestion and eventual adaptation have been beset with a 
great deal of criticism. The foreign companies were interested in seeing their money 
 
630 Fabrikant (n 21) 139. 
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well spent and the Government of Indonesia, on the other hand, was interested in 
retaining unqualified management control. One problem was the vagueness of the 
clause which led the parties to fail to agree upon its interpretation. While the 
companies, on the one hand, wished to define the clause more clearly and make the 
clause implementable, the State national company deliberately tried to keep it vague 
and to retain it as a statement of principle636. Both parties contend that their rights 
should be respected: in the case of the companies, they contend that they cannot 
afford the separation of the investment function and its concomitant risks from the 
managerial functions of ensuring the proper utilisation of the capital invested.637 The 
foreign companies were very apprehensive about the introduction of the 
management clause since it represented a radical departure from the contractual 
arrangements subsisting in other parts of the world. The majors638 were unwilling to 
give up managerial prerogatives to inexperienced and not always friendly public 
servants and pointed to the inequity of separating managerial and capital risk- 
bearing functions. 
Further, the majors contend that this clause would simply provide Indonesia with the 
legal means to conveniently eject the companies or nationalise them. An additional 
reason why the majors vehemently refused to accede to the management clause was 
that they feared it would precipitate the inclusion of similar clauses in their contracts 
with other oil exporting countries.639 What is more, there was some apprehension 
that companies would be disqualified from receiving depletion allowance under 
United Nations income tax law.640 
The controversy created by the management clause was effectively removed by the 
subsequent agreement to participation by a large number of the smaller 
“independents”  that  Indonesians  saw  as  being  more  at  amenable  to  the  less 
 
636  Khong Cho Oon, The Politics of Oil In Indonesia - Foreign Company-Host Government Relations 
(LSE Monographs in International Studies, Cambridge University Press 1985) 116. 
637 Fabrikant (n 611) 315. 
638 The designation ‘majors’ customarily refers to the seven international companies: Standard Oil 
Company (New Jersey), Royal Dutch/Shell, British Petroleum, Gulf Oil Corporation, Texaco, Standard 
Oil company (California) and Mobil Oil Company. See E T Penrose, The Large International Firm in 
Developing Countries (George Allen and Unwin Ltd 1968). 
639“Most Favoured Nation” clause confers upon the host country the right to adopt the terms of any 
other contract into which the company enters. Thus, the Major, by signing the PSCs, would have 
permitted any other host countries having most favoured nation status with which they had 
contractual relations to insert such a management clause in their agreement as well. See also Henry 
Cattan, The Evolution of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa (Dobbs Ferry, NY: 
Oceana Publications 1967) 99-100. 
640 Fabrikant (n 611) 315. 
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favourable financial terms.641 Fabrikant states that “the prior acceptance of the 
management clause by the large number of independents would establish a 
precedent effectively foreclosing any kind of future agitation for the clause to be 
withdrawn”.642 A closer examination of the structure of the provision in a standard 
PSC and its actual working, however, reveals that the “the increased de jure 
authority has not necessarily affected the extent of de facto control over 
companies”.643 
The management programme under a PSC is so designed that work programmes in 
each phase of operations are drawn up by the contractor and submitted for approval 
by the national company.644 In practice, the companies have submitted the rawest 
form of data. They raised objections to the submission of the evaluation reports on 
the grounds that they were already obliged to submit copies of original geological, 
geophysical and other data, and that the evaluation reports did not represent original 
data but were unoriginal in character.645A further objection was that the cost 
involved in preparing their reports was not included in the operating cost. This 
deliberately weak provision not only deprived the national company of evaluation 
reports but, in addition, by not specifying the kinds of statistics which the company 
should be required to collect and submit, it left the responsibility open-ended. With 
time, PSCs, and especially those adopted in other countries, have included express 
provisions for the submission of evaluation reports and some have purposely spelt 
out the significant kinds of statistics which the company should be required to submit 
to the host government. 
4.2.2 Relinquishment provision: 
 
A reduction/relinquishment provision is one which “requires the contractor to yield up 
to the host country part (in which case it is a reduction) or all (in which case it is a 
relinquishment) of some area (called the contract area) to which the production 
sharing agreement relates”.646 Such provisions vary from contract to contract. If, 
however, there has been a commercial discovery, the contractor is usually entitled to 
 
641 Ibid; The independents, because of their lack of capital and non-global operations, were anxious to 
enter into contractual relations with Indonesia. Moreover, many of these companies were not 
constrained by the “Most Favoured Nation clause”. 
642 Fabrikant (n 611) 314. 
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continue operations not only in the area where the discoveries have been made, but 
also in a substantial additional area. Some relinquishment is a standing requirement 
in PSCs, which provide for two types of surrender, namely mandatory and 
optional.647 Under the mandatory exclusion provision, “the contractor must surrender 
an agreed percentage of the contract area after specified periods of time during the 
initial exploration period”.648 The PSC appears to leave the issues of the percentage 
of the contract area to be relinquished and the intervals at which relinquishment is to 
take place as matters to be negotiated, rather than being governed by a mandatory 
programme as in several other producing countries.649 Consequently, the percentage 
of the area to be surrendered and the rate of recurrence of the relinquishments are 
items which the contractor may propose for negotiation and agreement with the 
national oil company (Pertamina).650 
Typically, the “contractor is supposed to make three surrenders and to have 
relinquished 80 per cent of the original area by the end of the initial exploration 
period”.651 The PSC usually provides that the area retained after relinquishment shall 
not be in excess of 20 per cent of the original total contract area.652 With regard to 
the area remaining after the mandatory surrender (roughly 20 per cent of the 
original contract area), the contractor is expected to “maintain a reasonable 
exploration effort”.653 If the contractor fails to submit an exploration program for 
such area during any two consecutive years, the PSC has two approaches to deal 
with such a state of affairs.654 In the first method, the parties may seek to relinquish 
any portion of the remaining area or restart exploration. In the second method, the 
parties may decide that the area should be automatically surrendered. 
With regards to the option surrender provisions, the contractor is given the right to 
surrender at the end of the second or third contract year and prior to the end of any 
subsequent year any portion of the contract area upon giving 30 days’ written notice 
to Pertamina.655 Such relinquishment can then be credited against whatever portion 












precise arrangements or requirements as to the exclusion or retention of an area 
except for the broad proviso that with regard to the area retained, “so far as 
reasonable, such portion shall each be of adequate size and expedient shape to 
enable petroleum operations to be conducted thereon”.656 The whole contract area 
must be given back to Pertamina, if no discovery is made by the end of the 
exploration period. 
Furthermore, whether a discovery is to be regarded as commercially significant so as 
to compel the contractor to undertake development under a standard PSC, is 
formulated in the following terms.657 
4.2.3 Commerciality: 
 
A significant characteristic of the modern petroleum contract is the commerciality 
clause, which is not an issue under the traditional concessionary contract. Under the 
commercial provision, “a discovery cannot be developed unless it is granted 
commercial status by the State oil company”.658 In other words, this clause marks  
the end of the exploration phase and the beginning of the development stage.659 A 
burden rests on the contractor to prove whether or not a discovery is economically 
viable for both parties. 
According to Gao, several oil companies have “complained about the negotiations 
associated with determining commerciality, and the issue can easily become an area 
of dispute between the contracting parties”.660 It deals with who determines whether 
or not a discovery is economically practicable and should be developed. According to 
Johnston, this is a “sensitive issue”.661 He goes on to explain that “one is often 
dealing with circumstances where accumulated exploration expenditures are so 
significant that by the time a discovery is made, these sunk costs upon development 
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represent a considerable value, although they represent a liability, or a cost, as far as 
the government is concerned”.662 
Where the cost recovery is too great, the government may be left with only a small 
percentage of the gross production, depending upon the contractual/fiscal 
structure.663 Some regimes will basically permit the contractor to make the decision 
as to whether or not to commence development operations. Other systems have a 
commercial prerequisite. This prerequisite fundamentally places the burden of proof 
on the contractor as to whether or not development of a discovery is inexpensively 
valuable for both the contractor and the government. Under countless commerciality 
clauses, a discovery cannot be developed unless it is granted commercial status. For 
instance, in Colombia, the matter of commerciality is convoluted by politics and 
instability of the succession of governments, so that there has been, on average, 
only a 50% carry-through from the exploration and delineation phase into actual 
development.664 
Coming back to Indonesia, government participation begins at the point when 
commercial status is granted. If the government does not agree that the discovery 
can be developed, the contractor may still go forward. In that case, the government 
backs out. The matter, for the most part, is significant with progressive regimes 
where the government take is based more on profitability than on gross revenues.665 
If a marginal field is developed under a progressive regime, then the government 
share of revenues could be both small and substantially delayed. This creates “an 
important consideration that is significant in fiscal design. There is a trade-off. The 
systems with important limits on the contractor’s access to gross revenues have little 
need for a commerciality requirement”.666 
Several problems may arise in relations between most governments and a company 
specifically when petroleum deposits are discovered in commercial quantities. The 













who has the power to define it; the procedure to follow after a commercial  
discovery; and the government option to participate in the development.667 
Different situations may arise in which both the host country’s government and the 
national oil company may consider that a discovery is not commercial and therefore 
oppose a declaration of commerciality.668 In such cases, the aggrieved party is 
usually the private company. For this reason, the operating company will often wish 
to retain the determination of commerciality as its prerogative. It may also argue  
that commerciality is too vague a notion to define a priori in the petroleum 
agreement669. The usual practice is that the commerciality of a discovery will depend 
upon both market prices at the time of the discovery and the size of the discovery.670 
The better approach will be that there should be a degree of flexibility, and in most 
cases, that will be valuable to both parties. For instance, the agreement may permit 
the host government to encourage the contractor to reconsider its stand.671 But 
where the contractor determines that a discovery is marginal or non-commercial, the 
company may propose a modification to the contract.672 
There are instances where different sets of circumstances may be found where, 
subsequent to a declaration of commerciality, the operator decides that the project is 
less attractive than originally envisaged. In such cases, the decision to develop may 
be changed. Notable examples are Norway, where the Ulla and Haemal fields were 
declared commercial, but development was subsequently delayed for several 
years.673 By contrast, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) there is a general rule 
where the contractor is deemed automatically to have waived all its rights to a 
discovery if development does not commence within ninety days of the date of 
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Further, it is important to stress the fact that a successful well is not necessarily 
equivalent to a commercial discovery. Thus, a better view is that a successful well in 
a new area will probably depend on the results of a subsequent drilling.675 In some 
extreme situations, the host country may argue that without at least some guideline 
definition of commerciality written into the agreement, they have little or no 
protection from the arbitrariness of the foreign investor. 
In most petroleum agreements, at least some definition of commerciality is offered. 
But there are also instances where there is none, as in the case of Tanzania.676 
However, there are instances where the issue arose at a point in time when only a 
single discovery had been made and the one allowed was probably due to expire.677 
In such a case, the contractor would be obliged to surrender the entire area unless 
the discovery was classified as commercially significant. If, however, there was a 
commercial discovery, the contractor was entitled to retain not only the area where 
the discoveries had been made, but a substantial area in addition. 
The systemic issue on the subject of time limits also often imposes a contractual 
limitation upon the host country’s power. A time limit within which the host 
government must approve a commerciality application or lose the right of 
participation may very well be an attractive form of investor protection. There are 
different scenarios. In the first instance, the agreement may anticipate future 
problems by requiring the Minister or national oil company official to give approval 
within a specified period. For instance, in the case of Argentina, the period is 90 
days. There are also instances where it might be stipulated that failure to extend 
such approval will indicate a presumption that an affirmative answer has been 
granted. On the other hand, however, the need to request explicit approval from the 
host government on this matter might function as a disincentive.678 
4.2.4 Drawing Up a Development Plan: 
 
The next question is what procedure is to be followed in the event of a commercial 
discovery. Once a discovery is classified as being commercially significant, the area in 
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area covered by the agreement and is designated a ‘development area’.679 Before the 
commencement of the project, the host government normally requires the foreign oil 
company to submit a development plan for official approval680. The investor is usually 
obliged to submit its development plan because the development phrase involves 
extensive obligations on part of the contracting party.681 The host country, in 
addition, has a duty to ensure that environmental safety and social interests have 
been considered before development actually commences. A more concise 
development plan can be found in the Danish Government’s Model Joint Operating 
Agreement (1986). A proposed development plan should include: 
1. A description of the hydrocarbon deposit(s) to be produced, with detailed 
analyses and evaluations of geological conditions, technical aspects of the 
reservoir and production and economic factors. 
2. A production plan with particulars concerning the date for commencement of 
production and the anticipated magnitude of the annual production for each 
year the deposit is planned to be in production. If it encompasses more than 
one deposit, such particulars shall be given for each deposit covered by the 
plan as well as for the cumulative production anticipated under the plan. 
3. A general description of the facilities planned to be installed including the 
number and type of wells, and equipment for production/reinjection, 
measurement, storage and processing, and pipelines between individual 
porting systems planned for the hydrocarbon produced. 
4. A risk analysis for the planned facilities with a statement of measures to be 
taken to reduce identified risks. 
5. A plan for the development project is to be carried out, including a time 
schedule, economics, and organisational plan for the execution of the project. 
6. A detailed description of any element of uncertainty in the project with respect 
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studies, interpretations, maps, models, and so on, which may be necessary for 
an evaluation of the project.682 
For the efficacy of the development plan, the host government and the private 
company will have an interest in the prompt approval of the development plan.683 In 
this case, a balance of equilibrium must be reached with regards speed and careful 
consideration of the information submitted.684 As a matter of practice, the 
development plan should be approved before development commences.685 It is 
important to do so, since it will provide the oil company the assurance that the 
proposed investment will meet the required criteria acceptable to both parties, 
permitting changes to be made without unnecessary waste or expense.686 In 
addition, it should be expressly provided that there should be a contractual 
requirement that recovery occurs in accordance with prudent economic and technical 
principles so that waste of petroleum is avoided.687 
Furthermore, there are also instances where the host government may require the 
international oil company to prepare a joint development plant to exploit petroleum 
on a cooperative basis.688 Further, where dispute arises between parties, such 
disputes could be settled through arbitration or by reference to a third-party 
expert.689 
4.2.5 Marketing of the crude oil: 
 
Generally, PSCs require the contractor to bear marketing responsibility for all crude 
oil produced in the contract area, including the State’s share of the crude oil. Besides 
giving prior notice to the contactor, however, the State or National Oil Company can 
take its portion of the oil in kind.690 Quite a few contracts nonetheless contain 
provisions reducing the total quantity of oil which the contractor is obligated to 
market on behalf of the national oil company.691 According to Fabrikant, “this ceiling 














market a quantity of national company share which equals almost twice its domestic 
supply requirements”.692 Under the PSCs, several provisions are incorporated which 
are designed to make the contractor’s operation serve domestic economic 
development. 
Initially, under a production sharing contract, domestic supply was not included but 
with time this provision became a common feature in all PSCs.693 Since 1966, a 
uniform provision compelling oil companies emerged to fulfil certain obligations 
towards the supply of the domestic market in Indonesia, the so-called domestic 
obligation694. Usually, in a typical a production sharing contract, the contractor 
undertakes to market all the crude oil produced in the contract area.695 In a number 
of contracts, the marketing obligation of the contractor is reduced and restricted to a 
quantity to be determined by a formula. Suffice to say that the quantity each 
company supplies varies according to its own production volume and decreases as 
overall oil production increases696. 
4.2.6 Pricing: 
 
The valuation of the petroleum is crucial in determining the amount of royalty and 
tax receivable by the host country. Historically, crude oil prices have been based 
either on realisation (the actual sales price realised or the posted price set by the 
host country and which, as a rule, is higher than the realised price).697 Currently, 
many countries prefer to set the price of crude oil at an approximate weighted 
average of international crude oil prices, allowing for transportation and quality 
differentials (e.g. Peru, Norway and Indonesia).698 Whatever basis is used, petroleum 
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In the case of Indonesia, the issue of pricing is important, since the determination of 
price has a major impact on the profits and the government’s revenue. For instance, 
the Indonesian PSC uses an “export price”.700 The figure had been introduced for  
cost recovery and tax calculation purposes. Traditionally, this price has usually been 
the government-set price which was to be in accordance with OPEC-type guide prices 
starting in 1988701. The official price at which the contractor is to sell has always 
been of huge concern.702 The foreign oil company could make a large gross profit 
resulting from the actual difference between the selling price and the realised export 
price under a PSC where the government take consists of a share in the 
production.703 
Prices nevertheless remain relevant under these contracts. Low prices increase the 
quantities of oil necessary for the contractor to recover operating costs, thus the  
total amount of oil available to Pertamina is consequently an important dimension. 
Low prices also lengthen the period of time necessary for the recovery of costs, 
thereby, postponing Pertamina’s contractual right to a larger portion of production.704 
Furthermore, there are also instances where the foreign oil company can influence 
the market by the prices at which it sells the cost oil and its share of profit, for if it 
sells them cheaply, this would tend to drive down the price at which the national 
company might be able to sell its share.705 
It has been argued that in such situations, the national company in the case of 
Indonesia (Pertamina) needs to have built-in mechanisms to protect the State’s 
interest in the issue of pricing.706 In the case of Indonesia, there is an express clause 
which provides that if Pertamina is able to secure a higher price than the contractor 
for the “cost” oil, the foreign oil company must either match the price obtainable by 
Pertamina, or permit Pertamina to sell the oil on the contractor’s behalf.707 However, 
the effectiveness of this mechanism would be substantially reduced where a national 
company operating under a PSC did not have its own marketing apparatus or access 
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to marketing outlets, as would be true of many of the national companies in 
developing countries.708 
Secondly, there are instances where valuation of cost oil sold to affiliates was to be 
done on the basis of a weighted average per barrel net realised price obtained in 
arm’s length sales of independent third parties, or in sales affected by Pertamina in 
exercise of its right to sell where it could obtain a price higher than the contractor.709 
It was expressly provided that: 
“The value of such sales to Associated companies (affiliates) should be 
determined in a commercial manner, taking into account prices at which 
comparable types and quantities have been sold in competing export 
markets, bearing in mind, in that connection, possible differences in 
quality and in export costs.”710 
Thirdly, there are also instances where there was an express provision prohibiting 
the contractor from giving any discount, commission or brokerage fees to their 
affiliates, while requiring that any commission or brokerage fees paid in connection 
with sales to third parties should not exceed the customary and prevailing rate.711 
This prohibition is self-executing, but its efficacy depends largely upon Pertamina’s 
ability to identify affiliates’ transactions.712 
In addition, there also other forms of safeguard in place with regards to financial 
matters, as provided by virtue of the power vested in the national oil company to 
approve the budgets and to undertake auditing and accounting of the operations.713 
Smith and Wells position, however, is that if deductions are applied to the “amount 
of income accruing to the government in the calculation of these operating costs 
incurred by the company under post-1965 agreements, such deductions must be 
given the quality of scrutiny that would be given by a government tax office to 
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In most of the cases such scrutiny requires a high level of sophistication and 
expertise which is notably unavailable, in most cases, to Governments in some of the 
developing countries. For instance, in Norway, the view has been expressed that the 
governmental machinery was handicapped in monitoring the accounts, and in 
particular, the operating expenses of the companies.715 
Arguably, a fundamental weakness in the standard PSC’s financial provisions is that 
under them the contractor can earn substantial windfalls in the event of a rise in oil 
prices. According to Fabrikant: 
“Although, price setting disputes between the parties are seen to be 
successfully avoided by the production sharing formula, the astronomical 
rise in price of crude oil pursuant to the Yom Kippur war reveals an 
inherent weakness of PSCs. As prices outstripped expectations, 
production sharing schemes received a windfall in unexpectedly high 
profits when the per barrel price of Indonesian oil was 5.05 in profit. As 
the price per barrel escalated to 51.00, the contractor profit increased to 
52.75 per barrel.”716 
 
4.2.7 Taxation matters: 
 
Furthermore, other problems that greatly affected the US companies which have 
arisen in relation to the financial package as enshrined in PSC, are the result of a 
ruling given by the Internal Revenue Service of the United States, to the effect that a 
US company is not entitled to a foreign tax credit in respect of certain payments 
made by Pertamina to the Indonesian Treasury717. 
Similarly, the view that was canvassed in the matter in respect of a production 
sharing contract proposed to be entered into by Mobil with Pertamina under which 
Mobil would recover its operating costs in barrels of oil, but not to exceed an amount 
equal to 40 per cent of the value of the total number of barrels produced from the 
contract area during the said year.718 The internal revenue in this matter, however, 
held that Pertamina’s share of production was in substance, if not in form, a royalty 
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and that no part of such royalty was identifiable as an income tax or tax in lieu of 
income tax and therefore in this instance, Mobil could not be entitled to a foreign tax 
credit (under section GO1 and GO3 of the Internal Revenue code of 1943), nor to a 
deduction under section 164 in respect of any part of Pertamina’s share of  
production applied towards payment of taxes to the Indonesian treasury.719 
The Internal Revenue Service reiterated this position with regards to sharing 
ventures in the following terms: 
“If a foreign government owns mineral resources and the taxpayer has 
an interest in such minerals in place, a foreign tax will not be recognised 
as a tax for U.S. Federal Income Tax purposes unless that government 
also requires payment that is commensurate with the value of the 
concession, such royalty or other consideration to be calculated 
separately and independently of the foreign tax. Satisfaction of such 
royalty by the U.S. taxpayer must be independent of any foreign tax 
liability”.720 
In addition, “for foreign tax to be credited under section 901, it must qualify in 
substance and form as a U.S. tax under U.S. concepts”.721 According to Hossain, “in 
the absence of other factors which have contrary implications, payments to a foreign 
government owning the minerals in place extracted by the U.S. taxpayer will be 
treated as a creditable income tax if all of the following characteristics are 
present”.722 He explains further: 
1. The amount of income tax is calculated separately and independently of the 
amount of the royalty oil of any other tax or charge imposed by the foreign 
government. 
2. Under the foreign income tax and in its actual administration, the income tax 
is imposed on the receipt of income by the taxpayer and such income is 
determined on the basis of arm’s length amounts. Further, these receipts are 









3. The taxpayer’s income tax liability cannot be discharged from property owned 
by the foreign government. 
4. The foreign income tax liability cannot be discharged from property owned by 
the foreign country. 
5. While the foreign tax base need not be identified or nearly identical to the 
U.S. tax base, the taxpayer, in computing the income subject to the foreign 
income tax, is allowed to deduct, without limitation, the significant expenses 
paid or incurred by the taxpayer. Reasonable limitations on the recovery of 
capital expenditure are acceptable.723 
Consequently, this ruling triggered considerable debate amongst interested parties 
and resulted in laudable reforms incorporated into the PSC, including the introduction 
of taxation.724 The Ministry of Finance with further reference to this matter provided 
for two types of normal corporate income tax: the first being 45 per cent of taxable 
profit and the second being a dividend tax of 20 per cent on interest, dividends, and 
royalties after deducting the corporate tax.725 
The introduction of taxation of foreign oil companies under a production sharing 
contract represents a substantial shift from the original arrangement and creates a 
form of ambiguity with regards to the government/company relationship. 
In the participation clause under the production sharing contract, Pertamina has the 
right to demand that a 10 per cent undivided interest be offered to either a limited 
liability company or an Indonesian entity collectively called the Indonesian 
participant, that is designated by Pertamina.726 This provision was incorporated in the 
1976 form, and it was expressly provided that the option must be exercised within 
three (3) months of a commercial discovery.727 The Indonesian participant under 
such circumstances assumes no exploration risks, since the participant is carried by 
the contractor during the exploration period.728 Further, the Indonesian participant is 
required to repay the contractor a proportionate share of all past operation costs, 
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including all matters which relate to information compensation and the production 
bonus incurred on his behalf.729 Thus, there are ample of options open to such a 
participant, such as the reimbursement may be made at the participant’s option 
either in cash or out of its production entitlement. 
It is noteworthy that participation clauses in modern petroleum contracts bother 
most contractors730 since they can be strong impediments to foreign investment.  
Very often, such a clause can become quite distasteful and can present management 
difficulties, because it can result in considerable erosion of the contractor’s profits.731 
In Indonesia, the country infrequently exercises its option to participate and in cases 
where this option is exercised, the participation role is titular since the Indonesian 
participant holds only a minority interest in the joint venture.732 
4.2.8 Employment and Preference for Local Suppliers: 
 
A unique feature of all PSCs is that they all provide for obligations on the part of the 
contractor to “prepare and carry out plans and programs for industrial training and 
education of host countries’ nationals for all job classifications with respect to 
operations.”733 Secondly, the contractors also agree to employ qualified Indonesian 
personnel in their operations and after commercial operations commence and in 
addition will train and educate the Indonesian personnel for labour and staff 
positions.734 Under the PSC’s specific provisions requiring the contractor to give 
preference, in its cost of operations, to the use of goods and services produced in 
Indonesia or rendered by Indonesian nationals, provided such goods and services  
are offered at substantially good conditions with regard to quality, price, availability 
at the time and in the quantities required, the cost of such training and activities to 
be treated as part of “operating costs”. 735 
Furthermore, since 1988, many changes have taken place in the Indonesian oil 
industry. It can be argued that under the new procedures, production sharing 
contractors purchase equipment subject only to a post-audit inspection.736 It is worth 
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noting that goods and services that are available on the local market still need prior 
approval. Notwithstanding, contractors in the exploration stage remain free to 
purchase their equipment wherever they choose. 
It has also been argued that procurement procedures are intentionally now being 
simplified and further simplification will be made in line with the government’s 
“deregulation policy”.737 In practice, however, the PSC contractors should not make 
so much ado about Indonesia’s preferential requirement to use domestic goods, 
because the truth of the matter is that no sophisticated exploration equipment is 
made locally. Until such time as the know-how is available for such equipment to be 
made locally, the requirement is little more than a paper provision with no actual 
substance. 
4.2.9 Cost oil and cost recovery: 
 
There are three essential elements in any production sharing agreement. When the 
venture reaches the production stage, the contractor will recover its allowable costs 
out of production. One laudable feature of the PSC is the cost recovery mechanism, 
which allows the contractor to recover all “operating costs” from production when a 
commercial discovery is made. This portion of crude oil that is used for the 
reimbursement of the operating costs of the operation is referred to as the “cost 
oil”.738 It has been argued that since the inception of cost oil provisions, contractors 
have only been able to recover their costs which were initially set at 40 per cent of 
annual gross production each year.739 If, in any given year, the allowable operating 
costs exceeded this limit, the unrecovered excess was carried forward and recovered 
in succeeding years.740 This generous provision mechanism under the PSC 
arrangement made it particularly attractive for the foreign oil companies, since they 
were able to recover their costs in fewer than five years.741 
Cost recovery is an ancient concept. Even communists are comfortable with it. The 
capital providers should at least get their money back. It is one of the most common 
features of a PSC. It is only slightly different from similar provisions which were in 
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force under the concessionary system. Sometimes the hierarchy of cost oil can make 
a difference in cash flow calculations.742 For the most part, this will be the case if 
certain cost recoverable items are taxable. The inherent vicissitudes resulted in the 
1976 model PSC which introduced several strict terms. The new terms substantially 
revised the cost recovery procedure and the foreign firm’s cost recovery was 
prolonged from seven (7) to fourteen (14) years.743 In the period leading up to the 
1976 PSC revisions, developments in the world market, starting with the 1973 oil 
crisis which caused oil prices to escalate drastically, caused the government to realise 
that a 65%:35% split allowed the companies far greater profits than had been 
foreseen in the 1960s.744 Coupled with this was the fact that expectations at that 
time were that oil prices would continue to escalate and might reach US$50- 
US$60/bbl within the decade.745 Consequently, these developments caused a change 
in the equity split was therefore negotiated, based on the principle that windfall 
profits caused by the escalation over the basis price of US$5/bbl were to be split 
85/15 in favour of the government.746 The foreign companies saw these new  
changes as devastating and due to their introduction, curtailed their exploration 
expenditure.747 
4.2.10 FTP and investment credit: 
 
The new or third generation contracts introduced further changes in the PSC. Cost 
recovery was rearranged with the introduction of the concept of FTP (First Tranche 
Petroleum) in the new package.748 The FTP is a portion of production which is split 
between the government and the contractor before the deduction of cost recovery; 
as such it serves as a cap on the cost recovery.749 Therefore, the contractor can 
recover its operating costs each year only from the remaining percentage of 
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Cost recovery/cost oil consists of “exploration and development costs, operating 
costs, current year, depreciation and amortisation, interest on financing, investment 
credit, and unrecovered costs carried over from previous years”.751 
In addition, there was a new provision on these contracts of “investment credit” 
which accompanied the abolition of the 40 per cent cost oil and was the worst 
feature of the new contracts.752 These new developments met stiff resistance from 
the investing companies as they were perceived as slowing down recouping 
exploration and development investment and their intention was to facilitate the 
recovery of cost.753 Investment credit is taken out of gross production before it is 
subject to taxation and it is also transferable to succeeding years until it is fully 
taken.754 
It has been argued that the implications of the investment credit are twofold.755 
Firstly, this credit serves as an incentive for the investor to recover, through cost 
recovery, some substantial percentage of capital cost.756 Secondly, the investment 
credit reduces the ultimate profit on the oil split for both the investor and the 
government.757 In most respects, cost recovery is akin to the deductions in 
calculating taxable income under a concessionary system. The profit oil share taken 
by the government could be viewed as the first layer of taxation. 
Nevertheless, the terminology is unambiguous and hearkens back to the ownership 
issue. A contractor under a PSC does not own the production and, as a result, at the 
point of cost recovery, has no taxable revenue against which to apply deductions. 
The government reimburses the contractor for cost through the cost recovery 
mechanism and then shares a portion of the remaining production or revenues with 
the contractor. Whilst cost recovery treatment is common in most PSCs, there are 
exceptions to the rule.758 A number of contracts have no limit to cost recovery. Some 
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allowance for cost recovery prior to the profit oil split.759 The government basically 
granted the contractor a share of production which ranged from 40% to 50% 
depending upon the contract area.760 An exception is where excess cost oil goes 
directly to the government. Even though this feature is quite rare, this provision was 
proposed by Egypt during the Nile licensing round in 1989.761 
4.2.11 Compensation and Production Bonuses: 
 
Generally, PSCs make allowance for a compensation bonus to be paid by the 
contractor after endorsement of the contract on receipt of the information  
concerning the acreage held by Pertamina which is to be made available to the 
contractor.762 The amount of the compensation bonus varies considerably from one 
contract to another. Since the amount of the compensation bonus is a matter of 
tender and negotiation, it is frequently unconnected to the quality and quantity of 
the information held and offered by Pertamina. The payment for that reason is more 
in the nature of a “signature bonus” than a payment for information.763 
The production bonus is a compulsory payment by the contractor once production 
reaches specified levels over a period of time, typically 120 consecutive days.764 On 
the other hand, there is distinct pattern as to triggering the levels of production.765 
The number and the amount of the bonuses, which are a matter of bidding, differ 
from contract to contract, depending conceivably on the geological prospects and the 
acreage in question.766 
Conceivably, bonus payments are borne exclusively by the contractor and cannot be 
built into the operating costs which are recoverable from production but can be 
charged against tax liabilities once profitable operation begins.767 It is unrefuted that 
the rates of bonus payments differ considerably between individual PSCs, but there is 
no unambiguous reason to account for these differences.768 Gao highlights that “one 
possible explanation is that the differences are related to the geological 
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attractiveness of the areas concerned. A high bonus payment can radically increase 
the chances of winning the contract, though other factors are also taken into 
consideration by Pertamina. The obligation for bonus payments has been 
deteriorating sharply in recent years”.769 
4.2.12 Production Split/Profit Oil: 
 
In a standard PSC, the crude oil remaining after the deduction for costs is referred to 
as profit oil or equity oil, which is to be shared between the national oil company and 
the contractors in accordance with a predetermined ratio.770 The usual practice is  
that this ratio is set by the national oil company in the draft contract. In order words, 
it is not subject to negotiation. 
Over the years, substantial changes have occurred in the Indonesian petroleum 
sector. Under the second-generation PSCs, the profit split changed substantially, with 
an increase in Pertamina’s share from 65 per cent to 85 per cent of production.771 
Such PSCs set a new tax split at 65.9091 for Pertamina and 34.0909 for 
contractors.772 The remainder of production after taxation was split between the two 
parties as contained in the pre-tax split.773 
In the third-generation PSCs, the profit oil share-out was restructured by the various 
incentive packages such as the ones embodied in the 1988 and 1993 PSCs.774 
Substantial changes were made, coupled with a government attempt to stimulate the 
development of its petroleum reserves in its eastern provinces, all of which fed into 
these third-generation agreements. The following issues were addressed. Firstly, the 
first tranche petroleum, set at 20 per cent of production, was to be split between 
Pertamina and the contractor, before the recovery of operating cost; this guaranteed 
Pertamina a minimum share of production, from the very start of production when 
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Secondly, an improvement was instituted in the contractor’s share from tier areas of 
25 per cent after tax up to 50,000bbl/day production and of 20 per cent up to 
150,000bbl/day produced.776 
Thirdly, there were improved incentives for new fields, such as unconditional 
investment credits and higher DMO (Domestic Market Obligation) from 0.20 to 10 per 
cent of export price.777 
Lastly, deregulation in procurement of materials and services, which allowed more 
efficient operations. It is noteworthy that, since 1988, the production split has been 
relatively more flexible and diversified. The new equity split ratio, however, 
introduced only marginal additional incentives for deep water and frontier area 
development.778 However, it is also noted that some terms and conditions such as  
the frontier and marginal field area incentives are not clearly spelt out. 
4.2.13 Dispute Settlement: 
 
Most PSCs specify that any dispute would be resolved not in the courts of  the 
country concerned but in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) in Washington DC or the International Chamber of Commerce in 
Paris. All PSCs have a standard dispute settlement clause which employs a three-step 
procedure for resolution of disputes779. In the first place, both parties are expected  
to meet periodically and discuss the conduct of the petroleum operations and to 
make efforts to settle amicably any outstanding dispute. 
The next step is arbitration; such disputes as cannot be settled amicably can be 
referred to arbitration.780 These arbitration hearings are generally closed to other 
than the contract parties. Commentators have observed that in most cases, tribunals 
are presided over by arbitrators with a background as corporate lawyers, and 
therefore, narrowly favour commercial interest rather than broader issues of national 
interest or sovereignty.781 It has been argued that “the system assigns the State the 
role of just another commercial partner, ensures that non-commercial partner issues 














The third stage of dispute resolution is judicial settlement; in the event the 
arbitration is unsuccessful, the dispute will be referred to the Indonesian Courts of 
Law.783 
PSCs generally exempt foreign oil companies from any new laws that might affect 
their profits. Hiatt argues that such “contracts often stipulate that disputes are heard 
not in the country’s own courts but in international investment tribunals which make 
their decisions on commercial grounds and do not consider the national interest or 
other national laws”.784 
4.2.14 Termination: 
 
The contract cannot be terminated during the first few years from the effective date. 
There are three instances whereby the contract can be terminated. 
First, “the contract can be terminated voluntary at any time should the contractor 
consider that circumstances do not warrant continuation of the petroleum operations. 
This is usually done by giving written notice and conferring with Pertamina”. 785 
Second, during the exploration stage period, “if no petroleum is discovered, the 
contract will automatically terminate in its entirety, unless the contractor elects to 
extend it”.786 If petroleum is not discovered by the end of the extended period, some 
contracts require that the contract be automatically terminated.787 Most contracts, 
however, grant the contractor the unqualified right to a further extension, usually for 
a duration equal to that of the prior extension period.788 
Third, the contract could also be compulsorily terminated if a major substantial 
breach of the contract is committed by either of the parties or by either party upon 
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giving 90 days written notice.789 This clause, however, is contingent upon conclusive 
evidence being proved by arbitration or final court decision. 
Under this standard contract, the government could increase its share by increasing 
the rate of taxes payable by the contractor; but before signing these contracts, it 
appears, the companies had obtained undertakings from the government that tax 
rates would remain “frozen” and would not be wide-ranging during the length of the 
contract.790 
The training obligations assumed by the contractor incorporated a precise obligation 
to provide $50,000 per year during the first 6 years, and $250,000 per year during 
the ensuing 10 years for scholarships and training of nationals in skills relating to the 
petroleum industry.791 
4.3 THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
Most PSCs, however, have shown little concern for the social and ecological impact of 
the extractive process. PSCs, both model and individual, do not have a separate 
article dealing with any environmental protection.792 The environmental provision is 
not lawfully sound for a number of significant reasons. Foremost, its most important 
objective is apparently the “execution of the work programme”, and environmental 
protection is given only a secondary place. Second, environmental obligations are not 
spelt out in operational terms.793 For example, the phrase “extensive pollution” is 
quite unclear and open to a lot of interpretations. Seemingly, the contractor assumes 
no liability except if its operations have caused “widespread pollution”.794 Third, the 
provision fails to spell out the environmental objective to be achieved or to set out 
several significant requirements such as unambiguous preventive measures, clean-up 
and restoration operations, or insurance programs.795 The words of the provision 
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specific or strict enough to compel foreign companies to take their environmental 
duties seriously.796 
Further, in PSCs generally national environmental legislation is not stated; the 
contract fails to refer production-sharing contractors openly to Indonesia’s existing 
environmental guidelines.797 According to Gao, “the loose environmental obligations 
may give rise to disagreement between the contracting parties”.798 Gao elucidates on 
the increasing controversy regarding who is responsible for the removal costs after a 
field is abandoned or decommissioned.799 Over 300 installations located in  
Indonesian offshore waters, mostly in areas close to navigation routes were due for 
removal in the 1990s.800 The financial obligations for maintenance and abandoning or 
decommissioning are substantial and burdensome for the contracting party that is 
responsible.801 
PSCs have no specific provisions regarding the abandonment of offshore platforms. 
Pertamina has attempted, through negotiations with contractors, to have the 
maintenance and lighting costs included in the PSCs.802 Legally however, once all 
equipment becomes the property of Pertamina once brought into the country, it is 
difficult to argue that the contractor has any responsibility to bear removal costs.803 
The subtle environmental provisions are possibly deliberate, because Indonesia must 
consider the degree to which the benefits from environmental protection exceed the 
costs incurred in the circumstance of a pressing need for foreign investment and 
economic development.804 This also explains why these provisions have remained 
unimproved throughout contractual revisions in the past.805 In short, the broad 
environmental terms of reference are essentially unenforceable because they contain 
no precise definitions and regulations.806 
Also, the PSC system has smoothed the progress of exploitation of petroleum 
resources over the past few decades leading to increased economic development. 
 













The colossal extraction has also created numerous problems, among them the 
diminution of petroleum resources. The declining of petroleum reserves has caused 
concern for many producing countries. Driven by the fear that existing fields will dry 
up within the foreseeable future, most State National companies have had to find 
new reserves and to into tap them swiftly to replace the older fields. For this and 
other reasons, the PSC is designed with strong encouragement for both the 
government and companies to optimise development and make the most of 
production in the event of a commercial discovery. As it stands, the contract contains 
practically no regulation for sustainable development. 
Furthermore, Indonesia represents a great opportunity for the decommissioning of 
supply chain. However, there is often a lack of clarity on when and who should 
decommission assets. While developments are in motion, the investors have 
reiterated that current contracts only state that assets should be decommissioned at 
the end of life with no more information beyond this statement. Fortunately, with 
issues and regulations now being addressed there is a growing optimism that 
Indonesia could become the next big market for decommissioning. 
4.4 EVALUATION OF PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS 
 
Production sharing contracts have been popular with the multinational oil companies. 
These companies control their own share of the petroleum products and except for 
an election by the national oil company to take its share in kind, they can control the 
destination of the State National oil company’s share.807 Most developing countries 
involved in the oil business have been driven by political and economic forces; they 
seek a contract structure that could assert sovereign rights over natural resources 
and meet the economic needs of developing the resources. Gao opines that “the PSC 
is a compromise between this political philosophy and economic reality”.808 
The PSC is an exceptional resource system pioneered, for the first time in history, by 
a developing country.809 It fundamentally distinguishes the popular trends which 
were on the rise, predominantly prior to the mid-1980s, towards State control over 









country.810 The system also recognises the indispensable responsibility played by 
foreign companies in the activities of exploration, which are extremely risky and both 
capital and technology-intensive, by passing on the functioning rights to the latter.811 
It is also significant that the PSC gives both parties an equal right to receive a 
positive amount of production to meet their necessary goals, specifically, to have 
access to petroleum products.812 This characteristic account, in part, for the rapid 
expansion of the system all over the world in the past several decades. 813 
It would appear that the PSC also places reliance on a mutuality of interests in the 
relationship.814 In cooperation, both parties proclaim in the PSC their obligation to 
carry out the contract in agreement with the principles of mutual goodwill and good 
faith.815 There is a growing recognition of the mutuality clause and a growing 
willingness to operate in response to it in diverse ways as a result. Certainly, one 
cannot deny the growth attained by the PSC over other arrangements which basically 
ignored the significance of this mutuality. 
Significantly, the new structures have broken the tight link between ownership, 
control, and financial risks and benefits that was intrinsic in the traditional 
concession.816 Smith explains that “arrangements have been negotiated which have 
repackaged these elements in ways that were not practicable under the old 
structures”.817 He further states that: 
“because ownership and control have become significant political 
symbols in most developing countries, new contractual forms have been 
created to permit greater freedom in allocating ownership, control, and 
financial risks and benefits in ways that satisfy both the new political 
and economic imperatives. Ownership can be allocated in a way that 
makes the presence of the foreign firm politically acceptable in the host 
country. Increasingly, managers have recognised that financial benefits, 
their main objective, need not be completely linked with control. And 
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control need not be linked at all with ownership. The new forms of 
agreement will almost undoubtedly extend into a number of industries 
where they have not been common. In some cases, the new 
arrangements may not generate significant shifts in the allocation of 
financial benefits. In those industries where bargaining powers continue 
to shift in favour of the host country and where host country 
negotiating skills are satisfactory, changes will be more than political. 
There will be real changes in who controls operations and who receives 
financial benefits from the projects”. Hitherto, whilst the new forms of 
agreement have provided ways of sharing symbolic power and 
economic benefits in ways that the traditional concession could not, 
they have not eliminated the complex technical problems relating to the 
allocation of financial benefits and financial risks. Thus, technical issues 
remain no matter what the structure of the agreement”.818 
Without doubt, the concept of production sharing itself is an obvious 
acknowledgment and materialisation of the principle of mutuality of interests.819 It is 
worth noting the contractual dynamism of the PSC; the system has undergone at 
least three key modifications since its commencement.820 Every time the change is 
claimed to revolutionise and revitalise all PSCs, both existing and new. 
Notwithstanding all the fanfare, the modifications in terms were more the result of 
bilateral consultation and negotiation than independent action and force. It would 
appear that both the government and companies have at all times managed to find a 
way of advancing their negotiations so as to accommodate each other’s objectives in 
a mutually satisfactory way.821 
The PSC does not differentiate between onshore and offshore development, despite 
the fact that it was initially intended and used for offshore extractions.822 Similar 
terms and conditions apply to both, exceptions being the investment credit and the 
positive equity split introduced by incentive packages in different years for oil and 
gas development in frontier and deep-water areas.823 A number of the incentives 
introduced over the years are valid only to new PSCs signed after the proliferation of 
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the incentive packages, whilst others are applicable to both existing and new 
contracts.824 Thirdly, the modifications made in the PSC over the years have all 
served to decrease the clarity of the concept of production sharing as they have 
progressively made the production-sharing process more and more complex.825 
On the negative side, PSC as a resource development system is definitely  not 
perfect. Its most ineffectual features are possibly its management clauses. Officially, 
the duty of management is at all times vested in Pertamina in the case of Indonesia, 
and the contractor is in charge of carrying out the extraction.826 In practice,  
however, Pertamina does not have adequate means to achieve the aim of full 
managerial control over all aspects of the operation and its authority to endorse 
company work programmes remains a rather token one.827 In fact, it is the  
contractor who retains effective control regardless of the management clauses.828 
Objectively, an assessment of the relationship between Pertamina and the foreign 
companies discloses the inconsistency between the “written word and the reality”.829 
One can safely argue that too much or too little management has been achieved 
under PSCs. At the same time as Indonesia has claimed that oil exploitation in 
Indonesia is in the hands of Indonesians, others may argue that the management 
clauses only give the “appearance of domestic control”.830 In any case, despite the 
controversy over the management clauses, Pertamina’s management capability has 
strengthened in recent times. As for the efficacy of the management clauses, it is 
justifiable to say that, under these provisions, the State maintains management 
responsibility, but the oil company exercises day-to-day control.831 Largely, the legal 
inadequacy of the PSC, i.e., the gap between management control as outlined in 
theory within the PSC and as practised on the ground has also proven to be its 
strength, in view of the fact that it provides both parties with elasticity. 
In the same vein as the management clauses, the provision for Indonesian 
ownership (Indonesianisation) is basically a token one owing to its formulation as a 






829 Fabrikant (n 611) 337. 
830 Ibid. 
831 Gao (n 83) 102. 
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these obligations that could provide a benchmark against which any company’s 
conformity with the government’s objectives in this area could be measured. The 
vague nature of the contract provision has generated disagreement over definition, 
timing and enforcement.832 What is more, the enjoyment of the whole of any price 
increase is seen, from the government’s point of view, as the main weakness of the 
PSC. 
In the field of employment, production-sharing contractors have found themselves 
essentially free to make use of and train their staff, irrespective of the contractual 
obligation of using the nationals of the host country.833 
A further major area of concern that has remained with most PSCs is that, without 
doubt, their environmental provisions are mere window-dressing without any 
practical force. The system has, consciously or unconsciously, failed to address the 
issue in a proper manner. For a modern resource development system that can meet 
the environmental challenges of this century to be instituted in reality, the contract 
must rectify the current woolly approach by incorporating specific, attainable and 
valuable provisions for environmental protection and sustainable development.834 
From the above discussion, it can safely be stated that there is no doubt the PSC will 
have contributed immensely to the government realising its objectives of maximising 
its revenue from the oil industry, but in terms of ultimately achieving de facto control 
of the oil industry and the development of the other aspects of petroleum operation, 
it has failed woefully. It is quite doubtful whether sufficient focussed thought and 
foresight has been given to the actual as opposed to the paper issue of transfer of 
control from the company to the government. The other matter is whether the PSC is 
compatible with the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The 
evolution of the oil agreement from the traditional concession regime to these newer 
forms of agreement has achieved financial and fiscal objectives for government but 
the fact remains that the issue of control and development of national interest has 






832  Oon (n 636) 98. 
833  Gao (n 83) 102. 
834 Ibid 103. 
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contracts do not change their nature; only their contractual provisions and substance 
determine their nature.835 
4.5 SUMMING UP 
 
The attractiveness of the PSC amongst both producing countries and foreign 
companies stems from its admirable characteristics which have political relevance to 
governments and possibly also practical relevance to oil companies who have come 
to the realisation that they can no longer be noticeably in control of the petroleum 
resources of producing countries. The triumph of the PSC in developing countries is 
principally due to the political impetus to assert sovereign rights over national 
resources by producing an image of national control over petroleum development. 
The PSC represents a significant effort to equalise the historical imbalance between 
producing countries and foreign petroleum companies. Although PSCs exaggerate  
the actual shift in power between the parties, they provide an appearance of parity 
as well as a means for eventually attaining such equality.836 One must look at the 
substance of each agreement to determine the bottom-line financial benefits as well 
as the controls that are involved in the particular contractual arrangement chosen.837 
Even though the new forms of agreement have provided ways of sharing symbolic 
power and economic benefits in ways that the traditional concession could not, they 
have not eliminated the complex technical issues relating to the allocation of financial 
benefits and financial risk. The technical issues remain no matter what the structure 
of the arrangement. 838 
The PSC has turned out to be a well-known petroleum development system through 
wide-ranging national practice, as opposed to the concession system, and a 
substitute to other contractual arrangements. Notwithstanding its key flaw on the 
environmental side, the system provides producing countries, on the one hand, with 
a reasonable foundation for petroleum development and foreign oil companies, on 




835 A Z El Chiati, (1987) ‘Protection of Investment Inherent in the Type of Agreement in A Z El Chiati, 
Protection of Investment in the context of petroleum agreements (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Collected 
Courses: Recueil des Cours 204 1987) 48-76. 
836 Fabrikant (n 611) 351. 
837 J Attwell, ‘Changing Relationship Between Host Countries and International Petroleum Countries’ 
(1979) Hous. L. Rev 1015. 
838 Smith and Wells (n 561) 590. 
208 
 
say that the PSC system is an important contribution made by Indonesia to the world 
petroleum industry. 
From the aforementioned, the Nigeria version of the PSC will be elucidated in the 
next chapter. The main attractions are two major reliefs the PSC provides. First, 
there is the respite of the burden of cash calls, since all funding for the operations is 
advanced by the contractor and secondly, the relief of the burden of risk, since the 
contract becomes effective only after a commercial discovery has been made. For the 
investor and the contractor, however, the risk is considered worth taking because a 
commercial discovery would yield higher returns plus the additional relief that 
government interference is minimal in its operations. The PSC scheme was originally 
intended only for newcomers and small producers. This is because once a 
commercial discovery is made, the only essential risk is automatically removed, and 





NIGERIAN PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS: PAST AND PRESENT. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Nigeria, in view of the burden of funding joint venture operations (cash calls) by the 
Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)839 and the need to increase Nigerian oil 
reserves, the Federal Government decided to introduce the Production Sharing Contract 
(PSC). As in most developing oil exporting countries, the PSC is essentially a form of 
commercial transaction for the development of petroleum resources of the state which, 
as a sovereign owner of vital depletable resources, seeks to exercise its sovereign rights 
in the development of the resources by the foreign oil company. The basic principle 
underlying the PSC is that the oil company carries the whole cost of exploration within 
the geographical area stipulated by the contract and is rewarded accordingly if a 
commercial discovery is made and development follows. However, such rewards come 
in the following manner: first with an entitlement to extract oil from the discovered 
source up to the amount needed for recovery of its costs of exploration; following 
thereupon with a share in production revenues, which share is determined by 
agreement. In other words, the PSC contractor has full rights only to “cost oil” (i.e. oil to 
recoup production costs). It can have a share of “profit oil” (oil to guarantee a return on 
investment) after the company has defrayed tax and royalty obligations through tax oil 
on the license holder’s behalf. 
The Nigerian experience will form the subject matter of this chapter and the nature, 
purpose and terms as applicable to Nigerian oil sector contracts will be examined. 
Where appropriate, comparisons will be made with other jurisdictions with a view to 
ascertaining what such arrangement should provide for. 
The further purpose of this chapter is to set out and examine the scope, the significance 
and the basic features of the typical PSC as it relates to Nigeria. As petroleum assumes 
 
839 The Department of Petroleum Resources is the regulatory arm of the Nigerian petroleum industry, 
charged with the overall responsibility for regulating, enforcing and monitoring the activities of the 
industry in accordance with the provisions of relevant laws. The Department used to be the Inspectorate 
Division of the NNPC established under section 10 of the NNPC Act before it was split off into an 
autonomous regulatory department. 
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increasing importance in the world economy, foreign oil companies are left with no 
choice but to compromise, in fact, many of the traditional prerogatives which they have 
previously enjoyed in the underdeveloped world. The PSC stands as an important effort 
to equalise the historic imbalance between the host country and the multinational 
corporation. Although such contracts seem to exaggerate the actual shift in power 
between the parties, they provide an appearance of equality as well as means for 
ultimately achieving such equality. How far this is true will be a further focus of this 
study. The new Production Sharing Contracts and the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin 
Production Sharing Contract will also be elucidated in this chapter. 
5.2 PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS 
 
In Nigeria, the term Production Sharing Contract is defined in the Deep Offshore and 
Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act, 1999840 as: 
“Any agreement or arrangement made between the corporation or the 
holder841 and any other petroleum exploration and production company or 
companies for the purpose of exploration and production of oil in the deep 
offshore842 and inland basins.”843 
According to Ogiemwonyi844 the PSC could be described as a “risk service contract 
where: 
 
• Corporation appoints the contractor to carry out petroleum operations. 
• Contractor provides necessary funds for petroleum operations 
• Contractor is allowed to recover operating cost from crude oil discovered. 
• Contractor bears the risk of operating cost, if no oil is discovered.”845 
 
 
840 Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act, (1999) as amended. Federal 
Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, No. 17, Vol.86, Lagos, 23rd March 1999. The law was enacted inter 
alia to give effect to certain incentives to the oil and gas companies operating in the Deep Offshore and 
Inland Basin areas under Production Sharing Contracts and such production sharing type arrangements 
between the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation or other holders of oil prospecting licenses and 
various petroleum exploration and production companies concerning the terms Production Sharing 
Contracts. 
841 “Holder” means any Nigerian Company that holds an oil prospecting license or oil mining lease situated 
within the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Under the relevant provision of the Petroleum Act, as 
amended. Section 18. 
842 “Deep offshore” means any water depth beyond 200 meters. Section 18. 
843“Inland Basin” means any of the following Basins, namely, Anambra, Benin, Chad, Gongola, Sokoto and 
such other basins as may be determined, from time to time by the Minister. Section 18. 
844 CO Ogiemwonyi The 1993 Production Sharing Contract (Undated). 
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The Nigerian PSC differs in certain important respects from the Standard PSC, which 
was pioneered in Indonesia and which is the subject of the preceding chapter of this 
dissertation. The first Nigerian Production Sharing Contract was concluded in 1973 
between the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and Ashland Oil (Nigeria) 
Company (then the Nigerian subsidiary of Marathon Oil Corporation) and initially 
covering the exploitation of the NNPC’s concession in OPL 98 and 118 situate 
respectively in Imo State and off-shore Cross River State. The lifespan of the contract 
was stated to be twenty years from 1979 with a term of five years.846 
This remained the only PSC in operation in Nigeria for over a decade until the end of the 
1980s when, pursuant to the Government’s oil sector policy in not increasing its joint 
venture exposure, and its encouragement of deep offshore exploration development, 
the PSC became the preferred vehicle of Government participation in the upstream 
petroleum industry. The deepwater acreages, which were allocated since the 1990/91 
licensing round, have thus been based on PSC arrangements. 
In 1992 and 1993, the Government, through the NNPC, negotiated new PSCs with Royal 
Dutch Shell, Exxon/Mobil, Chevron/Texaco, EniAgip, TotalFinalElf and the Statoil/BP 
alliance. These global parent companies were required to incorporate new Nigerian 
subsidiary companies to execute the PSCs. Addax Petroleum Development Company 
Limited subsequently acquired the interests of Ashland in the first PSCs in 1998 and this 
relationship is now governed by current PSC terms. Contractors who had existing 
traditional joint venture relationships with the NNPC were required to incorporate 
separate Nigerian companies to execute their PSC relationships. The reason for this was 
simply because it was important for the PSC operations to be ring-fenced from such 
companies’ existing traditional joint venture operations. Therefore, the insistence by the 
NNPC during the negotiations leading to the PSC grants to Chevron and Shell, for 
example, on the incorporation of new separate companies resulting in the birth of 
Chevron (SNEPCO) respectively to operate their PSC awards is understandable. 
However, the provisions of the Nigerian agreement are less ambitious as compared to 
845 Ibid. 
846 In 1991, the Minister of Petroleum Resources revoked the said contract on the grounds that Ashland 
Oil had sold its interests in four OPLs (Nos 96, 118, 90 and 225) to Perenco Investments SA (an American 
Company) without seeking the prior written consent of the Minister as required by law. See Daily Times 
Newspaper issue of Saturday, June 14, 1997. 
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those in Indonesia. Asante has argued that they are less pretentious than their 
counterpart Indonesian agreement in the areas of ownership and control.847 Although 
the contract was signed on the 12th of June 1973, it did not come into effect until 1979 
and it lasted for a period of twenty years. 
5.3 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES 
 
Under the NNPC/AON Production Sharing Contract, there are sets of obligations and 
rights which are included in the PSC. The most important of these are: 
5.3.1 Operating Costs: 
 
It is expressly provided under clause I that AON shall bear the risk of operating costs 
required in carrying out petroleum operations in the designated contract area. In other 
words, this clause imposes an obligation on AON to furnish the entire funding up-front 
for the costs involved in exploration, drilling, production and the day-to- day running of 
the PSC joint venture.848 Secondly, AON is also required to provide the technical 
expertise for the performance of the work programme.849 
The NNPC, on its part, is allowed to contribute professional staff to participate in the 
petroleum operations and is required to assist the contractor in obtaining necessary 
local funds, visa and work permits for its expatriate staff and in acquisition of surface 
rights. The cost incurred by the NNPC in rendering such assistance is reimbursable to 
the NNPC. Secondly, the NNPC also assures the contractor that it will not be 
discriminated against in any way and will be treated as well as any other oil companies 
operating in Nigeria. Further, the NNPC is also required to furnish Ashland with all 
geological data on drilling wells, production and other necessary information that they 
might deem necessary. 
5.3.2 Ashland operating costs and the sharing of profit: 
 
The Act defines the “operating cost” as expenditure made, and obligation incurred in 
carrying  out  any  petroleum  operation  excluding,  perhaps,  the  signature  bonus  if 
 
847 Asante (n 4) 366. 




payable. The term has been so defined because all allowable costs under the contract 
are recoverable from production if and when obtained. AON’s costs incurred in the 
course of the operation, under this situation, if they are reimbursable, are usually 
dependent on whether the production of petroleum in commercial quantity will be 
sufficient to compensate AON for its operating costs.850 The operating costs recoverable 
by Ashland out of the available oil is known as “cost oil.” Under clause 6 of this PSC, 
Ashland is entitled to recover not only its operating costs but also interest costs on 
funds borrowed to conduct petroleum operations.851 It is usually pegged at fifty per cent 
per annum of available crude oil. Under these circumstances, any unrecovered operating 
costs from the previous years are carried forward until fully recovered by Ashland in the 
succeeding years.852 
Furthermore, after the allocation of “cost oil” at 40% of the total oil produced, out of  
the 60% remaining, 55% shall be allocated to tax oil and shall be applied by Ashland for 
the payment of petroleum profit tax payable after the production.853 The balance of the 
available production after the deductions of cost oil and tax oil is known as the profit oil 
and would amount to 45% of the 60% remaining after deduction of the cost oil. The 
NNPC shall be entitled to receive 65% of this amount and Ashland shall be entitled to 
35%. However, this was subject to the proviso that the NNPC share of profit oil was to 
increase to 70% of the profit oil upon the venture’s operation reaching a daily 
production of fifty thousand barrels per day or more from the contract area. 
Hossain argued that the cost recovery provision is particularly attractive to the 
international oil company since it enables them to receive a quick payout of fifty per 
cent of the oil towards reimbursement of exploration development and other operating 
costs they have incurred.854 Each party under the contract is also at liberty to take in 
kind and dispose of available crude oil allocated to it. Thus, Ashland takes in kind cost 




850 Ibid. Under clause 1(g), commercial quantity is defined as the capacity to produce at least 10,000 




854 Hossain (n 260) 148. 
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the same in accordance with the approved work programme and pays the applicable 
rent royalties and petroleum profit tax. 
There are also instances where a host country might regard the 40% cost recovery as 
being excessive and commentators have argued this point. For example, Hossain 
explains with regards to the 1973 oil price escalation, that Indonesia sought an 
alteration in the contractual terms with the international oil companies, so that the 
existing cost recovery allowance that is usually forty per cent (40%) would be reduced 
to twenty five per cent (25%) and the ratio in which the remaining production would be 
shared between the government and the company would be changed from 60%/40% to 
85%/15%.855 
This new development did not go down well with the international oil companies, 
although the other legislative changes were more readily acquiesced to. The reaction 
was strongest in Indonesia, where the companies mounted a concerted opposition and 




In the earlier PSC negotiated in Indonesia, there were no provisions for the payment of 
income tax by the investor. This has changed, however, and such an international oil 
company is liable to a forty five per cent 45% tax on their income arising from the 
operations.857 
Under the Ashland/NNPC PSC, petroleum profit tax of fifty five per cent (55%) is paid 
from the available crude oil after the deduction of Ashland cost oil. This is known as the 
tax oil. The “tax oil” consist of the tax payable by the NNPC and Ashland.858 The price 
realised after the sale of tax oil shall be employed by Ashland towards the payment for 
the production.859 Any additional amounts of petroleum profit tax due after the 
 
855 Ibid 104. 
856 Ibid. 
857 Keith Blinn, Claus Duval, Honroe Le Leuch, and Andre Pertuzio, International Petroleum; Exploration 
and Exploitation Agreements; Legal, Economic & Political Aspects (London: Euromoney Publications & 





application of the fifty-five (55%) per cent for “tax oil” shall be paid by the NNPC and 
Ashland in proportion to the participating interest shares at the time that such additional 
amount of petroleum profit tax is payable. 
It has been opined that for “administrative purposes, Ashland in practice also pays, on 
behalf of the NNPC, the taxes and royalties payable by the NNPC in respect of the 
NNPC’s share of the joint venture production”.860 The last portion ‘profit oil’ is then 
shared between Ashland and the NNPC, in the ratio of 65 per cent to 35 per cent 
respectively; with a proviso that the NNPC’s share is to increase to 70 per cent of the 
profit oil upon the venture’s operation reaching a daily production of 50,000 or more.861 
Under the post-1992 PSCs, however profit oil is shared between the NNPC and the 
contractor at varying levels depending on the level of production; favouring the 
contractor at lower levels and gradually shifting in favour of the NNPC as production 
increases.862 
In Libya, for instance, it is a different scenario. Under the Libyan PSC there is no 
provision for the payment of an income tax.863 However, under this system, the National 
oil company retains a share of the production which is usually as high as 81% against 
19% for the international oil company.864 
It is immaterial whichever method is adopted, but what does matter is that the 
mechanism used depends largely on the host country’s political and administrative 
convenience. 
5.3.4 Management of the Operations: 
 
It has been noted earlier in this volume that the management system in Indonesia in 
the early period of the application of this concept was a radical departure from the 
conventional arrangement in other parts of the world. In Nigeria, management is vested 
in Ashland while the Indonesian model reserved this exclusively for Pertamina. In this 
regard, the Indonesian production sharing contract goes further than other legal 
 
860 Etikerentse (n 384) 89. 
861 Article 9 of 1993 and 2000 PSC (n 663). 
862 Ibid. 




arrangements in devising a mechanism for control, i.e. the designation of Pertamina as 
the manager of the enterprise. However, the effectiveness of this important provision is 
undermined in practice by Pertamina’s lack of managerial and technological skills. 
Robert Fabricant views are remarkable: 
“At first glance it is difficult [to argue] with Indonesian claims that, unlike 
typical concessionary arrangements, oil exploitation in Indonesia is in the 
hands of the Indonesians; yet an examination of existing relationships 
between Pertamina and the oil companies reveals the disparity between the 
written word and reality. The legal differences between production sharing 
contracts and concession contracts are often devoid of operational 
significance. In particular…contractors have retained effective management 
clause. The functions which Contractors have so far performed are virtually 
indistinguishable from those performed by concessionaires having formal 
equity interest and exclusive management prerogatives. The attraction, as 
well as the allocation, of capital, managerial skills and technology have 
remained basically in the hands of Contractors”.865 
Whether or not undermined in practice, such a provision is notably absent in the 
NNPC/Ashland PSC where the ultimate responsibility for control and the management of 
petroleum operations is vested in Ashland. The fact remains also that such a 
management clause has never been enforced under most PSCs, since in most cases it is 
extremely difficult in practice to separate the overall management of operations from 
the day to day running of them, especially in cases where one of the parties involved 
bears the financial risks in the arrangement of operations. The absence of this vital 
provision in the NNPC/Ashland arrangement calls into question the government’s 
objective of totally acquiring the overall control and running of the management of the 
industry. With regard to control, Gidado states that “the Ashland agreement departs 
from the Indonesian model in entrusting management and operational responsibility 
exclusively to Ashland”.866 It is feared that it will make it difficult to achieve the much 
sought-after control over natural resources and transfer of technology and it would have 
 
865 Fabrikant (n 611) 335. 
866 Gidado (n 392) 168. 
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been better if the agreement had provided for a transfer or proportionate sharing of 
management and operational positions as soon as commercial production begins; this 
would have provided an excellent watch-dog on Ashland’s production and marketing 
activities.867 Secondly, it would have also afforded NNPC’s officials an excellent 
opportunity for learning the operational techniques and skills of the petroleum 
company.868 
However, having regard to the cleavage between formal contractual provisions and 
practice in the Indonesian arrangements, the impact of the Indonesian provision is not 
noticeably different from that of the Ashland agreement.869 The only significant 
difference is that by virtue of its formal management powers, Pertamina has more 
leverage in insisting on a close inspection of all aspects of the activities of the 
international oil company.870 
The fact is that unlike the first PSC between the NNPC and Ashland, the current PSC 
includes provisions which allow for effective control and management by the NNPC in 
order to alleviate some of the deficiencies of the first PSC. For instance, the NNPC is 
responsible for the management of the operations while the contractor on the other 
hand is responsible for the work programme. To this end, management and control are 
undertaken through a committee comprised of ten persons who are appointed by the 
parties to the PSC; five by the Corporation (one of whom shall be the Chairman) and 
five by the Contractor.871 However, the management committee function  includes 
review of the work programme and ensuring that the Contractor implements the 
requisite accounting procedure.872 It is expressly stipulated under this provision that 
approval of expenditure exceeding $100,000 and local purchases of $100,000 etc. must 








869 Asante (n 4) 335-362. 
870 Ibid. 





of management committee potentially gives the NNPC strong powers of oversight which, 
albeit in voting terms, do not numerically exceed those of the PSC contractor.874 
Akinrele makes reference to the fact that “the NNPC’s position is strengthened by the 
corporate rule in Nigeria that in the event of a deadlock, the Chairman of the NNPC will 
have the casting vote, since there is no specific provision written into PSC providing for 
a deadlock”.875 The truth is that these oversight provisions on accounting and 
expenditures are particularly important since they limit contractors’ possible financial 
excesses and this provision has been further enhanced by the specific monetary limit 
placed in the 2000 PSC on cost oil recovery.876 
5.3.5 Work programmes and expenditure: 
 
The usual practice is for the work programmes to make detailed stipulations, expressed 
either in terms of minimum amounts that must be expended or sometimes in terms of 
technical details as to seismic surveys, exploratory wells, etc.877 It is important to note 
here that either of these methods, if used alone, has its drawbacks. The truth is that the 
positive effect of minimum expenditure amounts may be eroded by inflation or 
unanticipated high costs. The situation is more complicated if the territory has never 
been explored previously and if it is consequently more difficult to state minimum 
exploration requirements. The solution might lie in work programmes that combine both 
methods, bearing in mind that the greater the geological knowledge about an area, the 
more effective the exploration, exploitation and production stages are likely to be.878 
In the NNPC/Ashland PSC, under clause 4 of this arrangement, Ashland is mandated 
within three months after the effective date, subject however to any necessary 
extensions granted by the NNPC, to start seismic investigations in the contract area and 
thereafter to start drilling operations in accordance with good practice in the field.879 







877 Ibid 164. 
878 Omorogbe (n 25). 
879 NNPC/ Ashland PSC Clause 4. Quoted from Hossain (n 260) 141. 
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later than eighteen months after the effective date of the contract.880 Furthermore, 
Ashland is also required by law within one month after the effective contract date, and 
thereafter two months before the beginning of each year, to prepare and submit for 
approval to the NNPC a work programme and budget for the contract area and such 
approval should not be unreasonably withheld.881 However, when there is any revision 
to the work programme and the budget by the NNPC it is mandatory that such provision 
must be notified to Ashland within thirty days after receipt of the proposed work 
programme and budget.882 If, for whatever reason, the NNPC fails to advise Ashland of 
any revision to the work programme and budget, it shall be deemed to have been 
approved.883 
In the case of expenditure, clause 4 expressly provides that the amount to be spent by 
Ashland in conducting petroleum operations in the contract area during the first two 
years shall in the aggregate be not less than the equivalent of five million dollars.884 
Such amount to be prudently expended by Ashland with the concurrence of the 
NNPC.885 Most times, it is extremely difficult for the NNPC to monitor the cost that is 
being incurred since, in all cases, the level of expenditure might be influenced by the 
adverse effect of inflation.886 
5.3.6 Marketing of oil: 
 
It was expressly provided in the PSC granting rights to Ashland that it may, on behalf of 
the joint venture, sell the quantity of the annual available production made up of.887 
1. The cost oil 
 
2. Ashland tax oil 
 










886 Hossain (n 260) 141. 
887 Etikerentse (n 384) 90. 
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4. Ashland participant’s interest oil. 
 
The marketable portions of the production were judged likely to be equivalent to 
between 77 per cent and 85 per cent of the entire annual available production.888 The 
revenue earned by the Ashland was invariably less than the actual value of the crude oil 
Ashland was allowed to market because Ashland had the obligation to pay petroleum 
profit tax from the earnings derived from marketing the oil.889 However, Ashland was 
expected to simply market the tax oil for both the NNPC and itself and to pay petroleum 
profit tax in respect thereof to the Nigerian government.890 Etikerentse argued that “the 
PSC allowed Ashland to sell all or a portion of the oil to itself, but only at the price fixed 
by the NNPC. It is a standard practice that such price was usually at the NNPC’s 
periodically announced applicable official selling price for various categories of Nigerian 
crude”.891 
Furthermore, the contract stipulates that that Ashland is obliged to market all or part of 
the NNPC’s share of the available crude oil if the NNPC so notifies it in writing.892 For the 
sale of the NNPC’s share of the oil, Ashland receives a commission of one and one half 
per cent of the sale price f.o.b. at the port of export for the first 100,000 barrels per 
day.893 Additional volumes attract commission of 1% of the sales price f.o.b. at the point 
of export. Ashland is required to instruct all payments due under the contract, less the 
contractor’s commission to an account in any bank designated by the NNPC.894 
Ashland is required at the end of each calendar year to furnish to auditors appointed by 
the NNPC all necessary information and also mandated to give them access to the books 
and records pertaining to crude oil sales made by the contractor of the NNPC’s share of 











894 P Eyinla and J Ukpo, Nigeria. The Travesty of Oil and Gas Wealth (Lagos: The Catholic Secretariat of 
Nigeria 2006). 
895 Etikerentse (n 384) 90. 
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Etikerentse argues that the Ashland/NNPC relationship is beset with great shortcomings. 
For instance, he explains that the high rate of petroleum profit tax and the high level of 
cost oil allocation renders the oil split insignificant, leading to the three amendments 
which the subject PSC underwent between 1977 and 1992.896 Further, in respect of 
operating cost and sharing of profits, it mandates that “cost oil” recoverable by investor 
shall be 30%,while “tax oil” is fixed at 40% and 30%, and the balance to be shared in 
the ratio of NNPC 35%, the investor at 65%.897 However, the issues that arose then and 
the shortcomings in question have been addressed in the recent PSC. 
5.3.7 Pricing: 
 
The price of oil is material for the compilation of the government’s share of profit and 
other dues. There are, however, different scenarios in this matter. For instance, if the 
price of oil in the world oil market drops, the realised price from the sale will also drop 
and the government’s share from “profit oil” as well as taxes and other dues payable to 
the government will decrease.898 Coupled with this, in those circumstances, there may 
be no incentive whatsoever on the part of the international oil company to carry out any 
further exploration activities. 
Whenever the price obtained by Ashland, however, is more than the official selling price, 
it will invariably mean that the international Oil Company will have to pay more tax than 
would have been calculated as due because the computation of tax would not have 
been based on the actual market price but on the official selling price.899 The additional 
tax has the adverse effect of reducing their profit margin and it was this ugly situation 
that led to the memorandum of understanding between the government and Ashland.900 
It is a fiscal device which is utilised in Nigeria. It was however, developed in the 1980s 
to cope with the problems caused as a result of the slump in oil prices and the large 
fiscal burden imposed on operators which invariably led to disinvestment in the 
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laws. However, in Nigeria the result was yet another agreement regulating the 
relationship between the government and the investors.902 
5.3.8 Fiscal legislation: 
 
Ashland has title to a substantial percentage of the crude oil produced. This provision 
was included in the Petroleum Profits Tax Acts.903 By virtue of the PSC terms, the 
Petroleum Profits Tax and the Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations904 as 
amended, Ashland was obligated to pay tax and royalty in respect of its share of the oil 
produced. Strictly for administrative convenience, Ashland was required to pay on behalf 
of the NNPC the tax and Royalty payable by the NNPC in respect of the NNPC’s share of 
the joint venture production. As regards to the fiscal regime, if the Ashland/NNPC 
agreement were evaluated on that basis it would appear that the NNPC/Ashland 
arrangements do not give Nigeria enough financial returns as compared to some other 
countries such as Indonesia, Libya, and Malaysia.905 Furthermore, it is noteworthy that 
the Ashland/NNPC arrangement was notorious for the fact that the petroleum profit tax 
proportion was amongst the highest worldwide. In addition, the imposition of PPT on 
the contractor was unusual (most PSCs only attracted corporate tax), with the 
consequences that this PSC had the highest contractor tax liability worldwide at that 
time.906 
5.3.9 Technology Transfer: 
 
A transfer can be said to have taken place when technology developed and essentially 
applied by one organisation is utilized for production purposes and effectively applied by 
another organisation. In other words, without effective application no transfer can be 
said to have taken place. This effective application is possible only if the people in the 
recipient entity are substantially developed to be able to use the skills effectively, alone 
 
902 Ibid. 
903 See section 8 of the Petroleum Profit Tax Act and the Act’s interpretation section (section 2) for the 
definition of ‘petroleum operation’. Ashland was thus obligated to pay petroleum profit tax at 85% rather 
than the lower company tax rate under the Companies Income Tax Act (cap 60). 
904 See statutory instrument No. 3 of 2001 and s 1. 6 of 2003, the latter regarding royalties for offshore 
and shallow offshore production sharing contracts effective 1 January 2000. 
905 Omorogbe (n 25) 89. 
906 S Adepetun, (1995) ‘Production Sharing Contracts – The Nigerian Experience’ (1995) 13 Journal of 
Energy and Natural Resources Law 23. 
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if they choose to do so.907 Nevertheless the need exists for an effective and meaningful 
transfer of technology908 if real development is to take place. In its absence the 
acquisition of technology would always be subject to the termination of the contract of 
acquisition.909 It would appear that in speaking about technology transfer there is a 
certain amount of vagueness.910 A transfer as such does not take place; it would 
however, be more appropriate to refer to the development of a local capacity to absorb 
ideas, skills and processes which are imported and to adopt them to local use.911 
A definition of transfer has been offered: 
“Transfer of petroleum technology should mean the ability of the 
developing country concerned to purchase or hire in the international 
market the most advanced equipment for the exploration and development 
at a fair and a reasonable cost. Above all it should also mean developing its 
human resources by enabling its citizens to acquire the mental capability 
and practical experience needed to comprehend the mysteries of modern 
technology and to manipulate the sophisticated tools.”912 
At the same time the local base for the absorption of these ideas should be developed 
to the point where, with time, the total size of the imported package is reduced. An 
effective transfer requires that the country to reduce its dependence on imported 
technology with industrialisation.913 
Under clause 5(i)(h), Ashland is expressly required in implementing the work 
programme, and in accordance with the clause, to prepare to carry out plans and 




907 Omorogbe (n 25) 89. 
908 Transfer of technology can be defined as the transfer of systematic knowledge for the manufacture of 
a product, for the application of a process, or for the rendering of a service. Transactions involving the 
mere sale of or mere lease of goods are specifically excluded. See Negotiations of a Code of Conduct on 
the Transfer of Technology. U.N. Doc. TD/Code TOT/17, March 3, 1981, 3. 
909 K Khan, ‘The transfer of Technology and Petroleum Development in Developing Countries: with 
particular references to Trinidad and Tobago’ (1973) 4 Journal of Energy and Natural Resource Law 11. 
910 Ibid. 
911 Ibid. 
912 H Zakariya, ‘Transfer of Technology under Petroleum Development Contracts’ (1982) 16 Journal of 
World Trade Law 207, 221. 
913 Khan (n 909) 11. 
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classifications with respect to petroleum operations in accordance with the Petroleum 
Act 1969.914 
Secondly, under clause 12, Ashland is also required within two months after the 
effective date and after consultation with the NNPC to submit a detailed programme for 
recruitment and within four months to submit a training programme for Nigerians in the 
carrying out of petroleum activities.915 It is noteworthy that to adequately and  
effectively monitor the activities of the foreign companies which are in control of the 
technology, a certain degree of knowledge of the relevant skills is necessary.916 The fact 
remains that the main purpose for these provisions concerning manpower training is to 
enable Nigerians to take their destiny into their own hands by controlling all phases of 
the oil industry.917 From the look of things, these provisions have been vigorously 
pursued by the NNPC and the international oil companies alike. However, one finds that 
there is much disparity between the written and the spoken word.918 A better view is 
that ideally, provisions relating to the transfer of technology should be directed towards 
the attainment of an ideal situation whereby an effective transfer may be made. It has 
been argued that: 
“when it comes to real transfer of technology as defined above, there is a 
genuine divergence of interest between the developing countries and the 
foreign oil companies involved. Transfer of technology for petroleum 
exploration and development involves cost, above all in terms of time, 
since it consists essentially of a “learning by doing” process. For the 
developing country committed to acquisition of technology, the time 
required is whatever it takes to accomplish the learning, which may be 
very long. However, for the Oil Company, the time it can allow learning by 
nationals lasts only as long as the learning is commercially justifiable. The 
approach of the Oil Company based on private interest may therefore be 
incompatible with that of the country concerned, which is based on 
broader social and developmental considerations. There may also be a 
914 Ibid. 






more fundamental divergence of interest concerning the control of the 
petroleum operations. In order to prolong their lucrative role, the oil 
companies would naturally wish to keep the developing country in a 
continuous state of dependency on their services, so it is clearly not in 
their ultimate interests to contribute actively to any process that would 
eventually enable the host country to dispense with their services partially 
or completely”.919 
Consequently, transfer of technology can be regarded as the major externality of a 
petroleum arrangement, and as a result has a direct bearing on the level of the host 
country’s eventual development.920 
The topical question is whether Nigeria should rely exclusively on the international oil 
company for the training of Nigerians in petroleum technology or whether it should itself 
make efforts to devise programmes and create arrangements which would lead to the 
development or acquisition of petroleum technology.921 The fundamental problem is the 
issue of “control” and for Nigeria to achieve its technology goals, and effective control of 
the oil industry, it is imperative that technology transfer is a sine qua non.922 Technology 
transfer is the cornerstone of any meaningful control of its natural resources and for this 
to be addressed, the government must be involved in the training of Nigerians in 
petroleum technology.923 
A further aspect that has been adduced for lack of success in the training of Nigerians in 
petroleum technology is that petroleum technology, by its very nature, is sophisticated 
and capital intensive, usually involving considerable negotiations in foreign exchange924. 
It is important to note also that apart from the capital-intensive nature of the enterprise, 
the equipment needed for such technology gets outdated very quickly, because of the 
 
919 Problems and Issues Concerning the Transfer, Applications and Developments of Technology in the 
Energy Sector: Petroleum Exploration Contracts and the Transfer of Technology. A Study Prepared by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat in co-operation with Terisa Turner, TD/B/C/.6/AC.9/5, at para.8. 
920 Eternality being defined as a consequence of a project which gives rise to neither costs nor benefits in 
terms of the project itself. 
921 Khan (n 909) 10. 
922 Atsegbua (n 475) 127. 
923 Khan (n 909) 10. 
924 O A Odiase-Alegimenien, ‘Issues in the Acquisition of Petroleum Development Technology for Third 
World States’ (1991) 15(2) OPEC Review 123, 132. 
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fast-changing nature of the oil industry and thus there are imperative needs to absorb 
new ideas to keep up with new changes and new facts of life.925 
The fact remains that it is imperative for both parties involved in technology transfer to 
be committed to such development, because the acquisition of petroleum technology 
does not depend solely on the international oil company alone. Without full commitment 
on both sides, no matter how stringently technology transfer provisions are worded, 
they will be futile. As was proposed some years back by the United Nations Resolution 
1803, the issue of permanent sovereignty can only be achieved by Nigerians through 
the acquisition of petroleum technology so as to take over the mantle of leadership in 
the petroleum industry directly. A government cannot lay claim to having permanent 
sovereignty over its natural resources if the technology for such attainment is in the 
hands of foreign companies. 
What is saddening about this whole issue is the fact that Nigeria, with production of 
over 3,000,000 barrels per day, has no form of energy policy.926 This deficiency has 
tremendous effect and has contributed to the lack of technology capability to run its oil 
industry.927 Any form of legislation that is to address this issue must start with the 
formulation of a national energy policy.928 
For these underlying issues to be addressed, such a policy should provide: 
 
• Firstly, the training of Nigerians in various aspects of petroleum technology; 
• Secondly, the adopting of new ideas or methods in new combinations.929 
 
As a matter of fact, by law as well as by policy guidelines the Nigerian government 






926 The average daily production for 1990 totalled 1.83 million barrels of oil, as distinct from the OPEC 
quota of 1.61 million barrels of oil. Source: National Press Briefing by the Minister of Petroleum Resources 
of his Ministry for the year ending 1990. This statement, however, was published in The Guardian on 1 
May 1991. 
927 Ibid. 
928 A Adams, ‘Setting the Ground Rules for a Viable National Energy Policy’ (1998) OPEC Bulletin at 6. 
929 D H N Alleyne, ‘State Petroleum Enterprises and the Transfer of Technology’ in United Nations (ed) 
State Petroleum Enterprise in Developing Countries (New York: Pergamon Press 1980) 112. 
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personnel are adequately trained for those jobs.930 It must be stressed at this point that 
such training is seen as an important ingredient of the process of acquiring and 
absorbing oil technology.931 It was reiterated in the Ashland/NNPC contract that 
Ashland: 
“Shall undertake to make the maximum use of available indigenous Nigerian 
manpower in the conduct of petroleum operations. Furthermore, Ashland 
shall within six months after the effective date and after consultation within 
NNPC submit for NNPC’s approval a detailed recruitment programme and 
within twelve months, submit for NNPC’s approval a training programme for 
all Nigerians employed by Ashland in the conduct of all petroleum 
operations in accordance with the Petroleum Decree 1969. For example, the 
provision for a minimal Nigerian representation or 50%-70% for skilled 
worker and 100% for unskilled worker.”932 
The fact remains that for there to be proper technology transfer, this process invariably 
involves borrowing, adapting and experimenting with new ideas in our fund of scientific 
knowledge.933 A former minister has reiterated in a press briefing: “The ministry in 
consultation with appropriate agencies in the petroleum sector of the economy has 
produced a draft policy for the industry. The object is to develop immediate and long- 
term policies and pursue programmes that will enable our oil industry survive and 
compete internationally”934 
5.3.10 Title to Equipment: 
 
There are, however, some clauses enshrined in PSC contracts for the efficacy of the 





930 Petroleum Act as amended. The issue of employment of expatriates in place of Nigerians has being 
causing serious conflicts between Nigerian employees in major oil companies and the management of 
those companies. See front page of This Day newspaper 2005 April 27 & 28. 
931 Atsegbua (n 475) 127. 
932 Gidado (n 392) 165. 
933 Allenyne (n 929) 113. 




provision that equipment brought in for the work programme shall become the property 
of the host country at a specified time.935 
Under the Ashland/NNPC contract, it is expressly provided that all equipment purchased 
for the performance of the contract is the property of the NNPC.936 However, Ashland is 
required to recover the landed costs. Ashland is required to use this equipment. The fact 
remains, however, that such a right cease upon termination or expiration of the 
contract. For instance, under the Venezuelan contract, this provision is more detailed as: 
“the land and permanent works including the installations, accessories and equipment 
forming an integral part thereof, and any other assets acquired for the purpose of 
carrying out the contract, whatever the legal basis upon which it is acquired shall be 
conserved in order for the title thereto to be given to the Nation, without any payment 
or indemnity, upon the termination of this contract for any cause …when the efficiency 
of the operations directed to an economic development of the contracted area justifies 
the alienation, removal exchange or any other act respecting those assets which may 
affect the right of the Nation, “CVP”, on its initiative at the request of the 
“CONTRACTOR” shall handle the application to the National Executive which, if it deems 
it convenient, shall give the necessary authorisation in order to carry out the act for 
which the application was made”. 937 
Commentators are of the view that the main effect of these provisions might as well be 
simply to place responsibility on the host Government for the removal of equipment at 
abandonment.938 Since these processes cost a lot of money, at the end of the day such 
a responsibility might cause the host nation to have incurred more in costs than it has 




935 Omorogbe (n 25) 96. 
936 Ibid. 
937 Ibid; Clause Fifteen CVP/Occidental contract. 
938 Problems of abandonment are addressed in international treaties such as the Geneva Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, and the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 1982 both of which place 
varying obligations on the states to remove abandoned or disused installations. See T C Daintith, G D N 
Willoughby, G F Hewitt, and A D G Hill, United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1984) 
213. The Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has guidelines and 
standards for the abandonment of the offshore installations, which are awaiting adoption. These 
guidelines would on a case-by-case basis permit leaving an installation in place, or its partial removal. 
Only a few states appear to have addressed this issue in their national legislation. 
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money and trouble since the host state is left with equipment it may never use and is 
solely responsible for the cost of its removal.939 
5.3.11 Other Provisions: 
 
Furthermore, there are additional vital provisions contained in the contract, which deal 
with such issues as relinquishment and exclusion of areas, and settlement of disputes. 
On the question of applicable law, the laws of Nigeria govern the contract, and any 
dispute arising will be determined in accordance with the Nigerian legal system. 
Stabilisation and renegotiation clauses are remarkably non-existent in this contract. 
According to Eyinla, a stabilisation clause is particularly important to give the 
international company a status of continuity consistent with the reasonable satisfaction 
of commercial expectations.940 The main reason, which is not far-fetched, is to insulate 
the relationship from changes in the content of the law of the host state. On the other 
hand, renegotiation clauses allow the terms of the contract to be adjusted to any 
changes of circumstances substantially and adversely affecting the interests of the 
parties. Under the contract941 when a fair assessment is made of these clauses, it is 
observed that when they are incorporated in the contracts, the parties tend to rely on 
them to define the concepts of force majeure and hardship where they may be thought 
to fill the gaps left by the ordinary rules of law.942 For the efficacy of the contract and a 
cordial relationship between the parties, the contract would have benefited ab initio 
from the inclusion of a renegotiation clause, since it gives the parties involved a free 
hand to alter the terms of the contract in future and thus avoid unnecessary 
bureaucracy that might be involved if the long process of passing legislation or starting 
the process all over again needs to be adopted to remedy any aspect of the contract 
which they find to their disadvantage.943 
 
Thus, in contrast to the Indonesian agreements, the Ashland agreement departs from 
the tenets of Indonesian model. However, the Ashland agreement provides that title to 
available crude oil allocated to each party shall pass at the wellhead. In the case of 
939 Omorogbe (n 25) 96. 






Indonesia, it only passes when it reaches an export point. What this means invariably is 
that Pertamina owns the oil until it reaches the port of export before the contractor 
assumes title, although this might not mean much, since the passing of title has little or 
no economic or functional significance.944 This is because the international oil company 
continues to exercise de facto control of the oil industry whether title to available crude 
oil passes at the wellhead or at the point of exportation as in the Indonesian model.945 
However, the fact remains that the idea of postponing the transfer of title from the 
wellhead to the point of export would be to ensure that the complete ownership of 
hydrocarbons is vested in Nigeria.946 
In terms of control, the Ashland agreement radically departs from the Indonesian 
contract in vesting management and operational responsibility exclusively on Ashland.947 
In functional terms, the impact of the Indonesian provision is not noticeably different 
from that of the Ashland agreement and it would appear that the only significant 
difference is that by virtue of its formal management provisions, Pertamina definitely 
has greater leverage in insisting on a close inspection of all aspects of the operation of 
the oil companies.948 
Pertamina, while performing its responsibilities, must consult with the contractors. This 
exercise is cautiously carried out so that it does not lead to confrontation with the 
contractors or provide them with a genuine excuse to cut down operations thus causing 
divestment in the petroleum sector.949 The management provision in the Indonesian 
type of arrangement has an excellent opportunity for aiding them in wresting the 
requisite operational techniques and skills from the petroleum companies, and this in 
years to come will ultimately strengthen them and help in their subsequent control of 
the industry.950 In the Ashland agreement, it would have been better if the agreement 
had spelt out expressly provisions for a transfer or proportionate sharing of 
management and operation functions at designated positions as soon as there is a 
commercial discovery. This would have enabled the NNPC to act as a watch-dog on 
944 Asante (n 4)366. 
945 Ibid. 
946 Fabrikant (n 84) 37. 
947 Asante (n 4) 366. 
948 Ibid. 




Ashland activities in the areas of production and marketing and would also afford NNPC 
officers an excellent opportunity of learning the operational techniques and skills of the 
petroleum company, a process which will ultimately strengthen NNPC’s supervisory 
functions and consequently its control.951 
In the Indonesian model, with time, the contracts were renegotiated to allow 
contractors maximum cost oil, equivalent to the expenses incurred.952 It used to be 
limited to 40% whereas in the case of Nigeria, it was 50% as modified by retroactive 
legislation in 1977, and by so doing making the Nigerian cost oil the highest amongst oil 
producing nations in the world that operate this kind of arrangement.953 
5.4 GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONRACTS 
 
It has been suggested that by the very nature of the agreement ab initio, Ashland bears 
the initial technical and financial responsibility for exploration and drilling. This provision 
in the contract makes it particularly attractive in comparison to the joint venture, since 
the government is less perturbed and bears no form of financial loss in case there is no 
commercial discovery. 
Further, another remarkable provision in the contract is the fact that the NNPC is put in 
an intermediary position between Ashland and government agencies. For instance, it 
facilitates the procurement of visas, work permits, etc.954 By so doing, the NNPC enables 
Ashland to attend to the more pressing demands on it as an oil company and avoid all 
the bureaucratic procedures and obstacles involved in obtaining such documents.955 This 
is also the position in Indonesia. Fabrikant observed that: “the prospect of having a 
government agency negotiating on their behalf with Indonesian officialdom. Pertamina, 
it was thought, could deal more effectively than the contractor with government 
agencies, enabling the contractors to concentrate on the principal task of finding oil. 
Pertamina has thus concentrated mainly on providing liaison between government 
agencies and the companies, and generally expediting petroleum operations by reducing 
 
951 Ibid 366. 
952 Ibid. 
953 The other country with as high a cost oil allocation as Nigeria is Peru. For further details see Oil Money, 
Special Report No. 59 (New York). 
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the likelihood of a contractor becoming entangled in the considerable government 
bureaucracy.”956 
 
As to the financial aspect, if the Ashland NNPC agreement were evaluated on that basis, 
it would appear that, in terms of financial gains, that production sharing arrangement 
does not give Nigeria enough financial returns as compared to some other countries like 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Libya.957 
Furthermore, the setting aside of a percentage of production towards the payment of 
tax is also a departure from the normal practice. The general practice is that PSCs are 
subject to corporate income tax, other than in other oil producing countries like Libya, 
where no form of tax is payable.958 There is a petroleum profit tax of 85% in Nigeria. 
Commentators have argued that the contract is more advantageous to Ashland than to 
NNPC, notwithstanding the fact that the bulk of the proceeds of sale go to the federal 
board of Inland Revenue.959 
The contract has attracted a lot of adverse comment from many quarters. A crude oil 
sale Tribunal960 was set up to probe the alleged loss of N2.8 billion from the Account of 
the NNPC. The tribunal in its report, however, found no sum missing but was of the 
opinion that “the production sharing contract has no benefit whatsoever to the NNPC as 
it stands today … It seems too lopsided in favor of Ashland.’’961 The tribunal was of the 
view that after the operating company (Ashland) took its 50% for the amortisation of its 
investment and operating expenses, payment of royalties (as well as the additional 2% 
of the actual operating cost as overhead charges) and after setting aside the 55% for 
the payment of rent and petroleum profit tax, the balance left was hardly anything to 
warrant the application of any ratio whether it be 35%:65%: or 30%:70%.962 It would 
appear that this criticism is very harsh, and it suggests that perhaps the full facts were 
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aside for cost oil and tax oil are high, this does not, however, justify the tribunal 
criticism.963 
Notwithstanding the fact that the percentages of available crude oil set for cost oil and 
tax oil were to be reduced, that change alone does not guarantee the government de 
facto control of the oil industry.964 
Another concern of the contract is that it appears rather casually worded and subject to 
different interpretations as compared to several other PSCs from other countries which 
are extremely detailed and precise, especially as regards fiscal provision. 
Also, the Nigerian PSC lacks some progressive clauses found in other PSCs. For instance, 
in Indonesia, the law requires a contractor to provide 8.52 per cent of total production 
at a highly subsidised price to cover domestic demand.965 By contrast, the contract 
between Ashland and the NNPC has been discredited because it is felt that Ashland has 
been allowed to earn windfall profits.966 They occur when there is a drastic increase in 
prices as it did happen at the start of the gulf crisis, spark off by the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait.967 
Furthermore, it has been viewed from many quarters that “the PSC certainly has no 
benefits whatsoever to the NNPC as it stands today (referring to 1980)… it seems too 
lopsided in favour of Ashland… Ashland has taken the NNPC and this country for a good 
ride in the implementation of this contracts”.968 
A further concern of this contract is that since Ashland is given the right to prepare 
budgets and programmes with the NNPC approving them, the country will obviously be 
vulnerable should the contractor view this as a license to be extravagant, with the 
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“The truth is that the NNPC bears 100% of all expenditure incurred by 
Ashland which is a company incorporated in Nigeria for the purposes of 
executing the contract between the NNPC and Ashland Oil incorporated of 
the USA. They are agents of the NNPC who, contrary to what should be 
expected from a prudent investor, blindly pays for all types of expenses put 
up by Ashland without question.”969 
From the above it can be argued that the NNPC wants to be in a vital position whereby 
it can contribute meaningfully and question Ashland’s excesses. To perform this task 
diligently, it has to be part and parcel of the preparation of the budgets and should not 
in any way be isolated from such task.970 Additionally, where the contractor is aware 
that it holds an advantageous position, it is likely to concentrate on producing one 
lucrative field, whilst slowing down exploration on other areas covered by the PSC.971 
Further, the contractor, realizing that its expenses will be fully met, can afford to be 
wasteful or extravagant to the eventual disadvantage of the host country.972 
It has also been observed that there is no strict restriction in the contract as to how the 
company dispenses oil to either affiliates or non-affiliates.973 Some contracts provide  
that “no commission shall be paid on any sales to any affiliates”, i.e., expressly 
permitting commission only on sales to non-affiliates. Several contracts are silent on this 
question, however, and at least two contracts expressly permit commission paid on sale 
to any affiliates “so long as they do not exceed the customary and prevailing state.” 
Such disposal could be disadvantageous to the host government, for example, if such 
sale is done at an artificial price that may raise the recoverable cost.974 
Putting some devices in place dismantles such a lacuna in the Indonesian model. For 
instance, it is provided that if Pertamina is unable to secure a higher price than the 
contractor for cost oil, the contractor must either match the price obtainable by 
Pertamina or permit Pertamina to sell the oil on its behalf.975 Further, the government 
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prohibits contractors from giving discounts or commission to their affiliates. 
Nonetheless, the efficient working of this provision depends very much on Pertamina’s 
marketing and its ability to identify affiliates’ transactions. It guarantees Pertamina the 
right to check and supervise the company’s activities.976 In the Ashland/NNPC contract 
no such rights exist. Instead Ashland is given more rights than it actually deserves, for 
instance, to sell the cost oil as well as the tax oil besides its own share. The only 
remarkable difference is that it should be at prices fixed by the NNPC, which are 
periodically fixed for various categories of Nigerian crude.977 
It has been suggested that the operating company has a vested interest in the prices 
fixed by the NNPC lest it find itself in a difficult situation with regard to disposing of all 
its crude. The PSC allowed Ashland (in exercising its marketing rights) to sell all or a 
portion of the marketable quantity of oil to itself, but only at the price fixed by the 
NNPC.978 It may not be totally wrong to suggest that the operating company plays a 
notable role in determining prices fixed by the NNPC. Such price was usually at the 
applicable NNPC’s periodically announced official selling prices for various categories of 
Nigerian crude.979 
However, the anomalies created by the NNPC and Ashland PSC, such as the high price 
of petroleum profits tax (85%) and the high level of cost oil allocation, rendered the oil 
split insignificant thus leading to the three amendments that the subject PSC underwent 
between 1977 and 1992, these were essentially piecemeal and thus deemed 
insufficient.980 Recently, it has been proven that PSC can be improved by incorporating 
into it specific provisions to safeguard different interests which are inadequately 
provided for in a standard PSC.981 
Yet another concern with the arrangement with Ashland is that it may earn what is 
usually known as windfall profit. This usually occurs when there is a drastic increase in 
the price of oil as was the case during the Gulf crisis. This was occasioned by the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and its attendant consequences. Nonetheless, Atsebua asserts that 
976 Ibid. 
977 Ibid. 
978 Atsegbua (n 475) 16. 
979 Ibid. 
980 Akinrele (n 430) 160. 
981 Hossain (n 260) 158. See also Omorogbe (n 24) 347. 
236 
 
production sharing agreements have been popular with corporations because “they 
control their own shares of the crude oil and barring any election by the state oil 
company to take its share in kind, they can control the destination of the state oil 
companies’ share. Most importantly companies have been able, on the share of their 
crude oil, to enjoy the whole of the price increase in the world market”.982 
This anomaly can be corrected by incorporating into the contract certain kinds of 
mechanisms to check such price increases for instances of windfall profits which the 
international oil may earn. For example, windfall price increases have been dismantled 
in Angola by the inclusion of price cap clauses, so that where there is a price rise, the 
state expressly retains any excess profit that might accrue as a result of such increase in 
crude oil prices.983 
Another area of the contract which was of concern was the problem of eliminating slow 
exploration of certain fields by the international oil company. For example, in Nigeria, 
whereas previously the International Oil Company was obliged to have carried out 
exploration of at least 50% of the contract area within ten years, this period has now 
been reduced to five years.984 Such provisions have certainly resulted in a speeding up 
of the exploration activities of the International Oil Companies.985 Whether or not this 
will be agreeable to the International Oil Company, it has been suggested, is not so 
much attributable to the group of contracts known as PSCs as to the variant of the PSC 
that was operative in Nigeria.986 
From the above findings it can be safely concluded that there is no doubt that the PSC 
has contributed immensely to the government realising its objectives of maximising its 
revenue from the oil industry, but in terms of ultimate de facto control of the oil 





982 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘Acquisition of Oil Rights under Contractual Joint Ventures in Nigeria’ (1993) 37 
Journal of African Law 10, 19. 
983 Ibid. 
984 Omorogbe (n 24) 347. 
985 Ibid; In Nigeria, if there is a sharp increase or decrease in oil price the contract can be renegotiated 




petroleum operations, it has failed woefully.987 It is quite doubtful whether the issue of 
control has been given enough consideration in this instance. 
Also needing to be considered is whether the PSC is compatible with the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The UN General Assembly declared: the 
right of the people and nations to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and 
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and the well- 
being of the people of the state.988 In exercise of the above rights Libya in 1973 and 
1974 promulgated decrees purporting to nationalise all the rights, interest and property 
of Texaco Overseas Petroleum and California Asiatic Oil Company. The tribunal upheld 
the reliance of Libya on the import of the Charter while demanding the immediate, 
adequate and prompt payment of compensation.989 The argument of the plaintiff that 
the UN resolution was not of a binding force and should not be relied on by the 
defendant was rejected990 the free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of the 
peoples and the nations over their natural resources must be furthered by the mutual 
respect of states based on their sovereign equality.991 
The UN Declaration on the Economic Sovereignty of States firmly occasioned the 
introduction of the new international economics as confirmed in the 1974 Declaration of 
the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States.992 For instance, in exploitation 
of the minerals and resources in the developing countries before this time, agreement 
with natives was based on traditional concession agreements; the International Oil 
Companies made a token payment to the locals, if they wished.993 The illiterate elders 
and kings having no clear impression of what they were asked to sign, signed most of 
these concession agreements; thus, they signed away their natural wealth and mineral 
resources, a factor that in no way improved their standard of living.994 
In the absence of control by Nigeria of the oil industry, the compatibility of the PSC with 
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources is seriously in 
 
987 Ibid. 
988 UN Resolution 523(v1) of January 1952. 
989 Omorogbe (n 24) 347. 
990 Texaco Overseas Petroleum v Libya Arab Republic, [1977] 17ILM 1 P 389. 
991 UN Resolution 1803. 
992 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974) A/RES/29/3281. 
993 Omorogbe (n 24) 347. 
994 R L Buell, International Relations (New York: Holt and Company 1929) 397-98. 
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doubt. It is therefore contradictory to suggest that the evolution of the oil agreement 
from the traditional concession regime of the repealed Mineral Oil Ordinance of 1914 to 
PSC has led to the attainment by the government of its objectives. 
The problems which have persisted and that were present in the traditional concessions 
are still prevalent in the PSC Agreements. It has been argued that as petroleum 
assumes increasing importance in the world economy, the foreign oil companies are 
now left with no choice but to compromise, in fact, most of the traditional prerogatives 
that they have enjoyed in the underdeveloped world. The PSC, in particular, stands out 
as an important effort to equalise the historic imbalance between the host country and 
the foreign oil company. Although such contracts seem to exaggerate the actual shift in 
power between the parties, they provide an appearance of equality as well as a means 
for ultimately achieving such equality. 
The fundamental truth is that the new arrangement, as well as the traditional 
concessions which have been renegotiated, have one thing in common and that is that 
they are all vehicles which allow the multi-national oil companies to exploit the host 
countries to a greater or lesser extent. The new arrangement provides for the increased 
if not total ownership and control or management of the whole enterprise by the host 
government but in practice, the reverse is the case. It is important to note that in 
evaluating the relative merits of these forms with a view to making a choice among 
them one must at the substance of the arrangement. look behind the form and labels. 
Hossain corroborated this view by arguing that “labels, titles, appellations or headings 
given to contracts do not change their nature. Only their contents and substance 
determine their nature”.995 
5.5 MODERN ERA PSCs IN NIGERIA 
 
The post-1992 PSCs sought to address some of the concerns of the Ashland/NNPC 
contracts. Adequate provisions were made for the allocation of the crude oil proceeds 
between the contracting parties namely, the corporation (the NNPC) or the holder (the 
995 Hossain (n 260) 109; See also J E Attwell, ‘Changing Relationships between Host Countries and 
International Petroleum Companies’ (1979) 17 Houston L R 1015. Here, the writer submits that, “one 
must look at the substance of each agreement to determine the bottom line financial benefits as well as 
the controls that are in the particular contractual arrangement chosen.” Also in A Z El Chiati, ‘Protection of 
Foreign Investment: Petroleum Agreements’ (1987), Academie De Droit International 63. 
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Oil Prospecting License or OPL holder, i.e. an indigenous holder) on the one hand and 
the contractor (an oil exploration and production company on the other hand. Provisions 
were made for a contractual period of 30 years (10 years of exploration and 20 years of 
production) with a provision for relinquishment of parts of the contract area.996 
Provisions, however, are put in place for effective control and the management by the 
NNPC, which is not dissimilar to the role of the joint operating committee in the joint 
operating agreement (JOA) applicable to the traditional joint venture arrangement.997 
5.5.1 Allocations: 
 
The allocation of crude oil for cost oil is regulated by the provisions of the Petroleum Act 
as amended, the Petroleum Profit Tax Act (PPTA) as amended, the Deep Offshore and 
Production Sharing Contract 1999, as amended, and the provisions of the contract with 
respect to production split. The 1991 model PSC differs greatly from the 1990 model. 
Major changes are in respect of the recovery of operating costs and the crude oil 
allocation. Article (8) provides that:998 
(a) Tax oil, to offset actual tax and royalty due, will be deducted in full in the 
relevant year. The government agency shall take in kind, lift and dispose of tax 
oil and from the proceeds pay royalty and petroleum profit tax and concession 
rentals. 
(b) Cost oil: for cost recovery purposes, operating cost will be recovered in the year 
of expenditure, while capital cost will be recovered in a minimum of 20 quarterly 
installments. The contractor shall take in kind, lift and dispose of cost oil and 





996 Paragraph 12 and 19 of the First Schedule to the Petroleum Act and paragraph 2 of the Petroleum 
Regulations (Drilling and Production) provide for the relinquishment of the contract area. See also Clause 
4. 
997 The committee consists of officials of both the NNPC and the contractor, whose prior approval (based 
on unanimous decision) must be had before incurring expenditures that are over certain fixed levels. 
Additionally, work programmes and budgets are reviewed and approved by the Committee to ensure the 
propriety of operations. These safeguards do not however provide absolute protection against the 
tendency to incur unreasonable expenditure and concentration on the joint venture operations producing 
fields at the expense of new and potentially risky fields. 
998 Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act (1999). 
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(c) Profit oil: being the balance of crude oil after deduction of royalty, petroleum 
profit concession rental and cost recovery. Profit oil for the Niger delta area in the 




Royalties payable for the Offshore and Inland Basin PSC are determined in accordance 
with section 5 of the Deep Offshore Act 1999, whereas royalties for the Onshore and 
Shallow Water PSCs are enshrined in the provisions of the Petroleum (Drilling and 
Production Amendment Regulations 2003.999 Royalty rates in the deep offshore areas 
are graduated according to water depth. 
5.5.3 Management provisions: 
 
In terms of the management provisions of the newer PSC, there are gross lacunae in 
these PSCs provisions. The fact is that the Petroleum Act did not envisage the 
introduction of the PSC at the time it was enacted in 1969 and has remained 
substantially superfluous. According to Umar, the Act is either silent on or does not 
substantially address many important concerns affecting the legal rights and obligations 
of the parties under a PSC.1000 This includes the absence of specific provisions on the 
obligations of the PSC contractors independent of the corporation, as the provision of 
the Act and terms of the OPL and OML refer only to the holder of the license or lease, in 
this case the NNPC, and not a contractor for services.1001 
Furthermore, the provisions of the contract, particularly the 1993 contract, have created 
loopholes and ambiguities and as a result, compound the ineffectiveness. Examples of 
this consist of provisions requiring the contractor to execute the work programme (in 
accordance with best industry practice), the obligation of the contractor to patronise 
local contractors as far as is conceivable to do so provided they meet the mandatory 




999 Pursuant to sec. 9 of the Petroleum Act supra. 
1000 Umar (n 966) 51. 
1001 Ibid 51. 
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consequential losses or damages occurring including, but not limited to, lost production 
and lost profit.1002 
The Act provides amongst other things, for the amendment of certain enactments to 
give legislative effect to the fiscal incentives given to the oil and gas companies 
operating in the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin areas under Production Sharing 
Contracts or such Production Sharing Contract type arrangements between the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation or other holder of oil prospecting licenses and various 
petroleum exploration and production companies concerning the terms of the 
production sharing contract.1003 
5.5.4 Incentivisation: 
 
The Nigerian government has offered substantial financial incentives to attract 
investment in deepwater explorations such as: 
(a) The requirement that cost oil be allocated to the contractor in such quantum as 
shall generate an amount of proceeds sufficient for the recovery of operating 
costs. Also included is the specification of royalties payable at a rate lower than 
that obtaining under the concessionary arrangements. 
(b) Forming part of the financial incentive is the reduction in the profits payable as 
petroleum profit tax. Section 3(i) of the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin 
Production Sharing Contract as amended, stipulates it at 50% flat rate of 
chargeable profit for the duration of the contract. This represents a reduction of 
35% from the 85% stipulated by the Petroleum Profit Tax Act as amended, 
parties to Production Sharing Contracts are bound by any other taxes, duties or 
levies imposed by any federal, state or local government or area council 
Authority. 
(c) Also, there are investment credit and investment tax allowances. The former 
which are enshrined in section (4) of the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin 
Production Sharing Contract, as amended, is restricted to qualifying capital 
 




expenditure made by the parties in respect of the Production Sharing Contract 
executed prior to first of July 1988. It can be argued that to qualify, such 
expenditure must have been made wholly, exclusively and necessarily for the 
main purposes of petroleum operations carried out under the terms of the 
Production Sharing Contract in the Deep Offshore or Inland Basin. Investment 
credit is enjoyable at a flat rate of 50% of the qualifying expenditure. The fact is 
that the chargeable tax is the amount of assessable tax less offset of which ITC 
is an item. The chargeable tax so derived shall be split between the NNPC and 
the contractors in accordance with the proportion of the profit oil split.1004 
(d) Cost recovery: it is expressly provided in the Act that PSCs which do not place 
any cap on cost recovery provide that cost oil allocated to the contractor shall be 
sufficient to cover its operating costs consisting of (1) Tangible Drilling costs, 
(2) Capital Expenses (3) Intangible Drilling costs and (4) Qualifying Non-Capital 
costs.1005 
(e) Ring-fencing of operating expenses: these are usually operating expenses that 
were earned on different OPLs and are said to be ringed-fenced by statute.1006 
Notwithstanding these attractive fiscal incentives, operators have been reluctant to 
make the huge financial investment to take the operation into production because there 
was no specific legislation which dealt with the Production Sharing Contract since all 




1004 The exact interpretation of the provision of the Deep Offshore Act, and the PSC vis-à-vis the PPTA had 
been a subject of disagreement between the Corporation and the Contractor. 
1005 See Capital Cost shall be recoverable in full and chargeable in equal instalments over a five (5) year 
period or the remaining life of the contracts, whichever is less. Amortisations of such costs shall be in 
accordance with the method prescribed under the Second Schedule of the PPT Act, or over the remaining 
life of the contact, whichever is less. Qualifying Non-Capital Costs are, on the other hand, recovered in the 
year of expenditure. Also, certain operating cost are taken into account and deducted when calculating 
the chargeable profits for the purposes of Petroleum Profits Tax, in accordance with the Petroleum Profits 
Tax Act (PPTA). 
1006 Section 8 Deep Offshore Act. But there are unsettled questions about the proper interpretation of the 
section which are discussed in chapter 4. Ring fencing is defined as “a procedure where by the cost of 
drilling a dry hole in one production sharing area cannot be taken as a deduction in computing tax due on 
revenues from another production area. This means any tax offset is limited to costs incurred in a 
particular production sharing area. It means also that even if a discovery is made in one production 
sharing area, any tax/cost recovery in that regard will not occur until after production and revenue 
operation have commenced.” See Adepetun (n 906) 25. 
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which were not legally binding, and which were considered unenforceable.1007 The 
inconsistencies in the PSCs and the PPT led to a concerted call on the government by 
the operators to give these terms some sort of legislative backing.1008 The promulgation 
of the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Decree No. 9 and 
Amendment Decree No. 26 of 1999 (PSC law) specified the essential terms of the PSC, 
thereby providing the much-needed stability. The said Decree was gazetted in April 
1999 but was made retroactive and is subject to be reviewed in January 2008 and 
thereafter every five years.1009 
5.5.5 Stabilisation and arbitration clauses: 
 
Any disputes arising, are governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. Both the 1993 and 2000 PSCs provide for the economic 
stabilisation of the contract where the interests of the parties are seriously eroded.1010 
The 1993 PSC specifically provides for compensation when the rights and obligations or 
the economic benefit of the contract are negatively affected by an enactment of, or 
change in the laws or regulations of Nigeria or any rules, procedure, guidelines, 
instructions, directives, or policies regarding the contract adopted by any government 
parastatals or agencies.1011 On the other hand, the 2000 PSC stipulates only for such 
amendments to the contract as are essential to reinstate, as far as is visible, such 
commercial benefits as existed under the contract at an effective date.1012 
5.5.6 Termination: 
 
The popular view is that the provisions of the 1993 PSC on termination are fairly 
generous to the contractor. Also, they contain broad provisions concerning the material 
breach of the contractors obligations as well as a failure by the contractor to 
 
1007 T Adigun, ‘The Lurer into Oil: Gas’ (1996) The Guardian 20; This new productions sharing contracts 
have attracted the oil companies because of the fiscal and legal regimes. The oil companies are given a 
higher profit share for the more marginal high-risk projects. 
1008 Umar (n 966) 49. 
1009 The Act is retrospective although issued on March 23 1999, it is viewed to have come into operation 
in June 1993. See also section 19 Deep Offshore Act and the appraisal of the new production sharing 
contracts in Nigeria (1996) OGTR 436, 436. 
1010 Umar (n 966) 49. 
1011 Ibid 49. 
1012 Ibid 49. The PSC provides for a binding and enforceable arbitration in Nigeria pursuant to the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act (1990) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Cap 19. 
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significantly execute the agreed work programme after the sixth year from the effective 
date.1013 
By contrast, the 2000 PSC allows NNPC to terminate the contract if: (1) the oil company 
defaults in the performance of any part of its obligation set out in the specific provisions 
of the contract, (2) it fails to pay the agreed bonus and/or to fully execute the agreed 
minimum work programme and (3) if the warranties given by the contractor that it has, 
along with its affiliates, sufficient funds both in foreign and local currency to carry out 
petroleum operations are found to be false.1014 
It is fair to say that both PSCs provide that a foreign oil company can at any time at its 
sole discretion relinquish its rights and terminate the contract if, at the end of the sixth 
year from the effective date, petroleum has not been discovered in commercial 
quantities within the stipulated contract area and if no petroleum is found under the 
contract at the end of ten years from the effective date.1015 
The most recent production sharing contract is the 2005 model. This 2005 model PSC 
stipulates a cost recovery ceiling between 60% to 80%of available crude in each 
development area less deduction of Royal oil in any accounting period.1016 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
There is no doubt that the new PSCs have attracted the oil companies because of the 
fiscal and legal regime. The oil companies are given a higher profit share for the more 
marginal, high-risk projects. By these agreements, the oil companies are offered more 
favorable terms for frontier areas in a bid to secure their level of oil production in the 
next century. Any further innovation in the area of cost would continue to attract capital 




1013 Ibid 49. 
1014 Ibid 49. 
1015 Ibid 49. 
1016 The 2005 PSC introduced new terms such as: Commercial Discovery and Declaration of 
Commerciality; Assignment, Representative, Representations and warranties; Reviews/Renegotiations of 
Contract and Fiscal Terms, Valuations of Petroleum Productions; Conflict of interest; and Transparency. 




new PSCs, Nigeria has shown a preference for these forms of arrangement. Although 
other forms of agreement do exist in Nigeria, they are relegated to the background. 
The Nigerian government’s preference for PSCs is understandable since they provide it 
with the needed cash flow for the industry and the foreign oil companies are attracted 
to them because of their attractive fiscal provisions. It can be claimed that under 
Production Sharing Contracts the host country enjoys a better leverage than the 
contractor. In addition, the other important features of a PSC that makes it particularly 
attractive to the host government include the fact that the philosophy of permanent 
sovereignty finds fuller expression in a PSC than any other alternatives. The ability for 
the PSC to combine these features with other stipulations such as crypto1017 taxes, 
domestic market obligations, taxes and loyalties, and power of termination, which are 
common in concessions, makes it particularly attractive and the preferred granting 
instrument for the host government. 
The PSC also places an emphasis on the mutuality of interest in the relationship. Both 
parties in a PSC express their commitment to carry out the contract in accordance with 
the principles of goodwill and good faith. The fact cannot be denied that a substantial 
improvement has been achieved by the PSC over all previous arrangements, which 
substantially ignored the importance of these principles. Despite these factors, it is 
surprising that the investor finds the PSC acceptable. The only reason for this being so 
can only be put down to the fact that the investor has little or no choice, since he needs 
the host government’s oil and the host government, in turn, needs his capital and 
technology. Also, the PSC enables both the host country and the investor to allocate risk 
where appropriate. 
From the preceding chapter, the next chapter will deal with devices that are now in 
place for balancing the risk of the investor, companies have tried to deal with the risk 
involved in petroleum transactions by spreading that risk, insuring against risk; or 
creating contractual devices for risk management like renegotiation clauses, stabilization 
 
 
1017 There are taxes additionally borne by the investor, but which are not usually captured in the 
government stake statistics like bonuses, training fees etc. See Article 6.11 and 10 of EQE model PSC note 










BALANCING TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS – 
RENEGOTIATION, STABILISATION AND CHOICE OF APPLICABLE LAW. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources places the transnational oil 
company in an exceptionally multifaceted business arrangement with a foreign 
company. This understanding links the government who owns the resources with the 
transnational corporations who have the technology, capital and equipment necessary 
for such development in a sector where the stakes, risk and profit margin can be very 
high.1018 What emerges, however, is that some States have looked askance at the 
phenomenon and tried with varying degrees of success to minimise or eliminate its role 
in their economic development process.1019 There is no doubt that most States would 
welcome such inflow of foreign capital and know-how provided they are assured of 
control over its deployment and the general effect it is to have on their economies. The 
worst fear amongst developing countries which play host to foreign capital is that the 
owners of the capital may dominate the local economy and subsequently exert, directly 
or indirectly, undesirable political influence on the local scene. 
The basic underlying issue is that these petroleum agreements involve a large initial 
outlay of capital, and long-term investment in projects, including exploration appraisal 
and development1020: investments that must be recovered from the earnings. These 
investments expose the transnational oil company to significant risk for an extensive 
period of time. There is the economic risk that the natural resource sought may not be 
discovered or may not be commercially exploitable or that the industrial or commercial 
enterprise may turn out not to be profitable under the local and world economic 
conditions then obtaining. At the same time, because petroleum prices are volatile, it 
seems that what may at first have seemed a profitable agreement for the country can 
 
1018 M Coale, ‘Stabilisation Clauses in International Petroleum Transactions’ (2002) 30 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 227. 
1019 S K Date-Bah, ‘The Legal Regime of Transnational Investment Agreements that is Most Compatible 
with Both the Encouragement of Foreign Investors and the Achievement of the Legitimate National Goals 
of Host States’ (1971) 15 Journal of African Law 241. 
1020 Thomas A Walde and George Ndi, ‘Stabilising International Investment Commitment: International 
Law Versus Contracts Interpretation’ (1996) 31 Texas International Journal 215, 227. 
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look unattractive after it is entered into, particularly if the transnational company’s work 
proves highly productive.1021 The host country may attempt to change the terms of the 
agreement unilaterally in its favour or even to terminate the agreement in its totality 
and appropriate the project for itself.1022 These factors coalesce to put weight on the 
foreign company to seek fine-tuning for long-term agreements in response to political 
pressures and changed circumstances. On the other hand, the transnational oil company 
tries by all possible means to avoid the renegotiation of the agreement, the effects of 
successive changes to the country’s law or even a complete nationalisation of the 
company’s assets.1023 
The matter of contractual stability represents a major source of conflict between the 
transnational companies and the host governments. On the one hand, the interests of 
the transnational companies are served by stability and predictability in their contractual 
relationships with the host governments while on the other hand, the host governments 
favour a more flexible contractual regime.1024 
Furthermore, the legal institutions arduously established to protect foreign investment in 
the past have been found to be grossly inadequate to meet the nationalistic demands of 
the newly powerful countries. The access of a great number of newly independent 
countries to the community of nations, many with ancient cultures or new economic 
regimes far different from those dominating the international community in the past, is 
bound to put unprecedented strains on this consensus.1025 According to Geiger, the long 
duration of these contracts makes most of them vulnerable to political or economical 
pressures which were unforeseeable at the time of conclusion of the contracts. Unlike 
the economic risk, the political risk becomes greater as the project prospers.1026 The 




1021 Ibid 227. 
1022 Christopher Curtis, ‘The Legal Security of Economic Development’ (1988) 29 Harvard International 
Law Journal 317, 318. 
1023 Walde and Ndi (n 1020) 233. 
1024 Asante (n 742) 404. 
1025 Muir J Dapray, ‘The Changing Legal Framework of International Energy Management’ (1975) 
9 International Law Journal 605. 
1026 R Geiger, ‘The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements’ (1974) 23 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 73, 76. 
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agreement faces a dilemma: if the project fails, the company bears the loss; if it 
succeeds, the host government may seek to appropriate the gains.1027 
A basic underlying principle is that when a transnational company tries to spread its risk, 
it usually tries to form joint ventures to create a united and stronger front against a 
domineering host country. Companies have tried to structure and manage, through 
actions that include association with the host state, low visibility in the project, and 
flexibility in the investment to be able to adapt to changing pressures and 
expectations.1028 Also, the company can try to reduce risk by including in the contract 
clauses that provide for international arbitration, choice of law, renegotiation and 
stabilisation. This chapter examines the Renegotiation clauses, stabilisation clauses and 
choice of law clause and the direction these clauses have assumed in recent years. 
6.2 RENEGOTIATION CLAUSE 
 
Renegotiation clauses are mainly provisions for contractual stability and provide  
effective alternatives to complete nationalisation.1029 Host countries have suffered from 
terms and conditions which have been imposed on them for exceptionally long periods 
of time as a result of their initially extremely inferior bargaining power and ability, and 
need these to be modified in order to allow them to achieve material and effective 
sovereignty over their non-renewable natural resources.1030 Policies based on such 
objectives have clashed powerfully with the interests of the transnational oil companies 
in protecting investment conditions by relying on major exporting western countries. On 
the other hand, associations of producer countries such as OPEC1031 and predominantly 
 
 
1027 Curtis (n 1022) 319. 
1028 Walde and Ndi (n 1020) 234. 
1029 W Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 1986) 146. 
1030Thomas W Walde, ‘Revision of Transnational Investment Agreements: Contractual Flexibility in Natural 
Resources Developments’ (1978) 10(2) Lawyer of the Americas 265. 
1031 OPEC has taken a particularly strong stand on the revision of agreements in petroleum where changes 
of costs, prices, profitability rates, bargaining power and bargaining sophistication have clashed with the 
long duration of concessions. In Resolution XVI, OPEC has declared that governments have a right to 
renegotiate contracts when operators receive “excessively high net earnings after taxes.” Such 
renegotiations shall apply to the financial terms of the concession and OPEC has laid down rather  
concrete rules to determine excessive profits as well as criteria to be used for renegotiation. It is 
remarkable to discover the parallels between the OPEC standards and the comparable standards in the 
U.S Renegotiation Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C Appx.1211-1233 (1951) (repealed 1977), and the U.S Armed 
Services Procurement Regulations. 32 C.F.R. 3-308 (1977). OPEC has declared that the governments shall 
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the United Nations have progressively supported the efforts of developing countries to 
provide legitimacy for renegotiation of existing contracts. Such developments can be 
seen as the evolution of an alternative new legal order confronting traditional 
international law as generated by Western industrialised states. The essential 
instruments, relating to Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (PSONR) in 
their topical form1032 affirm the nationalisation of foreign owed mining operations to be 
the inalienable right of host countries. The notion of Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources has been in use as a key factor of the NIEO (New International 
Economic Order).1033 The concept of nationalisation entails the State’s right to impose 
renegotiation of an existing arrangement as an alternative to a complete takeover by 
the government. As such, the revision of existing agreements has become a main goal 
of authoritative UN instruments pertaining to the NIEO.1034 
Unhappily, renegotiation clauses have only been infrequently incorporated into 
investment agreements, notwithstanding that numerous renegotiations have been 
entered into in the recent past. Even though commentators have often championed 
these clauses, private parties involved in these international transactions have included 
them infrequently.1035 There is no consensus amongst commentators as to why there 
appears to be reluctance for the provision of such clauses. This hesitancy may stem 
from fears that these clauses will make the contractual relationship unpredictable, raise 




be entitled to determine the new financial conditions unilaterally if the operator refuses to comply with the 
renegotiation demand. 
1032 Mughraby (n 256) 161. 
1033 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N GAOR, 17th Sess., 
Supp. No. 17, at 107, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. 
Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 300, U.N. Doc A/9631 (1974). See generally Jiminez 
De Arechaga, Eduardo Legal Aspects of the New International Order (1980); T W Wälde, (1982) in A 
Requiem for the ‘New International Order”: The Rise and Fall of Paradigm in International Economic Law 
and a Post-Mortem with Timeless Significance; and Norbert Horn, ‘Normative Problems of a New 
International Economic World Order’ (1982) 16 Journal of World Trade Law 338. 
1034 The general assembly has generally decided that one of the five major objectives of a Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporation is basically to facilitate, as necessary, the review and the revision of 
previously concluded arrangements. This matter was further reiterated in an African meeting in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia in January to February 1977 pertaining to the Code of Conduct demands that “the TNCs 
shall accept the renegotiation of agreements which are not in conformity with the NIEO in a manner 
consistent with the national development objectives of the host countries.” 
1035 Jeswald W Salacuse, ‘Renegotiating International Business Transactions: The Continuing Struggle of 
Life Against Form’ (2001) 35 International Law Journal 1507, 1536. 
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upon to adapt the terms of the contract, will result in an unenforceable decision or the 
tribunal modifying the contract in a way that neither party intended.1036 
The fundamental issue is that these clauses provide a bulwark1037 against explosive 
actions by host governments such as nationalisation. For instance, when in Libya the 
government of Muammar Gaddafi nationalised fifty-one per cent of the companies’ 
interest in the concessions, when the companies commenced arbitration proceedings, 
their remaining forty-nine per cent interest was also nationalised. Libya did not respond 
to the companies’ request to submit to arbitration, but when the companies under 
clause 28(3) asked the President of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) to appoint 
a sole arbitrator, the Libyan government opposed such appointment in a memorandum. 
Libya objected to the arbitration procedure, stating that the disputes were not subject to 
arbitration because the nationalisations were acts of sovereignty. After considering the 
memorandum, the President of the ICJ named a sole arbitrator. A preliminary award 
was rendered in November of 1975, followed by an award on the merits in January 
1977. 
There would, in fact, be little preference to abrogate an undertaking if the terms of an 
investment agreement were to be reviewed at regular intervals. In a situation where 
there is no express provision for revision, the investor is invariably at an advantage 
relative to the host country which is in dire need of a renegotiation. Consequently, the 
investor can advance from a position of strength since he is under no legal obligation to 
renegotiate.1038 However, it is a different scenario when the venture turns out to be 
exceptionally profitable, with high profits being realised by the company; the 
government, whether of a developed or developing country,1039 is bound to call for 






1036  John Gotanda, ‘Renegotiation and Adaptation Clauses in Investment Contracts Revisited’ (2003) 36 
Journal of Transnational Law 1461. 
1037 Omorogbe (n 25) 105. 
1038 Peter (n 1029) 154. 
1039 For instance, Norway and the United Kingdom have both had recourse to renegotiate procedures see 
also Peter Cameron Property Rights and Sovereign Rights: The Case of North Sea Oil (Academic Press 
1983); this phenomenon is peculiar to most host States. 
252 
 
agreement, the transnational companies are the first to call for renegotiation, either 
unswervingly or by slowing down or entirely cutting short production.1040 
It would appear that renegotiation provides for a balancing of the contract terms so that 
neither party is unjustifiably disadvantaged by the initial terms and ought thus to be 
regarded as a fundamental part of the investment process. This issue was reiterated in 
a report by a group of eminent persons appointed by the secretary general of the  
United Nations.1041 
“While a clear understanding on various issues at the times of entry is vital, 
it has to be recognised that conditions change and what may seem to have 
been adequate and fair at the time of the entry may prove unsatisfactory to 
either party over time. A large number of agreements made in the past lack 
comprehensiveness and contain no provision for renegotiation. Developing 
countries have, of course, the power, through legislation, to modify the 
terms of agreements. But sometimes such actions, if carried out unilaterally, 
entail disproportionately high costs in terms of the future flow of 
investment. A willingness on both sides to renegotiate agreements which 
have been in force for more than, say, ten years could help to avoid 
recourse to extreme measures. The group recommends that in the initial 
agreement with multinational corporation’s host countries should consider 
making provisions for the review, at the request of either side after suitable 
intervals, of various clauses of the agreement.” 
In most international investment contracts, the inclusion of a clause allowing the parties 
to renegotiate the terms of their contract if certain events take place no doubt supports 
stability. In the case of E.D.F. v Société Shell Française,1042 an oil company and the 
French national power company had concluded a contract for the supply of fuel oil. The 
contract contained a hardship clause providing that in the event that the price of oil 
would increase beyond a stated figure, the parties would “consult to consider possible 
amendments to the contract.” In the early 1970s, there was a considerable increase in 
 
1040 Omorogbe (n 25) 105. 
1041 Asante (n 742) 413. 
1042 Paris, September 28, 1976 J.C.P. 1978,11,18810. Quoted from Blinn et al (n 863) 298. 
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the price of oil. However, rather than conforming to the agreed clauses, both parties 
brought this action in the courts. The oil company sought to have the contract 
terminated. The company petitioned the court to set up a new price. Both actions were 
dismissed on the ground that the parties had an obligation to negotiate and that it was 
only in the event that they could not reach an agreement that the courts could reflect 
on the matter. 
In circumstances where they are unable to arrive at an agreement, the parties at times 
authorise an arbitration tribunal to amend the terms of the contract in order to restore 
the economic equilibrium implied by the parties when they concluded in the agreement. 
The renegotiation of an international agreement is possible in international law under 
the principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus which states that a fundamental change in 
basic circumstances of a contract justifies a revision,1043 and in some extreme cases can 
lead to termination of the agreement in the instance of a change of the basic conditions 
on which the agreement was based.1044 The clausula rebus sic stantibus principle has to 
be interpreted in the light of relevant UN resolutions, reflecting the consensus of at least 
the capital-importing countries, on the territory of which the investment is embarked on. 
Therefore, a far-reaching change in relation to the commodities, or an innovative 
change of contractual terms which gains currency in similar agreements, would grant to 
both host states and investors the right to require renegotiation for adjustment. It is 
noteworthy that transnational companies are effective and resolute on such clauses 
granting themselves an exclusive right of unilateral revision. 
Some text writers are of the view that international law does not yield principles of 
adequate precision. A synoptic view1045 of major legal systems, with a growing emphasis 
on the legal principles originating from the United Nations, shows that a modification of 
the indispensable circumstances on which an agreement was based can give rise in key 




1043 Geiger (n 1026) 86. See also H S Zakariya ‘Where Changed Circumstances Affect Continued Validity of 
Mineral Development Agreements Contracts’ in K Hossain (ed), Legal Aspects of the New International 
Economic Order (New York: Frances Pinter Ltd 1980) 263 and 274. 
1044 Geiger (n 1026) 73-76 and Mughraby (n 256) 174. 
1045 Walde (n 1030) 271. 
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precepts and principles as “frustration,” “imprévision,” “contract administratif,” or 
“Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage.”1046 
Furthermore, concern must also be paid to legal readjustment or termination of 
agreements of unduly long duration or which reflect unequal bargaining power and 
experience.1047 Such principles are cited in major legal systems principally when the 
sovereignty of the government clashes with its contractual obligations. From the 
principles of major legal systems, interpreted in light of relevant resolutions of the 
United Nations and specified requirements of law adequate for an “economic 
development agreement,” one may safely say that following considerable change of the 
major circumstances fundamental to the agreement, revision of the terms is justified. 
Such a right of revision could not be excluded by “stabilisation” clauses,1048 provisions in 
investment agreements revealing a major bargaining weakness of developing host 
countries in comparison with the transnational corporation. 
Walde observed that as far as fundamental legal concepts of international and domestic 
law are concerned, a view which asserts absolute “sanctity” of contracts can barely be 
sustained. Renegotiation and readjustment can be satisfactorily justified by a change in 
the vital circumstances fundamental to an agreement. In natural resources contracts of 
very long duration where there has been considerable instability in the underlying 
conditions, there is consequently much room to claim for renegotiation.1049 
Conversely, as the circumstances giving rise to genuine renegotiation are difficult to 
define accurately, and as the development of standards to readjust contracts has not 
advanced very far, either in substance or in agreement, the requirement of precise 
conditions, procedures, and criteria for renegotiation may be preferable to a reliance on 
controversial and rather indistinguishable principles. 
As Hawkins and others suggested, it is not always straightforward to distinguish 
between renegotiation and nationalisation. This complexity is obvious, mainly in 
instances where the host country forces the investor to agree to a limited or complete 
1046 Geiger (n 1026) 73. 
1047 Ibid. 
1048 R Brown, ‘Choice of Law Provisions in Concession and Related Contracts’ (1976) 39 Modern Law 
Review 6 and Geiger (n 487) 73. 
1049 Walde (n 1030) 272. 
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take-over whilst carrying on some or all operations under modified terms. The absence 
of a gap between coercion and negotiation gives rise to gloominess on the part of the 
transnational company, especially when projected onto the background of past 
investments made on different terms.1050 On the other hand, renegotiation may be 
distinguished by the fact that revised terms are embodied in an agreement which 
constitutes some form of extension of the transnational’s activities. 
Furthermore, it would appear that renegotiations are a less consequential response to a 
change in investment conditions than are total revisions of the contract, and are 
therefore far less noticeable and consequently less well documented. Renegotiations 
tend to overlap with changes in the host State’s investment conditions or a change in 
laws or regulations. Such changes may also be in substance indistinguishable from an 
intended or previously closed renegotiation with the transnational company which now 
comes to be influenced by the new terms. A good number of cases of renegotiations 
reviewed are accompanied by or heralded by key changes in the investment and tax 
regulations of the host country:1051 
There is a popular view that renegotiation appears more the rule than the exception. 
Renegotiation has the benefit of eradicating a number of obstacles host countries have 
come across after nationalisations, such as problems in operations, in expansion of 
existing facilities, in marketing, and financing.1052 Early renegotiations involving 
considerable revision were, in the beginning, concentrated in the area of petroleum 
exploitation, but the signal produced by the strong petroleum producing countries has 
subsequently been followed by weaker petroleum producers and by host states 
producing non-fuel minerals.1053 Obtainable joint-venture and service contracts in 
petroleum have, to a large extent, been unchanged by renegotiation insofar as the host 
 
1050 Robert G Hawkins, Norman Mintz, and Michael Provissiero, ‘Government Takeovers of U.S Foreign 
Affiliates’ (1976) 7 Journal of International Business Studies 3-16. 
1051See Sec. General, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U.N. Doc. E/C.7/53(1975) (hereinafter U.N. 
Permanent Sovereignty); Robert Brasseur, ‘International Legislation and Fiscality of Hydrocarbon’ (1976) 
5 37; Norman Girvan, Corporate Imperialism, Conflict and Expropriation: Essays in Transnational 
Corporations and Economic Nationalism in the Third World (New York: Myron E. Sharpe 1976) 98. 
1052 It is on record that host countries have come across a series of obstacles, particularly countries like 
Peru, Bolivia (Patino), Chile (Kennecott/Anaconda). Theodore Harvey Moran, Multinational Corporations 
and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton, N.J. & London: Princeton University Press 
1974) 315. 




State’s participation and control were concerned.1054 Such relative immunity to the 
storms of change experienced in the traditional concessions suggests that companies 
who opted for more flexible agreements and conceded a larger share of partnership and 
control to the host State, were able to achieve a higher degree of stability in their 
contractual terms. Far from undermining the stability of agreements, renegotiation 
provides a assort of insurance against that kind of explosive reaction generated by the 
bitter realisation that the investment agreement itself emphatically rules out any rational 
process of revision. There would be little inclination to abrogate an agreement or 
nationalise an undertaking if the terms of an investment agreement could be reopened, 
say, every five years. 
In the petroleum sector, the most significant characteristics of recent renegotiations 
have been the participation of the host State, the multiple rises of posted prices, rises in 
royalty and tax rates, the removal of certain rebates, and the imposition of excess 
profits taxes. Renegotiation of oil concessions resultant in participation by the 
government of the host country has not completely eliminated the role of multinational 
corporations; they still continue to deal with the host States under new arrangements 
such as long term sales contracts on rather favourable terms and long term technical 
assistance agreements.1055 The terms thus renegotiated then go on to strongly influence 
negotiations of subsequent new contracts which are then more easily brought into line 
with the standard and objectives already achieved by the host countries in their 
renegotiations of older contracts and vice versa. 
There is a prevalent view that since the advent of the trend in renegotiated agreements 
to increasingly subject the transnational investors to national laws of general 
application, the traditional enclave status of the foreign investors has plummeted and 
conditions have shifted in favour of modern types of investment regimes.1056 There is no 
denying the fact that Companies are increasingly taking to sophisticated forms of non- 
equity control, such as management and long-term purchase as well as marketing 
arrangements, with the objective of holding on to material control despite having to 
 
1054   H  S  Zakaharia,  ‘New  Directions  in  the  Search  for  Development  of Petroleum  Resources  in the 
Developing Countries’ (1976) 9 Vand. J.Transn’l L. 545, 572. 
1055 Asante (n 742) 415. 
1056 Walde (n 1030) 275. 
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surrender to complete national ownership. This notwithstanding, the result of recent 
renegotiations is the development of more sophisticated forms of agreements, bringing 
older concession models in line with the modern evolution of the transnational 
investment agreement. Renegotiation is not an exception, but rather a main feature of 
modern large scale, and long-term investment contracts. 
Renegotiation is available to transnationals seeking to change the agreement in times of 
recession and depressed prices and thus it can be an effective means of stabilising the 
contract.1057 If appropriately restricted, renegotiation clauses can serve as stabilisation 
clauses that differ from real stabilisation clauses only in their limited effect on 
stabilisation over time or with regards to substantive matters. The triggering events for 
renegotiation that have been chosen by parties are indicative of the possibilities of 
renegotiation 
It would appear that the chances for a renegotiation clause to function in practice are 
dependent, above all, on the prerequisites for initiating a consensual procedure being 
clearly defined in the clauses.1058 On the other hand, and in direct contradiction to the 
necessity for existing definitions, it is the nature of these clauses that they can never 
cover every conceivable case.1059 Article 47(b) of the Ghana/Shell contract requires 
“such changes in the financial and economic circumstances relating to the petroleum 
industry, operating conditions in Ghana and marketing conditions generally as to 
materially affect the fundamental economic and financial basis of this Agreement.” The 
latter formulation makes clear the issues involved with this sort of renegotiation clauses. 
The change in the commercial balance of the contract can barely be defined more 
concretely. Trigger events evade a detailed definition as they are complex, unforeseen, 
and influenced by naturally volatile economic determinants. These clauses can be 
classified as “general review clauses.” Other clauses, however, link the trigger of the 
procedure to the occurrence of one or more events defined more precisely in the clause, 
such as tax increases, price changes for raw materials, or that a specific risk materialises 
(special risk clauses). 
1057 Peter (n 1029) 154. 
1058 Horn (n 1033) 129, observing that the defining of a particular event which will trigger review is the 
most salient feature of a special review clause. 
1059 William F Fox, International Commercial Agreements (3rd edition, 1998) 221 argues that “express 
contractual language will not totally eliminate risk, there is virtually nothing that can accomplish this”. 
258 
 
There is also the possibility for the host country and the transnational company to try 
and restrict the clause to a particular subject matter such as taxes from the date of the 
conclusion of the contract.1060 
It would appear that Renegotiation has the advantage of eradicating a number of 
difficulties host countries have come across after nationalisations, such as problems in 
operations, in expansion of existing facilities, in marketing, and financing.1061 It is worth 
mentioning that formerly existing joint venture and service contracts in petroleum have 
to a large extent been unchanged by renegotiation insofar as the host government 
participation and control are concerned.1062 Such comparative immunity to the wave of 
change qualified in the traditional concession advocates that the companies who are 
amenable to more flexible agreements and who have accorded a big share of the 
partnership and the control to the host country have been able to attain a higher degree 
of stability in their contractual terms.1063 
Some commentators from capital exporting countries have argued that the atypical 
characteristics of an investment agreement between a government and a foreign 
company make it comparable to an international agreement and as a result subject to 
such international legal doctrines as pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept). 
The legal consequences of this reasoning would be that a State would not be entitled to 
unilaterally modify or abrogate contracts to which aliens are parties.1064 The practical 
effect of this principle would be to exclude the renegotiation or the review of investment 
agreements or other transnational contracts at the instance of the host country 
government. A further consequence of this principle would be that the contractual 
interest of the alien would then constitute an acquired right which cannot be withdrawn 




1060 Atsegbua (n 982) 165. 
1061Moran (n 1052) 315. 
1062 Zakariya (n 251) 572. 
1063 Walde (n 1030) 275. 
1064 Louis B Sohn and R R Baxter, ‘Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens’ 
(1961) 55 AJIL 545. 
1065 For the recent discussion of this theory in its entire traditional ramifications, see ‘The Award of the 
Sole Arbitrator in the Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil 
Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic’ (1978) XVII International Legal Materials 1. 
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Another approach to protect the foreign investor is by an attempt to insulate the 
contract from the operation of the law of the host country by categorising the 
investment agreement as an independent and self-sufficient system of law, regulating 
the whole range of relationships between the host country and the transnational 
company without reference to any domestic law.1066 If parties decide to include a clause 
allowing an arbitrating tribunal to modify the terms of the contract in the event of the 
parties being unable to reach an agreement through renegotiation, it would be helpful 
to the tribunal if the parties provided some sort of criteria to guide the extent of 
adaptation. Indeed, as noted above, without any guidance, a tribunal may well be 
reluctant to adapt the contract.1067 
6.2.1 Reasons why Renegotiation Clauses are Obligatory 
 
The prevalent view is that renegotiation may become imperative by reason of the fact 
that the transnational company concerned has concluded a series of such liberal 
agreements with neighbouring countries.1068 In such a situation a sort of most favoured 
nation clause comes into operation. These most favoured (country or company) 
provisions stem from the practice of commercial treaties in international law. The grant 
of better conditions in a subsequent agreement to the party of the first agreement can 
be stipulated to be automatic, or it may give rise to a right to call for renegotiation of 
the first agreement. Most favoured company clauses are quite frequent in some 
concession contracts.1069 Transnational companies have therefore retained the unilateral 
right to revise contractual terms in their favour. Such provisions, however, have been 
criticised in that they hinder governments in their successive negotiations and are 
therefore difficult to implement, as it is difficult to single out individual provisions 
granting better conditions to the subsequent partner from an array of other 
 
1066 Asante (n 742) 405. 
1067 Final Award of 4 May 1999 (Ad hoc), reprinted in 25 Y.B. Com. Arb. 13. 61; Award in Case No. 1512 
(ICC 1971), reprinted in Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards, 1974-1985 3, 4 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains 
eds. 1990). 
1068 Asante (n 742) 413. 
1069 Particularly in agreements of transnational corporations with francophone countries in Africa. Such 
provisions favouring the company are frequent, see, e.g. the uranium agreement between the Central 
Republic and the French C.E.A. of 1969, art C.F., Journal Official May 26 1969. In addition, petroleum 
agreements before 1970 contain such clauses, a few examples will suffice, Kuwait –K.O.C. OF 1966, in 28 
P.L.M.E.A.-I(SUPPL) Iranian – Iminoco of 1965 in 4 O.P.E.C. The main aim for the transnational is to 
prevent another company from gaining a competitive advantage. 
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considerations and stipulations in the whole agreement. The rapid evolution of 
petroleum concessions, normally initiated in one country and leap-frogging to other 
countries, has brought about a larger number of most favoured nation clauses favouring 
the host country.1070 This permutation of the short-term period for the length of the 
agreement, collectively with the rights for renewal, under the terms prevailing at the 
time of the renewal, appears to be a flexible and mutually accepted way of adjusting 
mineral contracts without generating avoidable conflicts.1071The object of these 
provisions is to enable host governments to benefit from more favourable terms which 
transnational corporations subsequently concede to other countries. In some cases, 
most favoured nation clauses are confined to a particular region, such as Africa or the 
Middle East. For instance, in 1967, Nigeria invoked a most favoured African nation 
clause in securing a general review of its petroleum agreements with a transnational 
corporation in consonance with the terms which were conceded by such transnational 
corporation in Libya.1072 
An example of a most favoured nation clause contained in the 1980 Abu Dhabi 
concession1073 provides that: 
“If, in the future, arrangements are made between the government of Abu 
Dhabi and any other states in the Middle East or the agent of such 
government and the company or any other company/companies operating 
in the petroleum industry as a result of which an increase in benefits should 
accrue generally to all such governments aforesaid, the government and 
the company shall review and discuss the changed circumstances within the 
petroleum industry in order to decide whether any alteration in the terms of 
the agreement would be equitable to both parties.” 
Infrequently, a change of government brings in a new regime which is more 
ideologically dedicated to the control of the premeditated sectors of the country’s 
economy and results in consultation for equity participation in the foreign-owned 
1070 In petroleum agreements, see Abu Dhabi – Mitsubishi of 1968, 26 P.L.M.E.A.-. (Suppl) and Kuwait- 
Hispaniola of 1967, 25 P.L.M.E.A.-(Suppl). 
1071 Walde (n 1030) 294. 
1072 Smith and Wells (n 561) 137. 
1073 Article 68 of 1980 Concession Agreement between the Government and Sceptre Resources/Scimitar 
Oil/Wington Enterprise/Amerada Hess Corp. 
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enterprise. The country may also be faced with ominous economic difficulties which may 
oblige the government to turn to the foreign enterprise as a source of increased 
revenue. Once more, a broad evaluation of the fiscal policies of a country may make it 
almost unfeasible to eliminate the foreign investor with exceptional concessions from 
the domain of the new measures. At times, technical formula for determining a rate 
would be a legitimate ground for renegotiation. 
Renegotiation should thus be recognised as a basic facet of the foreign investment 
process. In this view, OPEC has declared that changed economic circumstances provide 
a justifiable basis for host governments to renegotiate petroleum agreements. In 
Resolution No. XVI. 90 of 1968, OPEC affirmed that governments have a right to 
renegotiate contracts when transnational corporations serving as operators obtain 
“excessively high net earnings after taxes.” Such renegotiation shall apply to the 
financial terms of the agreement. OPEC has approved existing rules to determine 
excessive profits and also the criteria to be used for such renegotiations. 
Generally there is a view that in recent times, the Secretary-General of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes has supported the espousal of 
renegotiation and review clauses in investment agreements as a mechanism for 
circumventing or containing conflict and investment disputes.1074 In its Programme of 
Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, the General 
Assembly clearly specified that one of the five most important objectives of a code of 
conduct incumbent on transnational corporations is to smooth the progress, as 
obligatory, of the review and revision of formerly completed arrangements. 
Occasionally, renegotiation has taken place at the demand of transnational corporations, 
in situations where perseverance on the original contractual terms would have caused 
substantial hardship to the corporation. A study of several cases of relations between 
host governments and United States subsidiaries has concluded that host governments 
have almost always resorted to renegotiation as a means of changing the terms of 
investment, and that such a method is favoured over absolute nationalisation when the 
fundamental incentive is economic. Renegotiation is therefore a main characteristic of 
 
1074 See the Annual Report of the Secretary to the Administrative Council, 1974 and 1975. 
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modern, large-scale and long-term investment contracts in natural resources. The 
pattern and results of negotiation are an indication of the superiority achieved by the 
host country in developing the necessary skill to exercise control over its natural 
resources.1075 
It would appear, however, that renegotiation is not a panacea,1076 and it has many 
downsides. Investors may refuse to include renegotiation clauses in their contracts for 
very many reasons. First and foremost, they may reduce contract stability.1077 It cannot 
be denied that a renegotiation clause may interpolate uncertainty into the contractual 
arrangement. Businesses value certainty and predictability1078 and predictability have 
been identified as a key element to a favourable climate for foreign investment.1079 
For instance, certainty in any business climate reinforces agreement. In 1978, the 
International Chamber of Commerce promulgated rules for the adaptation of contracts. 
With time such rules were withdrawn because they were hardly used due to the fact 
that practitioners viewed adaptation clauses with scepticism, preferring instead the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.1080 U.S. businesses are known to be reluctant to 
include compelled renegotiation and adaptation clauses, both because of the legal 
system’s reliance of pacta sunt servanda and because of the fact that such clauses are 
not as frequently used in common law countries, as they are in civil law countries such 
as Germany and The Netherlands.1081 
Another potential downside is that renegotiation clauses may come at a cost.1082 When 
confronted with uncertain economic return, an investor may refrain from entering into 
the investment agreement or structure the investment in such a way as to increase 
 
 
1075 Ibid; An internal paper prepared for the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations by 
Thomas Walde. 
1076 Gotanda (n 1036) 1463. 
1077 Peter Klaus Berger, International Economic Arbitration, (Boston: Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers 
1993) 1362. 
1078 See generally ‘A Report on the ICC Rules of Contractual Relations’ (1994) 5 ICC Bull. 31. 
1079 Jeswald W Salacuse, ‘Direct Foreign Investment and the Law in Developing Countries’ (2000) 15 
Foreign Investment Law Journal 382, 387. 
1080 Laurence W Craig, William Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber of Commence Arbitration 
(3rd edition, Oceana Publication 2000) 710. 
1081 Joseph M Perillo, ‘Force Majeure and Hardship Doctrine Under the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts’ (1997) 5 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 5, 26-27. 
1082 Salacuse (n 1079) 387. 
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returns to offset the risk created by the environment.1083 If a host state authorises such 
a clause in any foreign investment contract, the State runs the risk to lose the foreign 
investment or have to pay more for the investment of capital. In the light of the 
increased uncertainty, the investor would seek a higher return on the investment than 
that investor would otherwise require, so raising the overall transaction cost. 
Furthermore, it would appear that if a renegotiation clause is included in an investment 
contract, in the event the parties are unable successfully to renegotiate the terms of 
their contract it is unclear whether a dispute would exist between the parties.1084 
Without a dispute the arbitral tribunal may not be able to exercise jurisdiction and even 
if it does the tribunal may be unable to decree an enforceable award.1085 It has also 
been held that where the parties are unable to reach an agreement in renegotiation 
there is no breach of contract because an obligation to negotiate is not an obligation to 
agree,1086 and thus mere failure to agree does not constitute a real dispute between the 
parties.1087 
Commentators have favoured the view that there is not always a dispute when the 
parties request an arbitral tribunal to adapt a contract; others disagree.1088 If the 
applicable national judiciary refuses to consider the request for a tribunal to adapt the 
terms of a contract owing to a dispute over terms, then the arbitral tribunal may have 
the authority to adapt such a contract. On the other hand, if the tribunal exercises 
jurisdiction inappropriately, any decision to adapt the contract may be unenforceable 




1084 Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), On International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 22-29. 
1085 Ibid. 
1086 Award in the Matter of an Arbitration Between Kuwait and the American Independence Oil Company 
(Aminoil) March 24, 1982, reprinted in I.L.M.976, 1004 (1982). See also Gotanda (n 1036) 1465. 
1087 Georges R Delaume, ‘ICSID Arbitration: Practical Considerations’ (1984) 1 Journal of International Law 
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1088 Delaume Ibid. 
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A further concern, as already mentioned, is that the adaptation clause may provide the 
tribunal with little or no guidance upon which to modify the terms of the contract. In 
such a situation the tribunal may refuse to adapt the contract. Yet if the tribunal 
adapted the contract without any criteria to apply, the outcome could be one to which 
neither party would have agreed at outset.1090 
Another concern is that by allowing renegotiation and adaptation clauses to be triggered 
by events which are within the control of the host government,1091 these clauses are  
said to be operating in place of stabilisation clauses by allowing the host country to 
change its law in ways that can affect the economic equilibrium of the contract.1092 
Applying a renegotiation and adaptation clause in these circumstances might increase 
the likelihood of a host State taking some action that would cause the investor to invoke 
the renegotiation provision. According to Wolfgang, if the contract contained such a 
clause and the project turned out to be profitable, there would seem to be little 
downside for a State to take such action as might change the economic structure of the 
arrangement.1093 As a result, the State will entitle the investor to seek renegotiation as a 
matter of course. Therefore, the best the investor could then hope for would be a 
restructuring of the deal that would put it in the same position economically as if the 
host State had not taken action. However, on the other hand, the negative aspect for 
the host country would be minimal, because the tribunal would be unlikely to 
restructure the transaction to make it worse for the State in the light of the profitability 
of the project. Besides, the upside could be very lucrative if the restructuring were to 
provide the host country with more economic benefits than initially envisaged. 
In Nigeria, for instance, there are no renegotiation clauses in the contractual 
arrangements at present in use in the Nigerian Oil Sector. Nonetheless, the 
Transnational Oil Company and the Government have been able to renegotiate certain 
aspects of their agreements. For instance, because of the drop in substantial exploration 
 
provides that parties may agree to submit to arbitration “the filing of gaps in or modification of the legal 
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activities, it became obligatory for the Government to sign an MOU between the 
Nigerian Government and the Transnational Oil Company.1094 This Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Nigerian Government and the Transnational Oil Company 
contains all the benefits of renegotiation clauses, as it makes it feasible for the parties to 
renegotiate their agreements when circumstances change.1095 
In recent times, one of the consequences of renegotiation has been the development of 
more sophisticated forms of agreement, thereby bringing concession models more in 
line with the modern evolution of transnational investment agreements. Renegotiation is 
not an exception but rather a main feature of modern, large scale and long-term 
investment contracts. It is, however, not confined to the relations between transnational 
companies and host countries.1096 
There is a growing body of opinion in recent years, that trends in the natural resources 
industry reveal the increasing use of renegotiation clauses because they are mutually 
beneficial to both the interests of the host country and those of the transnational 
company. It can be safely said that notwithstanding the fact that it is difficult to 
recommend a renegotiation clause, a properly drafted clause that utilises the triggering 
event provision is capable of reconciling the conflicting principles of pacta sunt servanda 
and clausula rebus sic stantibus. 
There is a prevalent view amongst text writers such as Walde, that one characteristic of 
the older concession agreements was that they contained stabilisation clauses, whereby 
such contracts did not make renegotiation obtainable whatever the changes that may 
have occurred in the circumstances. The State was not allowed to resile from the 
contract even if the transnational corporation was making a profit far in excess of its 
initial investment. In modern contracts, clauses provide for sporadic reassessment of the 
contract1097 and for renegotiation of the terms if major changes occur which have an 
effect on the contract.1098 
 
 
1094 The Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 1991. Press statement by the Minister for 
Petroleum Resources. 
1095 Atsegbua (n 475) 19. 





It has been argued that that the relative bargaining strengths of the foreign corporation 
and the host government vary over the duration of the course of the investment. An 
American expert has propounded that a modern investment contract is only an invitation 
to a ball.1099 If there is no flexibility in the contract, acrimonious relationships could 
develop between the parties. 
The existence of renegotiation clauses makes harmonious relations between the parties 
possible and enables the corporations to keep the social objectives of the host State in 
mind in pursuing its profit objectives.1100 The renegotiation clauses also emphasise the 
sovereignty of the host country in that at no stage of the operation is the power of the 
State to interfere totally relinquished. 
There is a growing recognition that it is proper best practice for renegotiation to be 
limited to certain key provisions which affect the profitability of the venture and to be 
possible only after a stated period has elapsed since the previous renegotiation. There is 
a growing body of law which holds that in a situation where parties fail to agree on a 
renegotiation, then a problem might arise. Nonetheless, it is believed in some quarters 
that the nature of the oil industry militates against a permanent stalemate. The contract 
and the expectations of the parties are commanding factors supporting an acceptable 
negotiation. 
In a situation where on renegotiation, an agreement fails to be reached, there are 
various options open to the parties; either the worst scenario of the termination of the 
contract or the adoption of some third-party intervention such as the arbitration, 
litigation, or recourse to a third-Party expert. 
6.3 STABILISATION CLAUSE 
 
Stabilisation clauses or freezing clauses are meant essentially to restrain the host 
Government from subsequently abrogating or otherwise intervening, by the exercise of 
State power, in the investment agreements concluded with the transnational company, 
 
1099 Smith and Wells (n 561) 66-69. 
1100 Isaiah A Litvak and Christopher J Maule, ‘Foreign Corporate Social Responsibility in Less Developed 
Economies’ (1975) 9 Journal of World Trade Law 124; Theodore H Moran, ‘The Evolution of Concession 
Agreements in Underdeveloped Countries and the United States National Interest’ (1974) 7 Vand. J. 
Transnational Law 315. 
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so insulating the agreement from unilateral changes in the law of host country and 
ensuring ultimately that the contract is not altered, but remains stabilised.1101 Such 
clauses aim to insulate the relationship from changes in the content of the law of the 
host country. In considering this type of clause, we will need to look at supplementary 
clauses with consideration of the applicable law or laws in such areas as force majeure, 
hardship provisions, or provisions for the filling of gaps in agreements.1102 
Stabilisation may be sought by using specific contractual devices freezing the law of the 
host country at a point in time to the extent that the relation is governed by that law or 
by removing, in whole or in part, the relationship of the contract to the domestic law 
and subjecting it to rules of international law. 
Another method to stabilise the fundamental equilibrium of the relationship between the 
parties is to provide that in case of a change in the host country law substantially and 
adversely affecting the economic benefits accruing to one of the parties, it invariably 
follows that the terms of the contract will be adjusted accordingly.1103 
Transnational corporations have traditionally attempted to thwart attempts by host 
governments to make unilateral changes that would unfavourably affect the investors’ 
profitability.1104 The usual form taken by these attempts is the insertion of a clause that 
purports to proscribe any changes in the investor’s rights that may be made by the 
government without the transnational’s consent.1105 Also, many transnational companies 
seek such clauses as a means of underpinning the parties’ stated intention not to 
change the agreement without mutual consent.1106 
Stabilisation clauses are not by themselves an effectual device for achieving actual 
stability in contract terms. The clauses are unproductive because most companies 
choose not to be resolute on prompt enforcement of the clause, but to a certain extent 
 
1101 Atsegbua (n 982) 158. 
1102 Blinn et al (n 863) 302. 
1103 Ibid 302. 
1104 Asante (n 742) 404. 
1105 Stephen A Zorn, ‘Unilateral Action by Oil Producing Countries: Possible Contractual Remedies of 
Foreign Petroleum Companies’ (1985) 9 Fordham International Law Journal 73. 
1106 Theodore H Moran, ‘Transnational Strategies of Protection and Defense by Multinational Corporations: 




learn to live with the changed terms. Whichever adaptation of the formal contract terms 
occurs, if any, months or even years can elapse after the government has successfully 
made the changes before they have any effect. For instance, the Saudi Arabian 
authorities did not sign the agreement validating their ownership of the giant Aramco 
concession for a considerable period after the government was effectively assured full 
equity ownership.1107 
It has been suggested that such clauses are indispensable and that agreements must 
provide against destabilisation and unilateral changes in the future if prices rise. There is 
also another view that anomalies can be redressed by stabilisation clauses. It is worth 
noting that these clauses cannot stop destabilisation from occurring, and for that simple 
reason, an agreement cannot be insulated from changes in the host country’s laws and 
as such is an attempt doomed to failure.1108 According to Asante, the position is that 
that the doctrines of pacta sunt servanda and sanctity of contract reinforced by such 
devices as stability clauses fly in the face of global developments as well as the 
extremely fluid state of affairs in developing countries. It requires no prophet to predict 
that correct fiscal or other arrangements cannot realistically persist in the face of the 
dynamic economic changes at global and national levels which have been occurring for 
over ten years.1109 
 
It has been further remarked that such clauses may not be legally adequate to prevent 
a government from acting. In practical effect, they may in some situations be politically 
dangerous: ‘If there is one thing that can expose old Colonial wounds1110, it is for a 
government which is completely disgruntled with the terms of an agreement to be 
confronted by a provision which says that its sovereign Parliament cannot legislate 
without the consent of a foreign company.’1111 Such clauses, in fact, make the contract 
basically unstable. For instance, the 1967 Bougainville Copper Agreement in Papua New 
Guinea which contained such clauses had to be renegotiated after years of windfall 
 
1107 Hassan S Zakariya, ‘Sovereignty over natural resources and the search for a new international 
economic order’ in Hossain, Kamal (ed), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order (London 
& New York 1980). 
1108 ICJ Judge Rosalyn Higgins in Legal Preconditions of Foreign Investment Energy Law 86 231 at 242. 
1109 Asante (n 742) 411. 
1110 Omorogbe (n 25) 103. 
1111 John C Kinna, ‘Investing in Developing Countries: Minimization of Political Risk’ (1983) 1 Journal of 
Energy and Natural Resources Law 89, 94. 
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profits to the company. The one affirmative characteristic of such clauses appears to be 
that in the event of the breach of such a clause, a good measure of compensation could 
be awarded to the company by the arbitration panel, as was demonstrated in the  
Kuwait Aminoil Arbitration, and the Consortium case in the Iran/US Claims Tribunal. 
Furthermore, some text writers are of the view that in some cases when host countries 
have continued to unilaterally impose upon oil companies changes in the contract, those 
companies have either continued to function under the revised terms without any 
recognised adjustment of their contract,1112 or have surrendered their concession rights 
without making any claim against the government for compensation.1113 When a 
company continues to operate after a host country unilaterally changes the terms of the 
agreement, the multinational is either considered to have consented to the new 
conditions or have waived the rights it might have had under the original agreement to 
question such unilateral change.1114 
Long term resources and energy projects such as oil and gas exploration and mining 
have a serious need for stability that goes beyond short-term projects. It would seem 
that major financial requirements of these investors consist of swift investment recovery 
through step-up depreciation and pay-back, long loss carry-forward periods, reasonable 
royalty rates receptive to the mineral prices and a flexible system of income or cash 
flow-based taxation generated merely after investment recovery.1115 
Furthermore, to avoid financial vagueness about these requirements, companies often 
ask for guarantees of the stability of the status quo.1116 Every so often, these promises 
are made as administrative orders or regulations, although they are more regularly 
made through legislation or unambiguous contract provisions.1117 The greatest concern 
 
1112 Frank C Waddams, The Libyan Oil Industry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1980) 326. See 
also Zakariya (n 568) 6. 
1113 In the Libya case, Exxon surrendered its rights without making any claim against the government. See 
‘Poor Economics, Not Politics, Spurs Exxon’s Libya Exit’ (1981) Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 1. 
1114 As in the case of Libya, the fact that Mobil continues to operate in Libya even though under at least 
informal protest, could be construed as a consent or waiver. 
1115 Coale (n 1018) 221. 
1116 Walde and Ndi (n 1020) 226. 
1117 Peter Fischer and Thomas Walde, A Collection of International Concessions and Related Instruments 
195 481 (Oceana Publications 1981). Since resource projects are usually funded to a considerable extent 
by the external loan financing, these financials have as their core concern the ability of the company to 
repay its debt. Consequently, the stabilisation of the fiscal and foreign exchange regimes are necessary 
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is that the host country will expropriate or nationalise the transnational company’s 
operation.1118 This latter, however, can happen directly through legislation, or indirectly, 
through meddling with the transnational’s freedom to control the enterprise and make a 
profit.1119 
Also, another popular view is that companies want protection from changes in labour 
laws that could produce an increase in employment costs, government and in- 
production decisions,1120 unanticipated increases in energy and transportation usage 
costs, alteration in accounting rules which will result in augmented taxes, unforeseen 
obligation to make available infrastructures, or authorised local service and supply 
contracts.1121 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the principle of pacta sunt servanda which 
requires that States fulfil treaty obligations they had undertaken is a fundamental 
principle of international law applicable not only to treaties but also to any agreement 
between a State and a foreign national.1122 It has been contended that stability clauses 
in economic development agreements are absolutely binding on the host 
government.1123 It is a settled principle of law that any unilateral modification or 
termination of the agreement of the State is regarded as an act in violation of the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda and therefore contrary to international law. This 
position was canvassed in the pleadings of the Swiss government in the Losinger1124 
case before the PCIL. 
For the purpose of creating a concession, whether there has been the case in quasi- 





requirements that leaders want to see in investment agreements. See also Z Mikdashi, ‘Oil and Funding in 
International Financial Arrangements’ (1985) 9 Natural Resources Forum 283. 
1118 Eli Lauterpacht, ‘Issues of compensation and nationality in the taking of energy investments’ (1990) 8 
Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 241, 243-44. 
1119 Ibid 242-243. 
1120 Instances could include orders to reduce production or damaging the asset base of the investment 
through mandated overproduction. 
1121 Walde and Ndi (n 1020) 230. 
1122 Sornarajah (n 3) 199. 




principle of sanctity of contract must always be applied.1125 According to Verdross, the 
doctrine of quasi-international agreements is based on the idea that the contract itself 
represents the legal order. In his view, state contracts which are concluded in an “inter 
pares form” and which refer to international arbitration ‘are therefore, neither contracts 
governed by some municipal law of some state, nor are they international treaties since 
they are not concluded between subjects of international law. Accordingly, these 
agreements… form a third group of agreements, characterised by the fact that the 
private rights established by them are governed by a new legal order, created by the 
concurring will of the parties, i.e. the agreed lex contractus”.1126 
However, some commentators are of a different view, they support the existence of an 
international contract law on other grounds.1127 The elevation of a transnational 
company to the position of a sovereign state (which is inherent in the approach) 
militates against the structure of international law. Also, one must ask, if such 
Agreement can indeed be assimilated into treaties, what the effect is in such contracts 
of the clausula rebus stantibus which permits a party to a treaty to resile from the 
agreement on the grounds of changed circumstances. It invariably follows that the 
contract is invalid because its developmental goals have changed.1128 
In many areas of the world with important petroleum reserves, the sanctity of contracts 
has been undermined by the assertion of the debilitating and slippery qualification of 
rebus sic stantibus (circumstances remaining unchanged) or attacks based on their 
unconscionableness1129 or the circumstances of the negotiation. Freedom of 
management is carefully circumscribed to ensure maximum benefit to the State rather 
than maximum profit. 
 
 
1125 Alfred Verdross, ‘Quasi-International Agreements and International Economic Transactions’ (1964) 18 
Year Book of World Affairs 30. 
1126 Alfred Verdross, ‘The Status of Foreign Private Interests Stemming from Economic Development 
Agreements with Arbitration Clauses’ (1959) 9 Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur offentliches Recht, N.F. 449, 
451-452. 
1127 Lord McNair, ‘The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations’ (1957) 33 BYIL at 7; 
Friedmann and Kalmanoff (n 108) 175; Geiger (n 487). The claim was rejected in the Aramco Arbitration 
(1958) 27 ILR 117; See also F A Mann, Studies in International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1973) 229- 
230. 
1128 Geiger (n 1026) 85-86. 




However, it has been suggested that stabilisation clauses are baseless in the light of the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Reference is often made to 
General Assembly Resolution 1803, adopted in December 1962, which recognised “the 
inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural resources in accordance to 
their national interest” and which provided that “the right of the peoples and nations to 
permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the 
interest of their national development and the wellbeing of the people of the State 
concerned”.1130 That resolution was adopted in 1962 and represented a kind of 
compromise between countries seeking confirmation of their sovereign right to dispose 
of the their wealth and natural resources and the industrial countries seeking 
recognition of the necessity of honouring commitments and of treating foreign capital in 
accordance with the requirements of International Law. At the same time, a  
compromise resolution 1803 paid lip service to both interests, remained vague, and has 
been used by both importer and exporter ever since. It did not change international law 
with respect to the treatment of foreign capital, and one may ask whether it symbolises 
anything new with respect to sovereignty over natural resources. The aim of developing 
countries has been to create a norm of absolute sovereignty over natural resources.1131 
The resolution is significant in that it represents the genesis of a compromise between 
developed and developing countries.1132 According to Professor Sornarajah, the basic 
concept of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is the rule that 
national law should have supremacy over the exploitation of natural resources and that 
any dispute relating to such natural resources should be settled by the national courts of 
the State.1133 
Uncertainties have been raised as to whether a contractual clause can achieve the effect 
of fettering the legislative sovereignty of a State for a lengthy period of time.1134 The 
State, in theory, must act in the public good as it perceives it to be at any given 
 
1130   The  Charter  of  Economic  Rights  and  Duties  among  States  Res.3281,  29th   sess.,  Dec.12, 
1974.U.N.Doc.A/RES/3281(XXIX), 14 INT’L LEGAL MAT’L251(1975). 
1131 M S Rajah, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (New Delhi 1978); Gheorghe Elian, The Principle of 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers 
1979). 
1132 Wolfgang Friedmann, Changing Structure of International Law, (London, Stevens & Sons 1964) 138. 
1133 M Sornarajah ‘The Myth of International Contract Law’ (1981) 15 J. World T. 187, 210. 
1134 In Aminoil v Kuwait (1982) ILM 976, the Tribunal suggested that the clause may be valid if limited to  
a reasonable period. 
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time.1135 It may not be possible, as a matter of constitutional theory, for a State to bind 
itself by a contract made with a private party, characteristically a foreign party, to 
restrict its legislative power. It is trite law that a legislature is bound by its own 
legislation and has the power to change it. That being the case, it cannot be bound by a 
provision in a simple contract. Like a theme of constitutional theory, the stabilisation 
clause may not be able to achieve what it sets out to accomplish. It may not serve as 
anything more than a comforter to the foreign investor, who may obtain some security 
from the belief that there is a promise secured from the State not to apply its future 
legislation to the agreement.1136 
Furthermore, once a disagreement arises between the foreign investor and the host 
State, the legality of the stabilisation clause becomes a matter of discussion. States  
have always queried whether such a blanket surrender of sovereignty through what is in 
consequence a contract located under their own law can restrain their legislative 
sovereignty. There are two main ways in which the stabilisation clause could be 
attacked. In the first instance, one could question the vires of the officials who made 
the contract on behalf of the State party. The contract would more often than not have 
been made by officials of a State entity or of some ministry. They would usually lack the 
powers to commit the State to any specific requirement, particularly the requirement not 
to use the legislative powers of the State in a particular manner.1137 The second 
objection to the stabilisation clause is that the legislative powers of a State cannot be 
fettered by a mere contractual provision, particularly where the exercise of such power 
is necessary to secure a public benefit. In ordinary terms, both objections have a great 
deal of validity. The first opposition on vires is met with the rule which states that, once 
the contract is made, a State is not permitted to rely on its internal laws to contest its 
validity. In the Sapphire arbitration, Judge Calvin reasoned on the basis that a foreigner 
cannot be expected to know all the laws of the State. 
 
The second objection is met with the theory that the foreign investment contract is 
subject to a supranational system which can bind the local legislature, much in the same 
1135 Sornarajah (n 3) 407. 
1136 Ibid. 
1137 In SPP Ltd v Egypt (1983) 22 ILM 752 the Court came to the conclusion that a State does not become 
a party to a contract merely because officials of a State entity and the minister responsible for the entity 
signed the contract. 
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way that a treaty can bind the State.1138 The examination equates the foreign 
investment agreement to a treaty, which obviously it is not. 
Some text writers have sought to overcome this problem by arguing that the defect of 
personality in the foreign investor could be cured by the State conferring personality on 
the foreign investor. It is far-fetched to argue that the multinational corporation has 
personality when it suits its interests and that it does not have personality when it does 
not, as where liability is sought to be imposed on it for misconduct or to institute a code 
of conduct through international instruments.1139 
The popular view is that the theory underlying the principle that sovereignty over 
natural resources resides in the people, and that the State merely acts as an agent for 
the people. It does mean the supreme criterion to be applied in a judgment as to the 
validity of the contract is whether it benefits the people as a whole. However, where at 
any stage a State permitting the exploitation of the resources or the terms of such 
contracts are detrimental to the interests of the people or the economy of the country, 
the State can intervene in the contract, terminate it or renegotiate the terms so that it 
reflects the benefit of the people. It then follows that the adherence to such a principle 
generates a constitutional limitation on the State in international law to deal with natural 
resources except in accordance with the interests of the people. 
According to Geiger,1140 the doctrines of absolute sanctity of an economic development 
agreement appear to be unproved and rather based on biased hypotheses. There is no 
denying the fact that the principle of pacta sunt servanda has such a rigid meaning. It is 
however limited by considerations of good faith and equity and, in addition, as far as 
public contracts are concerned, by the intrinsic dominant power of the host government. 
6.3.1 Types of stabilisation clauses 
 





1138 The fact is that treaties are seldom made with a stabilisation clause. In any event, they are subject to 
the doctrine which makes the obligations defensible due to changed circumstances. 
1139 Sornarajah (n 3) 410. 
1140 Geiger (n 1026) 78. 
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The freezing type of stabilisation clause freezes the legal and fiscal system and protects 
the contract from any change in the law or the tax system of the host country. 
A second category is called the stabilisation clause stricto sensu which states that the 
governing law of the contract shall be the law of the contracting State at the time the 
contract was entered into, so preventing the application of succeeding changes in the 
host country’s State law. The stabilisation clause stricto sensu thus purports to protect 
the investor against the legislative risk which could ensue from the modification of the 
contractual regime by legislative act. In other words, the clause is intended to switch off 
any legislative involvement by the host State in the contractual relationship between the 
parties. Such a clause usually freezes the legislation of the host country as of a given 
date, usually when the contract is concluded, by simply providing that the governing law 
of the contract shall be that of the contracting State at the time the contract was 
executed, thereby precluding the application of subsequent changes in the law of the 
contracting State.1141 
Lastly, the intangibility clause provides that the host country’s government may not 
unilaterally modify or terminate the contract. The clause requires both parties to 
perform the agreement in good faith. Intangibility clauses were developed to avert the 
consequences of the exercise by the State of its authority in contractual matters. A good 
example of an intangibility clause may be cited from a Togolese petroleum concession 
contract of 1977 where it has been commented concerning the significant provisions in 
article 30 of the contract that: 
Furthermore, apart from the provision employed, the purpose of any 
stabilisation is to protect the agreement from the subsequent unilateral 
measures of the contracting State. These clauses may appear in broad form 
or in a narrow form that stabilises only limited aspects of the contract, such 
as the applicable tax regime.1142 
Stabilisation clauses also occur in contracts governed by national law. It has also been 
argued that if the contract as a whole is governed by the contracting State’s own law 
1141 A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘Understanding stabilisation Techniques in Production Sharing Agreements: 
Some Remarks’ (2005) <www.gasandoil.com/ogel/> accessed 2nd January 2018, 3. 
1142 Ibid; Revere award, 56, I.L.R. at 258. 
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then the stabilisation clause, like the rest of the contract, is adaptable if the State 
modifies the governing law.1143 To achieve the purpose of the stabilisation clause while 
respecting the wishes of the parties’ choice of governing law, the clause should be 
viewed as an independent obligation governed by international law, regardless of the 
governing law of the whole contract.1144 Sometimes stabilisation clauses are governed 
by international law even when other parts are of the contract are governed by the 
contracting State’s law. This was the issue that was canvassed in the Agip arbitration. 
The tribunal came to the conclusion that the Congo’s nationalisation of Agip’s interest 
violated international law because it was a violation of the contract’s stabilisation clauses 
which bound the State at the level of international juridical order.1145 This was also the 
reasoning employed in the Reeve arbitration,1146 in which the tribunal accepted that for 
most purposes the governing law of the agreement was Jamaican law but nonetheless 
held that the stabilisation clause guarantees in the agreement were governed by the 
principles of public international law which governed the responsibility of the State for 
injuries to aliens.1147 
6.3.2 Scope of Stabilisation Clauses 
 
The underlying principle is that stabilisation of the relationship is never total or definitive 
since certain matters may be barred from the scope of the stabilisation clause, or that 
the parties may agree that on definite points the relationship may be permitted to 
develop with the passage of time. In various cases, a compromise must be achieved 
between the transnational pursuit for total stabilisation of the legal, economic or 
commercial characteristics of the venture and the ordinary exercise by the host country 
of its sovereign prerogatives.1148 
 
 
1143 See, for instance, Somali Democratic Republic, Model Concession Contract South and Central Africa in 
Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts: South and Central Africa (New York: Barrows 1982). 
1144 Curtis (n 1022) 347. 
1145 Agip Co. v Popular Republic of Congo 21 I.L.R. 726. 
1146 Revere Award, 56, I.L.R.at 258. 
1147 The same result is suggested in a more complex manner by arbitrator Dupuy in the Topco arbitration. 
He suggested that a contract can be internationalized, subjected to international law as the governing 
law, or as the law, or as the law from which it derives its binding force and which gives the parties the 
right to choose another governing law – either by placing it directly under the aegis of international law or 
by subjecting it to the contracting State’s domestic law while at the time including a stabilisation clause. 
TOPCO award, 53 I.L.R. at 470-71. 
1148 Blinn (n 410) 310. 
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Rarely, an entire agreement may be made subject to the host country’s legislation. For 
instance, a Togo petroleum agreement states as follows: 
 
Article 37: “the present agreement has been executed in the French and 
English languages and both texts shall be deemed to have equal force and 
effect and shall be construed under and be governed by the Togolese law.” 
More often, the extent of the stabilisation clause may be restricted. Rather than 
applying the law of the contracting State as a whole, the clause may be limited to 
certain aspects of the host country’s legislation. The clause may also rule out from its 
scope certain matters which are politically important and principally responsive to the 
host country. 
To date, there have been legions of cases involving the interpretation of stabilisation 
clauses. In the case of Lena Goldfields v U.S.S.R.,1149 the issue that was canvassed was 
that under the arbitration clause contained in the concession agreement, Lena brought a 
suit against the Soviet government for the payment of thirteen million pounds, on the 
grounds that they had been created for Lena total impossibility of either performing its 
obligations under the concession agreement and enjoying its benefits. The court 
concluded that the agreement between Lena Goldfields and the Soviet Government, 
while governed by Russian law in respect to ordinary matters, was subject to the 
general principles of law insofar as the contractual provisions safeguarding the 
company’s position were concerned and the court ruled in Lena’s favour. A similar 
decision was made in case of Saudi Arabian v Arabian American Oil company 
(Aramco).1150 
Another view is that one positive aspect of such clauses appears to be that in the event 
of the breach of a clause, a good measure of compensation could be awarded to the 
company by the arbitration panel as happened in the case of Texaco Overseas Oil 
Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v Government of the Libyan Arab republic 
(TOPCO).1151   Between  1955  and  1968,  Texaco  and  Calasiatic,  both  United  States 
 
1149  Arthur Nussbaum, ‘Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields Ltd and the Soviet Government’ (1950) 
36(1) Cornell Law Review 31, 42. 
1150 27 I.L.R. 117 (1963). The general principles of law in this regard refers to… 
1151 53 I.L.R. (1979) 389. 
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corporations, obtained fourteen concessions from the Royal Libyan Government. In 
1973, the revolutionary government nationalised fifty-one per cent of the company’s 
interest in the concessions. When the company commenced arbitration proceedings 
their remaining forty-nine per cent interest was nationalised. The annoying fact was that 
Libya did not respond to the companies’ request to put the matter forward to 
arbitration, but when the company under clause 28(3) asked the President of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) to appoint a sole arbitrator, the Libyan Government 
opposed such appointment in a memorandum. Libya contested the arbitration procedure 
on the ground that the disputes were not subject to arbitration since the nationalisations 
were acts of sovereignty.1152 Subsequent to deliberating on the memorandum, the 
President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) named a sole arbitrator. The issue 
before the TOPCO arbitrator was whether TOPCO was entitled to compensation; he first 
rejected the notion that the concession agreement was an administrative contract. In 
this award arbitrator Dupuy held that Libya’s violation of the stabilisation clauses in the 
oil companies’ agreements was an unlawful act justifying an award of restitutio 
integrum, whereby Libya was required purposely to perform the agreement. This was 
the decision, also, in the Libyan American Oil Co. (Liamco) v Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic.1153 The sole arbitrator in that case, on analysing the stabilisation clause, 
found that the clause was justified not only by the said Libyan Petroleum Legislation, 
but also by the general principles of the sanctity of contracts recognised both in 
domestic law and international law. The arbitrator further found that since Liamco’s 
concession agreements were binding, they could not validly be terminated unless there 
was mutual consent of the contracting parties, in compliance with the said principle of 
sanctity of contract and particularly with the explicit terms of 16 of the said 
agreements.1154 
 
A stabilisation clause may lead to complexity in its execution if its intent is to insulate 
the investment agreement from subsequent labour legislation to the extent that such 
legislation may bring an extra burden to bear upon the transnational oil company. This 
 
 
1152 Von Mehren, B Robert and P Nicholas Kourides, ‘International Arbitration Between States and Foreign 
Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalisation Cases’ (1981) American Journal of International Law 476, 489. 
1153 62 I L R 140 (1977); 20 I L M (1977). 
1154 62 I L R 31. 
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introduces into the operation of the stabilisation device a biased element which may be 
controversial in times of contractual pressure. 
In several cases, issues of taxation are not completely stabilised. To a certain extent, 
the scope of stabilisation is ongoing in the sense that it may be greater during the set- 
up period than during years of commercial activity. In such cases, the main worry of the 
transnational oil company is to prevent it being subject to discriminatory treatment. 
In their search for stability, parties have considered that in times of fast evolution, 
stability may place them at a disadvantage with other competitors and make provision 
for conditions anticipated to safeguard their competitiveness such as “most favoured 
company” clauses and “most favoured nation” clauses. We have touched on these 
clauses earlier in this paper. This sort of clause may easily come to work to the 
disadvantage of the host countries in that it may restrain the State from negotiating 
with potential new investors to arrive at terms more favourable to the host country than 
those originally granted to the first investor, knowing in advance that the investor would 
be at liberty to claim the benefit of those terms without providing any new reciprocal 
benefit to the State. Besides, the automaticity of these clauses tends to work to the 
detriment of the host countries when, because of the administrative 
compartmentalisation of its agencies, one agency may act autonomously and without 
information exchange with other agencies. As a result, the host country may find itself 
exposed to modification in the treatment of previous investors without realising the cost 
of the change. Despite the formulation used in a stabilisation clause, there is no 
guarantee that, in the event of a disagreement, arbitrators will not construe the 
stabilisation provisions in agreement with their own view of the “real” meaning of the 
clause. The case of Aminoil offers a good illustration of such a state of affairs. 
Stability clauses occur frequently in economic development agreements with 
francophone African states. A typical example is article 10 of the agreement between 
the French company Uginor and the Malagasy Republic. 
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Even though stabilisation clauses represent a valuable bargaining chip to the 
transnational companies,1155 they cannot cure the intrinsic instability of these oil 
contracts and may in specific circumstances lead to conflict between host governments 
and the transnational oil companies. Inflexibility created by stabilisation clauses can still 
be found in international oil contracts between host governments and international oil 
companies. The fact is that stabilisation clauses in oil contracts may prevent host 
countries from achieving their goals which comprise of de facto control of their oil 
sectors and the development of technological capability in petroleum operations. In view 
of the fact that de facto control of their oil industries in several host countries is still in 
the hands of the transnational oil companies, they believe that the continued use of 
stabilisation clauses may prevent host countries from securing de facto control of the oil 
industry at the time the contract is stabilised. 
 
In Nigeria, modern contractual agreements in the oil sector do not utilise stabilisation 
clauses. On the contrary, it is expressly provided in the PSC and SC (Service contracts) 
that no term or provision of these contracts including the agreement of the parties to 
arbitration shall prevent or limit the government of Nigeria from exercising its 
inalienable right to alter or abrogate the contract with the transnational oil companies. 
Nevertheless, liability for breach of contract would arise for which damages could be 
awarded.1156 
To sum up, the function and significance of stabilisation clauses stems from their ability 
“to avoid the arbitrary acts of the contracting government.”1157 Such clauses provide 
motivation to the investor because they are seen as having the capability to protect the 
investment from harsh and arbitrary changes in laws and regulations and other acts of 
the government that can affect the financial premises of the project. They also act as a 





1155 Peter (n 1029) 157; Roland Brown, ‘The Relationship Between the State and the Multinational 
Corporation in the Exploitation of Resources’ (1984) 33 ICLQ 218, 223, where the commentator argued 
that stabilisation clauses are a fruitful source of provocation and misunderstanding. 
1156 See the Libyan award case; also in Liamco and Shell BP v Libya, the arbitrators held that 
nationalisation was arbitrary and awarded damages. However, in Topco the arbitrator ordered restitution 
interregnum. 
1157 Letco arbitration 1987 26 I L M 647. 
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investment stability and predictability.1158 Accordingly, whereas the investor sees it as an 
important safeguard mechanism in a PSC, the host government sees it as another 
incentive to the fiscal regime, particularly for petroleum. 
6.4 CHOICE OF LAW 
 
Beginning from a broad public point of view, it is obvious that in the present state of 
world society and the unequal distribution of capital and industrial skill necessary for the 
securing of a more equitable level of material civilisation, that the citizens of the highly 
developed countries should take on this process and receive a proper reward for their 
technical and financial aid. There is no gainsaying the fact that there is always a risk in 
these transactions that the presence of what one medieval reporter once described as 
“too great might on the one side, and unmight on the other”, or too great commercial 
experience on the one side and lack of it on the other may have the result of an 
agreement being entered into which is unfair to the State whose government becomes a 
party to it.1159 In a situation where a transnational investment contract is silent as to the 
applicable law, the position is that an agreement between a State and a private foreign 
legal person is not a treaty but a contract and the applicable law of such a contract 
must be some system of domestic law. The days of generous and blatant economic 
concession have gone. To a great extent, the rulers of the undeveloped or less develop 
countries have shown themselves to be astute and progressive men well able to take 
care of the interests of their countries in a bargain and assisted by first clause legal 
advice whether from their own fellow citizens or from foreigners. 
One of the complexities that arises in finding a system of law suitable to international 
development agreements arises from the fact that many of the countries which require 
skill and capital from outside for the development of their natural resources are 
governed by some system of law that is not mature enough to deal with this 
transaction. For instance, under Islamic law, provisions respecting economic 
development agreements are certainly inadequate, if really there are any at all. What is 
more, the content of Islamic law differs according to particular schools of thought whose 
1158 This is to ensure that the project can generate enough income to service and pay back the debt, 
among other things. T Walde and A Kolo, ‘Negotiation and Contract Adaptation in International 
Investment Projects: Applicable Legal Principles and Industry Practices’ (2003) 2(1) OGEL 3. 
1159 McNair (n 1127) 2. 
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teachings are to be followed, and it is understood that there are at least four schools of 
law. It is not surprising, therefore, that transnationals coming from countries enjoying a 
well-established system of national law which is familiar with contracts of this type are 
unlikely to be willingly disposed to enter into contracts with a foreign government that 
are to be regulated by systems of law which are vague, and which have not been 
developed to deal with this kind of transaction. 
Accordingly, it is therefore not surprising to find that the negotiators of these kinds of 
contract and the tribunals which adjudicate them tend to look for some direction in the 
matter of an appropriate system of law. 
McNair position is that private international law is not in itself an alternative, in view of 
the fact that it does not profess to be a complete system of substantive rules of law; it 
is adjectival and its duty is to stipulate rules for the direction of a tribunal in deciding the 
system of law it should apply for the solution of a matter that has been presented to it 
that includes a foreign element, and that its jurisdiction is with respect to that duty.1160 
The question that readily comes to mind is: what the appropriate system of law for the 
regulation of an economic development agreement is made with the government of a 
country whose legal system is insufficient for the regulation of this type of contract. It is 
submitted that a completely sufficient source for the choice by tribunals of an 
appropriate system can be found in the intention of the parties, evident either by the 
express provision in their contract, as occasionally happens, or by implication from the 
terms of the contract and the nature of the transaction envisaged by it.1161 
The choice of law system should depend on the intention of the parties expressed or 
implied, namely that most of these contracts contain provision for arbitration. 
Occasionally, the arbitration clause expressly specifies the system of law which should 
apply and every so often it contains some regulations or elements which can sometimes 










place of the arbitration or by investing some person with power to appoint an umpire if 
the parties or their arbitrators disagree.1162 
6.4.1 International Law as Applicable Law 
 
There is a great deal of controversy amongst commentators with regards to the 
application of public international law to a contract between a State and a foreign 
private individual. Some contend that such contracts are not governed by public 
international law stricto sensu. It has been suggested by Mann1163 that contracts 
between States and aliens are governed by international law if that law is chosen by the 
parties to be the proper law of the contract. Hitherto, Dr. Mann has made a strong case 
for the application of international law stricto sensu to economic development 
agreements. He has stated that: 
“It is possible, however, for contracts between parties, only one of whom is 
an international person, to be subject to public international law…(a) 
According to the theory referred to, a contract could be ‘internationalised’ in 
the sense that it would be subject to public international law stricto sensu, 
that, therefore, its existence and fate would be immune from any 
encroachment by a system of domestic law in exactly that same manner as 
in the case of treaty between two international persons; but that, on the 
other hand, it would be caught by such rules of jus cogens as are embodied 
in public international law.”1164 
He further stated: 
 
‘Where the parties have not expressly or impliedly provided for a law to 
govern their contract, a presumption in favour of international law has the 
great utility of assuring that the existence of, and faith in, such contracts 




1162 McNair (n 1127) 6. 
1163 F A Mann, ‘The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons’ (1959) 35 BYIL 34, 43; 





exactly the same manner as in the case of a treaty between two 
international persons…”1165. 
 
Dr Mann contemplated that the application of international law in this case would be 
undertaken by national or international officials, judges, or arbitrators having jurisdiction 
over the contract. The substantive law which they would apply is largely derived from 
those principles of law “accepted semper ubique et omnibus,” such as those which 
govern the interpretation of commercial treaties.1166 The argument that international law 
should form the foundation of economic development agreements has been supported 
by contention that such agreements, because of their international correlation are in 
reality international agreements. This matter was reviewed in 1950 by the International 
Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Case1167. 
This case involved a dispute which arose between Great Britain and Iran over the 
cancellation by Iran of a concession of the Anglo-Iranian Company (a British Company). 
Iran contested the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis that the dispute was between 
Iran and the British company and was not governed by an earlier declaration by Iran 
conferring upon the Court jurisdiction under an optional clause which had been 
contained in a concession agreement cancelled by Iran. The earlier, cancelled, 
concession agreement had a dual character: it was a concession to the company as well 
as a treaty between the United Kingdom and Iran. Iran’s argument was that as the 
current agreement was no longer of the same dual nature and did not contain the 
elements of a treaty, the previously granted jurisdiction should no longer apply. 
Also, it is a prevalent view that the fact that agreements often contain provisions for the 
possible appointment of the arbitrators by an international official can be adduced as an 
argument supporting the view that such agreements are governed by international law. 






1165 Ibid 39. 
1166 Ibid 40. 
1167 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (1952) I.C.L. 92. See G Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’ (1957) 33 Brit. Y.B. 
Int’l L. 203, 240. 
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parties fail to agree on the appointment of arbitrators, the President or the Vice- 
President of the International Court of Justice should perform that function.1168 
Furthermore, another contention in favour of international law as the governing law is 
expediency. It has been observed that it is expedient to apply international law to 
concession agreements because it helps to overcome the problem of the unwillingness 
of the host State to submit to foreign law and the reluctance of the alien individual or 
corporation to leave the arbitration of disputes to the courts of the grantor’s State.1169 
Further, it has been argued that international law has benefits both procedurally and 
substantively and there is less difficulty involved in drafting it into agreements than is 
the case with the provision of a specific law.1170 
There are, however, two schools of thought which champion the application of public 
international law to such contracts: The first school of thought supports the application 
of international law by elevating the contract between a State and a foreign private 
individual to the level of an inter-State treaty;1171 the other school of thought supports 
the application of international law, save in a cautious and limited sense.1172 
The first group of commentators consider that the choice of public international law by 
the parties elevates the contract to the international plane and makes it equivalent to an 
inter-State treaty.1173 One commentator contends that “the proposition that contracts 
between a State and a foreign national should be regarded in the manner as treaties 
between two States and hence governed by international law is both logical and 
desirable. In both it is argued that promises of an international scope or of an 
international flavour, are made, in both cases reliance is placed on the premises; in both 
 
 
1168 In the concession agreement concluded between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Iran, art. 22 
provided for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, the umpire of which was to be appointed by the 
president of the I.C.J., if the arbitrators appointed by the two parties could not agree. 
1169 Phillip C Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan 1948) 141. 
1170 Lowell Wadmond, (1961) ‘Arbitration Between Governments and Foreign Private Firms’ (1961) 
American Journal of International Law 69, 73. 
1171 A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘International Development Law as Applicable Law to Economic Development 
Agreements: A Prognostic View’ (2001) 20 Wis. Int’l L.J. 2. 
1172 Ibid 3. 
1173 Leo T Kissam and Edmond K Leach, ‘Sovereign Expropriation of Property and Abrogation of 
Concession Contracts’ (1959) 28 Fordham Law Review 207. See also A A Fatourous, ‘Key concepts in 
international investment arrangements and their relevance to international transactions in services’ (1989) 
61 Focus 4. 
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cases the obligation to perform those promises should be made.”1174 This was also the 
view in the case of Ambatielos case before the International Court of Justice. The Greek 
government in that case contended that the contract between the Government of the 
United Kingdom and Mr. Ambatielos was one between a State and a foreign national, 
with the result that according to the prescribed principles of international law, the 
Government of the State incurs a direct responsibility on the breach of the contract, for 
which the Government of the foreign national thereby injured is entitled to redress.1175 
Presently, however, there is no disproving the fact that there is a fundamental difficulty 
with regards to the issue of equating economic development agreements with treaties, 
the former being between two unequal parties, namely a sovereign State and a private 
entity, whereas the latter is between two or more equal parties, i.e. at the least, the 
parties are sovereign States.1176 The fundamental fact is that it is not only the quality of 
the parties that distinguishes the economic development agreement; there are other 
factors which make the distinction between them even more apparent. 
In the arbitration between Aramco and the Government of Saudi Arabia, the arbitration 
tribunal rejected the contention that an oil concession should be assimilated to an 
international treaty governed by the law of nations and concluded that as the 
agreement has not been concluded between two States, but rather between a State and 
a private American corporation, it was not governed by public international law. 
As a result, a number of developing countries stipulated in their internal legislation and 
international economic development agreements, the application of their domestic law 
to these agreements. This view has been modified by the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries OPEC Resolution XVI.90,1177 with regard to the declaratory 
statement of petroleum policy in member countries. The resolution recommended to 
member countries inter alia that: 
“Except as otherwise provided for in the legal system of a member country, 
all disputes arising between the government and the operators shall fall 
 
1174 Ibid 4. 
1175 The Ambatielos Case (Greece v. UK) 1953 I.C.J Pleadings 71 (May 1993). 
1176 Maniruzzaman (n 1118) 5. 
1177 OPEC Resolution XVI. 90 of the Sixteenth Conference Held in Vienna from 24th to 25th June 1968. 
See Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts (Middle East), Supplement No XXXI, P, C-1. 
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exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent national courts or the 
specialised regional courts, as and when established.”1178 
 
Similar to this is Decision 24 of the Andean Commission1179 March 31 1970, according to 
which “foreign member countries should not include clauses which withdraw possible 
differences or controversies from the national jurisdiction of the recipient country.” For 
instance, the Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955, as amended, provides that the contract 
“shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles of law in Libya 
which are consistent with the principles of international law”1180 hence, the Libyan 
legislation does not espouse the view of internationalisation of the State’s contract, 
though it approves the idea of subordination of the local law to international law. As a 
result, Libyan law applies in all cases save where it differs from international law.1181 
The topical question is: what is the necessary aim of the assimilation to a treaty of an 
investment contract between a State and a foreign entity? The underlying intention is to 
disallow the State from interfering with their mutually agreed contractual rights and 
obligations by their own legislative or executive measures, thereby upholding the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, which is the basic rule of treaty law. Under this rule, 
the State party cannot rely on its own executive acts or domestic legislation to avoid 
international obligations arising out of variation, termination or any other interference 
with the contract as if it was a treaty. The basic underlying fact is that the investment 
agreement is neither a treaty nor equivalent to a treaty.1182 That it is treated as such 
invariably means that such inference or the application of treaty rules to investment 
agreements is totally unacceptable in the extent to which it limits the jurisdiction of the 







1178 Declaratory Statement on Petroleum Policy in Member Countries (1968), OPEC Res. XVI. 90 reprinted 
in 7 Int’l Legal Materials 1183. 
1179 Al-Saeed Mansour, ‘Legal Protection of Economic Development Agreements’ (2002) 17 Arab Law 
Quarterly 169. 
1180 Zouhair Kronfol, Protection of Foreign Investment: A Study in International Law (Leiden: A W Sijhoff 
1972) 76. 
1181 Mansour (n 1179) 150. 
1182 Maniruzzaman (n 1141) 5. 
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majority of supporters amongst commentators and jurists, as well as juridical 
support1183 which tends to incline to this view. 
Sornarajah suggests that the assimilation of foreign investment agreements to treaties 
is a non-starter as the law on treaties was never developed in consideration of its 
application to foreign investment contracts. The observation that the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties could be applied to foreign investment is too fanciful1184 to have 
any merit, as the convention was not made by the parties to apply to anything other 
than agreements between States. It is, however, superfluous to hang on to such straws 
if the argument that is made has any intrinsic strength.1185 
The stark reality is that investment agreements and treaties differ considerably, not only 
in the quality of the parties concerned but on other essential grounds including the 
respective interests of such parties. It cannot be denied that the State, on the one hand, 
represents the interests of and welfare of its people, whereas the contracting foreign 
private entity, on the other hand, essentially represents its profit-motivated concern 
from the time it enters into such a contract in anticipation of its completion.1186 
Furthermore, it would appear that in entering into an investment agreement, the parties 
do not surrender the sovereignty of the State. 
It has been suggested that traditional public international law lacks apposite rules to 
govern contracts where one party is a State. These jurists perceive an honest need to 
develop such an appropriate body of law under some suitable label, whether it is 
something such as “public international law,” “general principles of law”, “transnational 
law” or another. However, it should be brought to the conscious attention of those 
considering this development that the impetus for and aspirations to develop this 
appropriate body of law are primarily biased in favour of the protection of investors in 
the rule-game and has as yet done little to advance a “justice-based” legal system, that 
is to function as a balance between the protection of investors’ interests and the needs 
of the developing world to ensure distributive justice internationally. 
1183 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 112 (July 2); Amoco International Finance 
Corporation v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 189, 242-43 (July 1987). 
1184 M Sornarajah, ‘Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration’ (1997) 14 Journal of International 
Arbitration 103, 119. 
1185 Maniruzzaman (n 1141) 6. 
1186 Ibid 7. 
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From the view and arguments expressed by the authors and commentators, it can be 
observed that the application of international law to State contracts has been supported 
in several arbitral awards; it is often suggested today, of a minority of States in the 
United Nations. This position holds that the host State is internationally responsible for 
upholding its side of a contract concluded with a foreign investor. 
According to Brownlie, foreign investment agreements to be of a higher status1187 than 
agreements with other States and for that reason some even assimilate these 
agreements to treaties.1188 These commentators rely for their authority mainly of 
Paragraph 8 of UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 on permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources which provides that “foreign investment agreements freely entered 
into by or between sovereign States shall be observed in good faith.” The controversial 
assertion is that the wording is not justly framed. Further, Maniruzzaman observed 
further that all contracts must be carried out in good faith and it is quite baffling to 
attribute a higher status to foreign investment agreements. To state that they are to be 
observed in good faith would indicate that other State contracts are likely to be based 
on bad faith and may not be binding.1189 
There is a consensus that agreement by parties to submit eventual disputes to arbitral 
award shall be based on good faith, equity and legal principles recognised by civilised 
nations or more specifically the juridical principles contained in article 38 of the Statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. This trend of internationalisation of 
investment agreements has been sustained by the decisions of international tribunals. 
In the Lena Goldfields case1190 the tribunal ruled that although the concession 
agreement did not provide for the application of international law, nonetheless, except 
for matters in the U.S.S.R. subject to Soviet law, the general principles of law enshrined 





1187 Ian Brownlie, ‘Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law (some aspects)’ (1979) 162 
Hague Recueil Des Cours 245, 305-9. 
1188 I Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law (2nd edition Dordrecht, Boston & Norwell MA: 
Martinus Nijhoff 1992) 154. 
1189 Maniruzzaman (n 1141) 9. 
1190 Lena Goldfield Ltd v Government of the USSR, Art. 89(1950-51) 36 Cornell L.Q. 31. 
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Similarly, in the case of the Ruler of Qatar v International Marine Oil Company, the 
arbitrators came to the same conclusion: Since the concession agreement between the 
International Marine Company Ltd and the Ruler of Qatar contained no provision as to 
the applicable law and since under Islamic Law the agreement would at least be 
partially void, as a result the arbitrator came to the reasoning that neither party 
intended Islamic Law to apply and the agreement was to be governed by the principles 
of justice, equity and good conscience.1191 Accordingly, the arbitrator stated: “I cannot 
think that the Ruler intended Islamic Law to apply to a contract upon which he intended 
to enter, under which he was to receive considerable sums of money, although Islamic 
Law would declare that the transaction was wholly or partially void.”1192 
Furthermore, the views that the internationalisation of investment contracts go beyond 
national frontiers has been recognised by the French civil courts.1193 Taking into 
consideration the special requirement of international commerce, they have allowed 
international settlements to be made in currencies other than the French franc even 
though French law required payment in French francs.1194 
In the case of Tresor Public v Galakis, the Cour de Cassation (court) concluded on the 
validity of the arbitration clauses between a French government enterprise and the 
foreign private party that these would have been void as a matter of internal law (article 
83, 1004 code of civil procedure), for the reason that investment contracts, made to the 
needs of maritime commerce, are not necessarily subject to the law of a specific 
state.1195 
Economic development agreements concluded between a State and a foreign private 
person are based on quite a different balance of power and interests and belong to a 
new and rapidly expanding domain of international law: The Law of Economic 





1191 18 I L R (1951), p. 149. 
1192 20 I L R (1953), 545. 
1193 Henri Batiffol, ‘Arbitration Clauses Concluded Between French Government Owned Enterprises and 
Foreign Private Parties’ (1968) 7 Colum. J. Transn. L. 32. 
1194 Cass May 17, 1927 (Pelissier du Besset v. Algiers Land and Warehouse Co.) 1927 Gaz. Pal. II, 153. 
1195 Cass May 2, 1966, Bull. Civ. I, 199. 
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There is a view that the internationalist advocates do not lay emphasis on the fact that 
international law should be used for a more reasonable interpretation of the agreement 
or for a better means of assessing the compatibility of the contracting sovereign State’s 
regulatory powers with the minimum standards of international law governing the 
treatment of foreigners within the jurisdiction. To a certain extent, the internationalists 
stress the need for such contracts to escape the comprehensive and continuing 
authority of the contracting State as an end in itself.1196 Thereafter, the general thesis 
began to appear that the parties, since they had the right to choose the systems of law 
to govern the settlement of disputes arising from the contract, may choose international 
law or the general principles of law as the law according to which disputes should be 
settled. Where there is no express provision to this effect, it has been argued that all 
clauses in the contract come under the like requirement that the proper law of the 
contract is international law. The objective of these claims was not to find a coherent 
system governing the contract but to exclude the possibility of changes in the national 
laws of the state affecting the contract. It goes without saying that it is the perception 
of many commentators that this undermines the authority of the contracting State’s 
domestic law to deal with the dispute, even in cases where the State’s own legal system 
functions to a very high standard. 
The current trend is that when international law is chosen in addition to or as a 
substitute for the law of the host State as the proper law of the contract between a 
State and a foreign private party, it would usually mean the applicability of the rules 
concerning State contract and other general principles of international law applicable to 
the State-alien contractual relationship.1197 It ought to, nevertheless, be noted that a 
few of general principles of international law claimed to be germane should apply 
mutatis mutandis, bearing in mind the sui generis character of investment agreements. 
There is a growing view in some quarters, and precisely so, that in the framework of 
 
1196 Sapphire Int’l Petroleum Ltd v National Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (1963). One reason given by the 
arbitrator for excluding the application of Iranian law in the Sapphire case was that the foreign company 
should be assured legal security. This could not be done since it was not within Iran’s power and that of 
its laws. 
1197 G Van Hecke, (1981) ‘Contracts Subject to International or Transnational Law’ in Hans Smit, Nina M 
Galston and Serge Levitsky (eds) International Contracts (New York 1981) 183; Richard M Buxbaum, ‘The 
Role of Public International Law in International Business Transactions,’ in J J Norton (ed) Public 
International Law and the Future World Order -- Liber Amicorum in Honor of A. J. Thomas, Jr.(Littleton, 
CO: Fred B Rothman & Co 1987); P F Kunzlik, ‘Public International Law – Cannot Govern a Contract, Can 
Authorize an Arbitration’ (1986) 45 Cambridge Law Journal 377. 
292 
 
concession agreements, at least certain general principles of international law such as 
pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus and those relating to remedies, principally 
specific performance, should be applied in a rather amended way, as opposed to their 
stricto sensu application, in the light of various up-and-coming notions such as 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and sustainable development.1198 It 
cannot be denied that in some recent important arbitration cases, however, this attitude 
towards the principles of pacta sunt servanda1199 and rebus sic stantibus1200 in the 
perspective of economic development agreements has echoed throughout, ultimately. In 
the midst of other general principles to which arbitral tribunals often have had to resort 
are: the autonomy of the will of the parties, the pactum de contrahendo,1201 abus de 
droit1202, the exceptio non adimpleti contractus1203, the adjustment of unjust 
enrichment,1204 and the duty of full disclosure.1205 At this point, the international 
corporation, with its superior indulgence and understanding of the industry and business 
connections, may have relevant material information at its disposal which it is under an 
obligation to disclose in good faith to its contractual partner, the less developed country, 
as it may have a bearing on its decision on the contractual matters. Consequently, this 





1198 Sornarajah (n 3); Sornarajah (n 7); A A Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (New 
York: Columbia University Press 1962) 136; It states “any law of contracts, national or international, is 
bound to start with this principle (pacta sunt servanda). But it cannot stop there”; Troy E. Elder, ‘The 
Case Against Arbitral Awards of Specific Performance in Transnational Commercial Disputes’ (1997) 13 
Arb. Int’l L; Stephen J Toope, Mixed International Arbitration - Studies in Arbitration Between States and 
Private Persons. (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, An Imprint of Cambridge University Press 1990)165-68. 
1199 Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran [1987] 15 
Iran U S C T R [189], [242]-[43]; Aminoil v Kuwait [1982] 21 I L M 976, 1024. 
1200 Aminoil paras. 97.98.98.100, Mobil Oil Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.3 (1987-111). Sournarajah (n 
1080) 108-112, 133-35; Abba Kolo and Thomas W. Walde, ‘Renegotiation and Contract Adoption in 
International Investment Projects: Applicable Legal Principle and Industry Practices’ (2000) 5 I. J. World 
Investment 41. 
1201 Government of Kuwait v American Independent Oil Co [1984] 66 I.L.R. [518], [575]. 
1202 Libyan Oil v. Govt. of the Libyan Republic [1977] 2 I L M 1, [196]; BP v Govt of the Libyan Republic 
[1974] 53 I L R [297], [330]. 
1203 The ICSID ‘Klockner v Cameroon: The Duties of Partners in North-South Economic Development 
Agreements’ (1984) International Journal International Arbitration 145, 157; Jan Paulson, ‘Third World 
Participation in International Investment Arbitration’ (1987) 2 Foreign Investment L.J. 21. See also 
Redfern. I C S I D – Losing its Appeal, 3 Int’l. Arb. 98 (1987); Banque de Montreal v. Bail L [1992] 2Rcs 
[554]. 
1204 Liamco v Libya [1981] 20 1 196; Kuwait v Aminoil [1982] 21 I L M 976 [565]. 
1205 Klockner v. Cameroon (n 664) 3; Paulsson (n 1080) 145; See also Alan Redfern, ‘I.C.S.I.D. – Losing 
its Appeal?’ (1987) 3 Arb Int’l 98; Banque de Montreal v Bail [1992] 2 RCS [554]. 
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mighty, well-informed and scheming international corporations in their contractual 
relationships1206. 
The findings of the ICSID arbitration Klockner v. Cameroon1207 on the issue merits 
citation in extenso as follows: 
“The tribunal’s reasoning and observation underscore the need to protect 
an underdeveloped and politically weary country by imposing the duty of 
full disclosure on multinationals, which is ever so more important – here 
and now in the age of technological innovation and progress to the 
advantage of multinationals and their parent countries and also in the wake 
of ever-growing movements towards globalisation and liberalisation. By 
developing such principles or rules based on international political justice, 
IDL can provide an answer to such tensions of the unwary vulnerable 
peoples, though not of their governments on some occasions.” 
6.5 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS THE APPLICABLE LAW 
 
In the middle of the last century, due to a lacuna in the legal regulation of investment 
agreements, some commentators put forward proposals as to how the gap might be 
bridged. That lacuna resulted in part from the inadequacy of some of the primitive 
domestic law systems to cope with the intricacies of modern commercial life. As a result, 
there was an unwillingness, certainly on the part of the transnational companies, to 
select the domestic law as the law governing the transaction and this has been 
evidenced by provisions in many agreements for the submission of disputes to 
arbitration applying, for instance, legal principles familiar to civilised nations.1208 The 
notion that an economic development agreement can be governed by general principles 
of law was enunciated by Lord McNair. He argues that the general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations is the system of law to be applied to these agreements 




1206 Maniruzzaman (n 1171) 47. 
1207 The ICSID (n 1086) 157. 
1208 H G Calvert, ‘The Law Applicable To Concessions’ (1959) I.U. Malaya L.Rev 265. 
1209 McNair (n 1127). 
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A good number of economic development agreements consist of provisions which 
specify the application of one of the general principles such as goodwill and good faith, 
or the application of the principles of law common to the contracting parties and in the 
absence of such common principles after that, by and in accordance with the principles 
of law recognised by civilised nations in general.1210 
This is also the view of article 39 of the agreement concluded between the Sheikh of 
Kuwait and the Arabian Oil Company of Japan of 1958, which first refers to the 
principles of goodwill and good faith. It subsequently provided for the application of law 
common to Kuwait and Japan and, in the absence of such common principles, after that 
in conformity with the principles of law by and large recognised by civilised states in 
general, as well as those which have been applied by international tribunals. 
The general principles of law have been long-established by the international arbitration 
cases. Most of these cases deal with oil concessions. In the Arbitration between Arabian 
American Oil Company (Aramco) and the Government of Saudi Arabia, the tribunal came 
to the conclusion that: 
“Matters pertaining to private law are in principle governed by the law of 
Saudi Arabia, but with one important reservation. That law must, in case of 
need be interpreted or supplemented by the general principles of law, by 
the custom and practice in the oil business and by notion of pure 
jurisprudence, in particular whenever certain rights which must inevitably be 
recognised to the concessionaire if the concession is not to be deprived of 
substance would not be secured in an unquestionable manner by the law in 
force in Saudi Arabia.”1211 
Furthermore, a number of legal luminaries have attempted to separate the rules from 
which they can extract the general principles of the internal legal systems. Nevertheless, 
these attempts have failed in identifying such principles. This is because it is not for 




1210 Calvert (n 1208) 265. 
1211 Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) (1969) 27 International Law Report 215. 
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matter. Therefore, some of those jurists hold the view that these principles are just 
general suggestions which consider the basis of different legal systems.1212 
It is often easy to demonstrate that arguments based on general principles are intended 
to support an a priori assumption of writers using them. General principles of law have 
been used extensively by arbitration tribunals in extracting principles applicable to 
investment contracts. Given that there is an orderly pattern in their use by arbitral 
tribunals and standards have been built based on past awards identifying general 
principles, the existence of some general principles, sanctified by long acceptance within 
arbitral jurisprudence, cannot be denied. However, tribunals have used general 
principles in a manner which may not be acceptable to States. They have often selected 
rules that favour the promotion of investment protection and which are detrimental to 
the interests of the host State. This result can be explained only on the basis that the 
present arbitral system is inclined towards investment protection rather than towards 
the acknowledgement of norms that may favour developing states.1213 
 
The most important is the norm relating to the sanctity of contract. This norm denies 
the right of the State to change a foreign investment contract unilaterally. The 
conception of sanctity of contract is stated to be a general principle of law. 
Nevertheless, the principle is taken from nineteenth-century systems of contract law 
which stressed freedom of contract and the bargain struck because of the exercise of 
this freedom. The attrition of this doctrine forms the basis of the modern developments 
in the law of contract.1214 Up till now, developments which undermine the notion of 
sanctity of contract have been ignored and it is acknowledged as a rule of international 
law, to the exclusion of the exceptions that undermine it in domestic contract 
systems.1215 Several jurists have endeavoured to specify rules from which they can 
extract the general principles of the internal legal systems. Nevertheless, these efforts 
 
1212 E Langen, Transnational Commercial Law (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1973) 33. In Mohammed 
Alwan, ‘The Legal Regime of Oil Exploitation in the Arab Countries: A Study in the International Economic 
Agreements Kuwait’ (1982) 324. 
1213 For an interesting sociological work which considers the neutrality of arbitration and the possibility  
that arbitrators, particularly in the arbitration of foreign investment disputes, may show obvious 
prejudices; see Yves Dezalay and Garth Bryant, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration 
and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago Series in Law and Society, University of 
Chicago Press 1996). 
1214 Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract (Oxford University Press 1979). 
1215 Sornarajah (n 3) 94. 
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have been thwarted in stipulating such principles. As previously mentioned, this is 
because it is not for internal legislation in different countries to agree on an applicable 
ruling in any precise theme. Consequently, some of those jurists have arrived at the 
view that these no general principles can be stipulated, other than in the form of 
general suggestions which consider the origins of different legal systems. 
6.5.1 The Application of Domestic Law 
 
The proper law of a State contract is usually the domestic law of the contracting State. 
In such an instance, the contracting State may disappoint the expectations of an 
investor in a number of ways. It may refuse to honour obligations owed according to  
the local law. Within broad limits, contracting parties are free to choose the law that will 
govern their agreement.1216 The application of domestic law has been adopted by a 
number of government contracts concluded with foreign investors. For instance, the 
choice of law clause approved in the mining contract between the Democratic Republic 
of the Sudan and the Japanese Group of 1976 unequivocally states in Article 12 that: 
“This Agreement shall be governed by and constructed in all respects in 
accordance with the law of the Sudan. Sudanese courts shall have 
jurisdiction to determine any matter arising from the Agreement.”1217 
There are, however, exceptions to these rules. In a number of cases, the law of the 
State of the foreign investor or any national law other than the host State’s law is 
chosen as the law applicable to the agreement between the State and the foreign 






1216 For instance, in TOPCO Arbitration 53 I. L.R. 389,442 (1977). An introductory question in most of the 
petroleum arbitration is which conflict of laws rules the arbitrator should apply in determining the 
substantive law that governs the dispute. There are two probable ways. In the first instance, the 
arbitrator could look into the conflict of laws rules in force at the seat of the tribunal. On the other hand, 
an arbitrator could apply the conflict of laws rules that he deems appropriate, without necessarily 
regarding the site of the arbitration, in the light of the circumstances of the case, so as to give effect to 
the will of the parties. 
1217’Abdallah El-Sheikh Fath El-Rahman, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and 
Saudi Arabia (2nd edition Cambridge University Press 2003) 241. See also Articles 21, 22 of the contract 
between Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (a national Argentine oil company) and Pan American 
International Oil Company of 1957. 
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the Government of Kuwait postulates the laws of England in the governing and 
construction of the contract.1218 
The application of the domestic law of the contracting State can be dictated by the 
intention of the private foreign party. As Garcia Amador observes: 
“Learned opinion and practice are agreed that contracts made between the 
Government of a State and an alien are governed, so far as their conclusion 
and performance are concerned, by the domestic law of that State and not 
by public international law.”1219 
It has been further remarked that, “a private person who enters into a contract with a 
foreign government ipso facto agrees to be bound by the local law with respect to all 
the legal consequences which may flow from that contract.”1220 As a result, the rules of 
private international law, which may call for the application of the lex rei sitae, lex loci 
contractus, or the lex executionis to determine the choice of the proper law of the 
contract, will lead to the application of the domestic law of the contracting State.1221 
 
Furthermore, the application of the national law to the contract between a State and 
private foreign investor can be based on practical considerations, e.g. the duty of the 
State concerned to serve the social and economic welfare of its people. This view is 
fairly evident in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (xvii) of 14 
December 19621222 and the UN Resolution 2185 (xxi) of 25 November 19661223 on the 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
From the perspective of the developing countries the preferred choice of law clause is 
one which provides that all disputes are to be settled in accordance with the law of the 
host State. It remains a fact, however, that a number of governments, particularly in 
1218 Basic Oil Law and Concession Contracts (Middle East) Supplement No. LXVI (66), pp. 25, 29. 
1219 F.V. Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur (1993) DOCUMENT A/CN.4/106 
International responsibility. Second report by F V Garcia Amador, ‘Responsibility of the State for Injuries 
Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens. Part I: Acts and Omissions’ 2 J. Transnat’l & 
Pol’y,23. 
1220 Amador Garcia and Edwin Borchard, ‘Contractual Claims in International Law’ (1913) 13 Columbia Law 
Review 460. 
1221 Mansour Al-Saeed, ‘Legal Protection of Economic Development Agreements’ (2002) 17 Arab. L. Q. 
172. 
1222 The General Assembly adopted the Resolution by 87 votes to 2 with 12 abstentions. 
1223 The General Assembly adopted the Resolution by 104 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions. 
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the early periods of oil exploration on their territory, have sometimes agreed to the law 
of the investor’s home jurisdiction.1224 In general, major natural-resource agreements 
provide for some wholly or partially internationalised choice of law.1225 It would appear 
that in the case where the particular formulation applies the law of the host country 
generally, it nonetheless provides that international law shall apply whenever there is a 
lacuna in the host State’s legislation. Another form of internationalisation, less 
appropriate to developing countries, applies international law or general principles of 
law whenever that law conflicts with the law of the host country.1226 
It is sometimes suggested that where a State contract is governed by the local domestic 
law as a proper law, there cannot in the juridical nature of things be any question of a 
claim on the contract arising at international law; the contract is created in and subsists 
in the local law and it ineluctably follows that it may be terminated in the local law 
whether by legislation or by some otherwise lawful process. 
Maniruzzaman argues that contracts between a State and a transnational corporation  
for the exploitation of mineral resources situated in the State are governed by public 
international law. It is therefore contended that the terms of such contract cannot be 
unilaterally changed by the legislation of the State. They further contend that such a 
change amounts to a breach of contract. The emergent fact is that the change of 
itself1227or because of the later denial of justice by the domestic system of the State 
would be a violation of international law.1228 The methods by which these countries try 
to exclude the possibility of a choice of law in contracts with foreign investors consist of 
either requiring a national organisation to assume the legal person of the foreign 
business enterprise (for example, partnerships or corporations) or stating expressly that 
the national legal order will govern all disputes. 
 
 
1224 See Kuwait Oil Co. Concessionary Agreement, Dec. 23, 
1225 Private International Law 
1226 Another form of internationalisation, less appropriate to developing countries, applies international law 
or general principles of law whenever that law conflicts with the law of the host country. See A F M 
Maniruzzaman, ‘State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist versus Dualist Controversies’ 
(2001) 12 EJIL 309-328. 
1227 See discussion in A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘State Contracts with Aliens: The Question of Unilateral 





The practice of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in granting oil exploration and 
prospecting licenses and leases provides for arbitration of disputes (except over those 
matters expressly excluded or said to be at the discretion of the Minister or 
Commissioner) and states that the lease or license “shall be governed and construed in 
accordance with the laws of Nigeria and Nigerian law shall be the proper law hereof”. 
Since 1968, all foreign enterprises, whether established in Nigeria before or after 1968, 
are required to be incorporated under Nigerian Law. This requirement makes all foreign 
enterprises, enterprises in Nigeria, Nigerian nationals being subject, of course, to 
Nigerian laws. 
The Nigerian Petroleum Decree, 1969, which regulates the oil industry, vests in Nigeria 
the ownership and control of all petroleum and provides that licenses or leases to 
explore, prospect and mine petroleum “may be granted only to (a) a citizen of Nigeria, 
or (b) a company incorporated in Nigeria under the Companies Decree 1968 or any 
corresponding law. Since only Nigerians can engage in the petroleum industry, it follows 
that there can be no possibility for a choice of law clause in oil agreements. 
The perseverance of the developing countries on the application of their own laws to 
agreements with foreign investors has been basically aggravated by the directives of the 
many natural resources producer organisations. For example, the OPEC guidelines for 
petroleum policy in member countries direct that: 
Except as otherwise provided for in the legal system of a Member country, 
all disputes arising between the Government and operators shall fall 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent national courts or the 
specialised regional courts, as and when established.1229 
A further example is decision 24 of the Andean Commission,1230 made December 31, 
1970, according to which foreign investment agreements by member countries shall not 
 
 
1229  Declaratory policy of the in member countries, OPEC Res. XVI.90.reprinted in (1968) 7 Int’l Legal Mat’l 
s1183. 
1230 Andean Commission Dec. 24, the Andean Pact Nations – Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and 
Venezuela – declared in Commission Decision 24 that “[n]o instrument concerning foreign investments or 
transfer of techniques shall include clauses which withdraw possible differences of controversies from the 
national jurisdiction of the recipient country, or which permit subrogation by the governments of the 
shares or rights of their national investors”. Standard regime for Treatment of Foreign Capitals [sic] and 
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include clauses which “withdraw possible differences or controversies from the national 
jurisdiction of the beneficiary country.”1231 In view of the fact that in 1966, the several 
United Nations resolutions on permanent sovereignty of States over their natural 
resources highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of local law, these have also been 
prominent in supporting the developing countries to be resolute that all their 
agreements with private foreign investors be governed by local law. 
Under the positive law, existing State contracts are usually subject to domestic law. 
Their breach is a breach of domestic law and will not cause the offending State to be 
wrong-footed when viewed from an international perspective, except in a situation 
where the breach is followed by a denial of justice in the local courts. As a result of this, 
a breach of a State contract is therefore not per se an internationally unlawful act. It is 
often the case that those people who conceive it as such are putting forward views de 
lege ferenda and that such views are not desirable on policy grounds. 
The policy consideration that is by and large adduced in sustaining such views is that 
the developing countries need foreign investment, while such investment will not be 
forthcoming except if it is assured. It has been suggested that the developing countries’ 
acceptance of the international legal character of State contracts will encourage the flow 
of foreign investment into such countries. 
On reflection, however, it should become apparent that the doctrine of 
internationalisation in this particular form is not the only way by which the protection of 
the contractual rights of the foreign investor can be realised. Apart from the protection 
of the foreign investor’s rights, there is also the need for a State to retain control over 
its economy. The fact is that a State may wish to bargain away its regulatory power and 
this is done by agreeing to the internationalisation of its contract with the foreign 
investor. The best way of making it equitable is that the domestic law should be 
developed to achieve fairness to foreign investors and to provide them with as much 
security as possible within the framework of the domestic law. In other words, the 
responsibility of public international law should be that of watchdog and, as a result, it 
 
for Treatment of Marks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, Andean Comm’n Dec. 24, art. 51(1970), 
reprinted in (1971) 10 Int’l Legal Mat’ls 152, 166. 
1231 Andean Commission Dec. 24, Ibid art 51. 
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should be able to enforce and develop the supervisory function that it inherently 
contains. 
There are two clear opinions at the extreme ends of this dispute of the law applicable to 
economic development agreements namely: Some proclaim the application of the 
domestic law of the contracting State to be appropriate, in order to support the 
developing host country’s position in its relationship with foreign investors and so that 
the host State shall have the right to modify its contract according to its public interest; 
while others seek to see entrenched the application of international law in order to 
internationalise the contract and thus widen the scope of international responsibility in 
case the contracting State breaches the contract. In listing the advantages of resorting 
to international law, it has been noted that the State party to the contract and to the 
litigation, may have no law of contracts, and no commercial law capable of meeting the 
demands of modern-day trade relations. This argument, however, does not really hold 
water and should, as a rule, be ignored. This is because most of the developing 
countries, including Arab countries, have a fully developed legal system of contract and 
commercial law which could be applicable in the case of contracting parties who do not 
intend to “delocalise” or “internationalise” their agreements. 
It can be concluded that if economic development agreements in general are subject to 
the domestic law of a contracting state, the contracting country is not the sole judge of 
the legality of its measures and domestic law is not the only relevant body of law. 
There is no denying that the subjugation of economic development agreements to the 
domestic law of the contracting state is unavoidable. Such law would have to be in 
accordance with international obligations, or at least such general principles of 
international law as may be applicable to such agreements until such time as a 
“Transnational Law” is developed which could be used to resolve the sometimes- 
complicated problems arising from such agreements. Thus, a contracting State’s latitude 
to take unilateral action with respect to its agreements will not be taken into 
consideration, since international law will be the legal order within which the domestic 
law must operate and to which it must conform. 
It is submitted that transnational law, already considered as a separate legal system, 
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may contribute to the knotty problems of overcoming the main obstacles to entering 
into a contract with a government, especially regarding the fear of private foreign 
investors with respect to a change of law in the contracting country in order to evade its 
contractual obligations. 
Finally, there is a growing recognition that concepts such as the denial of justice 
doctrine and the minimum standard for the treatment of aliens can serve as yardsticks 
of international law by which the standard of the domestic law of a host state can be 
evaluated.1232 
6.6 STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In recent modern investment agreements, in addition to the choice of law clause, there 
is usually a specific commitment on the part of the host country not to alter the terms of 
the agreement, either by legislation or by any other means without the consent of the 
other contracting party. The obligations embodied in these clauses create a special 
stipulation from the viewpoint of State responsibility.1233 
Many of the rules of State responsibility are known to have originated in the relationship 
between the United States and Latin America. In fact, early rules of diplomatic 
protection were formulated in response to circumstances of injuries suffered by US 
citizens in Latin American countries. Basic underlying principles were sought, and rules 
of State responsibility arrived at for injuries to aliens are now contained in the body of 
international law which seeks to enshrine a standard of treatment for aliens who enter 
states for various reasons including the carrying on of business. However, they create a 
liability on the host State for failing to observe the prescribed standard in the treatment 
of aliens. 
It is a settled principle of law that an alien who leaves his State carries with him the 
protection of his State. The theory of State responsibility for injuries to aliens’ rests on 
the idea that an injury to the alien is an injury to his home State. In consequence, 
resistance of nations on this point in law revolved around the insufficiency of personality 
 
1232 Date-Bah (n 1019) 249. 




in the alien to take up his case in an international debate.1234 The fiction, however, 
involved an emphasis on the link of nationality between the alien and his State and the 
notion of the injury caused to the State through the intermediary of the alien as a result 
of this link. This was the issue that was deliberated upon in the case of Peeves v 
Saldutiskis1235 and the Permanent Court of International Justice explained the position of 
the law in this way: “In taking up the case of one of its nationals, by resorting to 
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality 
asserting its own right to ensure in the person of its national’s respect for the rules of 
international law. This right is necessarily limited to intervention on behalf of its own 
nationals because in the absence of special agreement, it is the bond of nationality 
between the State and the individual which alone confers upon it the right of diplomatic 
protection, and it is as part of the diplomatic protection that the right to take up a claim 
and to ensure respect for the rules of international law must be envisaged.” 
Some text writers are of the view that the development of these principles is based on 
unexceptional sources.1236 There is general recognition that there is State responsibility 
for direct wrongs done to aliens. Hitherto, there has been substantial tension caused 
between developed and developing States as to the application of the rules of State 
responsibility and diplomatic protection in the area of foreign investment. There is a 
growing controversy amongst commentators that has principally been focused on the 
standard of treatment to be accorded to the alien. The developed states have 
maintained that aliens must be treated according to an international minimum standard, 






1234 Sornarajah (n 3) 138. 
1235 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (1939) Series A/B No.76, 16. 
1236 The basis is that the principles are constructed through 1) Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case 
[1929] PCIL series A No. 2, 12, the Court came to the conclusion that a State asserts its own rights when 
it espouses the cause of its nationals 2) Paneveezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case [1939] series A/B No.76, 
where the need for the link of nationality between the State and the national whose right was taken up 
was stressed; and lastly, the Chorzow Factory Case (1928) PCIL series A, No. 17. In this case, the 
reasoning of the Court was that the restitution as the basis of damages for the wrong done to the  
national through the violation of treaty rights was reiterated. 
1237 Edwin Borchard, ‘The Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens’ (1940) 38 Mich LR 445; Andreas 
Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Law as Applied to Aliens (Leiden: W Sijthoff 1949). 
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The subsistence of this minimum standard is asserted in investment treaties. Modern 
arbitral awards have also recognised that there are minimum standards to which the 
host State should conform in its treatment of foreign investors.1238 The minimum 
standard is an external standard which has enabled developed states to introduce 
standards of treatment that they expected for their foreign investors but which 
developing states may find it difficult to satisfy. The failure to conform to the minimum 
standard of treatment creates a cause of action against the violating State.1239 
This position was clearly stated in the Neers Claim1240 and the Roberts Claim.1241 The 
formulation in the Neers claim was that to constitute an international delinquency vis-à- 
vis the national, the treatment of an alien should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to 
wilful neglect of duty or to an insufficiency of government action so far short of 
international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would recognise its 
insufficiency. 
The extension of the idea to the property of the alien was not the focal point of these 
early cases. Such an extension came much later and became the foundation for building 
up a law on the protection of foreign investment. Accordingly, a powerful method was 
created which could be used to exercise influence in the securing of the interests of 
developed States and their foreign investors. This system, developed in customary 
practice, is now stated in treaties. 
However, some developing countries have maintained that an alien is entitled, at the 
most, to the same treatment as the citizens of the host State. The glory days of a joint 
position being adopted by developing countries arrived when the resolutions associated 
with the New International Economic Order were being debated in the 1970s.1242 The 
Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States was articulated in clear terms.1243 
Furthermore, subsequent to the decolonisation of the African and Asian States, 
developed States adopted the view taken by the United States concerning the rule that 
 
1238 American Machine Tools v Zaire ICSID Rpts 11. 
1239 Sornarajah (n 3) 140. 
1240 L.F.H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States [The Neer Claim] (1926) 4 RIAA 60. 
1241 Harry Roberts (U.S.A.) v United Mexican States [The Roberts Claim] (1926) 4 RIAA 77. 
1242 Sornarajah (n 3) 140. 
1243 Article 2(2) (c) of the charter, which contains, in effect, a restatement of the Calvo doctrine. 
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there was a minimum standard of treatment for alien property. In the midst of the 
ending of colonialism, there was a need to ensure that there was a rule-based system of 
foreign investment protection, because force could no longer be used to settle disputes 
as in the earlier period. These newly independent states, like the Latin American States, 
had denied the subsistence of a rule directing a minimum standard of treatment. Asian 
and African states joined in by contesting the validity of the rule. A number of 
commentators from developing countries have even questioned the very existence of a 
law on State responsibility in customary international law.1244 The most forceful 
challenges to the perspective of the developed countries have been mounted by the 
Latin American writers, who contend that the aliens had only the rights and privileges 
enjoyed by the nationals of the developing country and as a result are only able to seek 
enforcement of such rights before that country’s national courts. 
It would seem that the main purpose of the minimum standard rule was the protection 
of the lives and liberty of aliens in situations of turmoil that occurred in some States or 
at the hands of corrupt officials. If it had been used exclusively for such purposes, there 
could have been justification for it, but instead, it became the basis for a system of 
foreign investment protection which could curb the institution of economic reform by the 
developing countries. 
The Harvard Research Study in International Law on the topic of the Responsibility of 
States stated that there were numerous cases “where the arbitrary annulment of a 
contract by the Executive without appeal to the courts was held to justify diplomatic 
interposition and to render the State responsible.” 
There is growing support for the position that the legality of a questioned State action 
may be made to depend upon the issue of whether the State involved is willing to 
submit such a question to judicial determination. One of the earliest examples is the 
provision of Article 1 of The Hague Convention (No. 2) respecting the Limitation of the 
Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts. This article embodies the so- 
called Porter Proposition and provides that a State may not use force to recover contract 
debts owed its nationals by another state unless “the Debtor State refuses or neglects to 
 
1244 Guha-Roy, ‘Is the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International 
Law?’ (1961) 55 AJLI 863. 
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reply to an offer of arbitration, or after accepting the offer, prevents any compromise 
from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration, any judicial settlement.” 
 
Garcia-Amador, F.V. has suggested that the traditional position must be approached first 
in the light of modern juridical development. It is evident that the said position was 
taken with regard to ordinary State contracts and bearing in mind the law governing 
such contractual relationships. As a result, given the different character of investment 
agreements and of the obligations contained therein, it is only natural that the 
traditional position is no longer the right approach to State responsibility. The right view, 
as far as ordinary contractual relationships are concerned, is that in fact they are 
exclusively governed by the domestic law of the contracting State, such that a mere 
breach will not engage the latter in any international responsibility; for international 
responsibility to come into play, the occurrence of a denial of justice, or of some other 
wrongful act or arbitrary state conduct, must be required1245 which then brings to bear a 
different scenario. If there is a breach of contract to which a government is a party, it is 
normally the case that in international law no issue of State responsibility can arise 
unless the foreign national has exhausted his local remedies.1246 If he is prevented from 
doing so, or if the court is intimidated or otherwise suborned, the issue is not directly 
concerned with breach of contract as such, but turns on the extent to which 
international law can provide a remedy for a denial of justice.1247 In any event, in the 
context of a mining concession, this is not generally the contingency against which the 
foreign investor is concerned to protect himself. As suggested, the contractual 
obligations of the government may be discharged or modified by an exercise of the 
 
1245 F V Garcia-Amador, ‘State Responsibility in Case of "Stabilization" Clauses’ (1993) 2 J.Transnat'l L. & 
Policy 23. 
1246 States can, and in the context of agreements providing for international arbitration frequently do, 
waive the rule requiring an aggrieved party to exhaust his local remedies. On the rule generally see 
Brownlie (n 1134) 482-492; D P O’Connell, International Law (2nd edition, London: Stevens 1970) 1053- 
1059; J E S Fawcett, ‘The exhaustion of local remedies: substance or procedure?’ (1954) 31 B.Y.I.L. 452- 
458; C F Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (London: Clarendon Press; Oxford 
University Press) 169-269. 
1247Here the term “denial of justice” is used, broadly speaking, in the sense given to it by Art, 9 of the 
Harvard Draft Convention on State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens – 23 Am. J. Int, Law Special 
Supplement p. 173 viz. “A State is responsible if an injury to an alien results from a denial of justice. 
Denial of justice exists when there is a denial, unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to the courts, 
gross deficiency in the administration of judicial or remedial process, failure to provide those guarantees 
which are generally considered indispensable to the proper administration of justice or a manifestly unjust 
judgment. An error of a national court which does not produce manifest injustice is not a denial of 
justice.” The concept of “manifest injustice,” of course, gives rise to elusive problems of definition. 
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legislative competence of the State. If such an event occurs, the contract as originally 
agreed between the parties no longer exists, and remedies for breach of it may not be 
strictly in point.1248 
Another question that readily comes to mind is what the situation will be if the State, by 
the exercise of its legislative sovereignty, discharges or modifies its contractual 
obligations. Opinions on this issue are completely divided and what then emerges as 
decisions of international tribunals on the central point are inconclusive, or open to 
diverse interpretations.1249 
Furthermore, in a situation where there is expropriation without payment of appropriate 
compensation or if the legislation is discriminatory, it then follows that the foreign 
investor may accordingly invoke the protection of its own State. In the perspective of a 
mining concession, if laws are enacted which abrogate the concession and terminate the 
right to mine, it invariably means that expropriation has taken place. 
Amongst the circumstances indicating whether such annulment is arbitrary, or, as we 
have previously defined the issue, whether the termination of a concession agreement 
by a State is in fact an exercise of a claimed contractual right, is the willingness of such 
State to submit the issues leading to such termination to arbitration, in violation of an 
arbitration clause in the concession agreement. This has been held to create 
international responsibility to the State of the concessionaire. 
The right to rely upon arbitration as a means for the solution of difficulties arising out of 
the contractual relationships of the parties has, among other forces, led to the creation 
of a type of “living law” of the contract that the parties will, first of all, negotiate in good 




1248 R Brown, ‘Choice of Law Provisions in Concessions and Related Contracts’ (1976) 39 Modern Law Rev. 
625. 
1249It must be noted, however, that there are no well-settled and generally accepted international rules 
regarding State measures affecting the contractual rights of aliens. Not only commentators but States and 
international tribunals as well differ in their views on the law in effect. The fact is that the difference in 
opinion extends both to lex lata, the legal rules held to be effective, and to the lex ferenda the law which 
according to the particular views of each state or person ought to exist. These controversies, far from 
being merely theoretical disputes, are of real practical importance and have far-reaching effects on the life 
and relations of nations. See also Fatouros. (n 1173) 244. 
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When such negotiation fails, then the arbitral process is always available and, usually 
under the contract, it becomes the duty of the parties to resort to arbitration to settle 
their difference. The measurement of compensation for nationalised foreign-owned 
property has been justly called one of the most “intractable issues of contemporary 
law.”1250 As a starting point it can safely be said that the nationalising State owes some 
compensation to the foreign investor who suffers the expropriation.1251 Controversy 
arises in the attempt to find accepted standards for determining how much 
compensation the expropriating government should pay. Again, the two opposite 
positions are represented by classic international law in the form of the Hull Rule,1252 
and the position of Third World nations embodied in article 2(c) of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, also called the Calvo rule.1253 The Hull Rule calls 
for “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation, which means that the investor 
deserves compensation which takes account not only of the updated value of the 
physical assets, but also the loss of expected earnings. Another account of the classic 
position is that the investor should receive the fair market value of its investment.1254 
The developing countries, however, claim that apposite compensation should be 
calculated on the basis of the net book value, i.e., the value of the assets as registered 
in the company’s books for tax purposes.1255 There is no denying the fact that most 
States have not been content to accept compensation for their nationals simply by 
relying on the Cordell Hull formula requiring States nationalising aliens’ property for 
public purposes and without discrimination to pay prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. Some capital exporting countries, particularly the United States, have 
 
1250 D R Weigel & B H Weston, ‘Valuation Upon the Deprivation of Foreign Enterprise: A Policy-Oriented 
Approach to the Problem of Compensation Under International Law’ in Valuation of Nationalized Property 
in International Law (R. Lillich ed. 1975) 49, 54. [hereinafter cited as Valuation of Nationalized Property]; 
1251  M H Muller, ‘Compensation for Nationalisation: A North South Dialogue’ (1981) 19 Colum. J. Transnat’l 
L. 35, 37; R Dolzer, ‘New Foundation of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property’ (1981), 75 Am. J.  Int’l 
L. 553, 557-58. Professor Dolzer emphasizes the evolution of the rules governing compensation. It may 
be preferable to distinguish the three aspects of nationalisation (general requirements of international 
law, contractual relations and compensation). (Only one part of Hull’s concept is confirmed, i.e., that 
compensation must be paid for expropriated alien property as a matter of international law”); 
1252 Cordell Hull who was the Secretary of State during the Mexican expropriation of 1938, stated in a 
letter to his Mexican counterpart, which has come to be the standard ever since. This standard has been 
espoused by the United Nations and has been referred to as the Hull doctrine of compensation. Dolzer, 
ibid 557-58. 
1253 The doctrine is associated with Carlos Calvo, an eminent Latin American jurist and diplomat. 
1254 The Valuation of Nationalized Property (n 1250) 95. 
1255 Girvan, N. Expropriating the Expropriators: Compensation Criteria from a Third World Viewpoint, in 3 
Valuation of Nationalized Property (n 1250). 
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always discouraged expropriation and, unlike several developing countries, indeed such 
measures have been accompanied by partial or no compensation, while lump sum 
compensation agreements have acquired the character of customary international law. 
Indisputably, there is no international law compelling a State to allow private foreign 
investment. Apart from a treaty, there is no right of establishment.1256 However, once  
an establishment has taken place, indeed once an investment in a property has been 
acquired by an alien, if public property requires that that such a property be acquired, 
then the owner must be paid compensation. Cheng commented: 
“The rationale of compensation for expropriation consists in the fact that 
certain individuals in a community, or certain categories of individual, 
without their being in any way at fault, are being asked to make a sacrifice 
of their property for the general welfare of the community, when other 
members of the community are not making corresponding sacrifices. The 
compensation paid to the owners of the property taken represents precisely 
the corresponding contribution made by the rest of the community in order 
to equalise the financial incidence of this taking of private property.”1257 
The popular view is that in the event of expropriation or the taking of property owned 
by aliens, various United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources have reiterated that doubt is cast not only on the 
obligation of the taking States to pay compensation; these resolutions obviously also 
support the position that the quantum of compensation is solely within the sovereign 
jurisdiction of the taking States rather than a matter subject to international legal 
standards.1258 On the other hand, some commentators argue that some foreign 
investors have always maintained that measures unilaterally enacted to provide a better 
investment climate can easily be unilaterally revoked. Thus, some capital exporting 
countries have negotiated bilateral treaties for the mutual protection of the national 
 
1256 For conditions under which aliens have the right to be acquiring property, see Adeoye A Akinsanya, 
The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third World, (New York: Praeger 1980) 191-197. 
1257 B Cheng, ‘The Rationale of Compensation for Expropriation’ (1959) 44 Grotius Society Transactions 
267. 
1258 Adeoye A Akinsanya, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources and the Future of Foreign 
Investment’ (1979) 5 Nigerian Journal of International Affairs 70-92; Adeoye A Akinsanya, ‘The United 
Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States’ (1980) 30 EGRIL 51-99. 
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concerned and for recourse to international arbitration, while international measures 
have been and are being taken to promote and protect direct investment in developing 
countries. 
It would appear that where diplomatic representations or negotiations have failed to 
resolve investment disputes, there has been recourse to covert or overt intervention to 
obtain compensation and restore the status quo ante. For instance, the United States to 
a large extent and United Kingdom have actively intervened secretly or openly on behalf 
of their nationals involved in investment disputes abroad. It is important to note that 
such intervention could be direct, or proxy intervention as occurred in Iran (1954), 
Egypt (1956), and Cuba (1961), following expropriations in these countries.1259 
Furthermore, there have been instances where non-recognition or rupture of diplomatic 
relations has followed expropriations. Consequently, after the unsuccessful military 
intervention in the Soviet Union by the Western European powers following large-scale 
expropriation of private property, the United States of America and a number of 
countries including Belgium, Holland and Switzerland withheld diplomatic recognition of 
the Soviet Union. Another case in point is Cuba after the expropriation of most of the 
properties that were owned by aliens, especially citizens of the United States  of 
America. Further, following much closer cooperation with the Soviet Union, the United 
States took steps not only to withdraw diplomatic recognition of Cuba but, in January 
1961, also terminated diplomatic and consular relationships with that country.1260 In 
some other instances, capital-exporting countries, notably the United States and United 
Kingdom, have taken measures or enacted legislation which they believed would ensure 
that their nationals would receive “fair treatment” in respect of their acquired rights or 
assets. These measures included: suspension of bilateral foreign aid programmes in the 
taking States; denial of trade preferential treatment; blocking or freezing of the assets 
and bank accounts of the taking States and their nationals in the investor States; and 
voting against loan applications by the taking States in multilateral financial institutions 
or State-owned financial institutions. 
1259 Adeoye A Akinsanya, Multinationals in a changing environment: a study of business-government 
relations in the Third World (New York, Praeger 1984) 252-306; it is important to note that Western 
European States intervened militarily in the former Soviet Union following large scale expropriation of 




Regrettably, these measures have proved to be ineffective. They have neither deterred 
nor prevented expropriations, nor have they ensured compensation. In essence, they 
have been counter-productive. Neither has judicial examination of the validity of foreign 
expropriations been an effective remedy for obtaining compensation. 
Furthermore, the raison d’être for international protection in developing countries would 
appear to be not only because of the damage to the investment climate as a result of a 
rash of expropriations, revocation of contractual agreements or “creeping” 
expropriations, but also because measures taken or legislation by investor States aimed 
at ensuring that their nationals receive “fair treatment” have not, generally, been 
effective. Some have concluded bilateral agreements with several developing countries 
for the reciprocal promotion, encouragement and protection of direct foreign 
investments. Such treaties include specific references to expropriation or compensation 
for expropriation, “most favoured nation” treatment and settlement of disputes through 
international arbitration. A typical United States investment promotion and protection 
treaty provides thus: 
The prevalent view today would seem to be that a state has a sovereign 
right to expropriate property within its jurisdiction.1261 There are, however, 
limits to this right. Clearly, foreign property cannot be expropriated, nor 
can expropriation be effected in contravention of the terms of the treaty in 
force. 
Furthermore, it is asserted that there are certain conditions where expropriation can be 
carried out without any obligation to compensate. The guiding principle would seem to 
be that such a course of action may only be taken where the concession operates in a 
manner injurious to the public interest, due to causes outside the contemplation of the 
State at the time the transaction was entered into.1262 It may well be that the 
 
1261 See the letter of September 1948, from the U.K. Minister in Romania to the minister for Foreign affairs 
regarding the Romanian expropriation; the famous Middleton letter in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. dispute 
was in a similar vein. The position taken by some text writers is that contractual rights cannot be the 
subject of expropriations. The prevalent view is that the concession must give rise to acquired property 
rights and that these may be expropriated. 
1262 The proviso would seem to flow from a dictum in Czechoslovakia v Radio Corporation of America that 
“where a public institution enters into an agreement with a private person or a private company, it must 
be assumed that the institution has intended by this agreement to benefit its citizens. That this 
expectation sometimes proves to fail in not giving the country as large a profit as was expected, cannot 
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instrument conceding the concession makes express provision for such a 
contingency.1263 
This invariably means that it should be regarded as a matter of termination according to 
the terms of the agreement and thus not a matter of international law at all.1264 Yet, 
where the matter has been one for determination of what is harmful to the public 
interest, this is mainly the province of the State1265 save that in neither of these two 
cases has international law been content to vest an absolute discretion in the State. 
It has been suggested, however, that a State could be juridically responsible when it  
has abused its sovereignty in departing without need from the engagements which it 
had contracted. This was the view that was canvassed in the Shufeldt case, where the 
Tribunal argued that the issue of whether a concession was harmful to the national 
interest was for the government alone to decide, but declined, however, to admit this as 
conclusive international law and held that if injustice resulted from such decision of the 
government, the aid of international law could be invoked.1266 Certain conditions must 
be satisfied before an act is considered to be harmful to the public interest. The simple 
fact that a concession is opposed to the commerce of a country,1267 that the main object 
of the expropriation is the seeking of a source of pecuniary gain,1268 or the mere fact 
that the transaction has not turned out as well as expected do not constitute a 
yardstick.   There  are,   however,  certain  grounds  that   are  justifiable.  It  has  been 
 
be considered sufficient reasons for releasing that public institution from its obligation as signatory of said 
agreement.” 
1263 H G Calvert, ‘The Law Applicable to Concessions,’ (1959) I.U. Malaya L. Rev. 276. See Art. 22 of the 
Portuguese law regulating the concession of lands in the Portuguese colonies, which provides that “the 
State may always avail itself of the provisions of the following clauses if not otherwise expressly stated: 
The right to expropriate, without any compensation, portions of land required for the construction of 
works of admitted public utility, roads viaducts, etc.” 
1264 This position was demonstrated in the dictum in the matter of the Delagoa Bay Railway Arbitration 
that “from the moment when they could not justify themselves by the very terms of the concession and 
when it could no longer be said that the concessionaire was himself responsible, there remained only one 
principle of law which could be applied to the determination of the compensation to be allowed by this 
tribunal.” 
1265 Shufeldt v Republic of Guatemala [1930] Am. JIL 24 799, 814. 
1266 Ibid. 
1267 An instructive matter in this regard is that the report of the Transvaal Concession Commission 
included this as one of the grounds of non-payment of compensation, in cmd. 623, art. 13, pp. 6-8 . This 
claim was also reiterated in the Persian Tobacco Concession Affair. See Martini Am. J.I.L.25 [1931] 554, 
562-3. 
1268 United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Award, Vol. I p.7 et seq. the expropriations were 
upheld on the grounds that this was not the object. 
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suggested that permissible grounds for confiscation would be where, for instance, the 
execution of the concession is in a manner illegal by the domestic law1269 or in a manner 
involving a breach of neutrality. Further, it has also been suggested that when such 
grants are obtained by fraud, that too will suffice to justify confiscation.1270 
It is a settled principle of law that fundamental breach of the contract of concession by 
the individual justifies confiscation. The breach of contract is alleged to result from the 
fact that the Defendant State whose law governs the contract has, in the exercise of its 
legislative or executive powers, taken measures particularly designed to terminate or 
meddle with the particular contract in question. The international tort consists in the 
confiscatory, discriminatory or arbitrary character of the Defendant State’s sovereignty 
or in short in the abus de droit of which it is guilty, and which is sufficient to attract its 
liability.1271 A good example arose in the case of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. By a 
concession of 29 April 1933, Persia granted to the Anglo-American company the 
exclusive right within the territory of the concession to search for and extract petroleum 
and also to refine or treat in any other manner and render suitable for commerce the 
petroleum obtained by it. The concession could not be withdrawn or annulled by Persia 
nor could it be altered. In this case Persia’s conduct was tortious because it involved the 
taking of the alien’s property without compensation, or discrimination against the 
company, or an abuse of rights. 
Also, amongst the acts which have at various times been held to amount to sufficient 
breach to warrant confiscation are failure to commence work within a reasonable time, 
gross exploitation of affairs, great lapse of time during operations, and failure to 
conform with an absolute prohibition on assignment. 
It would appear that where the breach is non-fundamental, expropriation actually gives 







1269 Shufeldt v Republic of Guatemala (n 1265) 814. 
1270 In this instance, compensation was rejected to some shareholders in the Netherlands South Railways 
on these grounds. This was also the view of the Court in the case of Jarvis Ralston, report (1904). 
1271 F A Mann, ‘State Contract and State Responsibility’ (1960) 54 Am. J. Int’l L. 575. 
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breach.1272 It is also the case that where the breach is occasioned by the fault of the 
State-party, that party cannot be heard to complain of it. 
These instances apart, the obligation arising out of an expropriation is to compensate in 
full, though there is considerable diversity in State practice and otherwise as to the 
exact measure of this obligation. It is sufficient for present purposes that an obligation 
to compensate may arise out of the expropriation of concessionary interests. 
The Western commentators contend that a lawful expropriation must be non- 
discriminatory, for a public purpose and accompanied by prompt, adequate and  
effective compensation. This is the content of international law which is said to be 
applicable to foreign investment in general and to State contracts in particular. 
Sometimes described as the “Hull” rule, it represented the international consensus on 
expropriation until very recently. 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803 on the Permanent Sovereignty over National 
Resources can be considered the Hull rule’s most recent collective expression. The 
challenge from the Third World countries is represented by Article 2 of the U.N. Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which submits all nationalisations to domestic 
law, without mentioning the public purpose and non-discrimination principles. The 
principle of compensation, however, is included in the Charter, although there are issues 
of determination. 
Current arbitral practice supports the view that discriminatory expropriations, especially 
those undertaken for purely political purposes, are unlawful. In B.P. Exploration Co.1273, 
the arbitrator employed this standard to declare illegal the Libyan expropriation at issue. 
In other words, the tribunal concluded that the facts did not evidence discriminatory 
expropriation, but the principle outlawing discrimination was upheld. 
In the Aminoil arbitration,1274 the company claimed that the nationalisation was 
discriminatory because the only other foreign oil company operating in Kuwait, the 
Arabian Oil Company, had not been nationalised. The tribunal rejected this contention, 
 
1272 This was the approach that was adopted in the case of Ashmore Fishery, Moore’s Arbitrations 1857-9. 
1273 [1974] 53 ILR 297, 326. 
1274 66 ILR 560-62. 
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finding that adequate reasons existed for sparing the Arabian Oil Company. By 
considering Aminoil’s argument, however, the tribunal implicitly upheld the principle of 
non-discrimination as a requisite for nationalisations under international law. At the 
same time, the tribunal showed great deference toward the government’s motives. This 
attitude probably stemmed from an appreciation of Kuwait’s willingness to participate in 
the arbitral proceedings and the assumption that Kuwait normally would not take 
actions that would discourage foreign investors. Thus, the arbitral practice indicated that 
discriminatory expropriations are unlawful, but the host State is not obliged to 
simultaneously nationalise all competitors within one industry. In practice, the only 
clearly discriminatory expropriations are those made for political or other extraneous 
reasons such as revenge, retaliation and xenophobia. However, if the expropriation is 
otherwise legal, it is not clear whether political motivations would render it illegal. 
The tribunal’s reasoning illustrates that, even if the public purpose doctrine has  
survived, in most cases it is very difficult to prove the absence of any public purpose. 
Thus, in practice terms, the requirement that the expropriation should be in the public 
interest amounts to the same weakened requirements of the non-discrimination 
principle: only those expropriations which are unequivocally alien to the general 
interests whom the government is supposed to represent and protect can be considered 
unlawful. 
Nowadays, expropriation is “the exercise of a jurisdiction, which the state is recognised 
to possess by international law.”1275 Hitherto, expropriation has been a not uncommon 
method of meddling with concessionary rights. A dispute arising out of a concessionary 
relationship is then not unlikely to give rise to the questions (1) is the expropriation 
effective? (2) What obligations are regarded by international law as arising out of it? 
And (3) have these obligations been discharged? If, for any reason, the expropriation is 
futile, then there is an uncomplicated question of breach of contract which is not 






1275 S Friedman, Expropriation in International Law (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press 1981) 204. Any 
doubt as to the validity of this will certainly raise in itself a matter of inter state law. 
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effective, there remains the inter-state obligation of compensation for failure to respect 
acquired rights, a question of international law in the strict sense.1276 
It would appear that if, in expropriating or nationalising, the result is an unjust 
enrichment to the State, the interdependency of States reinforces the conclusion that no 
State shall take advantage of the fact that the resources of another State have entered 
into its territorial sphere and enrich itself with such resources at the expense of its 
neighbour. 
The rule of unjust enrichment (enrichissement sans cause) is one of the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations. This principle is based on the fact that 
there are situations in which the acquisition by one person of the property interest of 
another will be generally conceded, in all justice, to require restitution in kind or in 
value. The existence of this principle and the necessity of its application were  
recognised in the Laudreau1277 case involving a guano concession1278. Here, the rule in 
relation to the necessity of reserving rights was deliberated upon by the tribunal but in 
this case it was found that there was no cause for applying it to the claimant. The 
Commission stated: 
Of course if there was anything to show that Celestin knew of this release at the 
time of its execution and abstained from putting forward his claim, he and his 
representatives would be estopped from making any claim against the Peruvian 
Government, but there is nothing to show that there was any such acquiescence 
in this transaction by Celestin1279 
If the act of termination is in the bona fide exercise of a claimed contractual right, it is 
to be deemed an act jure gestionis and the rule of exhaustion of local remedies and the 
requirement of a denial of justice therein applies. On the other hand, if the act of 






1276 Calvert (n 1263) 279. 





an act jure imperii of which international law may unswervingly take cognisance and 
which may be held to be a violation of a right of the state of the concessionaire1280. 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The preferable course for the development of the law in this area should be as follows. 
The domestic law of host States should be developed to attain fairness to foreign 
investors, and to provide them with as much security as is possible within the 
framework of the domestic law. The role of public international law should be that of a 
watchdog, so to speak. In other words, it should enforce and further develop the 
supervisory rules that it contains. 
If properly restricted renegotiation clauses are stabilisation clauses that differ from real 
stabilisation clauses by their limited effect of stabilisation in time or with regard to 
substantive matters, then the issue of contractual stability represents a major source of 
conflict between transnational companies and host governments. On the one hand, the 
transnational companies are more concerned with stability and predictability in their 
contractual relations with the host government, while on the other hand, the host 
government favours a more flexible contractual regime. 
The legal significance of this reasoning is that the host government is not entitled to 
unilaterally modify or terminate the contract with the transnational corporation. The 
practical consequence is that the contract cannot be renegotiated or reviewed. The host 
government counters this argument by relying on the principle of Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States under which they claim that these contracts are governed by their domestic laws, 
and thus subject to unilateral change. 
It is submitted that excesses of formalism have failed to properly address the 
fundamental issues which ought to be addressed, i.e. how changes in circumstances 
should be dealt with in contracts between transnational companies and host States. It 
will be contended that a properly drafted renegotiation clause can effectively protect the 
interests of both the transnational companies and the host governments and, 
 
1280 Kenneth S Carlston, ‘Concession Agreement and Nationalisation’ (1958) 52 Am. J., Int’I L., 260. 
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consequently, thwart any potential conflict. Such clauses are preferable to stabilisation 
clauses because their flexibility may enable host governments to achieve their 
objectives. 
Lastly, the attitude of Latin American countries towards the ICSID convention and 
international arbitration has been traditionally articulated in the Calvo doctrine. Firstly, 
they regard diplomatic protection by an investor as contrary to the sovereignty of the 
host state, particularly where the investor has bargained away his rights to diplomatic 
protection in a contract concluded with the host state. 
From the aforementioned chapter, the subsequent chapter will investigate the most 
mutually beneficial contract for both parties; in such a swiftly changing environment, 
host countries and investors share a special responsibility to strive to negotiate 
agreements which include (not only for the short run but for the entirety of their term) 
incentives sufficient to induce both countries and investors to withstand pressures to 
renegotiate. It should be noted that at this stage an ‘ideal’ fiscal package (i.e., a fiscal 
package that the parties have an incentive to adhere to) is a package responding to oil 
price fluctuations and progressive enough to ensure that the portion of the economic 
rent allocated to the host country as a ‘government take’ grows in step with the 








The topic for analysis in this chapter is whether the activities of the transnational oil 
companies are mutually beneficial to the host countries. To answer this question, it will 
be pertinent to examine the international legal obligations of the parties involved. This 
chapter examines, firstly, the legally imposed obligations enshrined in Article 2 of the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (The Charter). The chapter next 
examines the situation in the Niger Delta and how it affects the Niger Delta communities 
and the State of Nigeria in general. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the marginalisation 
of the oil communities in Niger Delta area of Nigeria, including the injustice of the Land 
Use Act and the gross abuse of human rights. 
Developing countries and transnational corporations are often engaged in long-term 
agreements which may take the form of concessions, economic development 
agreements, production sharing contracts, joint ventures, services contracts etc. These 
agreements could be classified as a species of private contract and therefore be subject 
to the rules of contract law; it is irrelevant that such transactions are concluded with 
governments and may involve the exploitation of a national resource or the use of an 
essential national utility such as electric power or telecommunication. It will be pertinent 
to examine the bargaining positions of the two parties and the activities of the 
multinationals. 
7.2 BARGAINING POSITIONS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND 
MULTINATIONALS 
The flow of international investment into the developing countries is one of the most 
important socio-economic phenomena of contemporary world society and is a 
phenomenon on which some states have placed confidence in their development 
planning.1281 However, some states have also looked askance at the phenomenon and 
tried, with anecdotal degrees of success, to diminish or do away with its role in the 
 
1281 Date-Bah (n 1019) 241. 
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economic development process.1282 Logically, the most common trepidation amongst 
developing countries which play host to multinational capital is that the owners of the 
capital may take over the local economy and as a result may directly or indirectly wield 
adverse political influence on the local panorama. 
Usually, the business of petroleum development entails the use of sizeable risk capital, 
particularly in the initial stages, sophisticated technology, managerial expertise and 
marketing outlets. It also involves, to a large extent, negotiation between the 
multinational oil companies that provide these inputs, on the one hand, and the host 
country which owns the petroleum resources, on the other. Significant and rapid 
changes in both the economy and the politics of petroleum and natural resources have 
forced host governments to adjust both their operations and their objectives. Thus, the 
corporate objectives of the national oil companies have been very much a moving 
target. Negotiations often end in the kind of legal arrangement under which the 
resources are to be developed. In theory, the fact that the two parties have different 
objectives will provide a basis for adequately safeguarding the interests of each to 
provide a mutually acceptable basis for cooperation. The law of contract provides such a 
medium for the parties.1283 The term “contract” here consists of an exchange of 
promises, carried out through the process of offer and acceptance, with the element of 
consideration and the intention to create a legal relationship.1284 When the contract is 
made, it binds each party to performance, or, in default, to a liability to pay 
compensation. This model of contract is inherited from the classical contract law model 
of the nineteenth century, which is still useful and applicable today.1285 
Under common law, English courts give relief to a party to an unfair contract. It soon 
became apparent, however, that the inequality in bargaining power and the resulting 
unfairness are of different types in different situations. This was the view that was 
canvassed in the case of National Westminster Plc v Morgan1286. Beale explains: “The 
issue before the court was whether a transaction is or is not unconscionable. This 
depends, however, upon the facts of each particular case. The underlying fact is that a 
1282 Date-Bah (n 1019) 241. 
1283 Gidado (n 392) 4. 
1284 Ibid. 
1285 Ibid. 
1286 [1985] 1 ALL E R 821. 
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contract which is unfair in one case might not necessarily be unfair in another instance, 
and therefore the category of unfairness should never close. The bargaining power of 
parties is said to be unequal if the state of affairs is such that one of the parties is so 
strong in the negotiation process and other so weak that the stronger party is capable 
of pushing the weaker one into agreeing terms of contract which are in favour of the 
stronger party. To determine what constitutes stronger or weaker bargaining power, it is 
pertinent to examine the several doctrines under which the common law gives relief to a 
party to an unfair contract. This will go towards showing that the inequality of 
bargaining power and the resulting unfairness are of different types in different 
cases”.1287 
It has been commented that under English law traditional English doctrines apply only 
where there is unfairness in the sense of inadequacy of consideration, but the fact is 
that more modern rulings strike at clauses which leave a party at risk even if value for 
money has been obtained, and highlight the fact that “inequality of bargaining power 
can mean ignorance, vulnerability to persuasion, desperate need, lack of bargaining skill 
or simple lack of influence in the market place”.1288 In the case of Lloyds Bank v 
Bundy1289 Lord Denning came to the conclusion that many of the defences to contract 
enforcement such as duress, undue influence, and breach of fiduciary duty, were 
appropriately exemplary of a general doctrine of inequality of bargaining power. 
According to Beale, “traditional doctrines give relief where a party is in a weak position 
because of ignorance, inexperience, need or a relationship of trust and the other party 
has taken advantage of this to make a contract, under which the weaker party is 
exploited in value for money terms”.1290 He went further that “in the absence of 
inadequacy of consideration, relief is given by English common law only in very limited 
situations. The rules on non-necessaries supply to infants on credit protect the infants 
not just against exploitation, but against the temptation to improvidence”.1291 
Subsequently, the core weaknesses are ignorance, inexperience, vulnerability to 
 
1287 Hugh Beale, ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’ (1986) 6(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 123, 125. 
1288 Ibid 125. E I Sagey, Nigerian Law of Contract (London: Sweet and Maxwell 1985) for the 
requirements of a valid contract. 
1289 Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1974] 3WLR 501. 
1290 Beale (n 1287) 125. 
1291 Ibid 123. 
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influence and need.1292 Invariably, relief will not be granted unless the other party has 
exploited the weakness to his advantage, inadequacy of consideration is not in itself a 
ground for relief but is central to many of the doctrines.1293 
The topical question is whether such traditional concepts and rules as are applicable to 
private contracts are admissible in respect of these special arrangements. The main fact 
is that the classical idea of a contract is a private bargain struck by parties of equal 
bargaining strength and firmly rooted in the free will of the parties. Asante is of the  
view that “the judiciary frown at the idea of intervention in contract arrangements and 
are quite hesitant to declare a contract void as against public policy or to vitiate a 
contract struck by parties on the grounds that it is in the utmost interest of the social 
order that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting, and, based on such finding, that their contracts when entered into freely 
and voluntarily shall be held sacred and alternatively enforceable by judicial process”.1294 
Another school of thought championed by Professor Horowitz remarks that the modern 
theory of contract which asserts strongly individualistic idea of contract just referred to 
was not in place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when jurists attacked 
equitable concepts of exchange.1295 Before this time, the courts were of the view that an 
objective theory of contract obtained, which enabled them to intervene actively to 
rectify contractual provisions on grounds of equity. The current view is to curb these 
practices by legislative intervention.1296 It would appear that there is no immutable 
doctrine of contracts and that developing countries are perfectly entitled to seek such 
remedies as fairness and equity in reconsidering contracts that are harmful to the 
national interest.1297 
Furthermore, it can be deduced that what amounts to superior bargaining power is 
ambiguous and varies depending on each case. The fundamental factor is that the 
contractual transaction is not based on the give-and-take of bargaining but is rather a 
product of a take-it-or-leave-it-attitude, where the outcomes are seen as what one side 
1292 Ibid. 
1293 Ibid. 
1294 Asante (n 742) 401. 
1295 M Horowitz, ‘The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law’ (1974) 89 Harvard Law Review 917. 
1296 Ibid. 
1297 Asante (n 742) 403. 
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gains, the other side has necessarily lost.1298 At the end of the day, the ultimate 
objective of each of the parties is to maximise short term profits from the exploitation of 
the resources, despite the consequences of the impact on the other party or project. As 
a result, the bargaining power could take the form of bargaining skills, sophistication, 
capital, technology, possession of relevant information, knowledge or the availability of 
market outlets. 
From the analysis of the petroleum development contracts between developing 
countries and the multinational oil companies has shown the superior strength which  
the latter have over the former. It would appear that petroleum ventures involve a 
complex interchange of many matters; ranging from capital economics, to law, politics, 
development, skills and transfer of technology. The result of any petroleum 
development contract will greatly depend on the comparative strengths and bargaining 
positions of the parties in relation to such factors.1299 
By and large, “the multinational oil companies more often than not have greater 
bargaining power because of their superiority and access to sources of capital, 
technological know-how, managerial skills and most importantly marketing channels. 
The host country, on the other hand, exercises sovereignty over its natural resources to 
be exploited by the multinational corporations”.1300 
Furthermore, traditional concessions, and typically those contracted before the Second 
World War, are shown in retrospect to have incorporated terms which were principally 
beneficial to the companies. Under these concessions, companies acquired large areas, 
in some cases covering the whole territory of a country, as under the Kuwait concession 
of 1934 and the Qatar concession of 1935, or nearly half a million square miles as under 
the Saudi-Arabian concession of 1933).1301 Companies held ownership of the petroleum 





1298 Beale (n 1287) 125. 
1299 Gidado (n 392) 6. 
1300 Ibid. 
1301 David Smith, (1973) ‘Mining Resources of the Third World: From Concessions to Service Contracts’ 




per ton royalty and exercised virtually total control over all phases of petroleum 
operations.1302 
According to Hossain, in bargaining with governments, their negotiating power, 
frequently supported by that of their home governments, was as strong as that of the 
host governments was as weak. Governments had no choice but to grant concessions to 
the major players, on their terms.1303 The evolution of the relationship between the 
multinational oil companies and host states is due to alterations in the global 
environment and the conditions prevailing in the international petroleum industry. These 
alterations have also resulted in the development of new types of legal arrangements 
between governments and oil companies, under which governments have been able to 
obtain the resources of the companies for petroleum development on considerably 
better terms.1304 
The revolution of the last few of decades in the terms of concessions has led to the view 
that “a concession must be seen not as a contract, but as a process in which rights and 
obligations of both parties shift over periods of time as defined factors change”.1305 
Further, bargaining positions can shift owing to changes in the constitutions of the 
industry, as was the case in the beginning of the sixties, when the entry of a large 
number of purported “independent” and state-owned companies eroded the supremacy 
of the major companies which led to competition for acquisition of exploration rights, 
and therefore enabled governments to acquire improved terms under new types of legal 
arrangements.1306 
Shifts in bargaining positions can also take place due to purely local developments. 
Fabrikant and other text writers commented that alterations in the relative bargaining 








1303 Hossain (n 259) 59. 
1304 Ibid. 
1305  Smith (n 1301) 228. 
1306  Hossain (n 259) 60. 
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global or the local environment, but from their changing role over the life of a 
concession from one phase of the operation to another.1307 
It is important to note that the individual interests of the parties at each stage need to 
be identified, and it also needs to be understood that the balance of bargaining power 
shifts during each stage between the government and the company. 
There should be no misgivings about that the relative bargaining strength of a company 
being highest at the initial stages where there are only extensive indications of the 
prospect of the existence of petroleum resources. For the government at this stage 
there is an obvious interest in attracting the capital and technology of the oil companies 
to undertake systematic exploration, involving geological and geophysical surveys, 
followed by exploratory drilling.1308 The discovery of petroleum in commercial quantities 
considerably alters the relative bargaining positions of the parties, in view of the fact 
that, as has been remarked, the perceived level of risk connected with the enterprise 
declines at this point in time. The returns to the foreign company no longer seem 
appropriate to the risk and the Government feels justified in demanding downward 
adjustments in the investor’s share of profits. In the interim, the inclinations of the 
investor to comply with marginal pressures, if this will maintain the investment, have a 
propensity to develop.1309 
At the same time, the enthusiasm and ability of the company “to separate from the 
undertaking” without first getting back the expected remuneration diminishes as its 
stake increases through the infusion of equipment, personnel and capital.1310 Essentially, 
the comparative weakness of the government position in the initial phase leads 
companies to focus on negotiating, on the whole, an agreement which secures for 
themselves the best possible terms in all phases of the operations.1311 
 
 
1307 Fabrikant (n 611), quoting Louis Wells “A concession contract is the product of a bargaining process 
reflecting the strengths and weaknesses of the two parties and their bargaining skills. But the relative 
positions of the parties change with the time….” in The Evolution of Concession Agreements Economic 
Development, Report No. 117, Development Advisory Service Conference, Sorrento. 
1308 Ibid; Also, Raymond F Mikesell, Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries, 
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press 2007) 38-39. 
1309 Ibid. 





From the government’s perspective, it would hypothetically be preferable to negotiate 
the whole package of terms only after the exploratory work had been concluded and the 
size of the discovery evaluated.1312 A company, however, would not be likely to willingly 
invest in a considerable exploration programme unless it first acquires from the 
government an agreement or concession that in the event of considerable discovery it 
would have the right to exploit that discovery and earn sizeable profits.1313 It is, for that 
reason, imperative to keep in view the fact that companies endeavour to capitalise on 
their originally superior bargaining position to secure better terms are absolutely 
essential in their view.1314 One such condition would be an agreed legal regime which is 
cautiously worked out, and which demonstrates an understanding of the dynamics of 
the petroleum industry and the economics of petroleum development.1315 This will 
invariably result in improving the domestic environments in petroleum growth. 
To present possible solutions for the introduction of more flexibility in contractual terms 
in order to ‘tailor’ those terms to the actual profitability of petroleum operations, and 
therefore to try to achieve a fair and reasonable sharing of profits between the 
government and the oil companies, whatever the oil market situation, there are several 
contractual concepts used around the world by governments to permit international oil 
companies to carry out petroleum exploration operations and, in the event of a 
commercial discovery, development and production operations.1316 The “type of contract 
selected by a government and the terms and conditions agreed between the signing 
parties depend mainly on the government policy and the relative bargaining strengths of 
host countries, which are directly linked to the petroleum potential of the offered 
acreage and the international oil market situation”.1317 
In any agreement, “the package of economic and fiscal provisions, known as the ‘fiscal 
package’, plays a central role, since this constitutes the mechanism which enables the 
allocation of economic benefits and risks between the parties concerned. The 
1312 Roland Brown and Mike Faber, Some Policy and Legal Issues affecting Mining Legislation and 
Agreements in African Commonwealth Countries, (London: Commonwealth Secretariat 1977) 10. 
1313 Ibid 10. 
1314 Ibid. 
1315 Ibid. 
1316 Honore Le Leuch, ‘Contractual flexibility in new petroleum investment contracts’ in Nicky Beredjick, 
Thomas W Walde and Ian Townsend (eds), Petroleum Investment Polices in Developing Countries 




international oil market situation and its impact on petroleum prices need to be carefully 
considered”.1318 In the late 1970s, as a consequence of the increase in crude oil prices 
and the strong competition among oil companies to conclude new agreements, there 
had been a general tightening of contractual terms which showed in higher ‘government 
takes’.1319 Conversely, “since 1982, a tendency to grant incentives to oil companies to 
attract exploration capital has made itself felt, because of the ‘glut’ and falling prices in 
the international oil market”.1320 
In such a swiftly changing environment, host countries and investors share a unique 
obligation to negotiate agreements that are beneficial for both long and short term 
objectives. It is worth noting that the ‘ideal’ fiscal package is one which is responsive to 
oil price fluctuations, whilst ensuring that the host country’s economic rent grows 
accordingly without imposing unnecessary burdens on the investor. 
7.3 GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES 
 
It is worth bearing in mind that energy is the main factor for development and its 
presence or absence within a country always has a remarkable effect on that country’s 
level of development. As a result, all countries are keen to ensure that they have access 
at all times to sufficient energy resources to meet their needs. For instance, during the 
previous U.S. Administration, as a result of the soaring petroleum prices in the world 
market, President George W Bush threatened to stop buying oil if the prices continued 
going up. Ever since the early part of this century, petroleum has been the most 
multifaceted and economic energy source. Apart from this, it has many derivatives and 
end users which make it an essential component for many industrial processes. It is for 
that reason that oil is the most important globally traded commodity today. 
Furthermore, the need for petroleum leads to the employment of different strategies by 
various countries, principally dependent on whether they are developed or developing, 
importers or exporters. The developed countries are mainly importers and place a lot of 
emphasis on ensuring security of supplies and not being dependent on any one source. 
They are also concerned with increasing, or at least maintaining, their reserve levels. 




On the other hand, those developing countries who need to import oil are the poorest 
countries of the world. Unlike the richer importers, they cannot afford to spend what 
they do to meet their annual energy need.1321 To reduce the effects of the oil deficit on 
their balance of payments, their only hope is for petroleum to be discovered in their 
territory. For this reason, it is also particularly important for exploration programmes to 
be conducted within their territories. The oil exporting developing countries are more 
fortunate. However, the main difference between them and their poorer counterparts 
lies in the presence of large deposits of petroleum within their territory.1322 These 
countries have other important needs, such as to ensure effective control over their 
petroleum resources, and to maximise the revenues accruing. It is nevertheless just as 
important for them to ensure that exploration efforts are increased rather than decline, 
and to maintain their leading position through continuous increases in reserves. 1323 
The main objective for all countries, but predominantly for developing countries, is thus 
to ensure that exploration programmes are started and regularly continued in their 
territories. 
This retention of revenue is identifiable as a second objective. The revenues retained by 
the state are or should be used to realise the policy objectives of the particular state, 
and to ensure that the activities of the oil industry complement these policy 
objectives.1324 
The third objective is thus to ensure that oil industry activities complement and aid the 
stated policies of the country in question. This is the objective of ensuring control over 
petroleum resources.1325 
This objective came to the fore in the 1970s, which was both the period of the oil boom 
and of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. For some years now, less and less 
is being heard about control of petroleum resources, because this is only possible during 
a boom period when the host country is in a stronger bargaining position. However, the 








vanish, because it is only when a country controls its oil industry that it can actually 
successfully ensure that the other three objectives are accomplished, and that any 
profits accruing through the industry are properly deployed in the furtherance of 
national development. 
It will be seen that all these objectives have as their basis the entrenched desire of all 
nations to be economically independent, and to be free of foreign domination. Early 
concession agreements were concluded within the colonial era and were invariably 
lopsided in the company’s favour with the companies being given “such grotesquely 
favourable terms as could hardly survive the collapse of colonialism.”1326 In addition, 
these agreements were possible because of the lack of knowledge and expertise by the 
host country. 
Although most exporting countries are generally concerned in preserving absolute 
control over petroleum operations and the growth of the nation’s revenues accrued, oil 
importing countries are keen to promote cooperation with oil companies, with a view to 
reduce the effect of oil deficit on their balance payments.1327 Furthermore, due to 
declining revenues and dwindling resources, exporting countries “are looking at 
promoting exploration to find new discoveries and encouraging development of marginal 
discoveries”. As such, a balance must be achieved between various governmental 
petroleum policy objectives: 
• To stimulate exploration activities through incentives given to the exploration risk- 
takers; 
• In case of production, to maximise national revenue from petroleum, to achieve a 
fair government take in petroleum profits without discouraging investment from 
foreign oil companies; 







1326 Asante (n 4) 244. 
1327 Le Leuch (n 1316) 81. 
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• To develop national technology and expertise (transfer of technology, training, actual 
involvement of nationals in petroleum operations, preference given to local 
equipment and domestic service companies); 
• To minimise the nation’s financial risk in exploration activities, risk capital being 
provided by international oil companies.1328 
 
International oil companies are primarily concerned with the following three objectives 
rather than by the type of agreement itself: 
• To achieve a reasonable return on their investment, taking into account the 
exploitation risks and the long lead time between the exploration and the 
exploitation. The probable rate of return of a new venture has to be competitive with 
other investment opportunities available to the company in other countries, 
especially in countries which are already producing (whether they be developed or 
developing countries); 
• To enjoy an acceptable pay-out time in which to recover their original investment; 
 
• To gain long-term access to new supplies of crude oil or natural gas, through the 
right to export a significant part of the production.1329 
Further, it is worth recognising that, irrespective of the type of contract, oil companies 
are limited to “petroleum agreements containing provisions considered as standard in 
the international oil industry in terms of foreign exchange procedures, control of 
management of operations, sanctity of contracts”.1330 
Notwithstanding, Le Leuch emphasises on the mutual compromise both parties must be 
willing to make. He explains that “for a country deciding to promote petroleum  
activities, contractual terms have to be designed in order to encourage the participation 
of international oil companies willing to quickly commit meaningful exploration budgets, 









7.4 GOVERNMENT AND OIL COMPANIES’ RELATIONSHIPS: OBLIGATIONS 
 
In Nigeria, crude oil is the bastion of the economy. What takes place with regard to 
crude oil plays a considerable part in deciding the fortunes and misfortunes of the 
country in several ways: 
• First of all, the supremacy of oil in the economy has turned the country into a 
voracious rentier state, i.e. a rent-seeking entity in quest of maximising the gains 
from oil revenues at all costs. 
• Secondly, the importance of oil revenues has lit-up the possibilities for corruption. 
Within the Federal Government as the major gatekeeper for oil revenues, the centre 
has essentially become the main objective of an intensive zero-sum game between 
and among various factions of the ruling classes, military and civilian alike. 
Furthermore, oil revenue has led to the formation of a convoluted and mainly 
unofficial patron-client structure of incentives, promising astounding affluence to 
those in charge of political power. These concentrations of power in the hands of a 
few elites who socialise around the corridors of power more or less without end 
encourage political corruption and the unjustifiable abuse of power. 
• Thirdly, being a classical oil rent economy, economic development is strongly tied to 
sustaining and escalating oil earnings; a situation which requires the government to 
go to any lengths to secure this accumulative base.1332 
• Lastly, the possession of oil has enforced the absolute integration of Nigeria into the 
mayhem of global economy in a manner that has often taken the wind out of its sails 
as regards the country’s developmental ambitions. 
This oh-so-frequently ‘unholy’ association between the drive to maximise oil revenues 
and the detrimental effects on the country’s real development needs operates whether 
the brokers of oil business are the duly representative national bureaucrats or whether 
they are wielders of unauthorised power. What it boils down to, either way, is basically 
the same thing in terms of the multiplier effects of promoting a mutually valuable 
 
1332 Sayre P Schatz, ‘Pirate capitalism and the Inert Economy of Nigeria’ (1984) 22(1) Journal of Modern 
African Studies 45-57. 
332 
 
political and economic relationship between the State and multinational oil companies to 
the exclusion of oil communities.1333 In most instances, moreover, such coalitions have 
served multinational oil companies far better than the government. It should be 
recalled, for a case in point, that “during the depressing and ignominious days of 
military rule in Nigeria, multinational oil companies were amongst the few overtly 
flaunting their predilection for such ‘stable’ regimes instead of an ‘unhinged’ 
democracy”.1334 Ultimately, this relationship is at the heart of the persistent violence and 
political disaffection which has followed the allegations by minority oil communities of 
domination, socio-economic marginalisation and segregation, and the colossal damage 
to their environment by multinational oil companies.1335 
As is already stated in this study, prior to 1971, oil companies operating in Nigeria 
enjoyed oil concessions on very favourable terms. The concession era ended in 1969 
with a new Petroleum Act that gave the Federal Government greater control of the 
industry. Subsequent to 1971, *the government progressively increased its participation 
and regulation of the oil industry by creating partnerships with private foreign investors 
through a range of joint venture agreements, risk service contracts and production 
sharing agreements”.1336 From that time also, the government wanted to transform its 
role from that of a mere collector of oil taxes and royalties to that of an active 
participant in the oil industry.1337 It should also be noted that such increasing 
government intervention and involvement in the oil industry was in large measure 
motivated by the need to grant developing native elites more scope in deference to 
foreign capital, as dictated by the indigenisation policy of the government at that 
time.1338 
Hitherto gain leverage with multinational oil companies, the government transferred  
rent and royalties from offshore petroleum wells of the producing states concerned. By 
 
1333 Eyinla and Ukpo (n 894) 25. 
1334 Charles Ukeje, A Farewell to Innocence? African Youth in the Age of Globalization (2004) Mary 
Kingsley Zochonis Lecture of the Royal Africa Society to the Forty-first Annual General Meeting of the 
African Studies Association held at Goldsmith College, University of London, UK. 
1335 Eyinla and Ukpo (n 894) 25. 
1336 Olukayode Soremekun and Cyril Obi, ‘Changing Patterns of Foreign Investment in the Nigerian Oil 
Industry’ (1993) African Development, XVIII(3) 5-20; Ian Gary and Terry Lynn Karl Bottom of the Barrel: 
Africa's oil boom and the poor (Baltimore, MD: Catholic Relief Services 2003). 




April 1977, the Nigerian National Oil Corporation and the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources were subsumed into the NNPC, which became the sole government agency 
for control and regulation of the oil industry.1339 The Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR)1340 was also “created to further ensure effective regulation of the oil 
industry, enforce compliance with industry regulations, process applications for licenses, 
and to enforce environmental regulations by multinational and local oil companies, but 
still allowing multinational oil companies to wield and enjoy a lot of economic and 
political influence”.1341 Eyinla and Ukpo contend that notwithstanding the quest for 
control, “the government could neither challenge nor gain leverage over the technical 
capabilities of multinational oil companies”.1342 
It has been asserted that government agencies, and especially the NNPC, expected to 
standardise and control the industry. This may also be part of the problem, taking into 
consideration its over-bloated bureaucracy.1343 Those who have made such assertions 
also point to the absolute incompetence of its financial and audit control mechanisms, 
the persistent mismanagement and corruption taking place inside and around the 
organisation and the fact that the company performs more like a mini-state surrounded 
by the larger state.1344 
Furthermore, “multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria have come to resemble 
the proverbial cat with nine lives”1345 because of their obvious elasticity and flexibility in 
continually re-engineering their supremacy of the sector, through gaining apparent 
government agreement to the sorts of terms and conditions which obtained under the 
same joint ventures, PSAs and other arrangements1346. As regards the prospects for the 
private local oil companies, it is also obvious that the granting of more opportunities to 
such companies is unlikely to modify the existing control enjoyed by foreign oil 
 
1339 Ibid. 
1340 The DPR is entrusted with faithfully monitoring, on regular basis, the activities and facilities of oil 
companies and ensuring strict compliance with all governing laws, regulations and guidelines for optimum 
safety. Results of such monitoring and supervisory activities need to be published. 
1341 Eyinla and Ukpo (n 894) 26. 
1342 Ibid. 
1343 Ibid 27; One good thing is that, in recent times, the NNPC has been making genuine efforts to 






companies, given that the private local companies more often than not still depend on 
capital and technical expertise from abroad.1347 It is shameful that after nearly six 
decades of oil production, Nigeria is unable to develop its resources without assistance 
from external multinationals. 
This dependency on multinationals undermines the practicality of the government to 
institute effective control on the industry. The host government, as essentially 
bystanders in the development of their own resources, has led to discord with the 
multinationals. Eyinla and Ukpo highlight that “even on very straightforward matters – 
including those such as the exact quantum of crude oil produced, and revenue derived – 
government has had to accept without due challenge the judgment and claims of 
multinational oil companies”.1348 The country’s economic dependence on the exportation 
of these resources has only fuelled the government to agree to favourable investment 
incentives in the oil industry. Eyinla and Ukpo conclude that “fiscal and budgetary 
decisions are pegged to crude oil revenues, the unpredictability of oil prices in the 
international market tends more to emphasise than improve the problem of planning in 
Nigeria”.1349 
In view of the incidence of corruption and obnoxious practices in Nigeria, balance sheet 
discrepancies have occurred intermittently on production and oil revenue receipts 
between multinational oil companies and government. Notably, even though it is able 
“to obtain specialised skills and expertise to maintain an effective audit trail on real oil 
production, lifting and sale, some of the government’s own practices, including that of 
maintaining an out-and-out account for a percentage of oil proceeds to fund particular 
projects, are open to excessive abuse”.1350 Such abuses have been the basis of  
recurrent and unnecessary extra-budgetary expenditures that have been disparaged 
many times over. 
An additional factor is the failure of government to manage petroleum revenue in a 
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be obtaining less than the revenue declared from crude oil sales.1351 Cutting the 
potential for sharp practices may be easier said than done, as it may not be practical for 
government to guard against such practices due to its own intrinsic technical and 
institutional limitations.1352 The fact is that assertions that multinational oil companies 
may be short-changing the country are not new.1353 For example, as far back as 1969, 
the then Minster of Finance, Chief Obafemi Awolowo raised this concern. Soon 
thereafter, the Government began exploring ways to secure greater participation in the 
industry. One of the key steps in doing so, was to abandon the 1914 Petroleum Act 
which it inherited from the colonial government and forestalled such active involvement. 
Furthermore, multinationals operating in Nigeria often acquire a quasi-governmental  
role in the industry, leaving them as largely unaccountable corporations. It is generally 
the case that oil revenues will translate into colossal advantages and prospects to the 
political elite, which subsequently leads to resentment from the masses. It is hardly 
surprising that uprisings against the government are frequent in oil producing regions. 
In order to bridge the differences between the masses and the government, 
multinationals are left with no choice but to balance a quasi-governmental role 
alongside their commercial interests. 
7.5 DUTY CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The movement for human rights has been paralleled in the area of environmental 
protection, although much soft law which exists there has been found to be wanting. 
There is a growing literature on the obligation of corporations to stand up for the 
standard of human rights in the line of their actions in the host state.1354 These 
responsibilities include a duty not to uphold a regime which abuses human rights in the 








1354 M K Addo (ed) Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of the Transnational Corporation (The 
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The behind-the-scenes activities of multinational oil companies tend to negatively 
influence political issues, including human rights violations and environmental 
degradation, and more significantly, weak or non-existent enforcement on requisite 
industry laws and regulations. Amongst oil multinationals, the belief is that they are not 
under any legal obligation to concern themselves with the gross human rights violations 
around their areas of operation. They shut their eyes to the ‘social contract’ obligations 
of corporate entities to see themselves as moral agents with commitments and 
responsibilities to host communities.1355 As a result of this apparent attitude, they are 
also ultimately advancing oppression and contributing to the violation of human rights in 
host communities. One of the areas to which this obviously relates would be labour 
standards, which have traditionally been focussed primarily on ensuring the availability 
of a ready and servile pool of cheap labour to the foreign multinational corporation. The 
movement in this sphere by the International Labour Organisation has been useful in 
bringing about instruments which address the matter of possible safeguards to protect 
workers from abuse by Multinational Corporations.1356 
Additionally, carrying great weight are the modus operandi in the area of human rights 
that have brought about sanctions against abusive practices against both workers as 
well as people who are affected by the activities of multinational corporations.1357 For 
example, in the case of the Niger delta area of Nigeria, the local inhabitants, dissatisfied 
with the status quo, have been agitating for a return to local control of mineral 
resources.1358 These sentiments motivated the Ijaws, along with other ethnic tribes, to 
issue the Kaiama Declaration in 1999 demanding control of the oil in their land.1359 They 
have further articulated their demands in similar documents. The meeting of such 
demands would require sweeping constitutional changes. Short of such changes, the 





1356 The question of whether such labour standards should form part of the multinational code of conduct 
on investment has been the subject of consideration for some time now. See Lance Compa, ‘The 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment and International Labour Rights. A Failed. Connection’ (1998) 31 
Cornell Int'l L.J. 683. 






and activist groups reveals a general lack of awareness of the value and efficacy of 
court action.1360 
At the same time, many activists and leaders display little confidence in the ability of the 
current court system to assist them. They claim that oil companies frequently respond  
to litigation with incessant, unending appeals, making certain that the litigants, even if 
they have succeeded in their claims, do not benefit from their legal victory.1361 
In addition, the cost of bringing a case against the government or oil companies renders 
this prospect impossible for many individuals and communities; the right to private 
enforcement of environmental laws is almost non-existent in Nigeria. Until some 
mechanism for financially supporting environmental and human rights litigation is put in 
place, cost will continue to elude many Nigerians from exercising their rights.1362 The 
conflicts outlined above indicate that the development of human rights in Nigeria, whilst 
accelerated by the democratic dispensation, remains obstructed by a number of 
institutional stumbling blocks. In some areas, such labour rights, definite gains have 
been made. According to labour leaders, companies like Chevron are beginning to 
recognise oil industry unions after decades of opposing or ignoring their existence. 
Industry practices promoting safety have improved, pay is considerably higher than the 
national average, and prohibitions on international labour associations have been 
lifted.1363 On the whole, however, Nigerians living in oil producing regions still struggle, 
sometimes dangerously and often fruitlessly, to have their basic human rights 
respected. What is more, even as human rights gain wider acceptance in Nigeria, a 
 
1360 Ibid; There are signs that this may be changing. Since being interviewed for this report, a Nigerian 
environmental rights group, the Community Rights Initiative, has decided to employ litigation as a tool for 
environmental protection. 
1361 Interview with Joi Yowika, attorney for several oil-production communities, September 1999. 
1362 One option that may prove useful is attempts by community members to seek redress in the Human 
Rights Panel set up by the past government of Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, Joi Yowika, who represents the 
Ogonis, notes that they have filed over 5,000 petitions regarding human rights abuses. The panel headed 
by retired Supreme Court Justice Chukwudifu Oputa, has no sanctioning or enforcement powers, but its 
decisions are likely to bear some weight in determining the government’s position on past human rights 
abuses. 
1363 Interview with Joseph Akinlaja, Secretary-General of the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Workers (NUPENG). September 1999. Mr. Akinlaja lost his job at British Petroleum (later renamed African 
Petroleum) for leading a demonstration. Oil companies now solicit input from unions before making 
decisions that impact on workers and have made other improvements, such as distributing safety kits and 
undated manuals. Until recently, Nigerian law and the constitution of the umbrella organisation of the 
trade unions, the Nigerian Labour Congress (LNC), prohibited associations with unions in other countries; 
these prohibitions have now been lifted and NUPENG is in the process of joining ICEM, an international 
association of unions for workers in the chemical industry. 
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more enduring aspect of Nigeria’s oil legacy threatens people living in oil producing 
regions: the degradation of natural resources vital for life.1364 
 
Under U.S. law, there is an old statute, the Alien Tort Claims Act, which makes any act 
considered a tort in international law actionable in the U.S. courts. There are ample 
numbers of cases in this area of law and the U.S. courts have not denied litigation on 
the grounds that the acts complained of are extraterritorial. This was the issue that was 
deliberated upon in the case of Doe v Unocal.1365 In this case, the allegation was that a 
U.S. multinational corporation had participated actively or passively in the torture, 
forced labour and the killings of the aboriginal people by the Burmese military agents in 
the land through which the gas pipeline it was constructing for the Burmese government 
passed.1366 The focus shifted to the liability of the multinational corporation for being a 
knowing participant in the alleged activity.1367 The courts have progressively held that 
there is a foundation for jurisdiction, though none of them has hitherto gone on to hold 
that there could be a legal responsibility. The connection to the parent company in all 
these circumstances is that the parent company has managerial control and for that 
reason had legal responsibility for the acts of the subsidiary in the host state in which 
the human violation was being committed.1368 The underlying fact is that the Aliens Tort 
Act which has facilitated the instituting of such jurisdiction, is not superfluous to the 
pursuing of the policy behind such litigation.1369 The moral rationalisation is provided by 
the fact that the parent corporation benefits from the fault of its subsidiaries in the state 
and should, as a result, accept the blame for these faults1370 
There exist, however, a legion of cases connecting the involvement of multinationals 
with past crimes, and there is a common consensus towards legal responsibility. There 
are instances where Jewish plaintiffs have made claims against a number of U.S. 
corporations based on the allegation that these corporations had helped the Nazi 
government by the provision of technology and other forms of assistance which were 
 
1364 Environmental & Planning Law Review (2005) 2(2) EPLR 3 ISSN; 1597-4553 131. 
1365 960 F Supp 660 (1997) (CD Cal); there is a barrage of cases that have extensively treated this issue. 
For instance Saro-Wiwa v Shell, 226 F 3d 88 (2000) (2nd Cir); Sornarajah (n 1357). 
1366 Doe v Unocal 960 F Supp 660 (1997) (CD Cal) 
1367 Ibid. 
1368 Ibid. 
1369 Sornarajah (n 1357) 177. 
1370 Beth Stephens, ‘The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights’ (2002) 20 
Berkeley JIL 45. 
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instrumental in the extermination of the Jews.1371 Even banks have not been excluded 
from such crimes and as a result they are subject to claims on this basis.1372 There are 
very many cases which establish universal jurisdiction over gross human rights violations 
such as torture and genocide which can be brought to reinforce the endorsement of 
such jurisdiction over the parent corporation.1373 It is pertinent to note that this 
development is not peculiar to the U.S. This is also the view in England and other 
jurisdictions like Australia.1374 For instance, the law of England recognises jurisdiction in 
the parent company in respect of asbestosis-related disease occurring in a worker in the 
Rhodesia operations of a subsidiary.1375 On the other hand, courts have frowned and, as 
a rule, even where they may have been on the verge of imposing legal responsibility, 
often withdrawn by finding a want of jurisdiction. Matters are treated as non-permissible 
on the basis that finding jurisdiction over corporations on the basis of their sheer 
presence abroad may put foreign interests at risk.1376 There is a growing recognition 
that where there is involvement by a multinational corporation in such crimes, reliability 
will be lost if courts allow the argument that national interests countervail the need to 
accord legal responsibility to the offending entities. 
Also, there are in existence some soft law prescriptions relating to the obligation of 
multinational corporations to respect human rights. It is a growing area of law, and 
these prescriptions do not have much effect.1377 Sometimes there is an attempt to show 







1371 Sornarajah (n 1357) 177. 
1372 Ibid. 
1373A classical case, the Pinochet case (1999) 10 EJIL237, is instructive in this regard. The judgment of 
Lord Millet argues forcefully that there should be jurisdiction in situations of torture, even in cases of the 
absence of any law within the domestic law incorporating conformist norms preventing torture. 
1374 Dagi v BHP [1997] 1VR428. BHP sued in tort for polluting Ok Tedi River and the adjacent land, thus 
prejudicing the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the land and waters, which involved the tailing from a gold/copper 
mine. The court stressed the issue of negligent management of the multinational’s activities on the basis 
of human rights violations and environmental degradation. This case was an effort to bridge the yearning 
gap of holding multinationals accountable for the adverse consequences resulting from their operations. 
See also the more recent case of Chandler v Cape [2012] EWCA Civ 525. 
1375 Cape v Lubbe [2001] 1 WLR 1545. 
1376 In the case of Sarei v Rio Tinto, 221 221 F supp 2d 1116(CD Cal 2002), jurisdiction was accordingly 
refused. 
1377 Sornarajah (n 1357) 174. 
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7.6 OBLIGATION NOT TO MEDDLE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS: 
 
The common practice is that multinational corporations operate in host states in such a 
way as to make certain that governments or groups favourable to the multinational 
company hold on to power. Repeatedly the charge is that the “multinational corporation 
holds a proxy on behalf of the home state to ensure that there is flexible government or 
that the home state encourages meddling to ensure that pro-business governments are 
elected”. 1378 
In recent years, many systems have been put in place to ensure that the multinational 
corporations do not meddle in the politics of the host state. The statements contained in 
these are usually soft law interdictions. However, the question arises in modern law as 
to “whether there is a more direct responsibility in a state of affairs in which there is a 
connection of the Multinational Corporation or associated home state officials for 
effecting coups or carrying out regime change in the host state governments”,1379 since 
such an alteration in government will favour the multinational corporation’s actions or 
favour the home state’s strategies and objectives. The assessment of progress in 
establishing such direct personal liability of the corporations or officers for such action is 
an area which remains to be completely investigated.1380 
Further, in the light of developing realities, multinational industries can no longer afford 
to be complacent in view of the challenges posed to the future of the industry.1381 The 
preventive approach and the case by case approach to environmental and human rights 
issues are no longer adequate. As a developing phenomenon, this study concurs with 
the International Association of Geophysical Contractors1382 that the successful 
management of human rights and the environment requires planning, training, 
consultation and evaluation.1383 The evaluation of the human rights report on the Niger 




1379 Ibid 174. 
1380 The classic example is the Pinochet case; there is no consensus amongst commentators as to the 
extent of legal responsibility for effecting changes of foreign governments. Time will tell. 
1381 CPMLP Journal, “Environmental and Human Rights Issues: Implications for Petroleum and Mineral 





to determine its activities with potential environmental and human rights impact.1384 In 
the case where the impact is foreseeable, it permits the oil industry to make apposite 
venture decisions, as to whether taking into consideration the probable threats and the 
alleviation of costs it would be cost-effectively useful for a project to go ahead or not. In 
addition, the industry should always be resolute on environmental and human rights 
impact assessments for every project, irrespective of whether provided for or under the 
national law of the host countries.1385 
In the course of their links with the security arms of the state, multinational  
corporations progressively turn their areas of operation into garrisoned enclaves. Thus, 
the host country may be concerned about its military security.1386 Vagts explains this 
dilemma, in which he explains: “the product of the multinational corporation may be 
critical, directly or indirectly, to the defence structure of the state; local production may 
seem vital. Still, to allow production to be carried on within a structure which is 
controlled by a foreign commercial organisation and which ultimately owes some, if not 
primary, allegiance to a foreign political entity is to vitiate that security. The United 
States which has twice panicked over the power of the German chemical industry in this 
country,1387 can hardly tell other nations that this concern is a mirage”.1388 
Furthermore, the activities of multinationals in extractive industries “tend to excite great 
anxieties in host governments and in the popular imagination, giving rise to visions of a 
country stripped of its natural heritage, like Peru after the Conquistadores, while the 
benefits have fled abroad. Some multinational corporations have disturbed host 
governments more than small firms might because of the scale of their production, their 
tendency to exclude rival producers and their capacity to integrate downstream activities 
in a way that arouses suspicion that they are avoiding national policies. It should be 
noted that it is this latter aspect that converts a simple large-scale mining or drilling 
 
1384 Ibid. 
1385 M Zahraa and A Shehu, ‘Environmentalism versus Oil: Nationalism in the Niger Delta. Current 
Concerns and Dilemmas of the Multinational Oil Company’ (2006) 4(3) OGEL 1-29. 
1386 Note, for example, the French concern over the United States denial of use of the IBM computers in 
connection with atomic testing, reported in John Walsh, ‘France: First the Bomb, then the ‘Plan Calcul’ 
(1967) 156 Science 767. 
1387 Hearing on 3rd Res. before the Senate committee investigating the National Defence Program 77th 
congress (1941). 
1388 Detlev F Vagts, ‘The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law’ (1970) 83(4) 
Harvard Law Review 739, 761. 
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operation into a transnational enterprise with its special aspects of integrated 
international operations and product diversity”.1389 
Accusing fingers have been pointed in the direction of multinational oil companies for 
providing logistical and infrastructural support to the coercive arms of government, 
including the military and the police, in return for ‘protection’.1390 According to Ukeje, it 
is not totally unplanned that many police stations and military posts are located close to, 
next to, or inside oil installations.1391 This explicitly shows that as far as the oil region is 
concerned, the infrastructure of oil and oppression are closely linked in such a way that 
power flows from both the barrel of crude oil and the barrel of a gun. 
The hostility between multinational companies and host governments has, to some 
extent, broken in recent times. In an era where communism has been shown to be 
ineffective and the dominance of a free market economy to organise the means of 
production is gaining acceptance, hypotheses which are antagonistic to private schemes 
as the means of producing growth are unlikely to make progress.1392 “In the midst of  
the increasing privatisation of state companies underway in developed countries as well 
as developing countries, and the progress of the capital markets in most developing 
countries, there has been a significant shift away from ideological opposition towards 
foreign investment”. Several states have seen more wisdom in a practical approach to 
the quandary than in a specific ideological posture.1393 The fear that multinationals 
create a threat to the sovereignty of developing states has ebbed with the tide of 
increasing poise within the developing states in running their financial systems. 1394 It 
would appear that multinational corporations may also have left behind the role of being 
instruments of the foreign policy of their home states. Sometimes, they have even 





1390 Charles U Ukeje, ‘A Farwell to Innocence? African Youth and Violence in the Twenty-first Century’ 
(2012) 6(2) International Journal of Conflict and Violence 338, 
1391 Ibid. 
1392 Sornarajah (n 3) 59. 
1393 Ibid. 
1394 Ibid. 
1395 Ibid; The probable instances are coalitions made by oil companies with oil producing states which may 
be disadvantageous to their home states 
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However, a number of the larger multinational corporations are capable of carrying out 
courses of action on foreign soil for their corporate advantage.1396 
Furthermore, the decline in antagonism towards multinational corporations was 
advanced by the studies of the United Nations Commission on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC)1397. At the same time as sustaining the observation that foreign 
investment through multinational corporations may perhaps have negative results in 
specific situations, various studies have shown that, aptly proscribed, multinational 
corporations could be an engine to stimulate the growth of the developing world.1398 It 
can be said without any misgivings that this finding has had consequences in the 
promotion of a more permissive approach to foreign investment in developing countries 
and has created the authorised modus operandi which was to come into use to manage 
foreign investment. It also had an impact on the forms through which developing 
countries were privileged to receive investments.1399 
Changes in attitudes have developed over time. The laws that were shaped by the older 
attitudes have not completely been dismantled by those which are being shaped by the 
new attitudes.1400 The studies of the UNCTC on the role of foreign investment have 
helped developing countries to recognise the useful as well as the damaging effects of 
multinational activities.1401 Sornarajah explains: 
There was clear evidence for the view that foreign “investments made by 
multinational corporations benefit the local economy through the flow of 
capital and technology, the generation of new employment and the 
creation of new opportunities for export income.1402 For the first time, 
serious efforts were made to recognise the precise types of activity of 
multinational corporations which could harm the host economy”. This 
enabled the host countries to take regulatory measures to counter harmful 
practices. They also resulted in efforts to fashion codes of conduct for 
 
1396 Ibid 59-60. 
1397 Ibid; This body at present is much reduced and now functions within UNCTAD and, in a sign of the 
times, takes a less forceful position than it had before now. 







multinational corporations, so generating principles which, though not 
international law, will have an influence in shaping the course of the 
development of the law for the future”.1403 
The fundamental issue addressed by the draft codes of conduct was that multinational 
corporations should avoid certain identifiable conduct which was seen as harmful to the 
economic development of the poorer states.1404 
There were practices associated with technology transfer (extensively publicised as one 
of the benefits brought in by foreign investment) which deprived the host economy of 
the benefits of the transfer.1405 Chief amongst these were many limiting clauses 
introduced into transfer agreements which prevented the transferee from procuring the 
benefits of the transfer.1406 They were intended to make the most of the benefit to the 
transferor, but their indirect effect was to weaken the host economy. Thus, “there were 
restrictions on the export of the goods manufactured with the technology, grant-back 
provisions which required that new inventions or adaptations made by the transferee to 
be given over to the transferor, tie-in clauses which required associated products to be 
purchased only from the transferor, and similar restrictions controlling the use of 
technology”.1407 
There is a popular view that, with regards to the allocation of financial benefits, the new 
financial arrangements will not generate significant shifts. Notwithstanding however, in 
industries where “bargaining powers continue to shift in favour of the host country, and 
where host country negotiation skills are sufficiently strong, the changes will be more 
than political. There will be real changes in who controls the operations and who 
receives the financial benefits from the projects”.1408 The concept of ownership may 
have lost some of its significance for managers of companies with experience in 
arrangements which confer sufficient control over critical decisions and provide 
attractive financial benefits to the company, with little direct claim to ownership.1409 On 
 
1403 Ibid 60. 
1404 Ibid 60. 
1405 Ibid 60-61. 
1406 Ibid 61. 
1407 Ibid. 
1408 Ibid. 
1409 Ibid 32. 
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the other hand, the new forms of agreement, while providing a means of sharing 
symbolic power and economic benefits in ways the traditional concession could not, 
have not eliminated the complex technical problems relating to the allocation of financial 
benefits.1410 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that consecutive financial crises have also hurt the 
force of the classical view and the impacted on the liberalisation of entry standards to 
some extent.1411 Both the Mexican and the Asian financial crises were caused by the 
sudden withdrawal of foreign investment, particularly portfolio investment.1412 In the 
context of these events, there has been some re-examination as to the forms of foreign 
investment that would be beneficial and those which would not be. 
Sornarajah makes reference to studies which show that the technology exported was 
outdated and dangerous.1413 Equipment and processes which were antiquated and 
which, if not long superseded through more advanced knowledge ought to have been, 
were exported to developing countries who were possibly not sophisticated to recognise 
what they were receiving. The degree of harm to the environment caused by the export 
of such technology was identified in these studies, and there have been striking 
examples of the probable harm to both life and the environment that such outmoded 
technology could cause.1414 Such instances show that multinational corporations 
frequently employ technology which they are not allowed to use in their own states in 
developing states because it is cheaper to do so and there is no regulation or effective 
supervision to prevent the use of such harmful technology.1415 
It would appear that the benefits which multinational corporations bring are also 
undermined by practices they adopt to protect their commercial interests. By imposing 
limitations upon the host state as to business practices they are able to espouse on an 
international scale, they effectively prevent the host state from achieving the maximum 
 
1410 Ibid 33. 
1411 Sornarajah (n 3) 71. 
1412 Ibid 71. 
1413 Ibid 72. 
1414 Ibid. 
1415 The question has been raised as to whether a home state has responsibility in international law for 
allowing a multinational corporation to set up in other states with defective technology, the use of which 
would not have been allowed in the home state. See article by M Sornarajah, ‘State Responsibility for 
Harm Caused by Corporate Nationals Abroad’ in C Scott (ed) Torture As Tort, (Oxford: Hart 2000) 491. 
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scope of export potential for the goods manufactured within its territory. The delineation 
of world markets into sections in which each subsidiary operates may be beneficial to 
the multinational corporations, but not to the host states, as exports to some areas are 
effectively barred by this means. Efforts have been made to construct codes on 
restrictive business practices which have not materialised to any considerable extent, 
but the efforts themselves also add to the development of international law on foreign 
investment.1416 Of topical interest is the movement to include competition as a WTO 
discipline. Surprisingly, this would appear to be opposed by many developing states, 
who see in it an attempt to prise open their markets rather than an effort to help them 
reduce the preventive practices of multinational corporations.1417 
Foreign investments by multinational corporations can produce good and harm to the 
economic development, and as such must be carefully regulated. In response, many 
developing countries, are increasingly enacting regulatory frameworks for such 
investments by corporations.1418 For example, “some have legislation designed to ensure 
that technology transfers are affected without too many restrictions on their use by the 
transferee”.1419 Globally, this is the basis on which attempts at formulating codes 
regulating the conduct of multinational corporations are being made. Notably, 
Sornarajah recognises that “multinational corporations can engineer development if 
properly harnessed, challenges many propositions relating to international law which 
have been stated on the basis of the classical theory”.1420 
Sornarajah explains: 
 
Unlike the classical theory, which favours, liberalisation and the freedom of 
movement for multinational corporations on the assumption that this 
1416 Ibid 72. 
1417 Ibid. 
1418 In comparison to most developing countries, Australia has taken positive steps to ensure the 
enactment of proper legislation with regards to the protection of the environment. See Kenneth M 
Murchison, ‘Environmental Law in Australia and the United States: A Comparative Overview’ (1995) 22(3) 
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 503-561. R J Fowler, ‘Environmental Law and its 
Administration in Australia’ (1984) 1 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 10; Martin Auster, ‘The 
Harmonisation of Environmental Law: A European-Australian Comparison’ (1988) 5 Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 276; and Brian J Preston and Charlotte Hanson, ‘The Globalisation and 
Harmonisation of Environmental Law: An Australian Perspective’ (2013) 16 Asia Pacific Journal of 
Environmental Law. 
1419  Ibid 73. 
1420 Ibid 73. 
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promotes development, the newer theory requires the recognition of the 
right of regulation of the foreign investment process by the host state. The 
classical theory mandated absolute rules of investment protection and their 
uniform application to all investments. The basis of this position has been 
shaken by the increasing acceptance of the view that foreign investment 
should be entitled to protection only on a selective basis. Protection 
depends on the extent of the benefit it brings the host state and the extent 
to which it has conducted itself as a good corporate citizen in promoting 
the economic objectives of the host state.1421 There is a requirement to 
accept the laws and regulations of the host state which are designed to 
capture the maximum benefits the foreign investment can bring to the host 
state’s economic development. The quid pro quo for multinational 
corporations in existing and profiting from operations in the host state is 
that it should ensure that the laws that seek to link its operations with the 
economic goals of the state are pursued.1422 
The view favoured by some commentators is that a combination of directive and 
candour is what is seen as popular. The weighty authoritarian regimes which existed in 
the past have been replaced by regimes based on expediency. The policy of rapid 
industrialisation desired by developing countries requires capital which only  
multinational corporations are able to make available. This transformation must be 
supported by complimentary polices that give due regard to the commercial interests of 
multinational corporations. For example, the organisation of administrative controls is 
seen as obligatory to enhance the economic objectives of the state in receiving the 
foreign investment. The view that all investment has to be cosseted through 
international minimum standards is no longer a practicable notion, as the practice of 
states shows that they do not guarantee the idea that all foreign investment is entitled 
to such a minimum standard.1423 The superficially imposed minimum standards shield 
the multinational corporations without the imposition of any analogous duties. That idea 
has to be abandoned in view of the contending notions that extend protection only to 
 
1421 It is a settled principle of law that a dishonest investor should not be shielded. This is coming to be 
stated in the arbitral awards by the host country’s law. 
1422 Ibid 73 (Emphasis added). 
1423 Ibid 74. 
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multinational corporations which act in accordance with the laws and policies of the host 
states in which they perform their task. In the alternative, according to Sornarajah, such 
a minimum standard exists only to the extent that the multinational corporation abides 
by the regulatory standards directed by the host state. In this sphere it would be 
impossible for a multinational corporation which causes environmental pollution or does 
comparable harm in the host state to seek the defence of the minimum standards of 
treatment in international law, when there is the inevitable attempt by the state to 
prevent or counter such behaviour.1424 
Increasingly, international law on environmental protection has yielded greater influence 
on multinational corporations. This shows that the underlying principle must be 
formalised in law, in order to compel observation by these corporations. However, there 
are polarising views on the development of environmental prescriptive measures. This is 
evidenced by instances where regulatory intervention amounts to an expropriation for 
which compensation needs to be paid. It is worth emphasising however, that the extent 
of international law influence on multinationals is difficult to measure, given the fact that 
cultural, economic and political influences are even more elusive to measure. A more 
meaningful measurement would be the effect of the multinational company, as opposed 
to its mere presence which tends to be scrutinised. 
Gordon has suggested that the extensive activity of multinational corporations in 
developing countries has tended to place the blame for nearly all of the negative 
conditions of the developing countries on the multinational, such as the failure to 
eliminate poverty, the continued existence of unequal employment opportunities, 
persistent high levels of unemployment and inflation and an increasingly 
disproportionate distribution of income as opposed to some movement, however 
modest, toward a more egalitarian society.1425 While the multinational enterprises are 






1424 Ibid 64. 
1425 Michael W Gordon, ‘The Impact of the Multinational Corporation in the Third World’, in Kenneth 
Simmonds (ed) Legal Problems of Multinational Corporations, (London: British Institute of International & 
Comparative Law 1977). 
349 
 
except in rare instances1426, institutions with wrongful intentions and they are usually 
quite subject to host nation control.1427 
Without a doubt, the increasing attempts of developing countries to re-enforce the 
nation-state concept, have been demonstrated quite clearly in declarations of the United 
Nations and Developing Countries’ organisations. It is hardly surprising that contrasting 
views are held by the heads of home governments of multinational enterprises; the goal 
of the multinational enterprise is to provide a return on invested capital, and that of the 
developing countries to seek a development which will improve the quality of life of its 
citizens.1428 What is necessary is to seek structural relationships between multinational 
enterprises and Developing Countries which are compatible, and which can resolve the 
real and perceived damaging effects of the multinational enterprise in developing 
countries.1429 
In the study’s view, the achievement of a balance of interests rests initially in the hands 
of the developing countries, each of which must develop a framework to regulate the 
activities of multinational corporations in a manner compatible with the achievement of 
their desired levels of development. If these nations can formulate such a regulatory 
framework, an effective framework may require actions in concert through multi- 
national associations such as geographic and product unions, in order to undermine the 
efforts of large multinationals to play one nation against another, then perhaps a 
healthy balance of interests can be arrived at.1430 The objective must be to identify an 
international legal framework generally agreed upon by nations as appropriate for the 
conduct of both multinational enterprises regarding their relationships in developing 
countries, and, equally important, the obligations of developing countries toward 
 
 
1426 The experience attendant on such corporations as IT&T and United Fruit (now United Brands) 
presents a distorted view of the aggregate impact of the multinational. See e.g. Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations, Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the International 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. and Chile, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (comm. print 1973) and Thomas McCann, An 
American Company: The Tragedy of United Fruit. (New York: Crown Publishers 1976). 
1427 The Mexican regulations regarding foreign investment illustrate the form of regulation increasingly 
being adopted in the developing world. See Michael W Gordon, (1973), ‘The Contemporary Mexican 
Approach to Growth with Foreign Investment: Controlled but Participatory Independence’ (1973) 10(1)m 
Calif. West L, Rev. 1. 
1428 Gordon (n 1427) 23. 
1429 Ibid. 
1430 Asante (n 4) 358. 
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multinational enterprises.1431 With regards to expansion and the like, a government with 
a system of import controls could have considerable impact on the policy of the 
multinational company through the administration of import licenses.1432 Asante 
rightfully denotes that “gross intervention by governments in these issues could be 
counterproductive”.1433 
7.7 MULTINATIONALS AND THE OIL COMMUNITIES, THE NIGER DELTA AS 
A CASE STUDY 
The Niger Delta lies in the southernmost part of Nigeria, stretching from the Cameroon 
boundary in the East to the Ondo–Ogun States boundary in the West. The Niger Delta 
comprises about 1,600 communities in nine states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
namely Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States 
with a collective population of more than 20 million people. The strategic location of the 
area and the actions of its people placed the Niger Delta on a strong path to socio- 
economic growth rather early on, particularly throughout the period of trans-Saharan 
trade in Africa. 
The Niger Delta is undoubtedly the most exploited, controversial and misunderstood 
region in sub-Saharan Africa. The plunder of the Niger Delta has turned the quality of 
life, the status and the well-being of the Niger Delta full circle.1434 Crude oil has replaced 
palm oil produce, but the dramatis personae are the same – the image of a powerful 
European multinational company intent on extracting the last life juice out of the richly 
endowed Niger Delta, and a hapless people struggling valiantly against the juggernaut 
dates back to the activities of the slave trade, when able-bodied men and women were 
exported to the New World and Europe to provide the European masters such cheap 
services as the slaves were intimidated to perform.1435 
This inhuman trade sucked the people of the Niger Delta into the orbit of international 
finance capital and, undeniably, laid the starting point for the exploitation of the area’s 
 
1431 Ibid. 
1432 Ibid 359. 
1433 Ibid 359. 
1434 Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger 




resources by outsiders.1436 For years now, the pattern has remained unchanged and 
most of these multinationals have added a frighteningly new dimension to this scenario: 
ecological warfare.1437 As far back as the colonial times, the region was exploited 
through the payment of very low price for its agricultural produce, exorbitant prices for 
its imports and meagre wages to local personnel who served in the civil service and 
some sectors of the economy.1438 
The hope of Niger Delta people to change their fate through the practice of federalism 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s was dashed by the introduction of many negative 
legislative policies such as the Petroleum Control Decrees of 1967; the Oil in Navigable 
Waters Act 1968; Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulation Law No 45 of 1968; Oil Terminal Dues 
of 1969; Petroleum Act of 1968; Land Use Act of 1978, Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 
1978, Land Title Vestry Decree of 1993 and the National Inland Waterways Authority 
Decree of 1977. 
Furthermore, oil production in Nigeria has no doubt been “a mixed bag of fortune and 
misfortune, of blessings and curses dependent largely on who is feeling the pain”.1439 
For Nigeria, by and large, it has been a huge blessing in disguise. Apart from its oil 
revenues, Nigeria’s is an almost total agrarian economy and oil revenue thus accounts 
for about 90% of her foreign exchange earnings and substantially funds her 
development programmes.1440 
For the oil communities in Niger Delta, however, oil has been more of a curse than a 
blessing, particularly those communities where oil exploration and production are carried 
out onshore. Deforestation, erosion and destroyed farmlands are the main signposts for 
this supposed gift of nature.1441 Oil companies’ activities in these communities have 








1439 Udeme Ekpo, The Niger Delta and Oil Politics (Lagos: International Energy Communications Ltd 2004) 
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The balance of power in Nigeria is such that the national interest reigns supreme over 
local rights.1442 It has been argued that, in the national arena, an influential individual or 
dominant group is often able to influence decisions in its favour, creating imbalances, 
distortions, and inequity. It has also been argued that the Nigerian revenue allocation 
formula is grossly inadequate since it fails to adequately take into account depreciation 
and other serious adverse externalities distressing the oil producing areas.1443 
Nigeria is not alone in this. Even though the exploitation of oil has created some of the 
largest fortunes and has helped to achieve remarkable economic growth and 
development, little or no attention has been directed to the impact of this exploitation 
on the producing areas, particularly in developing countries.1444 
Another incommodious aspect is that where there are spillages, losses could be 
unquantifiable.1445 Even where attempts are made by the companies to pay monetary 
compensation, such compensation is usually inadequate.1446 To make matters even 
worse, “there is also the problem of acid rain, which destroys the houses and 
environment of people living within the vicinity of oil exploitation and production 
activities, and which they have to contend with every day of their lives”.1447 
The sizeable oil revenue generated during Nigeria’s oil boom, if well managed, offered 
the potential for improving the lives of the poor through increased investment in health, 
education, water, roads and other vital necessities.1448 But if such public funds find their 
way into governments lacking in transparency and accountability, it is most unlikely that 
the objective of poverty reduction will be achieved. To nobody’s surprise, matters for 
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Furthermore, it is a popular view amongst economic and political theorists that oil in the 
Niger Delta has been a curse on the nation.1450 This so-called resource curse theory 
explains the restiveness of the Niger Delta communities, which has transformed the 
communities into a breeding ground of vandalism of oil installations, kidnappings of 
foreign workers, just to mention a few. A formerly peaceful and stable region, the Niger 
Delta has given way to violence and crisis, due to community disapproval of these 
activities.1451 
At this juncture, it is worth highlighting that whilst the black letter law enshrines oil 
resources ownership and control in the Nigerian government, the reality is that the 
government itself continuously struggle to assert these rights against the multinational 
companies. The global oil industry for example, is dominated by a few major super- 
companies such as ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and BP; all of which have a heavy 
presence in the Niger Delta. These companies have superior access to capital and 
technology in an industry extremely dependent on both. The fact remains that these 
companies most often stunt the growth of other sectors. Take Nigeria for example, that 
was an agricultural based economy, before the discovery and development of oil. 
Moreover, the disproportion of wealth, power and knowledge between international oil 
companies and host government means that oil companies can drive hard bargains over 
the percentage of oil profits accruing to them. 
Africans, desperate to change the unchanging nature of colonialism in their territories, 
allege that the formation and execution of foreign policy, especially in oil-producing 
nations, has been deliberately tied to foreign oppression, exploitation and the trappings 
of imperial ambition by multinational corporations which are nurtured and supported by 
1450 Many theorists often consider Nigeria as the poster child of the resource curse. The resource curse 
was a term developed by economic theorists to describe the adverse impact on economic growth by 
natural resource abundance. For further commentaries, see Andrew Williams, ‘Shining a Light on the 
Resource Curse: An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Natural Resources, Transparency, and 
Economic Growth’ (2011) 39(4) World Development 490-505; W Max Corden and J Peter Neary, ‘Booming 
Sector and De-industrialisation in a Small Open Economy’ (1982) 92 Economic Journal 825-848 and W 
Max Corden ‘Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation’ (1984) 36(3) 
Oxford Economic Papers 359; Jeffrey D Sachs and Andrew M Warner ‘Natural Resource abundance and 
Economic Growth’ (1995) 5398 NBER Working Paper 1-50 and Jeffrey D Sachs and Andrew M Warner, 
‘Natural Resource and economic development: the curse of natural resources’ (2001) 46 European 
Economic Review 827-838; Larry Diamond and Jack Mosbacher, ‘Petroleum to the People: Africa’s Coming 
Resource Curse – and how to Avoid It’ (2013) Foreign Affairs. 
1451 V Ojakorotu, ‘Anatomy of the Niger Delta crisis: causes, consequences and opportunities for peace 
(2010) 3 LIT Verlag Munster. 
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their respective imperial centres.1452 The reaction to the experience in Africa is such that 
multinational corporations are regarded as being neo-colonialist.1453 According to 
Nkrumah, the past president of Ghana observed: 
“Africa is a paradox, which illustrates and highlights neo-colonialism. Her 
earth is rich, yet the products that come from above and below her soil 
continue to enrich not Africans predominantly, but groups and individuals 
who operate to Africa impoverishment… If Africa’s multiple resources were 
use din her own development they could place her amongst the 
modernised continents of the world but her resource have been and still 
are being used for the greater development of oversees interest”1454 
It is not out of place to say that such conflict amongst the oil producing communities of 
the Niger Delta reflects the widespread collapse of public order in the country. These 
inordinate conflicts derive from the depth of social frustration and anger harboured by 
the oil communities. These grievances, however, are directed first against elements they 
consider having sold out their communal heritage; secondly, against the oil companies, 
whose years of exploration and production have so far yielded little positive 
development; and thirdly, against the ‘distant’ Nigerian state, more concerned over what 
it accumulates than caring about the proverbial goose that lays the golden egg1455. 
The truth is that, most of the violent conflicts in contemporary Nigeria, especially those 
in the oil-rich area of the Delta State, reveal, in unequivocal terms, the inherent 
weakness of the state institutions.1456 The state, in order to resolve  these anomalies, 
has resorted to a strong preference for military coercion to suppress such incessant 
militant groups, whose activities destroy the production of oil in these communities.1457 
The oil-rich communities are now “on the boil, and they have struck out for self- 
determination, insisting on a new Nigeria informed by true federalism, equity, justice 
 
1452 Bingu W T Mulharika discussed in Isaac Igweonwu, ‘A Theoretical Perspective on Negotiations with 
Reference to the International Oil Industry’ (1988) 11(2) OPEC 181. 
1453 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism (Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd, 1st 
edition 1965) 1-2. 
1454 Ibid. 
1455 Charles Ukeje, ‘Youth, Violence and the collapse of Public Order in the Niger Delta’ (2001) XXVI (1 
and 2) 337, 338. See also Okonta and Douglas (n 1381) 19. 
1456 Ibid 338. 
1457 Ibid 338. 
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and negotiated co-operation”.1458 They are agitating that multinational  companies 
should be held accountable and compelled to pay reparations for the devastation caused 
to their environment and lives. 
Another notable factor is the emergence of a new generation of well-educated youth, 
aware of the disparity between urban and rural centres and believing that the 
multinational oil companies have the wherewithal to redress the forever-growing social 
gap. It is a known fact that Nigerian economy runs on oil extracted from the Niger Delta 
region of the country1459. 
Oil is the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy and the interest and stakes of key players, 
especially the state and international oil companies, in the oil economy are reasonably 
high. To a great extent, and for understandable reasons, “the majority of the oil-bearing 
communities and the people of Niger Delta region adopt a counter-hegemonic and anti- 
oil stakeholders’ discourse and orientation”.1460 
Several scholars1461 cite the fact that statistics from the Central Bank of Nigeria clearly 
support the various research findings. On record is a recent Central Bank of Nigeria 
report finding that Nigeria earned about $2.9 billion from oil during the month of 
January 2006 alone.1462 This underscores the importance of oil to the Nigerian economy. 
On the international scene, Nigerian oil is of great importance, it being the eighth 
largest producer of oil in the world, and therefore any form of disruption to the oil 
supply from Nigeria would have serious consequences to the global oil supply and no 






1458 Okonta and Douglas (n 1434) 19. 
1459 Before the discovery of oil in 1956 at Oilober, the Nigerian economy was agro based. They key 
agricultural products were cocoa, groundnut and palm oil. See W Graf, The Nigerian State: Political 
Economy, State Class and Political System in the Post-Colonial Era (London: James Curry 1988) 9; D 
Robinson, Ogoni: The Struggle Continues (Geneva: World Council of Churches 1996) 9. The rise of oil 
revenue led to the affliction of the Dutch Disease see T L Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Boom and 
Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press 1997). 
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conflict in the middle East which already accounts for an enormous supply of oil for the 
world oil reserves.1463 
There is no doubt that despite the fact it contributes to the Nigerian and global 
economy, Nigerian oil has been a source of huge profit for multinational oil companies. 
It can be argued that, “like most oil and gas export dependent states of the Middle East 
and North Africa, Nigeria has the constitutional framework of a rentier state. But unlike 
the typical rentier state of the Arabian Gulf and Maghreb region, the Nigerian state lacks 
a coalescence of political structures in which the national identity and hegemonic elite 
interests are both preceded by and predicated on the invocation of a common 
supranational idiom of cultural heritage such as pan-Islamism, sovereign or 
constitutional manacling and pan-Arabism”.1464 
Simply stated, a rentier state is a state reliant not on the surplus production of the 
domestic population or economy but on externally generated revenues or rents, usually 
derived from an extractive industry such as oil,1465 It lacks a productive outlook in the 
sense that revenues from natural resources really contribute a significant proportion of 
the gross domestic product and dominate national income distribution, in most cases at 
the expense of the real production sectors of the economy.1466 In most rentier states, 
such as those in Africa and the Middle East, considerable political influence is wielded by 
the rentier elites. For instance, Nigeria is a colonial creation controlled by a coterie of 
men who are endemically individualistic with a tenuous productive base but lavishly 
ostentatious.1467 In a rentier state, the distribution of revenue, in the absence of stable 
and well-developed legal, political and bureaucratic institutions, tends to encourage 
corruption. The tendency towards corruption is also compounded by the pervasiveness 





1464 P M Lewis, ‘The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria’ in Nancy Birdshall, Milan Vaishnav and Robert L Ayres 
(eds) Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and. Poorly Performing States (Washington DC: Center for Global 
Development 1998) 83-116. (Emphasis added) 
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1468 Ibid 57. 
357 
 
A 2006 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report also concludes that “the 
Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social 
infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth 
and squalor”1469 What’s more, the account affirms that “the prevailing state of affairs  
not only elucidates the escalating waves of restlessness in the region, it also signifies a 
bleak future for the area and the country” and that “if unaddressed, these do not augur 
well for the future of Nigeria or an oil hungry world.”1470 
Significantly, the foregoing is in unwavering agreement with earlier findings of several 
commentators and they favour the view that the quandary is both consistent and long- 
lasting.1471 In an investigation carried out in the mid-1990s the World Council of 
Churches (WCC), Geneva, pointedly put forward its conclusion as follows: 
It is clear that the oil boom resulted in numerous financially capital- 
intensive projects, including the expansion of the network of roads, and of 
course the development of the new capital city Abuja. Most of this 
development took place in the non-oil-producing areas. The oil-producing 
areas were, and still are, some of the least developed in the country. There 
is no electricity, running (potable) water, no telephones, no good roads, 
poor health care facilities, etc. People in Ogoni land, and other minority 
groups in the Niger Delta live in similar or even worse conditions. The 
revenues from oil have bought incredible modernisation and development 






1469 UNDP, Niger Delta Human Development Report (2006) 
<http://hdr.undp.org/doc/report/national/NIR> accessed 20 January 2018. 
1470 The report rightly captured the mood in the region when it found that for most people of the Delta, 
progress and hope remain out of reach. See Kaniye S A Ebeku, ‘Oil, Niger Delta and the New 
Development Initiative: Some Reflections from Socio-Legal Perspective’ (2006) 3 OGEL 4. 
1471 In the meeting held on the 5th of April 2006, it was reiterated by stakeholders in that meeting that 
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Furthermore, the state of underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region is a well-known 
fact all over the world, thanks to the higher profile given to the matter in recent times 
by the recurrent actions of militant youths in the region. For example, the kidnapping of 
foreign oil workers which causes the world oil prices to rise has attracted the attention 
of national and international news media which have focused on the developmental 
despair of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Significantly, neither the federal 
government of Nigeria nor the multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta 
deny that the Niger Delta region is underdeveloped and neglected, and its indigenous 
inhabitants are poor.1473 Without a doubt, the oil companies exert a lot of influence but 
allegedly they do not employ their position to bring about development in the area they 
work in1474. 
Firstly, most of the multinational oil companies, given their long history of exploiting 
resources in the Niger Delta, such as Shell, are well aware that the region is devastated 
and neglected by the federal government and consider reinvesting some of its oil 
revenues for the development of the region.1475 They argue that their operations are 
guided by specific contractual terms with which they have complied. They also 
distinguish their role, being a private enterprise, from that of the government as 
provider of social services to its population.1476 This argument, however, does not hold 
water since corporate constructive social engagement is not statutory but in fact an 
obligatory ingredient of stakeholder management. Corporate practice has shown that 
effective management of stakeholders’ relations can be a prerequisite for the win-win 
outcome for a firm and its stakeholders in the form of increased revenue stock value 
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Secondly, on behalf of the Nigerian State, the past and present Presidents1478 of Nigeria 
have severally reiterated that ‘it is unfair for south-south [Niger Delta] state, the 
producers of the nation’s wealth, to mope in penury whilst the resources from their 
areas are used to develop other parts of the country’. It is also worth mentioning that 
the Nigerian State recognises in a note verbale1479 sent to the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights the ‘gravamen’ of allegations of environmental degradation, 
neglect of the Niger Delta, and violations of human rights in the pursuit of ‘protection’ of 
oil installations.1480 
The Niger Delta people regard as unjust and inequitable the pervasive poverty amongst 
them and the underdevelopment of their region and perceive this as an even keener 
insult precisely because of the mammoth revenues which oil operations in their region 
have yielded and continue to yield to the Nigerian State.1481 The people of the area have 
continued to agitate vociferously about extreme poverty, hunger and disease, 
environmental degradation and loss of their traditional means of livelihood.1482 
7.8 RESOURCE CONTROL 
 
The supremacy of control resources bestowed by the 1999 constitution on the 
government of the federation is absolute.1483 For that reason, the said government is 
permitted to exercise such power in accordance with its own judgment and or as may 
be approved by the legislative authority of the federation, namely the National 
Assembly.1484 
Over the years, several local pressure groups and organisations have made demands of 
the Federal Government of Nigeria and also of multinationals for attenuation of the 
1478 General Abubaker, as Head of State, has, in the 1999 budget, described the situation of pervasive 
poverty and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta as ‘a sad story’. President Olusegun Obasanjo 
expressed similar sentiment. 
1479 In a Note verbal was dated 16th February 2000 and referred 127/2000. 
1480 Communication 155/96 of The Social and Economic Rights Actions Centre and the Centre  for 
Economic and Social Rights/Nigeria (decided at the 30th Ordinary Section or the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights held in Banjul, in the Gambia from 13th to 27th the October 2001) paras 30  
and 42. 
1481 Ebeku (n 1470) 12. 
1482 Diepreye Alamieyesiegha, ‘Nigeria: The Way Forward’ < 
https://allafrica.com/stories/200410181341.html> accessed 10 July 2018. 
1483 See section 44(3) of the 1999 Constitution Laws of the Federation. See also section 1(1) of the 




poverty of the peoples of the Niger Delta and the development of the region. Following 
on from the initiation of the quest for resource control which was advocated by the 
regional governments, there arose agitation for local ownership of the land and 
petroleum occurring thereon. This demand had the support and advocacy of the 
communities but not the governments.1485 The most important part of their demands 
has been captured in two important documents or declarations of rights, specifically: the 
Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990, with a 1991 appendix) and the Kaiama Declaration 
(1998)1486. The people are demanding what they call ‘resources control’. The subject of 
resource control is a catch-phrase for the demand for ownership and control of natural 
resources to be vested completely, or at least to a certain extent, in the constituent 
states of the Nigerian Federation or communities where they are naturally located and 
not, as at the moment, solely in the Federal Government.1487 
The agitation for resource control is naturally tied to the demand for the control of land. 
The people of the area point to other parts of the country, for example the north, where 
traditional rulers hold land in trust for the people. They avow that this was the practice 
in the Niger Delta as well, right from the earliest times until oil was discovered in the 
area.1488 The demand for resource control has not been limited to the Niger Delta, 
where the major resources are oil and gas, but runs through the entire south where the 
call has been loudest for the practice of federalism. Further, the people are demanding 
the right to political and economic self-determination within the Nigerian State.1489 
It is significant to underscore the benevolence in the meaning of ‘resources control’ in 
the various declarations of rights of the people; ‘resources control’ means much more 





1485 Patrick Ndubisi Oche, Petroleum Law in Nigeria: Arrangements for Upstream Operations, (Published in 
Jos, Nigeria, January 2004 by Heirs Great Commission 2004) 35. 
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the Ogoni Bill of Rights and the Kaima Declaration are not in any way at all secessionist 
in character but are simply calls for justice and development by deprived people.1490 
Also, a cautious look at the specifics of the demands of the people of the Niger Delta as 
contained in their various declarations of rights suggests that ‘resources control’ includes 
rights to be involved in the exploitation of oil resources and the management of the 
environment: (with the related rights, inter alia, to obtain some royalties). Furthermore, 
it includes customary rights to ownership and control of land, forests and water which 
the Nigerian States has allegedly expropriated by various statutes, including the 
Petroleum Act 1969 and the Land Use Act 1978.1491 
What is more, in Nigerian history, no matter has been as contentious and controversial 
as resource control. People in the south view it as the only answer to the fundamental 
question of how to guarantee justice and fair play in the handling of resources of nature 
particularly when the exploration of such resources carries with it negative 
consequences for the environment. Many from the north regard such agitation as an 
invitation to anarchy and express a preference for a stronger Federal Government that 
would be more responsible for all the other parts of the country.1492 Behind these 
preferences for a stronger government at the centre is a sense of suspicion and 
misgiving that, given control of their resources, there could be a grand design by states 
with colossal wealth to seek independence from Nigeria.1493 
One of the problems with state control of petroleum is the apparent complexity of being 
able to guarantee transparency of successive leadership in the State over the issue. 
Another quandary is that inter-state wrangling is likely to become the order of the day, 
and yet a further likely scenario is that the success of the Niger Delta States in wresting 
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analogous agitation by individuals, families and/or communities in petroleum-bearing 
localities.1494 Thus, agitation from Local Government Areas cannot be ruled out.1495 
7.9 OWNERSHIP OF MINERAL RESOURCES 
 
As with ownership of land, ownership of mineral resources (including oil) varies from 
one jurisdiction to the other. For example, oil resources could be owned entirely by the 
state or in some cases by individuals or private enterprise. It could also be owned 
together, in some form of joint ownership by the state and the private sector. It is 
important to note also that despite the fact that land in the strict sense is not subject to 
absolute ownership because it cannot be destroyed, mineral oil, on the other hand, is a 
consumable asset and is subject to absolute ownership in the legal sense, in that right 
in respect of it may consist of right of free as well as exclusive enjoyment, including the 
right of using altering, disposing of or destroying it. 
Where mineral resources are owned by the State, development operations are then 
subject to the acquisition of rights from the Government authorities, generally in the 
form of concessions or leases, preceded in some cases by licenses or permits.1496 In 
such a situation Governmental grants of permits, licenses, leases and concessions are 
an important means of controlling the acquisition and the extent of rights of foreigners 
in a country’s mineral resources. 
With regards to petroleum exploitation, it is useful to pause to example some case law 
on the comparison with permeable water resorted to in the English case of Denton v. 
Blundell.1497 This comparison was satisfactorily demonstrated in the American case of 
Banord v Bouongahela Natural Gas Co. Ltd.1498 The issue that was pleaded in this case 
was whether an injunction to prohibit drilling by a land owner on adjacent land could be 
issued on grounds of damage to the plaintiff’s land by permeation. The Court, however, 
denied the remedy on the grounds that the Court was incapable of determining the 




1496 In the context of Nigeria’s oil industry, there are only three types of concessions, namely, exploration, 
prospecting and mining – Schedule 2, para. 1, of the Petroleum Profit Tax Act, 1959. 
1497 Denton v Blundell [1843] 12 M.&W. 324. 
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capable of being easily owned in situ because of its migratory nature was recognised. 
There is a whole range of decided cases which have since established the theory in the 
American Law of Property.1499 
Wherever private ownership is in fashion, it is customary for the owner to either grant 
the mineral rights outright, or by an agreement of lease or otherwise contract out to a 
company or some similar entity, the right to remove the mineral for an agreed financial 
consideration. There may also be a mixed bag of private and State ownership or the 
State may reserve its right to specific minerals, such as uranium while leaving the 
residuary minerals to private ownership, such as in Austria. As has been observed in this 
study, where mineral resources are owned by the State, exploitation may be undertaken 
by private enterprise, foreign or indigenous in accordance with the mining legislation of 
the State or by some other special arrangement e.g. as in Britain. For many decades, 
Nigeria was a protégé of Britain, belonging to the same common law jurisdiction and 
having most of our laws in important areas such as land, companies, natural resources 
etc. fashioned after those of Britain.1500 
In developing countries, there is a general unwillingness to put mineral oil resources at 
the disposal of individuals. This is logical. To do so, it is assumed, would breed a class of 
wealthy tycoons in countries where, because of the poverty which permeates society, 
government programmes should aspire to an even development and improved standard 
of living for all. However, the capital and technical know-how for the exploitation of 
minerals is lacking in developing countries. As a result, legislation is therefore geared 
towards investing ownership in the State which, as owner, may then contract out 
mineral resources exploitation to foreign enterprises for a fixed term and under specific 
conditions which are typically concluded under concession agreements. The Venezuelan 
Mining Law of 29 December 1944, as amended, declares all mines, seams, beds or 
mineral deposits to be public utilities and under that country’s constitution they are only 
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Also, the Libyan Petroleum Law is even more categorical.1501 It affirms that all  
petroleum in its natural state in strata is the property of the State and no person may 
explore, mine or produce petroleum without a permit or concession. The Zambian Mines 
and Minerals Act no. 32 of 1976 and the Mines and Minerals Act of Botswana1502 vests 
the property in all minerals in the State for the common benefit of the people in spite of 
any right of ownership which any person may possess in and to the soil on or under 
which minerals are found or situated. Furthermore, the ownership of natural resources 
and the ownership of land in Nigeria are debatably based on the ‘Regalian Doctrine’ and 
the power of ‘Eminent Domain’ in that order. The ‘Regalian Doctrine’ or jura regalia 
‘refers to royal rights, or those rights which the King (State) has by virtue of his (its) 
prerogatives’. On the other hand, the power of ‘Eminent Domain’ is the power of the 
State to expropriate suitable private property for its own exploitation without the 
owner’s consent. The legal rewards enjoyed by oil companies in the framework of this 
controversial act in fact distance oil communities from their traditional and cultural 
resources. This is the background against which land has become the most debatable 
resource in the Niger Delta and the frequent cause of intra-community and inter- 
community disputes on one hand and most of those between oil communities and the 
Multinational Oil Companies on the other. 
Lesser incidents are usual. In addition to the pollution and hazards associated with 
spills, oil production in the Delta has extremely negative environmental impacts due to 
the prevalent practice of gas flaring. The natural gas produced as a derivative of oil 
production is burned, creating incessant, high-intensity flames. While associated natural 
gas is commonly captured and sold or used as a local energy source, in Nigeria the lack 
of delivery and utilisation infrastructures for natural gas render it a by-product which 
cannot be exploited. It is by and large The above is a partial outline of the reasons why 
the tensions and conflicts over land have become a frequent and major bone of 
contention between oil companies and their hosts. Apparently, once oil is discovered, 
the area on and under which the discovery has been made automatically becomes 
contested amongst previously peaceful neighbours, owing to the privileges and perks 
 
 
1501 Ibid 333. 
1502 Laws of Botswana cap 6601 sec.2. 
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that come out of it. The unfavourable impact of oil operations must therefore be 
appreciated, mostly with reference to land. 
Although some conflicts over land in the region have antecedents that preceded the 
discovery of oil, ignorance of (and disdain for) customary land rights and local customs 
on the part of multinational oil companies worsen existing disputes and produce new 
ones. 
In the framework of the controversial legislation hitherto in force, the benefits which oil 
companies enjoy by effectively not being required to prevent pollution in the first place 
or to make any meaningful legal recompense which is more than derisory for the harm 
sustained by the oil communities, effectively deprive oil communities from their 
traditional and cultural resources. This is the background against which land has 
become the most controversial resource in the Niger Delta, and the unrelenting factor 
destroying intra-community and inter-community harmony on the one hand and fuelling 
conflict between the oil communities and Multinational Oil Companies, on the other. 
7.10 THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY 
 
As a final point, security has turned out to be one of the foremost concerns in the Niger 
Delta with the substantial attendance of state security and the explosive burgeoning of 
unofficial security networks and hardnosed criminal gangsters who flourish on political 
support, illicit oil bunkering and gun-running. Within such an unhinged atmosphere 
marked by barefaced human rights abuses and state repression, violence 
overwhelmingly offers a self-fulfilling example that is inimical to peace, stability and 
national development. Activities by belligerent groups ranging from the Egbesu 
fraternities, the Bakassi Movement for Self-determination, to the Niger-Delta Avengers 
are well documented.1503 
 
However, it is important to note that when the objective situation of a group or 
community is repressed through violence, social values also become militarised. Since 
the commencement of the 1990s, when aggressive conflicts began to assume an 
1503 John Boye Ejobowah, ‘Who Owns the Oil? The Politics of Ethnicity in the Niger Delta of Nigeria’ (2000) 




unparalleled scale that has threatened domestic stability in the oil region and  
throughout the country, social ferocity has attained a frightening level with the  
explosion of militant youth groups whose activities confront and weaken traditional 
social order in various parts of the oil area. These community iconoclasts who always 
tend to thrive in disturbed situations, seem to spare no efforts in organising pipeline 
ruptures, thefts and other forms of sabotage. They can be quite sophisticated in their 
methods and so elicit the sympathies of the uninformed. Thus, as already stated, 
examples include the ‘Egbesu boys’ and a host of other criminal gangs. 
7.11 HISTORICAL DIVIDE AND RULE TACTICS 
 
Historically, multinational oil companies gained influence and control of the areas they 
now exploit through spending a great deal of time, effort and money on a network of 
local patrons.1504 Oil companies set up a self-serving divide-and-rule arrangement which 
regularly played neighbouring communities (or groups within each community) against 
each other and it is reasonable to suggest that this approach may have become rather 
ingrained. 
Following on from this, it can be seen that in response to the civil unrest now being 
encountered, oil companies from time to time call upon and exploit their historical direct 
and unhindered admittance to the instrumentality of official intimidation to beef up their 
protection and power in their areas of operation.1505 This lack of ethical standards in 
their approach to the real social problems throughout the Delta region goes a long way 
towards revealing a callous mindset surrounding the actions of multinationals in the 
resource-endowed but impecunious Niger Delta and the Nigerian State.1506 
7.12 THE WAY FORWARD 
 
It is apparent that grassroots mobilisation and violent behaviour are unlikely to end for a 
long time, bearing in mind how the social values amongst the oil communities have 




1504 Okonta and Douglas (n 1434) 200. 
1505 Ibid. 
1506 Ibid 200-201. 
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about the best way to restore the long list of developmental tragedies facing the oil 
communities. 
It is fair to assert that what must be recognised at some point is that the current 
situation is unsustainable. For the long-term health of the area and of the interests in 
exploiting its resources, it is clear that, sooner rather than later, a turn-around in 
approach will be required, with a realisation that the true patrons whose support needs 
to be solicited for the future are the communities themselves, and not the old-fashioned 
corrupt ruling class of officialdom. A serious and genuine commitment to expand and 
deepen democratic participation by government and the people would definitely set a 
good tone accompanied by a serious investment in improving their material well-being. 
From the foregoing, there is no denying the fact that some ground has already been 
covered in the past few years since the commencement of democratic rule. However, 
the oil communities are concerned that the much-vaunted dividend of democracy is still 
an object of distant and wistful thinking. Arguably, real democracy could bring about 
positive transformations to the present bellicose approach to law and order in the Niger 
Delta and the nation at large. 
To sum up, this brings the study to the last chapter, the protection of communities 
should be in the form of enacting municipal laws and regulations which take into 
account their particular status and not through claims of local ownership. The 
movement promoting community ownership of natural resources of some sort is 
designed at tackling this current inequality. It must be emphasised that no matter how 
bleak the prospects for peace and security may seem to be in the Niger Delta, a 
legitimately staunch civilian government which acts with sufficient determination to 
achieve necessary reform stands a far better chance than the military to beneficially 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter presents the conclusion through comparing the actual research outcome 
with the objective and the research questions set at the beginning of the research. 
The conclusion will aim to recapitulate some of the main themes which have been 
extensively discussed in this study, draw some conclusions and make some 
recommendations. More specifically answers were sought to the following: 
Research question: whether the joint venture and production sharing contracts are 
mutually beneficial to the parties involved (the foreign oil company and the host 
country). The specific question raised here is how petroleum arrangements can be 
improved for the benefit of all parties, including the interests of the world community 
at large and those of future generations. Further, whether the existing regime 
requires change or improvements, whether and how the management of production 
sharing contracts and joint venture agreements could be improved or complemented 
using some contractual devices such as stabilisation clauses in negotiations and 
enshrining in all these agreements, the proper law in case there is a dispute in such 
arrangements. The research has addressed the following key issues: 
(1) What is the current legal framework for production sharing agreements and 
joint venture agreements in the petroleum sector? 
(2) What are the differences between a production sharing contract and a joint 
venture? 
(3) How did they originate and what has been their subsequent development? 
 
(4) What are the desirable improvements to these contracts and how can these 
be implemented? 
(5) How different clauses like renegotiation clauses, stabilization clauses and 
choice of law are imperative in such contracts to make them more equitable. 
(6) How the bargaining positions of the developing countries and the 
multinational have changed over time. 
(7) How agreements can be geared to protect the needs for sustainable 
development and protection of the environment. 
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8.1 AGREEMENTS CHANGED ALONGSIDE LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND 
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
The legal categorisation of the agreements has changed from concessions to other 
forms, such as, Joint Ventures, Production Sharing Contacts, Work Contracts, and so 
forth.1507 Some writers have expressed the view that this change is not as important 
as it may look, and that as regards to substantive rights and obligations, the new 
kinds of agreements do not differ very much from concessions.1508 More or less all 
the developing countries have established certain legal and political changes within 
their national law by means of wide-ranging or special legislation pertaining to their 
natural resources, or by constitutional provisions which provide for state or public 
ownership of natural resources.1509 
Still, in respect of pre-existing concessionary rights, multinationals have come to 
accept the retroactive effect of such legislation or constitutional provisions. The legal 
institutions so laboriously established to protect foreign commerce in the past have 
not been adequate to meet the nationalist demands of newly powerful countries. At 
best, international law is not self-executing, but rather depends on the consensus of 
nations with respect to political and moral precepts. The accession of great numbers 
of newly independent countries to the community of nations, many with ancient 
cultures or new economic regimes far different from those dominating the 
international community in the past, are bound to put unprecedented strains on this 
consensus.1510 
Concessions which grant ownership rights to the multinationals are now inconsistent 
with the rights of permanent sovereignty of the state. Even if the economic benefits 
to the parties are the same in both concessions and other forms of agreements, the 
political value of the change to the states is important and substantial.1511 
 
 
1507 David N Smith and Louis T Wells Jr, ‘Mineral Agreements in Developing Countries: Structures and 
Substance’ (1975) 69 AJIL 3 560-590. 
1508 Ibid. 
1509 Cattan (n 639) 84- 85. 
1510 Muir J Dapray, Partner, Berliner, Maloney, Gimer & Muir, Washington, D.C. Vice Chairman, 
Committee on International Economic Organisations, American Bar Association, International Law 
Section. Formerly Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic & Business Affairs, U.S Department of State 
from 1971-73: ‘The Changing International Framework of International Energy Management’ (1975) 9 
Int'l L. 605. Based on remarks to the World Energy Conference Legal Seminars, September 25, 1974, 
at Detroit, Michigan. 
1511 The political survival of the governments in many developing countries may depend on how well 
they are deemed to manage the national patrimony. Calling an agreement, a ‘concession’ rather than 
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The old form of concessions, which granted extensive and absolute ownership rights 
as well as extensive control over a large territory of the granting state, was no longer 
politically or economically acceptable to the developing countries. Smith and Wells 
discuss that traditional concession agreements endured as the elusive institutional 
framework defining the commercial and legal relationship between energy-producing 
countries and international oil companies.1512 The concession agreements reflect a 
passive role for the host state, which was confined to receiving royalties for the oil 
that was exported. The concession agreement is no longer used, as the oil-producing 
countries have sought greater control over the industry.1513 The new agreements, 
which replaced the concession agreements, reflect in every way the fact that there 
has been a shift of power away from the oil companies to the oil-producing 
states.1514 
The early concession regime was based on power politics and a ‘big oil’ strategy 
rather than partnership and cooperation.1515 As a result, the concession regime 
bestowed on the major oil companies nearly complete freedom to conduct petroleum 
operations in the home states.1516 Governments had little control over either their 
resources or the companies operating within their territories. The notion of mutuality 
of interest was not even seriously entertained under the concession regime.1517 As 
such, the concession system came under increasing pressure by the host-country 
governments for a more equitable sharing of the gains and ultimately went through 
various stages of renegotiating, revision, nationalisation, and eventful  
termination.1518 
8.2 BALANCE, STABILITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT AS OBJECTIVES FOR 
AGREEMENTS 
The study has demonstrated that traditional concession agreements largely fail to 
develop a balanced, indefatigable, unchanging and mutually beneficial relationship 
between the contracting parties. 
 
giving it a label indicating state ownership, especially when the laws of the State require such a label 
would spell the doom of the Government. 
1512 Smith and Wells (n 1507) 561. 








Concerns for natural resource preservation and sustainable development were not 
articulated at all during this period. The last quarter of the twentieth century not only 
observed the waning of the old concession system but saw stable development of 
new contractual arrangements. 
This progression from traditional concession agreements to modern petroleum 
contracts has been viewed by some developing countries as a ‘revolutionary process’ 
which would wholly restructure the legal relationships between governments and 
companies in the years to come.1519 As a result, agreements such as those  
considered by Lord McNair are rare today. They have been either renegotiated or the 
lands to which they related have been expropriated by developing countries in the 
exercise of their permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.1520 
8.3 THE THRUST FOR REAL PARTICIPATION 
 
The study is of the view that the sharing of financial benefits in natural resource 
development agreements has changed. With respect to petroleum and other 
important natural resources development agreements, the producing countries are 
no longer interested merely in collecting taxes and royalties; they now seek, and 
have acquired by agreement or unilateral action, equity participation in the operating 
companies.1521 The laws of the developing countries regulating natural resources 
have been progressively modernised and are now, without doubt, more 
ascertainable. 
8.4 CLAIM THAT DOMESTIC LAW UNSUITABLE ARGUABLY A RED 
HERRING 
It is clear that one of the alleged problems of applying the law of a developing 
country to agreements was that it was too unsophisticated to regulate such complex 
economic agreements, and that such legal system was often not similar or close in 
content or stage of development to those of the investors.1522 Even if this contention 
had any validity at one time, which is doubtful, given the fact that most of the 
 
1519 Robert Fabrikant, ‘Pertamina: A Legal and Financial Analysis of a National Company in a 
Developing Country’ (1975) 10 Texas Int’l L.J. 535. 
1520 Ibid. 
1521 Smith and Wells (n 1454); The Report of the General Assembly on Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources U.N Doc A/C.97/5 Rev. 2 (E/3511); Investment Laws and Regulations in Africa U.N 
Economic Commission for Africa, U.N. Doc (1965) E/CN.14/INR/28/Rev.2. 
1522 McNair (n 1074). 
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developing countries have at one time or another shared a common legal association 
with some sophisticated legal system, the position has changed considerably in the 
last decades, as developing countries reform their laws and enact new legislation, 
mainly in the area of the development of their natural resources.1523 These changes 
in the internal legal arrangements of developing countries for exploiting their natural 
resources signify their acceptance of the now universally acknowledged challenge 
that social and economic development is primarily their responsibility. The changes 
also echo the countries’ belief in the significant role that natural resources are 
anticipated to play in their efforts.1524 
In general, the rules and practices are designed, on the one hand, to encourage 
investment of foreign capital for oil and gas development, and on the other, to 
guarantee that oil and gas development by multinationals is carried out with 
appropriate regard to the country’s national interest.1525 It is a settled principle of law 
that such matters as, permanent sovereignty over natural resources ownership, 
control and management of oil and gas resources, and participation by nationals and 
host governments are enshrined in company polices and guidelines.1526 
8.5 CLAUSES PROMOTING STABILITY EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED AND 
PRESENTED 
One of the themes to emerge from this analysis is that no agreement can exist in a 
vacuum but must be shaped and formed in the context of a legal system agreed 
upon by the parties to the agreement as binding upon the terms of the agreement. 
The legal system provides the norms by which genuine differences of opinion about 
the meaning of the terms of agreements can be resolved. 
The view in the research has been that no model agreement can fulfil this objective 
because of the diverse circumstances and capabilities of the parties, particularly the 
host country. On the other hand, there are certain types of clauses which tend to 
 
1523 For instance in the charter of Algiers adopted by the Ministerial Meeting of 77 Developing 
Countries, Oct.24, 1967, U.N. Doc. MM/77/1/20, reprinted in 7 Int’l Legal Mat’ls 177, 188 1968. The 
same conclusion was reached by many delegations in the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the 
General Assembly. 
1524 See Natural Resources of Developing Countries: Investigation, Development and Rational 
Utilisation, U.N. Doc. E/4608/Rev. 1, ST/ECA/122 (1970); Mineral Resources Development with 
Particular Reference to the Developing Countries, ST/ECA (1968). 
1525 Martin Olisa, ‘Comparison of legislation affecting foreign exploitation of oil and gas resources in 




promote the objectives of either of the parties without detriment to the remaining 
party, and to aid stability. For these reasons they are better included. There are also 
some clauses which have greater effect when they are phrased to reflect objectives 
or situations. Thirdly, there are clauses which promote contractual stability through 
all seasons because of their in-built flexibility. 
What this study has attempted to do has been to emphasise the above and to 
provide a framework within which parties may negotiate and decide on variations 
which will suit their particular situations and allow for efficient 
exploration/development of the particular area. 
8.6 THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL POLICIES ON AGREEMENTS 
 
The study found that the policies on agreement, international or otherwise, later 
become the main basis for legislation governing oil and gas operations in the 
country. Similarly, amendments to oil and gas legislation are quite frequently derived 
from specific policies on particular aspects of oil and gas operations. Because of 
“diverse national interests, developing countries that produce mainly for export lay 
emphasis on measures designed to increase oil and gas revenue, whereas highly 
industrialised countries that have not attained self-sufficiency in oil and gas from 
domestic production give priority to measures for adequate and steady importation  
of cheap oil and gas to supplement domestic production”.1527 
It has been shown that economic nationalism directed against multinationals is 
fundamental to producing countries, wherein foreign companies have large stakes in 
their oil and gas industry. In several oil producing countries, these national 
imperatives are often enshrined in legislative provisions. 
In joint venture arrangements the functions, powers and privileges of the foreign 
“partner” are more restrictive than in concessions. The host state has been able to 
participate to a greater extent, in the decision-making processes of exploitation of 
their resources by these multinationals. For example, nationals also participate at all 
levels in day to day operations, acquiring various skills in the process. The functions, 
powers and privileges of the foreign “partner” are so defined as to promote the 
national interest of the host country. 
 
 
1527 Ibid 487. 
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In a joint venture, the objectives of the multinational corporations and the home 
state will frequently be in conflict. The multinational corporation is driven by the  
need for instant profit. The home state entity, on the other hand, has long-term 
economic objectives of development and seeks to pursue these through the joint 
venture with the multinational corporation. The cooperation that is crucial for the 
success of the joint venture will be wanting in such an association and the probability 
for conflict is high.1528 
Unlike the multinational corporations, the state agency has a claim to greater 
recognition in international law. There are rules of international law which give it an 
ideal standing and make it immune, to a degree, from the process of national courts. 
The entire matter of the applicability of sovereign immunity to State entities has  
been prickly but is now being resolved by the broad acceptance of the rule that such 
immunity cannot be claimed by a State entity which engages in commercial 
activity.1529 
Multinational corporations have begun to take a long-term approach to the problem. 
As a result, they may be more willing to take an assuaging approach to such 
conflicts. Their self-interest in upholding oligopolistic positions in world markets may 
make it advantageous from their point of view to seek accommodation of their 
interests than to seek conflicts. There is also the problem that the State will be 
willing to back its entities by enacting laws that favour its entities in dealings with 
multinational corporations if the necessity for such a course arises.1530 In such a  
state of affairs, the position of the multinational corporation becomes tenuous. In the 
face of an obdurate state, a multinational corporation has little by way of legal 
weaponry to use, at least if it wishes to preserve its relations within the State.1531 
8.7 ECONOMIC PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE WILL BECOME CRUCIAL 
 
The research has demonstrated that the producing countries are acutely aware that 
their economy is based upon a diminishing asset, and that unless they diversify their 
economy, they may lose their only chance to attain prosperity and development.1532 
 
1528 Sornarajah (n 3) 70. 
1529 Ibid 72. 
1530 Ibid. 
1531 Ibid. 




And it is specifically in these fields of economic planning, of science and technology, 
and of industrial development that the consuming countries can make available 
services to the producers. It is only when these matters are objectively addressed in 
the spirit of compromise and mutual benefaction, the prospects for world peace 
cannot be viewed very positively.1533 The basic fact is that the world’s economy 
cannot be left solely to the discretion of a single bloc of countries, whether they are 
producers or consumers. In the same vein, the world cannot be “allowed to regress 
from freedom and development to a kind of reverse imperialism”.1534 It is hoped that 
the producers will act from a sense of social responsibility to the world as well as to 
the communities where they carry out their operations. Such matters are urgent and 
crucial to the world’s economy as it adjusts to the post-petroleum age.1535 
The study is of the view that production sharing agreements are “based on the 
concept that the ownership of oil is always in the state and that the state alone has 
the right to its disposal, a reflection of the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources”.1536 The risk of oil exploration is borne by the foreign corporation, 
which is given a licence for the exploration of parcels of areas where there is a 
prospect of finding oil. When oil is found, the foreign corporation may extract the oil 
and is given a certain percentage of it, so that it may recover the expenses of the 
exploration and secure a reasonable profit. These findings are consistent with 
previous research, although there are areas in which they differ.1537 The percentage 
of the oil given to the foreign corporation gradually diminishes as the expenses are 
recovered by sale, until the whole project is taken over by the state oil 
corporation.1538 The state retains ownership of the oil, subject to the right of the 
foreign corporation to its share of production. There is usually provision for joint 
management of the project with the State oil company.1539 
Both the joint venture agreement and the production-sharing agreement are legal 
arrangements which demonstrate that host states are asserting their power over 
incoming investments.1540 The amount of power that can be asserted will depend on 
 
1533 Curtis (n 1022) 317. 
1534 Dapray (n 1025) 605. 
1535 Ibid. 







the relative bargaining strengths of the parties and will involve the realisation of the 
advantages of a fine balance. A state which is desperate for investment will be 
mindful of how it exercises its sovereign power. If it wishes to be perceived as a 
country that is attractive to foreign investment, it behoves the state to take 
advantage of foreign inflows, while ensuring that the foreign investor is privy to 
incentives that will encourage him to remain and do business in that state.1541 
8.8 TO BEGIN AS ONE HOPES TO CONTINUE 
 
This study has demonstrated that from the point of view of the developing countries, 
the joint venture serves three core purposes: (1) It encourages the engagement of 
responsible local capital in productive enterprises; (2) it assists in developing a 
nucleus of experienced managerial personnel in the public and in the private sectors, 
in proportion to the participation of public authorities and private capital in the joint 
venture; and (3) it assists in the enhancement of the training of native labour and 
technicians.1542 
As developing countries progress in these respects, their need for joint ventures is 
expected to reduce. There is a general consensus amongst scholars that joint 
venture agreements are the preferred form of legal arrangement with foreign 
investors, when compared to outmoded concessions.1543 
Notwithstanding however, it is not possible to determine whether existing joint 
ventures are likely to endure. It is possible that many of them will likely be replaced 
by wholly indigenous ownership and management, given the progressive nature of 
legislative amendments in their favour by the home state.1544 Having said this, joint 
ventures do present advantages to both parties in that it involves the sharing of risk 
capital. It is also advantageous to other business entities, public relations and social 
constructs.1545 Furthermore, human capital developed through joint ventures 
agreements will undoubtably endure beyond the lifespan of the said project. It is to 
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partnership on the process of jointly seeking broader alternatives to ensure mutual 
profitability once the petroleum resources have diminished.1546 
8.9 HONESTY AND FLEXIBILITY BOTH NEEDED TO OVERCOME 
NEGATIVE FACTORS 
The basic truth is that political and psychological circumstances sometimes mitigate 
against joint ventures.1547 Where hard and unhinged circumstances prevail in a 
country, the association of a foreign investor with local interests may increase the 
precariousness of the situation. Pressure on the foreign firm may be increased 
through the local interests involved. The chosen partner may fall out of favour with a 
new government and prove to be a liability rather than an advantage.1548 
The most prevalent and indispensable criteria are flexibility of mind and attitude, and 
the ability to evaluate the elements inherent in a country, a certain situation, and for 
a particular product or service.1549 
The joint venture is an important symbol of the changing relationship between the 
developed and developing countries, but it cannot be regarded as a panacea. As 
Friedman and Kalmanoff summarise, “it is a device to be adopted, rejected, or 
modified after sober consideration of the many legal, psychological, and technical 
factors prevailing in each situation. Confidence between the partners will overcome 
the most difficult obstacles; lack of confidence will destroy the most perfect 
devices”.1550 
One element which contributes to lack of confidence and trust has emerged from 
studies which have indicated that the nature of the technology which has been 
exported has often been outdated and harmful.1551 The extent of harm to the 
 
1546 Ibid. 




1551 See generally, Abigail Ackah-Baidoo, ‘Enclave development and ‘offshore corporate social 
responsibility’: implications for oil-rich sub-Saharan Africa’ (2012) 37 Resources Policy 152; A S 
Macfarlane, ‘The implementation of new technology in southern African mines: Pain or panacea’ 
(2001) The South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy; Jennifer Kuan, Seraphima Rombe- 
Shulman and Ekundayo Shittu, ‘The Political Economy of Technology Adoption: The Case of Saharan 
Salt Mining’ (2014) < 
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June 2018; and Ron Adner and Daniel Snow, ‘Old technology responses to new technology threats: 
demand heterogeneity and technology retreats’ (2010) 19(5) Industrial and Corporate Change 1655. 
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environment caused by the export of such technology has been identified in these 
studies, and there have been dramatic examples of the potential harm to both life 
and the environment that such outdated technology could cause.1552 Such cases 
demonstrate that multinational corporations often use technology which are not 
permitted for use in their own home states, but do so in developing States because it 
is cheaper and there are no regulations or effective supervision to prevent their 
use.1553 However, multinational corporations must also come to realise that as part of 
building long-term cooperation, it is not in their own interests to impose substandard 
technology on developing countries, if only because developing countries will not 
forever remain unaware of it.1554 
8.10 DAWNING OF THE THEORY THAT THE MNC SHALL CONTRIBUTE TO 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The study has further remarked that the existing model that multinational 
corporations can produce both good and harm to economic development. In view of 
this model, it is easy to espouse the view that foreign investment should be 
employed to achieve economic development, which ultimately requires judicious 
regulation. For example, several developing countries have now enacted legislation 
to set up screening bodies which permit entry to or give incentives to investments 
which are approved by them. On the global arena, this model has been the basis on 
which the code of conduct for multinationals are being formulated. 
However, these views challenge many propositions in international law which have 
been formulated on the basis of a new theory. Unlike the traditional approach, which 
favoured liberalisation and the freedom of movement for multinational corporations 
on the assumption that this promotes development, the latest theory requires the 
recognition of the right of regulation of the foreign investment process by the host 
state.1555 
The traditional theory mandated absolute rules of investment protection and their 
uniform application to all investments.1556 The basis of this position has been shaken 
by the increasing acceptance of the view that foreign investment should be entitled 
 
1552 Sornarajah (n 3) 62. 
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to protection only on a selective basis. Protection depends on the extent of the 
benefit it brings the host state and the extent to which the enterprise to be protected 
has conducted itself as a good corporate citizen in promoting the economic 
objectives and interests of the host State.1557 There is no obligation to abide by the 
laws and regulations of the host state which are designed to capture the maximum 
benefits the foreign investment can bring to the host state’s economic development. 
The quid pro quo for existing and profiting from operations in the host state for the 
multinational corporation is that it should ensure that the laws that seek to enmesh 
its operations with the economic objectives of the state are complied with.1558 
8.11 MIX OF REGULATION AND OPENNESS 
 
The study’s view is that the extensive regulatory regimes which existed in the past 
have given way to new supervisory regimes based on realism. The approach of rapid 
industrialisation desired by developing countries requires capital which only 
multinational corporations can provide.1559 This certainty requires the adoption of 
new policies that show a willingness to accommodate the interests of multinational 
corporations. 
What is more, the institution of administrative controls is necessary to enhance the 
economic objectives of the State in receiving the foreign investment. A uniform view 
that all investment must be protected through international minimum standards is no 
longer a feasible notion, as the practices of States indicate that they do not subscribe 
to the idea that all foreign investment is entitled to such a minimum standard.1560 
The externally imposed minimum standard insulates the multinational corporations 
without the creation of any corresponding duties. That idea must be abandoned in 
view of the competing notions that extend protection only to multinational 
corporations which act in accordance with the laws and policies of the host states in 
which they function. In the alternative, such a minimum standard exists only to the 
extent that the multinational corporation abides by the regulatory standards 
mandated by the host state. International law itself may impose a requirement of 










corporations.1561 Acquiescence with domestic laws is a prerequisite to admittance. 
These remedies may evolve but not without a division in law; the evidence of such a 
spit will be seen in deciding when a regulatory meddling amounts to an expropriation 
for which compensation needs to be paid.1562 
Notwithstanding the downside of PSCs in general, and the oppressive tax rates and 
other provisions which might make PSCs time-consuming for the parties involved, 
they still appear to be the most feasible option for oil producing developing countries 
in making the most of their oil industry potential, not least because they facilitate a 
gargantuan degree of control over private petroleum operations.1563 In effect, the 
PSCs allow the host oil-producing countries to “nationalise” their petroleum resources 
(by retaining ownership rights to the concessions) whilst at the same time attracting 
a much desired and direct involvement of foreign private enterprise. The PSC is also 
nostalgically seen as an attractive experiment of the early 1970s, having regard to 
the subsequently prevailing problems of an insufficient technological base and 
unskilled workforce, combined with perennially inadequate financial resources which 
beleaguered developing countries.1564 
8.12 PSC vs JV UNDER THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DECLINE 
 
In the later part of last century, the reality of developing countries’ deteriorating 
economic fortunes and their persistently increasing deficits and debts made other 
forms of contractual relationships (particularly PJVs) very unattractive. In Nigeria for 
instance, as a direct result of the Federal Government’s recent inability to meet its 
joint venture funding obligations and the unlikelihood of it succeeding in this regard 
in the near future, the PSC appears to proffer some relief. 
The new financing arrangements will not generate significant shifts in the allocation 
of financial benefits. However, in industries where bargaining powers continue to 
shift in favour of the host country, and where host country negotiation skills are 
sufficiently strong, the changes will be more than political.1565 There will be real 
changes in who controls the operations and who receives the financial benefits from 





1564 Ibid 66. 
1565 Smith and Wells (n 1507). 
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managers of companies with experience in arrangements which confer sufficient 
control over fundamental decisions and provide attractive financial benefits to the 
company, with little direct claim to ownership.1566 Nevertheless, the new forms of 
agreement, while providing a means of sharing symbolic power and economic 
benefits in ways the traditional concession could not, have not purged the complex 
technical problems relating to the allocation of financial benefits and risks.1567 
The advantage of the joint venture arrangement lies in its negligible risk exposure 
and guarantee of profit, since it applies only to reputable commercial and producing 
assets anywhere the risk of exploration are hitherto been removed.1568 In fact, in 
Nigeria under the terms of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to which 
all the joint venture companies are signatories a profit-investment ratio of about 65 
per cent is guaranteed the investor, even at low prices.1569 The joint venture 
arrangement in Nigeria is a comparatively low risk, high reward investment by 
Government, even with titular supervision of its stake in the venture.1570  
Nonetheless, there is a catch to the continued enjoyment of these high rewards: it 
must be cautious enough to make satisfactory provision for working capital and at 
the appointed time to pay cash calls.1571 Developing countries which are still at an 
early stage in their petroleum activities should exhibit a realistic altitude when 
studying and learning from experienced producers. 
The PSC is an important effort to equalise the historic balance between the 
producing countries and the foreign petroleum companies. Although the contracts 
exaggerate the actual shift in power between the parties, they provide an 
appearance of equality as well as a means for ultimately achieving such equality.1572 
8.13 QUESTIONS OF DE FACTO CONTROL AND SHARING 
 
Notwithstanding the changes in the Nigerian oil industry over the past 50 years, de 




1568 Friedman and Kalmanoff (n 108). 
1569 Akinrele (n 430) 312. Due to inflation, which had eroded the guaranteed profit margin, as well as 
changes in the operating environment, the 1991 MOU was replaced by a new MOU introduced in the 
year 2000 for a period of three years, with the capacity to be extended by mutual agreement of the 
parties. 
1570 See generally, G K N Ogunlami, ‘An Analysis of Nigerian Petroleum Profit Taxation’ (1989) CEMPL. 
1571 See generally, Gidado (n 392). 
1572 Fabrikant (n 611) 351. 
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since the petroleum contracts and some government policies towards development  
of the petroleum products are not sufficiently designed to enable local control and 
full participation as well as to have an effectual transfer of technology. Currently, the 
government’s participation in the oil industry is only noticeably limited to profit 
sharing.1573 Such areas as operational strategies of the subsidiary oil companies are 
still in the hands of the multinational and are thus under the whim and caprice of 
their parent companies in Europe and America. If the goals of the host government 
are to be realised, the Government must go further than majority shareholding and 
secure de facto control of the operational policies of the subsidiary oil companies. 
This may possibly be achieved through the setting up of efficient management 
committees to run the affairs of the oil companies, with the government interest 
rightly protected.1574 
 
There is the view (that is favoured by this study) that the sharing of representation 
at the level of the Board of Directors of the subsidiary oil companies does not in any 
way guarantee de facto control. Neither does majority shareholding. The fact is that 
the government has been unsuccessful in arriving at a coherent understanding of 
what it means by control as enshrined in section 1(1) of the Petroleum Act. The 
absence of de facto control by the Nigerians of the oil sector will continue until there 
is a clearer enunciation and execution of government goals. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that despite over 50 years of petroleum operations in the 
area and the huge oil revenue derived for the nation, the physical and socio- 
economic conditions of the inhabitants of oil producing communities remain 
deplorable. The low quality of living of the inhabitants is revealed by the high poverty 
threshold, poor housing conditions, high rates of unemployment, and collapsed or 
non-existent social and infrastructural facilities. To date, the benefits that were 
expected to be derived from the very high oil revenues nonetheless seem to have 
eluded or had only infinitesimal effect on the oil communities. In its place, there is 
manifest social decay and underdevelopment, as well as a cavernous gap between 
people’s expectations and what the government and oil companies consider 
obligatory to put in place. 
 
1573 S B Falegan and G O Okah, ‘The Contribution of Petroleum to the Nigerian Economy’ in Oil and the 
New International Economic Order, Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic 
Society (Ibadan: The Nigerian Economic Society 1976) 163, 184. 
1574 Ibid. In 1991, NNPC signed its first joint operating agreement (JOA) with a transnational oil 
company. Under a JOA, a management committee comprising representatives of the Joint Venture 
partner is set up. 
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8.14 THE CONTINUED ABSENCE OF PALPABLE BENEFIT FOR THE 
IMPOVERISHED 
Notwithstanding the enormous earnings from crude oil, the expected dividends in 
terms of socio-economic development, job opportunities and employment, physical 
infrastructure, essential social sector infrastructure such as education, health, 
electricity, telephone, etc. have not been realised. In its place, the industry has 
created irretrievable social, health and environmental problems, particularly for the 
host communities in Nigeria’s oil province. Recognised to be operating in a lax 
environment with little or no accountability and transparency, the oil industry has 
been accused of nurturing a group of highly corrupt technocrats, business and 
political elites, whereas most local inhabitants wallow in penury and abject poverty. 
Oil-related environmental, political and human rights abuses were, and still are 
commonplace.1575 As a result, long years of acute neglect and social frustrations  
have elevated the level of anger amongst the inhabitants of the oil communities 
against the government and multinational oil companies operating in the area. Most 
attempts by the Government and oil companies to address the countless challenges 
precipitated by oil production have achieved only limited qualitative results.1576 
Likewise, there is presently a paucity of innovative strategies for conflict prevention, 
management and resolution in the area. It also well known that official responses to 
the oil-goaded violent conflicts have only served until now, to exacerbate this 
unpredictable social state of affairs. Nowadays the semantics of violence have been 
complicated by a politically-motivated clamour for resource control and ownership of 
petroleum resources by the oil communities.1577 
8.15 ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION 
 
In addition to the provision of some directions for future research, this study has 
made modest contributions to the currently existing wealth of academic writing on 
the legal framework of petroleum exploration and production. Even though the focus 
is on the petroleum industry, this study is intended to make meaningful 
contributions, particularly to the legal framework of extractive industry and natural 
 
1575 Emeka Duruigbo, O Wozniak and M Leighton ‘Oil Development in Nigeria: A critical investigation of 
the Chevron Corporation’s Performance in the Niger Delta’ (2001) Field Research and Report Writing, 





resources in general. Apart from adding to the body of existing scholarly writing, 
other research will take place in future in the same field; and directions for future 
scholars and researchers to explore. 
 
Further, to advance legal discussion in international commercial law, especially in the 
sphere of international development agreements. This study will act as a catalyst for 
the on-going improvement of oil and gas by encouraging the industry worldwide to 
adopt the key features of production sharing contracts and joint venture agreements 




The study recommends policy changes to make public a shift in goals from output 
maximisation to poverty reduction through: 
1. The Government should use its sovereign power to strengthen the preventive 
and safety requirements for all drilling activities. 
 
2. The Government must require all mineral extracting firms to adopt state-of- 
the-art technology that would eliminate (or at least minimize) damage to the 
environment and its inhabitants. 
 
3. The Government should join with the oil firms and the local community in 
seeking feasible ways and means of cleaning up existing pollution. 
 
4. The production of good and services at a reduced rate for the poor. 
 
 
5. The creation of job opportunities in oil producing areas. 
 
 
6. The building of public essential services, schools, roads, hospitals etc. 
 
 
This study is of the opinion that any effective integrative socio-economic 
development approach should be in harmony with the cultural sensitivities of these 
communities. Attention must be made to address the long and painful legacies of 
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degradation and deprivation experienced inhabitants of resource-bearing regions. It 
points to the fact that lack of institutional mechanisms for local participation in the oil 
industry, especially on matters that affect the communities, may be partly 
responsible for the level of social anguish and ill feelings by host communities. 
 
Accordingly, only the future can determine whether the host government can 
successfully promote and protect human and environmental rights after decades of 
government collusion and negligence. There are promising signs, especially with the 
Niger Delta Development Commission (“NDDC”). Generally, the Commission’s 
mandate comprises addressing the substantive grievances of different communities, 
both oil-producing and non-oil-producing, in the nine states that are included in the 
Niger Delta. While local control of oil and gas resources may not be practicable, the 
present government provides another golden opportunity for government to 
distribute the benefits downwardly in a just and equitable method. 
 
 
The adoption of good credit and good oil-field practice is for multinational oil 
companies and government to carry out oil-producing activities in a socially, 
economically, politically and environmentally responsible manner. This can only be 
achieved when the citizens, particularly the host communities, are able to partake in, 
and enjoy the benefits and rights deriving from their God-given resources. Hence, 
intervention strategies for environmental assessment and sustainable development 
should adopt a participatory development practice, which guarantees the people’s 
right to participate in decision making and implementation in matters that affect their 
communities and environment. 
8.17 SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS TO ENCOURAGE DEMOCRACY AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The Nigerian government should take several steps to continue its commitment to 
democracy and sustainable development: 
Political leaders should create a stronger legal and policy framework for oil 
development by removing redundant provisions and updating outmoded laws. 
A Fund should be established to assist victims of environmental and human 
rights abuses to litigate their claims in court. This will help to promote a 
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culture of accountability. 
 
The judiciary should take every necessary action to ensure that public 
confidence in the courts is restored. Otherwise people will continue to resort 
to overseas litigation against oil companies in Nigeria. 
The police should be weaned from warring tendencies accumulated during 
decades of dictatorship by retraining; this is especially important in cases of 
peaceful protests. 
Multinationals can and should use the changes taking place in Nigeria as a basis for 
building a more sustainable, less damaging oil industry. It should incorporate a 
philosophy of community development that looks beyond immediate needs and 
prepares members of local communities for a self-reliant future. It should work with 
the government to fashion an alternative economic base for oil communities where 
petroleum production has destroyed traditional means of survival such as farming 
and fishing. Lastly, it should open its activities to the scrutiny of independent 
assessors. For that reason, international government and non-governmental agencies 
should be involved in monitoring the companies’ compliances with existing laws and 
their business policies in areas such as environmental protection and community 
development. They can only benefit from the rights to forcefully insist on control  
over their own resources and the enforcement of meaningful standards to remedy 






Funds contribution to Joint Venture by government and Joint Venture companies 
 
 
 NNPC Joint Venture Partner Total 
Years $ billion N billion $ billion N billion $ billion N billion 
2006 2.19 206.33 2.91 192.56 4.59 398.89 
2007 2.62 295.75 1.69 183.13 4.32 476.88 
2008 2.51 291.83 2.56 287.17 5.11 579.87 
 
The findings in Table 1 – From the above findings, in PSCs, Multinationals bear all 
exploration and development costs. This is in line with the findings of the 
commentators Atsegbua, 1999 and Muhammad, 2010. They are of the view that 
exploration and development costs are borne 100 per cent by the contractors, 
therefore, bearing all the risks of the contracts. From these findings, it can be safely 




Years JVs (Barrels) PSC (Barrels) 
2007 462,888,989 192,621,306 
2008 471,900,351 195,127,693 
2009 331,554,144 268,792,256 
2010 364,717,172 316,887,117 
2011 348,509,885 289,333,720 
Source NNPC (2011) 
 
Omorogbe has observed that “money received by the owner of a resource as 
compensation is based on production volume irrespective of production cost and 
prices.” 
Table 3 
Depth of the Sea 
 
Area in metres Percentage of Crude found 
0-100 m depth 18.5% 
101-200 m depth 16.5% 
201-500 m depth 12.0% 
501-800 m depth 8.0% 
801-1,000 m depth 8.0% 
Over 1,000 m depth 8.0% 
Source NNPC (2011) 
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Accountability and Transparency 
 
According to Sani Saidu, Hamidu Abubar Sadiq observed that the NEHI 2001-2008 
reconciliation report found “different difficulties and system weaknesses in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry which stem from lack of accountability and  
transparency in the transactions between the parties involved and the general 
public.” 
Table 4 
Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) Payment by JV Companies 
 
Years Government $ JVC Companies $ Difference Adjusted Difference Adjusted Price 
2006 9,775,427 8,784,861 990,566 10,022,955 
2007 7,105,070 7,798,048 -692,778 7,250,050 
2008 8,298,906 9,063,000 -764,094 10,189,225 
Source NATI 2006-2008 Audit Report 
 
 
From Table 4, PSCs are more beneficial in terms of transparency and accountability 
because in PSCs multinationals are 100 per cent responsible for all the costs and 
risks, and that the PPT charge is based on the reported production. This finding is 
supported by Oyefusi (2007) and Ocheje (2006), who observe that “more contained 
a very complex formula that was not easily understood by a majority of stakeholders 
in the industry.” It can be safely concluded from the report that this action by the 
multinationals thwarts transparency and trounces verification and the accountability 
of PPT assessment. 
Table 5 
Rate of Return of Questionnaires 
 





Royal Dutch Shell Plc 30 10 
ExxonMobil Plc 50 6 
Chevron Plc 50 4 
Agip Plc 20 1 
Petrobras Plc 20 4 
Total Plc 10 2 
Statoil Plc 10 2 
Handy Oil and Gas Plc 30 4 
Nexin Incorporated Plc 10 3 
Addax Plc 10 1 
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This data was carried out between July -September 2016. Out of the 140 
questionnaires sent out, 37 questionnaires were returned. Extractive activities by 
multinational oil companies stated have caused severe environmental and social 
damage in the Niger Delta. Crude oil extractive has caused pollution to the river’s 
basin and the surrounding land as well as the expropriation of host communities. The 
opposition of the host communities had been severely oppressed by police forces 
resulting in blood shed and hundreds of fatalities. Host communities supported by 
successionists movements including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta, have continued their opposition to those exploitative polices. Basically, they 
demand a full clean-up of water ways and territories as well as a more equitable 
distribution of oil revenues, including broader compensation for ecological damage. 
 
Table 6 
Response rate to the Issue of Control 
 
Options Joint Venture Production Sharing 
Contracts 
Very high rate 0 0 
Considerably high rate 0 0 
High rate 2 40 
Low rate 20 50 
Very low rate 20 50 
 
This data was carried out between July-September 2016. This table shows that the 
respondents believe that the management of the joint venture and production 
sharing contracts, to a large extent, is still a distant goal. Control still resides with the 
multinationals. 
 
Questions asked in Questionnaire 
 
Questions on the company 
1. How would employers rate your company and the work environment? 
a. Are employers satisfied with the direction of the company? 
b. Do employers feel engaged with the employees of the company? 
2. Across departments, what are the employer’s opinions of the management? 
 
a. Do supervisors and managers communicate expectations in their direct 
reports? 
b. Are the goals ambition of the company clear? 
3. What is your opinion about joint venture and production sharing contracts? 
4. What major changes do you perceive from the workability of these 
arrangements? 
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Questions on the responsibility of work 
1. What are your feelings about your work? 
2. Can you describe briefly on the impact of your work on your life generally? 
3. Have you been offered any opportunities for formal training to advance your 
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